Thema der Arbeit sind die Konzepte von 'phänomenaler Erfahrung' und 'Bewußtsein' in verschiedenen empirischen und philosophischen Theorien über das Verhältnis von physiologischen und mentalen Prozessen. Der 1. Teil klärt das Umfeld des Problems: Kapitel 1 und 2 erläutern, warum die Diskussion phänomenaler Qualitäten oder Qualia zum Lackmustest der neuen Theorien des Bewußtseins geworden ist. Kapitel 3 und 4 zeigen, inwiefern ein Großteil der Verwirrung bezüglich von Qualia auf den impliziten Annahmen bestimmter Wahrnehmungstheorien beruhen. Sinnesepisoden (und damit zumindest eine wichtige Klasse phänomenaler Episoden) können nur auf der Ebene von Systemen erklärt werden, die in angemessener Weise auf Eigenschaften ihrer Umgebung reagieren können. Von dieser Einsicht ausgehend, verhandelt der 2. Teil mit verschiedenen konkreten Versuchen, Qualia innerhalb empirischer Kontexte zu erklären. Kapitel 5 untersucht konnektionistische Modelle, die sich einer Vektorkodierungsstrategie bedienen (Churchland, Clark, Flanagan) und sich an die Theorie der Selektion neuronaler Gruppen (Edelman) anzubinden. Wenn aber das Qualia-Problem nicht so einfach neurophilosophisch gelöst werden kann, so fährt Kapitel 6 fort, ist es verlockend, mentale Zustände als informationstragende neurophysiologische Zustände zu betrachten. Das ist der sogenannte Repräsentationalismus oder Intentionalismus (Dretske, Beckermann, Tye). Kapitel 7 behauptet, daß diese Versuche, Bewußtsein im direkten Verweis auf die empirische Forschung zu erklären, philosophisch nicht befriedigend sind, weil Bewußtsein keine 'natürliche Art' ist, d.h. kein einheitliches Phänomen, das isoliert durch eine Einzeldisziplin (einschließlich des Funktionalismus) untersucht werden könnte. In Kapitel 8 analysiere ich Damasios Theorie somatischer Marker als Versuch, Searles Intuition bezüglich der phänomenalen Grundierung aller bewußter Prozesse empirisch zu plausibilisieren. Nicht Gehirne (also sub-personale Systeme) sind Träger bewußter Zustände, sondern potentielle Handlungssubjekte. Alle empirischen Theorien etablieren höchstens eine gutbestätigte Kovarianz zwischen Gehirnzuständen und mentalen Zuständen. Im abschließenden Kapitel 9 verteitige ich demgemäß einen nicht-puritanischen, eklektischen Naturalismus, der sich dem Bewußtseinsproblem unter Aufbietung aller theoretischen Paradigmata nähert, die sich als heuristisch produktiv erwiesen haben. Fragen des Bewußtseins involvieren immer auch eine Selbstinterpretation des Fragenden. Das allein ist schon Grund genug zu der Vermutung, keine naturwissenschaftliche Einzeldisziplin werde je für sich allein alle dieser Fragen klären können. / "Qualia - Phenomenal states as a problem for philosophical and empirical theories of consciousness" In this essay, I examine the concepts of 'phenomenal experience' and 'consciousness' in several empirical and philosophical theories about the relation between physiological and mental processes. Part I sets the stage for the problem: Chapters 1 and 2 establish why the discussion of phenomenal qualities or qualia has become a litmus test for current theories of consciousness. Chapters 3 and 4 show how large parts of the confusion about qualia rest on implicit assumptions that characterize certain theories of perception. Against mainstream inferentialist theories, I defend a vaguly Gibsonian direct theory. Sensory episodes (and thus at least one important class of phenomenal episodes) can be explained only on the level of systems that have the ability to usefully react to features of their environment. Using this insight as its point of departure, Part II deals with several concrete attempts to explain qualia in an empirical context. Chapter 5 examines connectionist models using vector coding strategies (Churchland, Clark, Flanagan) and tries to connect them to the Theory of Neuronal Group Selection (Edelman). If the qualia-problem cannot be simply solved by means of neurophilosophy, I go on to argue in Chapter 6, it is tempting to regard mental states as information-bearing neurophysiological states. This is the position taken by Representationalism or Intentionalism (Dretske, Beckermann, Tye). Chapter 7 claims that these attempts to explain consciousness with direct reference to empirical research are not philosophically satisfactory because consciousness is no 'natural kind', no unified phenomenon that lends itself to examination in any single scientific discipline (including all kinds of functionalims). In Chapter 8, I analyze Damasio's Theory of Somatic Markers as an attempt to empirically support Searle's intuition concerning the necessary phenomenal grounding of all conscious processes. Bearers of conscious states are not brains (sub-personal systems), but subjects with the potential to act; consciousness is embodied consciousness. All of these theories establish at most a good covariance between brain states and mental states. In the concluding Chapter 9, I defend a non-puritan, eclectic naturalism which approaches consciousness using all theoretical paradigms that have proved themselves to be heuristically productive. Questions about consciousness always involve questions of self-interpretation. This alone is reason enough to suspect that no single scientific discipline will be in a position to solve them all.

This dissertation concerns the location and nature of phenomenal qualities. Arguably, these qualities naively seem to belong to perceived external objects. However, we also seem to experience phenomenal qualities in hallucinations, and in hallucinations we do not perceive any external objects. I present and argue for a theory of the phenomenal qualities, "brain theory", which claims that all phenomenal qualities we experience are physical properties instantiated in the brain, regardless of whether they are experienced in veridical perceptions or in hallucinations. I begin by more carefully identifying the phenomenal qualities, discussing how they are related to "qualia" and "phenomenal character". Then I present brain theory, and investigate its implications for the perceptual relations we stand in to external objects, noting that it is mostly neutral. I also compare brain theory to a similar theory of perception advocated by Bertrand Russell. Next, I provide an overview over the competing theories of phenomenal qualities, and relate them to theories of perception, such as representationalism, qualia theory, sense data theory and disjunctivism. The majority of my argumentation for brain theory focuses on arguing that the phenomenal qualities are instantiated in the brain, rather than on arguing that they are physical properties. Instead, I largely assume physicalism. However, even independently of the physicalism assumption, I show that we have reason to believe that phenomenal qualities are experienced in hallucinations, and that qualities experienced in hallucinations are instantiated in internal objects, such as our brains or sense data. In the first step towards this conclusion I argue that theories which deny that phenomenal qualities are experienced in hallucinations face serious problems. In the next step I argue that theories which deny that phenomenal qualities experienced in hallucinations are instantiated in internal objects face serious problems. Finally, an important part of the argumentation is my replies to objections against brain theory, including common sense objections and the "observation objection". From these conclusions, together with the physicalism assumption, I infer that we have reason to believe that brain theory is true about hallucinations. On this basis, I then argue, through a generalizing argument, that the same is the case for veridical perceptions.

[pt] Ao negar que o significado seja imanente à letra e enfatizar a multiplicidade não inventariável de interpretações que cada texto pode ter, abordagens nãorepresentacionistas da linguagem vêm gerando, entre alguns de seus adeptos importantes, apreensão quanto aos limites da interpretação. No debate motivado por essa apreensão, destacam-se indagações como: Em que sentido se pode dizer hoje que certas interpretações não são admissíveis? Abordagens nãorepresentacionistas levam necessariamente a interpretação a um regresso ao infinito? Autorizam a validade de qualquer interpretação? A interpretação é a substituição de um signo lingüístico por outro? Ela é sempre necessária? Ela tem um fim? O objetivo desta dissertação é mostrar como a perspectiva de linguagem de L. Wittgenstein permite-nos repensar de modo frutífero a questão dos limites da interpretação. Para isso, identificam-se na concepção de linguagem do autor aspectos relevantes para o tema em foco; analisam-se reflexões que ele desenvolveu explicitamente sobre o tema da interpretação; e estabelece-se um contraponto entre a sua perspectiva e uma abordagem a que se tem atribuído um relaxamento excessivo quanto aos limites da interpretação, a desconstrução. / [en] Denying the immanence of meaning and emphasizing the inexhaustible multiplicity of interpretations that each text can accommodate, some distinguished supporters of non-representationalist approaches to language have recently been manifesting concern as to the limits of interpretation. The debate motivated by this concern raises such questions as: In what sense can one say today that certain interpretations are not admissible? Do non-representationalist approaches necessarily lead interpretation to an infinite regress? Do they give license to any interpretation? Is interpretation the replacement of one linguistic sign with another? Is it always necessary? Does it have an end? The major aim of this dissertation is to show how L. Wittgenstein's view of language can throw a light on the issue of the limits of interpretation. Aspects of Wittgenstein's view of language that are relevant to the topic are identified; some of his explicit reflections on interpretation are analyzed; and a comparison is established between his view and a contemporary approach that is often criticized for encouraging excessive flexibility in interpretation, namely deconstruction.

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THIS THESIS IS IN THE EXAMINATION PROCESS Christian Frederik Louis Leipoldt was born in on 28 December 1880 in the Rhenish House in Worcester, Cape Province, the fourth child of the Reverend Christian Friedrich Leipoldt and Anna Meta Christina Leipoldt (born Esselen). His father left the mission field to take up the position of the dominee in the Dutch Reformed Church in Clanwilliam where the Leipoldt family went to live, from 1884. Leipoldt received his education from his father at home, on a broad range of subjects, including several languages and also in the natural sciences. He became interested in writing from a very young age and sent pieces of his writing for publication when still a boy. When he was fifteen he began sending dried plant specimens to Professor McOwan in Cape Town, from Clanwilliam. It was through his interest in botany that Leipoldt met Dr Harry Bolus, a life-long friend. Leipoldt wrote the Civil Service examinations in 1897 after which he went to Cape Town to work as a journalist. Living in Cape Town he served on the staff of the pro-Boer newspaper, The South African News from 1898 until it was closed down by the British authorities in 1902, when he travelled to Britain to look for work as a journalist in London. Soon after arriving there he took up the offer from Bolus who would lend him money to study medicine at Guy’s Hospital. It was more or less at this time that some of his early literature on the South African War was written, for instance, his well-known poem, Oom Gert Vertel (published in 1911). After successfully obtaining his MRCS medical qualification in 1907, winning gold medals for medicine and surgery in the process, he briefly served as Acting House Surgeon at Guy’s until 1908 when he travelled to Europe to work in a number of hospitals to receive further training. Later the same year he took up a post as medical adviser to J D Pulitzer, the American newspaper owner. Thereafter he worked as a doctor in London except for the time he proceeded on a four month visit to the East in 1912, the experience of which he penned in a manuscript entitled ‘Visit to the East Indies.’In 1914 he returned to South Africa to take up a post as Medical Inspector of Schools with the Transvaal Education Department. During the First World War in South Africa, he was drafted into the army as the personal medical doctor to the Prime Minister at the time, Genl Louis Botha. He resigned from his post as Medical Inspector in 1923 to take up an offer from Dr F V Engelenburg to serve on the editorial staff of the pro-Smuts newspaper De Volkstem,. He worked there until 1925 when he and the newly appointed editor Gustav Preller did not see eye to eye and it was then that he decided to return to Cape Town. His second Cape Town period (1925 – 1947) was characterized by the most prolific writing, during which he published a great many works across a broad range of topics. Furthermore, though he never married, he adopted Jeffrey Leipoldt, and took in a number of boys as boarders in his home ‘Arbury’ in Kenilworth, Cape Town. At the same time as he wrote most prolifically for a wide range of publications including many novels, he taught pediatrics at the University of Cape Town Medical School and practised as a pediatrician in the city. C Louis Leipoldt was a versatile person who published across a wide range of fields, to include literature, medical studies, letters to friends and associates, the history of wine and cookery, and what few seem to be aware of, his three English historical novels that make up The Valley, written in English between 1928 and 1932. Whilst Leipoldt’s early work such as Oom Gert Vertel gave voice to the suffering of the Afrikaner people, in The Valley, his voice is one of protest against the isolationist policies of the National Party of the 1920s.</p/> Whilst Leipoldt will be known for his work as the inaugural medical inspector of schools of the Transvaal Education Department, the inaugural lecturer in pediatrics at the University of Cape Town and Cape Town’s first practising pediatrician, he will also be known for his wide oeuvre as a writer. For example, he served as the Medical Association of South Africa’s first editor of its South African Medical Journal, a post he held for 18 years. Leipoldt never married and died on 13 April 1947 in Cape Town. His ashes were scattered in the Pakhuis Pass near Clanwilliam, where there is a memorial to his life. / Thesis (DPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Historical and Heritage Studies / unrestricted

The South African author C Louis Leipoldt is known as an Afrikaans poet and as one of the ‘Driemanskap’ with Celliers and Totius. Together with Eugene Marais, they wrote the first serious Afrikaans literary poetry in the early decades of the Twentieth Century. The ‘Driemanskap’, grouped together for its clear national(ist) thrust, is well-known as part of the Tweede Afrikaanse Taalbeweging not only for celebrating the universal effects of nature but also for extolling the virtues of forgiveness after the South African War. Apart from his extensive canon of Afrikaans literature and a sizable discourse in the culinary field, not much is known about The Valley, Leipoldt’s so-called ‘English’ novels written in the late 1920s and early 1930s in English, a language he was equally at home in. The titles of these novels making up The Valley trilogy are Gallows Gecko, Stormwrack and The Mask. Despite several efforts to have the novels published with leading publishing houses in both Britain and the United States of America, both during and after his lifetime, the three ‘English’ novels of C Louis Leipoldt remained unpublished for 69 years. It was in 2001 that for the first time they appeared unedited in a compendium volume. Prior to 2001, two of the novels were published −in 1980, the year of the centenary of Leipoldt’s birth, an abridged edition of Stormwrack appeared, edited by Stephen Gray and published by David Philip, Cape Town. It was re-published by Human&Rousseau in 2000. An abridged edition of Gallows Gecko appeared in 2001, under the title Chameleon on the Gallows which the editor Stephen Gray explains he changed for stylistic reasons. Leipoldt uses the form of historical fiction in his trilogy as a way of conveying historical meaning by relating the chronicle (1820 – 1930) of the place he calls the Valley, recognizable as Clanwilliam. Initially, the Valley is at peace and is sketched in its idyllic state. After the Jameson Raid of 1895, the prospects of the South African War become a reality for the inhabitants of the Cederberg as they are torn apart by their emotions, feelings and loyalties. The course of events drastically changes when war finally comes to the District. Discontinuity and change is a strong theme in the novels. Eventually the inhabitants ofthe Valley find that the former, respectful relations, based on tradition and tolerance, have given way to sectarian interests. This changes the social fibre of the once idyllic environment. The Valley is a lamentation of lost opportunities for a culturally unified South Africa. Its voice is one of moderateness and is inclusive for all South Africans, addressing race relations as a theme as well as decrying sectionalism. In the light of this, it is argued that Leipoldt is revealed as a political liberal and cultural pluralist. This can be heard through the voices of the characters in The Valley and seen by the way Leipoldt meant the events in his fiction to serve as an allegory for the way he saw South Africa emerging at the time. He was writing against the Nationalists, particularly against the narrative of Gustav S Preller, who spent his working life constructing a volksgeskiedenis that resulted in a significant public history that dominated Afrikaner historical thinking from circa 1905 to 1938. In this sense, it is argued, The Valley is an alternative history to the dominating Preller historiography, and because it is in the form of narrative/historical fiction, it can also be seen as an alternative form of history, to be read against certain theoretical texts, without in any way detracting from the voices of criticism against deconstructivist history. / Thesis (DPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Historical and Heritage Studies / unrestricted

Le comportement moteur est un phénomène où les différentes composantes d’un système biologique sont organisées de façon à assurer la coordination d’un mouvement intentionnel. Selon les théories computationnelles, le comportement est défini comme un problème moteur dont la solution peut être trouvée par des systèmes divisés de manière hiérarchique. Les composantes traitent et communiquent entre elles de l’information représentant les aspects pertinents du problème moteur (positions, trajectoires, vitesses, forces, etc.) lesquels sont censés être organisés à leur tour selon une hiérarchie d’abstraction et de complexité ascendante. Le défi est de faire face à quatre problèmes centraux du comportement : a) Le nombre élevé de degrés de liberté et d’interactions ; b) La redondance des degrés de liberté ; c) L’anticipation des effets du mouvement ; d) L’incertitude dans l’information. Les théories computationnelles classiques proposent des schémas explicatifs composés d’un agencement de différents modèles internes (prospectifs et inverses). Plus récemment, l’approche bayésienne propose un schéma hiérarchique plus homogène lequel est censé faire face aussi à l’incertitude de l’information. Cette recherche démontre que les théories computationnelles, y compris l’approche bayésienne, sont paralysées par un dilemme insurmontable : soit elles peuvent passer à l’échelle de manière computationnellement faisable - les calculs peuvent être réalisés en un temps raisonnable - mais dans ce cas elles ne peuvent pas reproduire la versatilité caractéristique du comportement des êtres vivants ; soit elles aspirent à reproduire la versatilité biologique mais alors elles sont infaisables. / Motor behavior is a phenomenon where the components making up a biological system are organized so as to ensure the coordination of a purposeful movement. According to computational theories, behavior is defined as a motor problem the solution of which can be found by systems divided hierarchically. The components process and communicate information representing the relevant variables of the motor problem (positions, trajectories, velocities, forces, etc.) which are, in turn, assumed to be organized as a hierarchy of increasing abstraction and complexity. The challenge is to tackle the four core problems of behavior: a) The high number of degrees of freedom and their interactions; b) The redundancy of degrees of freedom; c) The anticipation of the effects of movement; d) The uncertainty in information. Classical computational theories advance explanatory schemas made of structured sets of internal models (forward and inverse). More recently, the Bayesian approach advances a more homogeneous hierarchical schema which is supposed to account for uncertainty in information. This research shows that computational theories, including the Bayesian approach, are crippled by an unsolvable dilemma: The first horn is that if the models can scale up while staying computationally tractable, i.e. the computations can be carried out in a reasonable amount of time, then they fail to reproduce the versatility which characterizes the behavior of living beings. The second horn is that if the models aspire to reproduce biological versatility, then they are intractable.

This dissertation investigates how a symmetrical approach to archaeology can be applied to identify the properties and effects of the non-living, abiotic materials. And to reconfigure the relationship between humans and non-human objects, bridging the divide between what has been termed ‘cultural’ and ‘natural’ and thus placed in different ontological realms. This is examined by studying the practices surrounding “boulder graves”, from the Late Bronze Age - Early Iron Age (approx. 1000 – 0 BC) in Kättsta, Ärentuna parish in Uppland, Sweden. The boulders tend to be studied from an anthropocentric point of view, in which they are seen primarily as passive objects, interpreted only for what they represent. The objective of this research, however, is to gain new insights into the agency of boulders, and how they contributed to the practices carried out adjacent to them. The dissertation is based on a case study where a thematic analysis is performed, focusing on the properties and characteristics of boulders, their affordances, the distribution of finds and their interrelations, and the effects their relations generated. The results show that the boulders themselves contributed in human-stone relations and were vital in the formation of the grave-like features they became part of. It is argued that a symmetrical, non-anthropocentric approach to these features will broaden our view on materialities in the past, affording ontological as well as ecological implications.

[pt] Este trabalho apresenta uma reflexão sobre a comensurabilidade entre as perspectivas chomskyana e wittgensteiniana da linguagem em geral e, em particular, no que diz respeito à questão do sentido. O objetivo da pesquisa foi examinar, nos textos do Wittgenstein maduro, nos desenvolvimentos mais recentes de Chomsky — levando em consideração as sucessivas mudanças na teoria gerativa — e nas obras de outros autores que se alinham com as ideias de um e outro ou se dedicam a estudá-los, convergências e divergências relevantes entre eles. A pesquisa adotou uma perspectiva pragmática e antiessencialista da linguagem, mais especificamente a versão dessa perspectiva oferecida pela filosofia mais madura de Wittgenstein, sobretudo nas suas Investigações filosóficas. Sem renunciar a essa perspectiva, foram analisadas as teorias sobre a linguagem humana defendidas por Noam Chomsky, geralmente tidas como opostas às do filósofo vienense, partindo da hipótese de que fosse possível encontrar, no diálogo entre elas, possíveis complementações para uma melhor compreensão do funcionamento da linguagem humana. As teses que resultam do trabalho são as seguintes: (1) Que os pontos de vista de Chomsky e Wittgenstein sobre a linguagem não são inteiramente irreconciliáveis e podem existir convergências, divergências e possíveis complementações que valem a pena serem exploradas, (2) Que as versões contemporâneas das teorias de Chomsky estão mais abertas à aproximação com Wittgenstein do que versões passadas, (3) Que algumas contradições entre as análises de Wittgenstein e Chomsky podem ser atribuídas à diferença entre o ponto de vista e os métodos de um filósofo e os de um cientista da linguagem, ou a confusões conceituais provocadas pelas armadilhas da própria linguagem — termos usados por eles próprios ou por seus mais destacados comentadores de formas que parecem altamente contraditórias, podendo nos levar à conclusão de que existe uma incompatibilidade insuperável entre seus pontos de vista, (4) Que, ao menos parcialmente, algumas dessas contradições podem ser atribuídas ao choque entre a tese chomskyana da autonomia da sintaxe e a preocupação quase exclusiva de Wittgenstein pelo sentido. Entre outros aspectos relevantes das ideias de ambos os pensadores, analisamos o uso que eles fazem de termos como representação, mente, descrição e explicação; de questões fundamentais para ambos, como suas ideias sobre o que seja aprender uma língua e seguir uma regra, e de algumas noções distintivas do pensamento de cada um, como a noção wittgensteiniana de forma de vida e a hipótese inatista de Chomsky. Por último, analisamos de forma mais aprofundada duas controvérsias explícitas entre Chomsky e Wittgenstein, a partir de dois textos do primeiro que fazem detalhadas críticas a aspectos importantes da filosofia do segundo: o argumento da linguagem privada e a crítica à ideia de que existem processos cerebrais correlacionados com o pensamento. / [en] This work reflects on the commensurability between the Chomskyan and the Wittgenstenian perspectives of language in general, and in particular it deals with issues on meaning. The goal of the research was to examine, in the mature texts of Wittgenstein, in the most recent developments of Chomsky — taking into consideration the successive changes in generative theory — and in the works of other authors that align themselves with the ideas of one or the other or devote themselves to study them, convergences and divergences relevant to them. The research adopted a pragmatic and anti-essentialist approach to language, more specifically the version of this approach offered by Wittgenstein s more mature philosophy, mostly in his Philosophical Investigations. Without renouncing this approach, the theories of human language supported by Noam Chomsky were analyzed, which are generally considered as opposed to those of the Viennese philosopher, starting from the hypothesis that it is possible to find, in the dialog between them, possible complementarities for a better understanding of how human language works. The present work are guided by following thesis: (1) Chomsky s and Wittgenstein s points of view about language are not completely irreconcilable and there can be convergences, divergences and possible complementarities that are worth exploring; (2) the contemporary versions of Chomsky s theories can be more open to a rapprochement with Wittgenstein than past versions; (3) some contradictions between the analysis of Chomsky and Wittgenstein can be attributed to the difference between the points of view and methods of a philosopher and those language of a scientist, or to conceptual confusions originated in the tricks of language itself – terms used by them or by their more outstanding commentators in ways that seem highly contradictory, leading us to the conclusion that there is an insurmountable incompatibility between their points of view; (4) at least partially, some of those contradictions can be attributed to the conflict between the Chomskyan hypothesis about the Autonomy of Syntax and the almost exclusive preoccupation of Wittgenstein for the meaning. Among other relevant aspects of the ideas of both authors, we will analyze how they use terms like representation, mind, description and explanation; fundamental questions for both, like their ideas about what it is to learn a language and follow a rule, and about distinctive notions of their thought, like the Wittgenstenian notion of form of life and the Chomskyan innate hypothesis. Finally, we analyze in deep two explicit disputes between Chomsky and Wittgenstein, taking as a starting point two texts of the former that formulate detailed criticism to important aspects of the latter s philosophy: the argument of private language and the criticism of the idea that there are brain processes correlated to thought. / [es] Este trabajo presenta una reflexión sobre la conmensurabilidad entre las perspectivas chomskyana y wittgensteiniana del lenguaje en general y, en particular, en lo que se refiere a la cuestión del sentido. El objetivo de la investigación fue examinar, en los textos del Wittgenstein maduro, en los desarrollos más recientes de Chomsky —teniendo en cuenta los sucesivos cambios en la teoría generativa— y en las obras de otros autores que se alinean con las ideas de uno y otro o se dedican a estudiarlos, convergencias y divergencias relevantes entre ellos. La investigación adoptó una perspectiva pragmática y antiesencialista del lenguaje, más específicamente la versión de esta perspectiva ofrecida por la filosofía más madura de Wittgenstein, sobre todo en sus Investigaciones filosóficas. Sin renunciar a esa perspectiva, fueron analizadas las teorías sobre el lenguaje humano defendidas por Noam Chomsky, generalmente consideradas como opuestas a las del filósofo vienés, partiendo de la hipótesis de que fuese posible encontrar, en el diálogo entre ellas, posibles complementaciones para una mejor comprensión del funcionamiento del lenguaje humano. Las tesis que resultan de este trabajo son las siguientes: (1) Que los puntos de vista de Chomsky y Wittgenstein sobre el lenguaje no son completamente irreconciliables y pueden existir convergencias, divergencias y posibles complementaciones que vale la pena explorar, (2) Que las versiones contemporáneas de las teorías de Chomsky están más abiertas a la aproximación con Wittgenstein que las versiones pasadas, (3) Que algunas contradicciones entre los análisis de Wittgenstein y Chomsky pueden ser atribuidos a la diferencia entre el punto de vista y los métodos de un filósofo y los de un científico del lenguaje, o a confusiones conceptuales provocadas por las armadillas del propio lenguaje — términos utilizados por ellos mismos o por sus más destacados comentadores de maneras que parecen altamente contradictorias, pudiendo llevarnos a la conclusión de que existe una incompatibilidad insuperable entre sus puntos de vista, (4) Que, al menos parcialmente, algunas de esas contradicciones pueden ser atribuidas al choque entre la tesis chomskyana de la autonomía de la sintaxis y la preocupación casi exclusiva de Wittgenstein por el sentido. Entre otros aspectos relevantes de las ideas de ambos pensadores, analizamos el uso que realizan de términos como representación, mente, descripción y explicación; de cuestiones fundamentales para ambos, como sus ideas sobre lo que sea aprender una lengua y seguir una regla, y de algunas nociones distintivas del pensamiento de cada uno, como la noción wittgensteiniana de forma de vida y la hipótesis innatista de Chomsky. Por último, analizamos más profundamente dos controversias explícitas entre Chomsky y Wittgenstein, a partir de dos textos del primero que hacen detalladas críticas a aspectos importantes de la filosofía del segundo: el argumento del lenguaje privado y la crítica a la idea de que existan procesos cerebrales correlacionados con el pensamiento.

Notre étude s'attache à reconnaitre en Thompson Clarke, le précurseur d'un contextualisme épistémique puissant qui rend compte de l'applicabilité conceptuelle et ce que prétendent signifier les philosophes. En effet, Clarke examine les définitions épistémologiques traditionnelles à propos de la nature des concepts, du philosopher, de l'ordinarité et du scepticisme. En étudiant la nature de l'épistémologie traditionnelle, il ambitionne de substituer à la méthode austinienne, sa propre méthode d'examen des présupposés concernant la nature de l'expérience et du langage. Il défend ainsi une philosophie de la connaissance programmatique qui nous interroge sur ce que nous faisons avec nos concepts en matière de connaissance. Elle peut être réalisée à partir de l'examen du legs du scepticisme, à savoir : un nouvel éclairage apporté à la nature et aux procédures du scénario sceptique montre manifestement que la prétendue objectivité attribuée à l'ordinarité n'est que superficielle ou relative. L'idée clarkienne de relative non-objectivité n'est en aucune mesure identifiable ou réductible à un relativisme ou à un subjectivisme épistémique. Selon Clarke, il n'existe pas de traits internes à l'expérience. Il suggère simplement que l'existence des objets nous est confirmée à partir de traits caractéristiques que nous discernons, reconnaissons et identifions comme tels. Ces traits qui caractérisent les objets nous permettent d'établir l'applicabilité des concepts. Or, l'ordinarité n'a pas proprement de traits qui la restreindraient à être de telle ou telle manière, comme le prétendent les philosophes et les sceptiques. Cette prétention relève d'un rêve d'une complétude intégrale de la concevabilité de la structure de l'ordinarité partagé implicitement par les épistémologues et leurs détracteurs, les sceptiques. Le rêve et la veille ne sont pas deux expériences au sein d'un genre qu'il suffirait d'identifier. Tout comme le rêve n'a pas de traits caractéristiques qui viendraient déterminer son application ou sa non-application, l'ordinarité n'a pas de traits en propre qui nous permettent fondamentalement de déterminer et de fixer, ni une limite à celle-ci, ni une frontière absolue entre le philosophique et le non philosophique. Pour ces raisons, selon Clarke, nous ne savons pas foncièrement, ni ce qu'est un concept, ni pourquoi les concepts et leurs applications, comme ceux de Plain et de Philosophical, sont susceptibles d'être sensible au contexte. / Our study focuses on the recognition that Thompson Clarke was the precursor of a powerful epistemic contextualism which gives an account of conceptual applicability and what philosophers claim to mean. Clarke examines the traditional epistemological definitions pertaining to the nature of concepts, of philosophizing, of ordinarity and of skepticism. By studying the nature of traditional epistemology, his ambition is to substitute his own method for examining presuppositions with regard to the nature of experience and of language for that of Austin. He thus defends a philosophy of programmed understanding which makes us look at what we do with our concepts regarding understanding. It can be achieved by an examination of the legacy of skepticism, i.e. a new light thrown on the nature and the procedures of the skeptic’s scenario manifestly show that the so-called objectivity attributed to ordinarity is only superficial or relative. The Clarkian idea of relative non-objectivity is in no way identifiable with, or merely reduced to, epistemic relativism or to epistemic subjectivism. According to Clarke, experience has no internal features. He simply suggests that the existence of objects is confirmed by characteristic features that we discern, recognize and identify as such. These features which characterize objects enable us to establish the applicability of the concepts. However, ordinarity does not strictly have features which would restrict it from being thus or thus as philosophers and skeptics claim. This claim belongs to a dream of a completedness of the conceivability of the structure of ordinarity shared implicitly by the epistemologists and their detractors, the skeptics. The states of dreaming and waking are not two experiences of a type which it suffices to identify. Just as the dream does not have characteristic features which will determine its application or its non-application, ordinarity does not have features of its own which fundamentally enable us to determine and to fix either a limit to it, or an absolute boundary between the philosophical and the non philosophical. For these reasons, according to Clarke, we don’t really know what a concept is, nor why concepts and their applications, such as those of the Plain and of the Philosophical, are likely to be context-sensitive.