Cette thèse vise à mettre en lumière, dans les Essais de Montaigne, un aspect peu connu du débat sur la constance à la fin du seizième siècle. Alors que la vertu de constance devient à cette époque un enjeu philosophique et moral de première importance, servant à la fois des idéaux stoïciens, chrétiens et civils, nous constatons une insistance des Essais à souligner le phénomène contraire, l’inconstance. Il s’agit dans un premier temps de montrer le dialogue que construit l’ouvrage de Montaigne face à la vertu de constance, puis d’établir le statut argumentatif de l’inconstance dans les Essais. Afin de mettre en valeur ce dialogue dissimulé sous les bigarrures des Essais, nous nous proposons de combiner lecture internaliste et intertextualité, afin d’évaluer au mieux les actes d’écrire de cet ouvrage. Dans le but de situer ce débat sur la constance et l’inconstance, nous nous rapportons d’abord à certaines écoles de philosophie hellénistique que pillent les Essais. Nous présentons d’une part l’origine, d’autre part et les déplacements de ce débat. Le scepticisme de Montaigne s’en trouve déstabilisé, le stoïcisme à la fois débattu et repoussé, l’épicurisme instrumentalisé. L’inconstance prend un visage universel qui rend présomptueuse, vaine et même dangereuse toute aspiration à la constance. La deuxième section de la thèse montre la prise en charge méthodologique de l’inconstance dans les Essais, notamment à travers le Distingo, et son effet sur la connaissance historique comme sur les activités prudentielles (politique, jurisprudence, action militaire). Après avoir montré que l’ouvrage de Montaigne présente une critique radicale de la méthode et des objectifs des moralistes, nous posons que la nature de l’essai est de corriger cette erreur et de donner sa juste place à l’inconstance humaine. Nous constatons alors que l’inconstance a le statut d’une condition pré éthique poussant les Essais à déconsidérer toute entreprise humaine dans la sphère publique. Mais ce désaveu jeté sur la sphère publique ne conduit pas à renier toute réflexion éthique. Les Essais n’encouragent pas simplement à se laisser porter par la fortune ou la coutume. Dans la sphère privée, le troisième livre des Essais construit plusieurs règles éthiques étonnantes et hétérodoxes : non repentir, diversion, vanité, expérience…qui toutes prennent pour pierre d’assise le possible (selon qu’on peut) et contribuent à redéfinir la grandeur d’âme (magnitudo animi, megalopsychè), en présentant un nouvel ordre ou une nouvelle conformité de l’action. Par delà l’analyse morale et la peinture du moi, se déploient dans les Essais une éthique qui s’approprie le mouvement imparfait de l’existence, qui s’édifie non plus contre l’inconstance, mais avec elle. Cette « éthique de l’inconstance » ou « éthique de l’indirection » se construit en opposition avec les morales doctrinales avec lesquelles elle discute toutefois sans interruption. / This thesis aims to emphasize in Montaigne’s Essays a little known aspect concerning the debate of constancy towards the end of the 16th. Century. While the virtue of constancy becomes a philosophical and moral issue of great importance, favouring at the same time the stoic, Christian and civil ideals, we observe in Montaigne’s Essays, an insistence to underline a contradictory phenomenon; inconstancy. First, it is essential to demonstrate the dialogue that builds Montaigne’s work concerning the virtue of constancy, to finally establish the proper argumentation on inconstancy in his Essays. In order to highlight this dialogue concealed in the patchwork of the Essays, we are proposing to combine internal and external reading, in order to evaluate thoroughly the act of writing they implicitly propose. With the intent to situate this debate concerning the virtue of constancy and the problem of inconstancy, we will refer primarily to the Hellenistic philosophies plundered by the Essays. We will present in the first part the origin and in the second part, the transfer of the debate. Montaigne’s scepticism happens to be destabilized, his stoicism is at the same time debated and rejected, his Epicureanism becoming a tool determining their truth. The inconstancy as mentioned takes a universal appearance making all references to the virtue of constancy as presumptuous, vain and even dangerous. The second section of the thesis demonstrates that methodology of the Essays takes over the notion of inconstancy, notably through the “Distingo”, and its effects on the historical knowledge relating to prudential activities such as: jurisprudence, political and military life. Now that we have demonstrated that the work of Montaigne presents a radical critic of the method and the objectives of the moralists, we claim that the nature of the essay is to correct this error and thus give the right place to human inconstancy. We acknowledge the fact that inconstancy has a status of a pre-ethic condition which pushes the Essays to disrepute any human enterprise in the public sphere. However, this denial cast upon the public sphere does not lead us to reject any kind of ethical reflection. Therefore, the Essays do not exclusively encourage letting faith or fortune carry us. In the private sphere, the third book of the Essays constructs many ethical regulations that are astonishing and heterodox: non repentance, diversion, vanity, experience...These aspects are all grounded in the ethical mode of the possible, (« Selon qu’on peut ») and at the same time contribute in redefining the magnitude of the soul (magntiudo animi, mégalopsychè) by presenting a new order or a new conformity of action. Beyond the moral analysis and the description of oneself, an ethical process seizes the imperfect movement of existence in the Essays, which erects itself not against inconstancy but in harmony with it. This ethic of inconstancy or ethic of indirection is built in opposition with the moral doctrines even though a constant debate seems to unite them. / Thèse de doctorat effectuée en cotutelle au Département de philosophie Faculté des arts et des sciences de l’Université de Montréal et au département de philosophie école doctorale V de l’Université de la Sorbonne – Paris IV. Soutenue à Paris le 8 avril 2010.

Proclus is part of a long exegetical tradition that understands Plato and Homer to be in agreement. The Sixth Essay of his Commentary on Plato’s Republic particularly significant because it is the only extant ancient text that attempts to prove the concord of Plato and Homer philosophically. Yet, despite his uniquely reasoned approach, this endeavour suffers from charges of irrationalism. The necessity that drives him to seek this conciliation is thought to come from the pious attachment he has to Homer as an authority rather than the properly philosophical demands of his rational system. The aim of this thesis is to show that Proclus’ need to show Plato and Homer’s agreement is not an irrational adjunct to an otherwise rational outlook, but that it follows from the central doctrines of his philosophy. This will be accomplished through a detailed consideration of Proclus’ doctrine of the poetic ????????. In looking at how Proclus’ reading of Plato in the Sixth Essay is informed by his understanding of ????????, we will see how Homer becomes the means, both of taking the traditional criticisms of Plato’s apparent self-contradiction seriously and also of defending him against them. In looking in turn at how the soul actually experiences the ??????? of Homer’s inspired poetry, it shall become apparent that Homer does not just save the coherence of rational thought in this exterior way, but that his poetry operates as both the possibility and perfection of the rational soul’s various powers.

Nous entendons, dans ce mémoire, préciser le sens d'actus essendi par l’analyse de l’emploi du terme par Thomas d’Aquin. Bien que la notion d’acte d’être soit sousjacente à nombre de développements philosophiques et théologiques de l’Aquinate, elle n’est considérée pour elle-même dans aucun texte du corpus thomasien. En exposant le cadre théorique des onze unités textuelles dans lesquelles on retrouve nommément l’expression, nous explicitons les distinctions qu’opère Thomas entre l’acte d’être et les notions ontologiques corrélatives (étant, quiddité, être du jugement prédicatif et être commun). Si « actus essendi » désigne en premier lieu un principe constitutif de l’étant, il peut encore désigner le terme abstrait correspondant à cette perfection de l’étant. L’acte d’être est ainsi ce par quoi l’étant est étant; il est cependant, au plan ontologique, propre à chaque étant singulier tandis que, au plan conceptuel, le même terme exprime ce qui est commun à tous les étants. Une traduction des extraits du Scriptum super Sententiis, des Quæstiones de quolibet, de la Summa Theologiæ, des Quæstiones disputatæ De potentia, de l’Expositio libri De hebdomadibus et de la Expositio libri Metaphysicæ a été produite pour les fins de cette étude. / In this paper, we intend to precise the meaning of actus essendi by analyzing how Thomas Aquinas uses this term. If the notion of the act of being underlies a number of Aquinas’ philosophical and theological developments, it is not treated in itself in any of his writings. By exposing the theoretical framework of the eleven textual units in which the expression namely appears, we explicate how he distinguishes between the act of being and the correlative ontological notions (the being, the essence, the predicamental judgment being and common being). If « actus essendi » first designates a constitutive principle of being, it can also designate the corresponding abstract term of this perfection of being. The act of being is that by which being is being; however, it belongs, at the ontological level, to each particular being whereas at the conceptual level, the same term expresses that which is common to all beings. Extracts of the following texts have been translated in French for this purpose: Scriptum super Sententiis, Quæstiones de quolibet, Summa Theologiæ, Quæstiones disputatæ De potentia, Expositio libri De hebdomadibus and the Sententia libri Metaphysicæ.

Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Many people in Western culture experience systemic separation from an intimacy with the natural world and as a result, suffer a disconnection from their own natures. As an educator, my interest in the epistemological and ecological implications of nature-based, reflective learning as a form of initiation into maturity and calling led me to explore how education might create the conditions for consciously turning around the whole human with potential for turning around the whole world. Drawing from insights and wisdom from depth psychology, ecopsychology, mythology, philosophy, the poetic traditions, literature, spiritual practices, and curriculum studies, and by adopting Jung’s psychology of individuation as a theoretical backbone for this body of work, I sought to fully flesh out and discover how we might reclaim and embody our original human wholeness (our individuated natures), and how education might be a catalyst for this. I have organized this study in such a way as to align with three central themes found universally in all rites of passage and that mirror my own heuristic research journey, namely: the separation, the threshold experience, and the return. In the separation stage, I offer an historical perspective for much of Western culture’s current incongruence with nature. In addition, I provide a critique of how contemporary educational practices with their overt focus on profit-making and careerism further reinforce this dualistic thinking. As a counterbalance, at midpoint of this study, I set forth on my own deep phenomenological threshold-crossing immersions into nature. This research became, in effect, a (re)search of self where surprisingly more of my own calling was revealed to me through the hermeneutics of powerful, wild teachings. At the conclusion, as I (re)turn “from the woods”, my findings are shared (in part) as pedagogical examples of life-enhancing, less codified and embodied practices designed with the whole person—body, mind, and soul—(and earth), in mind that may support students (and teachers) in discovering their particular and deeply fulfilling ways of belonging to and contributing toward a living ecology. A symbolic artifact (a ‘body’ of work) accompanies and completes this work (Figure 3). / Graduate / 0727 / 0525 / 0534 / hilaryjl@telus.net

Submitted by Noeme Timbo (noeme.timbo@metodista.br) on 2017-06-12T18:27:05Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Andre Magalhaes Coelho.pdf: 666895 bytes, checksum: 73ff206de83f00bb2a5cfdd172196a8a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-06-12T18:27:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Andre Magalhaes Coelho.pdf: 666895 bytes, checksum: 73ff206de83f00bb2a5cfdd172196a8a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-24 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This research proposes to investigate the theological anthropology of the Christian Community Peace and Life, evangelical group of neo-Pentecostal matrix. The theological emphasis on the unity of the human constitution, which biblical testimony indicates, contrasts with the historical experience of Christendom in which the body has always played a secondary role, a status that still remains in various religious groups, including current Brazilian Pentecostalism. In view of this reality, Pentecostalism establishes its foundations, faithful to its ecclesiastical context in the same Platonic tendency to value more what is usually called the "soul" and "spirit" than the body, despite the value of body healing, Corporeality in the liturgy and the logic of material prosperity also present in these religious experiences. In order to counter this view, the concept of integrated anthropology will be indicated, based on several authors, especially the theologian Alfonso Garcia Rubio. This concept is fundamentally characterized by the understanding that the human being is a unit. It is that concrete being that appears in all its corporeal dimensions, and the body must relate to the whole cosmos and other living beings making present in a world of relationships and not of exclusions and dichotomies. In this sense, we wonder to what extent the contribution of an integral theological anthropology can constitute a contribution to overcome the anthropological dualism in religious groups such as the Christian Community Peace and Life? The research indicates some theological paths of overcoming concepts of dualistic and reductionist nature of the human condition, in view of an integrated anthropology. As an overcoming of this dualism we suggest an incarnated spirituality where the body makes evident in all its relations and where the unitary experience of the human being as a concrete person. From the concept of Integrated Human, which seeks to overcome dualisms, it is hoped to offer the Christian Community Peace and Life, from its own experience, with all the ambiguities in it, a unitary perception of the human being. / Esta pesquisa propõe investigar a antropologia teológica da Comunidade Cristã Paz e Vida, grupo evangélico de matriz neopentecostal. A ênfase teológica na unidade da constituição humana, que o testemunho bíblico indica, contrasta com a experiência histórica da cristandade, na qual o corpo sempre teve um papel secundário, status que ainda permanece em vários grupos religiosos, incluindo o pentecostalismo brasileiro atual. Diante desta realidade, o pentecostalismo estabelece suas bases, fiel ao seu contexto eclesiástico na mesma tendência platônica de valorizar mais o que usualmente se denominou a “alma” e “espírito” do que o corpo, não obstante ao valor da cura do corpo, da corporeidade na liturgia e da lógica de prosperidade material também presentes nessas experiências religiosas. Para se contrapor a essa visão será indicado o conceito de antropologia integrada, a partir de vários autores, em especial o teólogo Alfonso Garcia Rubio. Tal conceito se caracteriza fundamentalmente por entendermos que o ser humano é uma unidade. Trata-se daquele ser concreto que se apresenta em todas as suas dimensões corpóreas, sendo que o corpo deve se relacionar com todo o cosmo e com outros seres vivos fazendo presente em um mundo de relações e não de exclusões e dicotomias. Nesse sentido, nos perguntamos em que medida a contribuição de uma antropologia teológica integral pode se constituir em uma contribuição para a superação do dualismo antropológico em grupos religiosos como a Comunidade Cristã Paz e Vida? A pesquisa indica alguns caminhos teológicos de superação de conceitos de natureza dualista e reducionista da condição humana, tendo em vista uma antropologia integrada. Como superação desse dualismo sugerimos uma espiritualidade encarnada na qual o corpo faz evidente em todas as suas relações e na qual a experiência unitária do ser humano como pessoa concreta. A partir do conceito de Humano Integrado, que busca a superação dos dualismos, espera-se oferecer à Comunidade Cristã Paz e Vida, a partir de sua própria vivência, com todas as ambiguidades nela existentes, uma percepção unitária do ser humano.

Defendo, nesta dissertação, uma interpretação materialista da filosofia humeana. Essa interpretação se apóia em alguns dos temas presentes no Livro 1 do Tratado da Natureza Humana. Divido a tarefa em três partes: no primeiro capítulo, examino dois dos princípios que fundamentam a teoria das idéias apresentada na Parte 1, o princípio da cópia e o da separabilidade. Juntos, eles implicam a impotência da razão a priori no domínio dos fatos. É a imaginação, uma faculdade corpórea, que assume o papel principal na epistemologia humeana; no segundo capítulo, examino a seção “Da imaterialidade da alma” (Parte 4, Seção 5), na qual a alma substancial desaparece e dá lugar a percepções causalmente relacionadas a um corpo. Aqui se evidencia a concepção fisicalista de Hume sobre o fenômeno cognitivo. Procuro esclarecer tal concepção por meio de uma comparação entre ela e a concepção de Reid, segundo a qual o fenômeno cognitivo é intrinsecamente imaterial e, portanto, sem qualquer relação causal com a matéria; o objeto do terceiro capítulo é a seção “Da identidade pessoal” (Parte 4, Seção 6), na qual Hume afirma que a crença nessa identidade decorre de associações de idéias. No Apêndice Hume reconhece a insuficiência de sua explicação inicial. Exponho alguns dos problemas que podem ter gerado as dúvidas do Apêndice e defendo que elas não configuram um possível abandono do materialismo, ou seja, da concepção ontológica que levou à tese de que a mente é um mero feixe de percepções relacionadas causalmente. / I defend, in this dissertation, a materialist interpretation of humean philosophy. This interpretation is based on some of the themes presented in Book 1 of the Treatise of Human Nature. The task is divided in three parts: in the first chapter, I examine two of the principles which ground the theory of ideas presented in Part 1, the principles of copy and of separability. Together, they imply the impotence of a priori reason in the factual domain. It is the imagination, a corporeal faculty, that assumes the leading role in humean epistemology; in the second chapter, I examine the section Of the immateriality of the soul (Part 4, Section 5), in which the substantial soul disappears and gives place to perceptions causally related to a body. Here, Hume’s phisicalist conception about the cognitive phenomena is evidenced. I try to explain this conception by comparing it to Reid’s conception, according to which cognitive phenomena is intrinsically imaterial and, therefore, without any causal relation to matter; the subject of the third chapter is the section “Of personal identity” (Part 4, Section 6), in which Hume states that the belief in this identity derives from associations of ideas. In the Appendix Hume recognizes the insufficiency of his early explanation. I expose some of the problems that may have engendered the doubts of the Appendix and defend that they don’t amount to a possible abandonment of materialism, that is, of the ontological conception which has led to the thesis of the mind as a simple bundle of perceptions causally related.

Western psychology has in its current position and definition laid claim to the “psychology” landscape, despite being the construction of one epistemology. This imposition allows western psychology to dominate and control the “psychology” landscape, to the detriment of other equally valid and “scientific” “psychologies”. We argue for redefinition of western psychology in terms of lived experience or soul, so that it can co-exist with other “psychologies”. This should co-facilitate the process of repositioning western psychology into a dialogically equal relationship with indigenous african psychology. Redefinition of western psychology is dependant on psychologist’s appreciation of the relativity of epistemological frameworks and ability to challenge their own subjectivities. This in turn requires epistemological curiosity. This study adopts a conceptual, autoethnographic approach and methodology. Our aim is not to provide answers, but rather create a context for dialogue. / Psychology / M.A. (Psychology)

Pour considérer le libre-arbitre, Augustin doit mobiliser des conceptions déjà établies sur la nature divine, sur la nature du mal, ainsi que sur la nature du bien. À mesure que de telles conceptions se modifient, le libre-arbitre de la volonté prend des contours variés jusqu’au point d’atteindre la forme la plus achevée. Et c’est là où il se révèle en tant que racine du mal moral – nul rapport avec l’action divine – et où il se montre essentiellement vicié – sans autre alternative que d’accepter l’aide divine. Ainsi, si d’un côté le libre-arbitre de la volonté n’exige aucun rapport de Dieu à la cause du mal, d’un autre côté exige le rapport à Dieu comme le seul et unique chemin de correction du mal. Le but de ce travail de recherche est d’analyser les trames conceptuelles supposées dans la conception du libre-arbitre, voyant en cette dernière une clé de lecture assez forte pour mettre en évidence une certaine logique interne dans le mouvement qui implique la conversion d’Augustin au christianisme. / In order to consider the free choice of the will, Augustine has to mobilize concepts already established about the divine nature, the nature of evil and also the nature of the human soul. As such concepts change, the free choice of the will takes on different features until it reaches its most defined form, in which it is revealed as the origin of moral evil – without reference to the divine authorship – and in which it is also revealed as essentially vicious – without any alternative but to accept divine aid. Therefore, if on the one hand the free choice of the will does not entail a relationship between God and the cause of evil, on the other hand it requires the relationship between God and the only way to stop evil. The objective of this work is to analyse the conceptual webs entailed in the concept of free choice, viewing it as a reading key capable of evidencing a certain internal logic in the movement involving Augustine's conversion to Christianity. / Para considerar o livre-arbítrio da vontade, Agostinho deve mobilizar concepções já estabelecidas sobre a natureza divina, sobre a natureza do mal e também sobre a natureza da alma humana. À medida que tais concepções se modificam, o livre-arbítrio da vontade assume contornos diversos até obter sua forma mais acabada, na qual se revela como raiz do mal moral – sem nada referir à autoria divina – e na qual se revela também como essencialmente viciado – sem ter outra alternativa senão a de aceitar a ajuda divina. Assim, se de um lado o livre-arbítrio da vontade não exige relacionar Deus com a causa do mal, de outro lado exige relacionar Deus com a única forma de corrigir o mal. Nosso trabalho tem o objetivo de analisar as tramas conceituais supostas na concepção de livre-arbítrio, vendo nesta uma chave de leitura com força de evidenciar certa lógica interna no movimento envolvendo a conversão de Agostinho ao cristianismo.

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