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311	L’absurde dans les mangas de l’après Deuxième Guerre mondiale au Japon –Nejishiki de Tsuge Yoshiharu (つげ義春）et l’oeuvre de Sasaki Maki（佐々木マキ） Lopez Lena, Surya 12 1900 (has links) Ce mémoire se penche sur l’absurde dans les oeuvres de deux mangakas de l’après Deuxième Guerre mondiale, soit Tsuge Yoshiharu（つげ義春） et Sasaki Maki（佐々木マキ）. Cette étude comparative approche l’absurde comme expérience et tente de penser l’écho que le concept a pu ou non avoir chez les auteurs en question. Pour ce faire, une exploration de divers courants underground des années 50 et 60 au Japon (culture kasutori, nouvelle vague japonaise et avant-garde) est menée afin de retracer comment ceux-ci auraient éventuellement influencés les oeuvres des auteurs analysées, elles-mêmes s’inscrivant dans la culture manga underground de l’époque. Cette section sert également de point d’appui afin de réfléchir sur la place que l’absurde aurait pu prendre au sein de la société japonaise, voyant ses fondements basculer à l’aube de la défaite et contrainte à coopérer sous tutelle américaine. C’est dans cette optique que nous proposons une lecture de l’oeuvre culte de Tsuge Yoshiharu, Nejishiki (ねじ式) comme exprimant une nostalgie propre à une « sensibilité absurde », telle que théorisée par Camus, via le motif de la réparation du corps. Parallèlement à ceci, nous nous attarderons à l’oeuvre de Sasaki Maki au coeur de laquelle le nansensu, compris comme interjection ainsi que référence au courant de l’ero-guro-nansensu, s’érige. À la suite de quoi, nous conclurons sur une comparaison entre les deux expressions de l’absurde chez les mangakas étudiés de manière à dégager, également, ce qui différencie le nansensu de l’absurde. / This text focuses on the artwork of two mangakas of the post Second World War, Tsuge Yoshiharu（つげ義春） and Sasaki Maki（佐々木マキ）. This comparative study investigates the absurd through its experimental component and tries to think the resonance that the concept might have had (or not ) among the authors cited. To this effect, we will explore diverse movements of the 50’s and 60’s in Japan (kasutori culture, Japanese new wave and avant-garde) in order to retrace how they might have eventually influenced the works of the mangakas analysed, themselves being part of an underground culture in the manga community of the time. This section also serves as a starting point for reflecting on the place that the absurd had in the Japanese society of that era, the country being recently defeated and obliged to cooperate under the American occupation which will bring profound changes to the society. It’s in the same vein that we propose a reading of Tsuge Yoshiharu’s masterpiece, Nejishiki (ねじ式), as expressing a nostalgia specific to what Camus calls an « absurd sensibility » through the motive of a body in search of repair. Alternatively, we will analyse Sasaki Maki’s work in the heart of which nansensu, thought as an interjection and in reference to the movement of the ero-guro-nansensu, is present. Finally, we will conclude on a comparison between the two expressions of the absurd in Tsuge and Sasaki’s respective work in order, as well, to elucidate what distinguishes nansensu from the absurd. Absurde nansensu Deuxième Guerre mondiale manga gekiga Tsuge Yoshiharu Sasaki Maki Garo manga alternatif culture kasutori kokutai avant-garde nouvelle vague japonaise Absurd Second World War alternative manga kasutori culture Japanese new wave
312	Der „Charakter" des deutschen Feindes / eine Analyse der britischen Propaganda und psychologischen Kriegsführung im Zweiten Weltkrieg Amr, Firas 25 July 2016 (has links) Der Zweite Weltkrieg war von neuer Technik und damit auch von neuen Möglichkeiten in der Propaganda und Psychologischen Kriegsführung geprägt. Speziell in der britisch-deutschen Auseinandersetzung wurden aus den Erfahrungen des Ersten Weltkrieges neue Konzepte entwickelt, mit denen eine Manipulierung feindlicher Soldaten und Zivilisten ermöglicht werden sollte. Die Dissertation setzt sich mit den Mentalitäts- bzw. Charaktereinschätzungen der Deutschen aus Sicht der britischen Akteure auseinander, die für eine effiziente Propaganda und Psychologische Kriegsführung gegen das sogenannte ''Dritte Reich'' sorgen sollten. Die oftmals präzisen Einschätzungen der Propagandisten, teils auch unter Verwendung psychologischer und psychiatrischer Dossiers hatten jedoch nicht immer den gewünschten Effekt. Auch aus diesem Grund wurden neue Strategien im Rahmen der sogenannten ''schwarzen'' Propaganda entwickelt, die den Gegner in den Grundfesten seiner Seele erschüttern sollte (und zu Teilerfolgen führte). Auch wenn die Briten auf beeindruckende Art und Weise die Deutschen hinsichtlich politischer, sozialer, religiöser oder lokaler Zugehörigkeit analysierten und Versuche unternommen wurden, diese Gruppen anhand dieser vermeintlichen Schwächen zu manipulieren, wurde nie das Ziel erreicht, via der Provokation von Differenzen innerhalb der Bevölkerung oder zwischen Bevölkerung und NS-Regime den Krieg zu verkürzen. Dabei ist die britische Effizienz im Einzelnen wiederum schwer messbar, festzustellen ist jedoch eindeutig, dass die britischen Propaganda-Maßnahmen keinen durchschlagenden Erfolg hatten, da die Autorität des NS-Regime zu keinem Zeitpunkt durch Massenaufstände oder Meutereien bzw. Massendesertionen an der Front gefährdet waren. Im Großen und Ganzen war die Entwicklung der mentalitätsorientierten ''geistigen Kriegsführung'' ein beeindruckendes Kapitel der britischen Geschichte, jedoch ohne messbare Auswirkung auf den Kriegsverlauf bzw. seiner Verkürzung. / The beginning of the Second World War imposed a new kind of warfare on the battlefield. The progress of radio and flight techniques permitted measures to manipulate the enemy with a combination of propaganda and psychological warfare. Furthermore, an analysis of his character was needed to spot the weak points in German psychology, to support the enemy population and soldiers in enmity towards their own government and to the war and to induce political uprising, sabotage and desertion. But the economic rebirth of Germany had created a strong connection between the Germans and Hitler, that would not be easy to weaken. British attempts to manipulate the German mind were wholly unsuccessful. Even the best analysis, very often close to the truth, could not jeopardize the efforts of Nazi propaganda, that drummed successfully into the German mind that the intentions of the Allied forces would be to destroy and enslave Germany. Furthermore, efforts to drive a wedge between the Germans and their leaders failed. Even in decline and defeat, the average German remained incapable of drawing his own conclusions and rising up against the Nazis. The history of the British attempts to manipulate the German mind was yet an impressive chapter of the Second World War, even if not entirely successful. The propaganda-organization of those measures and the confirmation of at least some of the estimates proved the efficiency of a well-organized brain-pool. For the totalitarian regime, it was easier in the end to oppress opposition, and for the democratic system too difficult to penetrate the German minds. Großbritannien Schwarze Propaganda Flugblätter Radiopropaganda Mentalitätskenntnisse Second World War Propaganda Psychological Warfare/Great Britain Propaganda Leaflets Radio Propaganda Concepts of the enemy German mentality 940 Geschichte Europas NQ 2580 NQ 2620 NQ 3220 ddc:940
313	Command Unity and the Air War against Germany Truxal, Luke 12 1900 (has links) Starting in August 1942 the United States and United Kingdom started waging a strategic bombing offensive against Germany. Throughout the course of the 1942 and 1943 campaigns, American and British air forces struggled to gain the upper hand in the European air war. By November 1943 American and British defeats at the hands of the German Air Force, or Luftwaffe, had placed the air war in doubt. By February 1944, the air war had turned around in favor of the Allies. This dramatic turn of events has been explained by historians in a number of ways. The most popular narrative is that the introduction of the long range escort fighter, the P-51 "Mustang," turned the tide in the air war. Another narrative is that there was a change in the fighter tactics. Starting in January 1944, American fighters stopped defending the bombers and started aggressively pursuing German fighters. Yet, these analyses do not include a major command changes that took place from November to January 1944. After his appointment to command of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, General Dwight D. Eisenhower used his position centralize all of the major air commands in Europe under his control. By unifying the air commands, the Allies were able to better coordinate and concentrate their air against Germany. In February 1944 the Allies focused their air forces against the Luftwaffe ultimately wearing down German fighter strength. After finally removing a major obstacle impending the strategic air war against Germany, the Allies concentrated their air forces against transportation and oil targets. The destruction of these two major economic systems crippled Germany's ability to fight the Allies in 1944 and 1945. By changing the command structure, Eisenhower was able to use his air forces in successful coordinated strategic air offensives that the Allies had previously been incapable of accomplishing. Combined Bomber Offensive Air War Air Power Second World War Ira Eaker Carl Spaatz
314	'Factum ex scientia': I Canadian Corps Intelligence during the Liri Valley Campaign, May – June 1944 Seefeldt, Connor 26 September 2012 (has links) Studies on Canadian Army military intelligence remain sparse in Canadian military historiography. This study is unique in that it focuses on the development, doctrine, and influence of intelligence within the I Canadian Corps throughout the Liri Valley battles during the Italian Campaign. It will be argued that I Canadian Corps intelligence achieved notable overall success in helping to break the Hitler Line by providing comprehensive and relatively up-to-date information on enemy dispositions and strengths which helped commanders and staff planners properly prepare for the operation. This success was attributable to three main factors: excellent intelligence personnel selection and training; the successful mentorship of I Canadian Corps intelligence by Eighth Army's intelligence cadre; and the overall effectiveness of 1st Canadian Infantry Division's intelligence organization which had been in the Mediterranean theatre since July 1943. Notwithstanding these successes, a number of faults within the Canadian Corps intelligence system must also be explained, including the poor performance of 5th Canadian Armoured Division's intelligence organization during the pursuit up the Liri–Sacco Valleys, and the mediocre execution of Corps counter-battery and counter-mortar operations. This study will demonstrate how an effective intelligence organization must augment existing army doctrine and how it can mitigate, though not completely eliminate, battlefield uncertainty. Further, it will also demonstrate that a comprehensive lessons-learned process must be undertaken to continually refine existing intelligence doctrine and procedures, with frequent training programs inculcating personnel in this doctrine. Taken as a whole, this study is unique as it is one of only several studies devoted solely to developing a greater understanding of a little-understood, and often forgotten, staff function within the Canadian Army during the Second World War. Intelligence Military Intelligence Liri Valley Second World War ELM Burns Burt Hoffmeister Darcy Kingsmill Eighth Army Italian Campaign 1st Canadian Infantry Division 5th Canadian Armoured Division Canadian Intelligence Corps British Intelligence Corps I Canadian Corps Gustav Line Hitler Line Edgar Bill Williams Chris Vokes North African Campaign Ultra Prisoner of War Interrogation SIGINT Signals Intelligence Counter Mortar Counter Battery Corps of Guides War Intelligence Course Intelligence Doctrine Intelligence Training Air Photo Intelligence Special Wireless Service Intelligence Planning Operation DIADEM Operation HONKER First Canadian Interrogation Team
315	Reordering of Meaningful Worlds : Memory of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Post-Soviet Ukraine Yurchuk, Yuliya January 2014 (has links) After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian society faced a new reality. The new reality involved consolidation and transformation of collective identities. The reinvigoration of national identity led to a change in the emphasis on how the past was dealt with – many things which were regarded as negative by the Soviet regime became presented as positive in independent Ukraine. The war-time nationalist movement, represented by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), became one of the re-configured themes of history. While most of the studies of memory of the OUN and UPA concentrated on the use of the history of the OUN and UPA by nationalist parties, this study goes beyond the analysis of such use of history and scrutinizes the meaning of this history in nation- and state-building processes in relation to memory work realized on the small-scale regional and local levels with the main focus on Rivne and Rivne oblast’. Moreover, this book focusses not only on the “producers” of memory, but also on the “consumers” of memory, the area which is largely understudied in the field of memory studies. In the book the main emphasis is put on monuments which are regarded as catalysts and symptoms of memory. The present study showed that the OUN and UPA are used more as the metaphors of the anti-Soviet and anti-communist struggle for independence than as historical entities. This past is largely mythologized. Functioning as a myth the memory of the OUN and UPA obliterates difficult knowledge that the historical research reveals on the questionable activities and ideology of those organizations. As a result, the past of the OUN and UPA is re-imagined, re-filled with new meanings so that it is used along even with the democratic and pro-European claims in the present. It was especially well-observed during the Orange Revolution in 2004 and during the Euromaidan in 2013-2014, when the European Union’s flags were seen next to the OUN’s red-and-black flags or when the pro-European slogans were proclaimed alongside the OUN and UPA slogans. At the same time, the results demonstrated an intricate complexity of memory work shaped by intensive dynamics of private and public, grassroots and official, local and national encounters. Although there have been attempts made by political actors to draw a direct link between the national identity, political allegiances and proposed heroic version of memory, the study showed, that such attempts did not really work. In the pluralistic context the meanings are too fluid and adherence to one version of history does not preclude adherences to other versions of history which are presented as diametrically opposite in the political sphere. As result, on the recipients’ grassroots level, the memory reveals its amalgamated characteristics. Drawing on studies about post-colonial subjectivities and theories of remediation developed in memory studies, this book explores the changes in memory culture of contemporary Ukraine and examines the role of memory in producing new meanings under the rapidly changing conditions after the collapse of the Soviet Union up to 2014. The book contributes to the studies of memory culture in post-Communist countries as well as to the studies of society in contemporary Ukraine. Ukraine memory Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists OUN Ukrainian Insurgent Army UPA Rivne monuments Volhynia historical representations reception of history nationalism nation-building state-building commemoration narrative analysis Klym Savur Taras Bul'ba-Borovet's Hurby Euromaidan Orange Revolution post-Soviet post-colonial reclamation history-writing difficult knowledge remediation premediation myth Second World War ОУН УПА пам'ять комеморація пам'ятник Рівне Волинь рецепція історії міф Друга світова війна minne minneskulturen myt Ukrainska upprorsarmén reception av monument monument problematisk kunskap
316	'Factum ex scientia': I Canadian Corps Intelligence during the Liri Valley Campaign, May – June 1944 Seefeldt, Connor 26 September 2012 (has links) Studies on Canadian Army military intelligence remain sparse in Canadian military historiography. This study is unique in that it focuses on the development, doctrine, and influence of intelligence within the I Canadian Corps throughout the Liri Valley battles during the Italian Campaign. It will be argued that I Canadian Corps intelligence achieved notable overall success in helping to break the Hitler Line by providing comprehensive and relatively up-to-date information on enemy dispositions and strengths which helped commanders and staff planners properly prepare for the operation. This success was attributable to three main factors: excellent intelligence personnel selection and training; the successful mentorship of I Canadian Corps intelligence by Eighth Army's intelligence cadre; and the overall effectiveness of 1st Canadian Infantry Division's intelligence organization which had been in the Mediterranean theatre since July 1943. Notwithstanding these successes, a number of faults within the Canadian Corps intelligence system must also be explained, including the poor performance of 5th Canadian Armoured Division's intelligence organization during the pursuit up the Liri–Sacco Valleys, and the mediocre execution of Corps counter-battery and counter-mortar operations. This study will demonstrate how an effective intelligence organization must augment existing army doctrine and how it can mitigate, though not completely eliminate, battlefield uncertainty. Further, it will also demonstrate that a comprehensive lessons-learned process must be undertaken to continually refine existing intelligence doctrine and procedures, with frequent training programs inculcating personnel in this doctrine. Taken as a whole, this study is unique as it is one of only several studies devoted solely to developing a greater understanding of a little-understood, and often forgotten, staff function within the Canadian Army during the Second World War. Intelligence Military Intelligence Liri Valley Second World War ELM Burns Burt Hoffmeister Darcy Kingsmill Eighth Army Italian Campaign 1st Canadian Infantry Division 5th Canadian Armoured Division Canadian Intelligence Corps British Intelligence Corps I Canadian Corps Gustav Line Hitler Line Edgar Bill Williams Chris Vokes North African Campaign Ultra Prisoner of War Interrogation SIGINT Signals Intelligence Counter Mortar Counter Battery Corps of Guides War Intelligence Course Intelligence Doctrine Intelligence Training Air Photo Intelligence Special Wireless Service Intelligence Planning Operation DIADEM Operation HONKER First Canadian Interrogation Team
317	Une oubliothèque mémorable. L’écriture de l’histoire dans la trilogie allemande de L.-F. Céline Wesley, Bernabé 03 1900 (has links) No description available. L.-F. Céline Sociocritique trilogie allemande oubli collectif amnésie collective roman français XXe siècle D'un château l'autre Nord Rigodon Roman sur la Seconde Guerre mondiale paradigme du passé réécriture genres littéraires désuets chroniques spectre Roman historiographique vocation léthéenne oubliothèque oubliogramme Sociocritic German trilogy Collective oblivion XXth century french novel Castle to Castle North Rigadoon Second World War Paradigm of the past Lethean novel Rewriting Obsolete literary genres
318	The pursuit of the 'good forest' in Kenya, c.1890-1963 : the history of the contested development of state forestry within a colonial settler state Fanstone, Ben Paul January 2016 (has links) This is a study of the creation and evolution of state forestry within colonial Kenya in social, economic, and political terms. Spanning Kenya’s entire colonial period, it offers a chronological account of how forestry came to Kenya and grew to the extent of controlling almost two million hectares of land in the country, approximately 20 per cent of the most fertile and most populated upland (above 1,500 metres) region of central Kenya . The position of forestry within a colonial state apparatus that paradoxically sought to both ‘protect’ Africans from modernisation while exploiting them to establish Kenya as a ‘white man’s country’ is underexplored in the country’s historiography. This thesis therefore clarifies this role through an examination of the relationship between the Forest Department and its African workers, Kenya’s white settlers, and the colonial government. In essence, how each of these was engaged in a pursuit for their own idealised ‘good forest’. Kenya was the site of a strong conservationist argument for the establishment of forestry that typecast the country’s indigenous population as rapidly destroying the forests. This argument was bolstered against critics of the financial extravagance of forestry by the need to maintain and develop the forests of Kenya for the express purpose of supporting the Uganda railway. It was this argument that led the colony’s Forest Department along a path through the contradictions of colonial rule. The European settlers of Kenya are shown as being more than just a mere thorn in the side of the Forest Department, as their political power represented a very real threat to the department’s hegemony over the forests. Moreover, Kenya’s Forest Department deeply mistrusted private enterprise and constantly sought to control and limit the unsustainable exploitation of the forests. The department was seriously underfunded and understaffed until the second colonial occupation of the 1950s, a situation that resulted in a general ad hoc approach to forest policy. The department espoused the rhetoric of sustainable exploitation, but had no way of knowing whether the felling it authorised was actually sustainable, which was reflected in the underdevelopment of the sawmilling industry in Kenya. The agroforestry system, shamba, (previously unexplored in Kenya’s colonial historiography) is shown as being at the heart of forestry in Kenya and extremely significant as perhaps the most successful deployment of agroforestry by the British in colonial Africa. Shamba provided numerous opportunities to farm and receive education to landless Kikuyu in the colony, but also displayed very strong paternalistic aspects of control, with consequential African protest, as the Forest Department sought to create for itself a loyal and permanent forest workforce. Shamba was the keystone of forestry development in the 1950s, and its expansion cemented the position of forestry in Kenya as a top-down, state-centric agent of economic and social development. 962
319	'Factum ex scientia': I Canadian Corps Intelligence during the Liri Valley Campaign, May – June 1944 Seefeldt, Connor January 2012 (has links) Studies on Canadian Army military intelligence remain sparse in Canadian military historiography. This study is unique in that it focuses on the development, doctrine, and influence of intelligence within the I Canadian Corps throughout the Liri Valley battles during the Italian Campaign. It will be argued that I Canadian Corps intelligence achieved notable overall success in helping to break the Hitler Line by providing comprehensive and relatively up-to-date information on enemy dispositions and strengths which helped commanders and staff planners properly prepare for the operation. This success was attributable to three main factors: excellent intelligence personnel selection and training; the successful mentorship of I Canadian Corps intelligence by Eighth Army's intelligence cadre; and the overall effectiveness of 1st Canadian Infantry Division's intelligence organization which had been in the Mediterranean theatre since July 1943. Notwithstanding these successes, a number of faults within the Canadian Corps intelligence system must also be explained, including the poor performance of 5th Canadian Armoured Division's intelligence organization during the pursuit up the Liri–Sacco Valleys, and the mediocre execution of Corps counter-battery and counter-mortar operations. This study will demonstrate how an effective intelligence organization must augment existing army doctrine and how it can mitigate, though not completely eliminate, battlefield uncertainty. Further, it will also demonstrate that a comprehensive lessons-learned process must be undertaken to continually refine existing intelligence doctrine and procedures, with frequent training programs inculcating personnel in this doctrine. Taken as a whole, this study is unique as it is one of only several studies devoted solely to developing a greater understanding of a little-understood, and often forgotten, staff function within the Canadian Army during the Second World War. Intelligence Military Intelligence Liri Valley Second World War ELM Burns Burt Hoffmeister Darcy Kingsmill Eighth Army Italian Campaign 1st Canadian Infantry Division 5th Canadian Armoured Division Canadian Intelligence Corps British Intelligence Corps I Canadian Corps Gustav Line Hitler Line Edgar Bill Williams Chris Vokes North African Campaign Ultra Prisoner of War Interrogation SIGINT Signals Intelligence Counter Mortar Counter Battery Corps of Guides War Intelligence Course Intelligence Doctrine Intelligence Training Air Photo Intelligence Special Wireless Service Intelligence Planning Operation DIADEM Operation HONKER First Canadian Interrogation Team
320	"Åtgärder som befrämja rikets försvar och överensstämma med flaggans värdighet" : En undersökning av Sveriges marinstrategi våren 1941 Strömgren Lasell, Victor January 2021 (has links) Denna uppsats undersöker Sveriges marinstrategi i händelse av krig med Tyskland respektive Sovjeteunionen våren 1941 utifrån Chefen för Marinens instruktioner för krigsfall I respektive II. / This paper explores Swedish naval strategy during the Second World War (1939-1945), an area that has not seen significant research. This paper focuses on how Swedish maritime forces were to be used in case of war with Germany (War Plan I; Krigsfall I), and with the Soviet Union (War plan II; Krigsfall II). This paper focuses on Swedish planning during the spring of 1941. The period after the fall of France (June 1940) and before the German invasion of the Soviet Union (June 1941) was a period where both Germany and the Soviet Union possessed what could be described as strategic freedom of action. This means large parts of their armed forces could have been used for operations against Sweden. The basis for each potential conflict was different: Germany occupied Norway and Denmark and could launch a ground invasion of Sweden directly; meanwhile Sweden and the Soviet Union were still separated by Finland and the Baltic Sea. Maritime forces would therefore play very different roles in the two War Plans. No official plans in case of war with the western Allies existed at the time, and hence this has not been explored here. The conclusion of this paper is that Swedish naval strategy at the time was somewhat offensive and focused on gaining sea control, at least in the Baltic Sea and Gulf of Bothnia, to maintain freedom of action to be able to conduct troop movements along the Swedish coast, to the island of Gotland, and to Finland. Sweden 1941 World War two Second world war WW2 naval strategy strategy see power naval power war planning defence planning Nazi Germany Soviet Union Finland Ruotsi 1941 Toinen maailmansota Strategia Laivasto laivaston strategia puolustuksen suunnittelu Natsi-Saksa Neuvostoliitto Suomi Schweden 1941 zweites Weltkrieg Marine Strategie Marine-Strategie See-Strategie Flotten-Strategie Verteidigungsplanung Kriegsplanung NS-Deutschland Deutschland Sowjetunion Finnland Sverige andra världskriget 1941 flottan marinstrategi strategi krigsplanering flottstrategi sjömakt försvarsplanering Nazityskland Sovjetunionen Finland History Historia Other Humanities not elsewhere specified Övrig annan humaniora

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