Die Dissertation besteht aus drei empirischen Beiträgen zur Analyse moralischer Emotionen sowie einer zusammenfassenden und integrierenden Synopse. Im Rahmen der Arbeit wird dabei zunächst (1) eine umfassende Theorie zur Klassifikation und Entstehungsbedingungen moralischer Emotionen entwickelt. Darauf aufbauend wird (2) die Entstehung moralischer Emotionen im Setting der Schule anhand der Urteile von Lehrern und Schülern sowie (3) unter entwicklungspsychologischer Perspektive überprüft. Die vorgeschlagene und empirisch überprüfte Theorie ermöglicht erstmals eine übergreifende Analyse der Entstehungsbedingungen moralischer Emotionen. Die Befunde werden vor dem Hintergrund der bisherigen Forschung zu einzelnen moralischen Emotionen diskutiert.

Text in German / Friedrich Durrenmatt hat die meisten seiner Dramen als Komodien oder Tragikomodien bezeichnet, da er davon uberzeugt war, daB es unmoglich sei, in der heutigen Zeit noch Tragodien zu schreiben. Diese Arbeit versucht am Beispiel einiger dramatischer Werke Durrenmatts zu zeigen, daB der Autor der "Physiker", der "Panne" und anderer Stucke, vor allem des "Besuchs der alten Dame", in weit hoherem MaBe der griechischen Tragodie verpflichtet war, als er erkannte oder zugeben wollte / Friedrich Durrenmatt has described most of his dramas either as comedies or as bitter comedies for he firmly believed that it was not suitable to write tragedies in our modern times. This paper was written to prove with the help of a few examples that the author of "The Physicists", "The Puncture" and others especially "The Visit" - was more bound to the classical Greek form of tragedy than he recognized or admitted / Linguistics and Modern Languages / M.A. (German)

Ce travail propose une présentation et une défense du "sentimentalisme", c’est-à-dire de la théorie philosophique selon laquelle les émotions constituent notre principal accès aux valeurs, et la source de nos jugements évaluatifs. Après avoir brièvement retracé les origines historiques de ce courant (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, et Adam Smith), j’examine la littérature psychologique et philosophique actuelle portant sur les émotions. Je propose une définition de la fonction des émotions, en soutenant que ce sont des "attitudes" corporelles et cognitives dotées d’une intentionnalité évaluative. Elles nous permettent ainsi d’apprécier la valeur des objets en fonction de leur pertinence pour nos états motivationnels, tels que nos désirs ou nos sentiments. Je procède ensuite à une analyse des conséquences épistémologiques et métaphysiques que l’on peut dériver de cette thèse. Je montre que les émotions sont susceptibles de jouer un rôle crucial dans notre connaissance des valeurs, en étudiant le débat relatif aux "conditions de correction" des émotions. Je propose de distinguer ici deux caractérisations des conditions de correction qui ne sont généralement pas explicitées dans les débats actuels, que j’appelle la conception "indépendantiste" et la conception "motivationnelle". J’argumente en faveur de la deuxième approche, et je défends la thèse selon laquelle les émotions constituent un accès fiable aux valeurs, lorsqu’elles sont basées sur des motivations qui sont elles-mêmes correctes ou appropriées. Selon cette approche, les valeurs doivent être comprises comme des propriétés réelles et relationnelles. Je m’intéresse enfin plus particulièrement au rôle que les émotions sont susceptibles de jouer dans les jugements moraux. Après avoir écarté les théories innéistes au sujet de la morale, je soutiens que les émotions sont des conditions nécessaires au développement de la moralité. / This dissertation is both a presentation and a defense of "sentimentalism", the philosophical theory according to which emotions constitute our main access to values, and the source of our evaluative judgments. After considering briefly the historical origins of this philosophical approach (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith), I review the current psychological and philosophical literature about emotions. I define the function of emotions, arguing that they are bodily and cognitive "attitudes" that possess an evaluative intentionality. They allow us to appraise the value of objects according to their relevance for our motivational states, like our desires or sentiments. I proceed then to an analysis of the epistemological and metaphysical consequences that we can draw from this thesis. I show that emotions are likely to play a crucial role in our knowledge of values, focusing on the debate about the "correctness conditions" of emotions. I propose a distinction between two characterizations of correctness conditions, which are generally not explicit in the literature, and which I name the "independence" approach and the "motivational" approach. I argue in favor of the latter and I defend the thesis that emotions constitute a reliable access to values, when they are based on motivations that are themselves correct or appropriate. According to this view, values should be conceived as real and relational properties. Finally, I consider the role which emotions may play in our moral judgments in particular. After having rejected nativist accounts of our moral competence, I claim that emotions are necessary conditions to the development of our moral life.

O tema desta dissertação encontra-se na filosofia moral de David Hume, e este trabalho busca lançar luz sobre sua fundamentação a fim de esclarecer algumas dificuldades e ambiguidades. O problema aqui apresentado refere-se à natureza da simpatia e dos sentimentos morais na filosofia humeana, e visa determinar qual é o objeto adequado dos juízos morais e o status moral da simpatia enquanto produtora de conteúdo moral ou enquanto mecanismo de comunicação de sentimentos, bem como tratar de uma ambiguidade referente ao objeto próprio dos juízos morais e ao objeto próprio da simpatia. Isto será feito através de uma análise dos livros 2 e 3 do Tratado da Natureza Humana e nas Investigações dos Princípios da Moral das ocorrências do princípio da simpatia, atentando para seu papel no contexto de cada passagem e sua relação com as noções de prazer e dor, aprovação e desaprovação, no contexto da teoria moral humeana A tese de que apenas o caráter do agente ou motivo da ação pode ser objeto próprio de avaliação moral será problematizada através das relações que Hume estabelece entre os sentimentos de prazer e dor produzidos por ações e nossos sentimentos morais, onde não se trata do caráter ou motivo do agente, mas sim seus efeitos que constituem o objeto de avaliação moral, o que (tal como aponta o comentador Bernard Wand) poderia gerar ambiguidade em relação ao objeto próprio dos juízos morais ou dificuldades na explicação humeana para as avaliações morais. Minha intenção é esclarecer estas dificuldades e, através do exame de alguns outros comentadores da obra humeana, afastar a interpretação de Wand esclarecendo que não há ambiguidade ou circularidade entre causa e efeito dos juízos morais na teoria humeana. Ao longo deste procedimento, serão examinadas dificuldades que também dizem respeito às correções e às condições necessárias de operação adequada do mecanismo da simpatia, a fim de oferecer uma explicação coerente com os propósitos de Hume de explicar as origens de nossa aprovação e desaprovação morais a partir de um princípio geral de explicação. / The subject of this dissertation is in David Hume's moral philosophy, and this work seeks to cast light on its fundaments in order to clarify some difficulties and ambiguities. The problem here presented refers to the nature of sympathy and moral sentiments in Humean philosophy, and is aimed in determinate the proper object of moral judgment and the moral status of sympathy as source of moral content or as a mechanism of communication of sentiments, as well as solve an ambiguity concerning the proper object of moral judgments and the proper object of sympathy. This shall be done through an analysis of the books 2 and 3 of the Treatise of Human Nature and the Enquiries Concerning The Principles os Morals of the occurrences of the principle of sympathy, paying attention to its role in the context of each account and its relations with the notions of pleasure and pain, approval and disapproval in the context of the Humean moral theory The thesis that only the agent's motive or character can be the object of moral valuation will be problematized through the relations Hume establishes between the feelings of pleasure and pain produced by actions and our moral feelings, where it is not the agent’s character or motive, but its consequences, which constitute the object of moral appraisals, and this (as Bernard Wand points) might constitute an ambiguity concerning the proper object of moral evaluation. My intention is to clarify this difficulties and, through the analysis of other critics of Hume, refusing Wands interpretation and clarifying that there is no ambiguity and no circularity between the cause and effect of moral judgment in Hume’s theory. Throughout this procedure, difficulties will be examined concerning the corrections and the necessary conditions for sympathy’s proper operation, in order to offer a coherent explanation with Hume purposes of explaining the origins of our moral approval and disapproval from a general principle of explanation.

Fundação de Amparo a Pesquisa no Estado do Rio Grande do Sul / The present dissertation - through bibliographical research grounded mainly in the reading of the Theory of Moral Sentiments and of the Wealth of Nations - investigates the connection between Smith's moral philosophy and his approach regarding to the human principles that govern individual pursuit for improving own life condition. For achieve this goal are analyzed some of the Philosophical bases of the author (Stoics, Hutcheson, Hume) and studied the key concepts present in his two books in order to defend the viewpoint of that the Wealth of Nations is a continuity of the Theory of Moral Sentiments. From among the main lessons learned, from the study of the work of Adam Smith, are of which he cultivated, in his personal life, the qualities that in the TMS he considered defining of an excellent character: sobriety, temperance, fairness and magnanimity; which was through of the concepts of sympathy and the impartial spectator, created and developed in the TMS, that Smith created the concept of the prudent man, to which characterizes the majority of people who live in society; that the prudent man of Adam Smith is much different than homo economicus neoclassic; and, mainly, that the Smithian view of self-love is impregnated of moral connotations, once which goes far beyond mere self-interest for material wealth. / A presente dissertação - por meio de pesquisa bibliográfica fundamentada principalmente na leitura da Teoria dos Sentimentos Morais e na Riqueza das Nações - investiga a conexão entre a filosofia moral de Smith e a sua abordagem em relação aos princípios humanos que norteiam a busca individual por melhorar a própria condição de vida. Para alcançar este objetivo são analisadas algumas das bases Filosóficas do autor (estoicos, Hutcheson, Hume) e estudados os conceitos chaves presentes em seus dois livros de modo a defender o ponto de vista de que a Riqueza das Nações é uma continuidade da Teoria dos Sentimentos Morais. Dentre as principais lições aprendidas, a partir do estudo da obra de Adam Smith, está a de que ele cultivou, em sua vida pessoal, as qualidades que na TSM ele considerava definidoras de um caráter excelente: sobriedade, temperança, justeza e magnanimidade; que foi através dos conceitos de simpatia e espectador imparcial, criados e desenvolvidos na TSM, que Smith criou o conceito do homem prudente, o qual caracteriza a maioria das pessoas que vivem em sociedade; que o homem prudente de Adam Smith é muito diferente do homo economicus neoclássico; e, principalmente, que a visão smithiana de selflove está impregnada de conotações morais, uma vez que vai muito além do mero auto interesse por riquezas materiais.

O tema desta dissertação encontra-se na filosofia moral de David Hume, e este trabalho busca lançar luz sobre sua fundamentação a fim de esclarecer algumas dificuldades e ambiguidades. O problema aqui apresentado refere-se à natureza da simpatia e dos sentimentos morais na filosofia humeana, e visa determinar qual é o objeto adequado dos juízos morais e o status moral da simpatia enquanto produtora de conteúdo moral ou enquanto mecanismo de comunicação de sentimentos, bem como tratar de uma ambiguidade referente ao objeto próprio dos juízos morais e ao objeto próprio da simpatia. Isto será feito através de uma análise dos livros 2 e 3 do Tratado da Natureza Humana e nas Investigações dos Princípios da Moral das ocorrências do princípio da simpatia, atentando para seu papel no contexto de cada passagem e sua relação com as noções de prazer e dor, aprovação e desaprovação, no contexto da teoria moral humeana A tese de que apenas o caráter do agente ou motivo da ação pode ser objeto próprio de avaliação moral será problematizada através das relações que Hume estabelece entre os sentimentos de prazer e dor produzidos por ações e nossos sentimentos morais, onde não se trata do caráter ou motivo do agente, mas sim seus efeitos que constituem o objeto de avaliação moral, o que (tal como aponta o comentador Bernard Wand) poderia gerar ambiguidade em relação ao objeto próprio dos juízos morais ou dificuldades na explicação humeana para as avaliações morais. Minha intenção é esclarecer estas dificuldades e, através do exame de alguns outros comentadores da obra humeana, afastar a interpretação de Wand esclarecendo que não há ambiguidade ou circularidade entre causa e efeito dos juízos morais na teoria humeana. Ao longo deste procedimento, serão examinadas dificuldades que também dizem respeito às correções e às condições necessárias de operação adequada do mecanismo da simpatia, a fim de oferecer uma explicação coerente com os propósitos de Hume de explicar as origens de nossa aprovação e desaprovação morais a partir de um princípio geral de explicação. / The subject of this dissertation is in David Hume's moral philosophy, and this work seeks to cast light on its fundaments in order to clarify some difficulties and ambiguities. The problem here presented refers to the nature of sympathy and moral sentiments in Humean philosophy, and is aimed in determinate the proper object of moral judgment and the moral status of sympathy as source of moral content or as a mechanism of communication of sentiments, as well as solve an ambiguity concerning the proper object of moral judgments and the proper object of sympathy. This shall be done through an analysis of the books 2 and 3 of the Treatise of Human Nature and the Enquiries Concerning The Principles os Morals of the occurrences of the principle of sympathy, paying attention to its role in the context of each account and its relations with the notions of pleasure and pain, approval and disapproval in the context of the Humean moral theory The thesis that only the agent's motive or character can be the object of moral valuation will be problematized through the relations Hume establishes between the feelings of pleasure and pain produced by actions and our moral feelings, where it is not the agent’s character or motive, but its consequences, which constitute the object of moral appraisals, and this (as Bernard Wand points) might constitute an ambiguity concerning the proper object of moral evaluation. My intention is to clarify this difficulties and, through the analysis of other critics of Hume, refusing Wands interpretation and clarifying that there is no ambiguity and no circularity between the cause and effect of moral judgment in Hume’s theory. Throughout this procedure, difficulties will be examined concerning the corrections and the necessary conditions for sympathy’s proper operation, in order to offer a coherent explanation with Hume purposes of explaining the origins of our moral approval and disapproval from a general principle of explanation.

Au-delà de l’utilisabilité, la question du ressenti émotionnel est devenue prépondérante pour les équipes de conception d’applications souhaitant se différencier par la qualité d’utilisation. Mais malgré l’importance des enjeux, les bonnes pratiques de conception pour l’émotion ne sont pas ou peu documentées. L’objet de ce travail de thèse consiste donc à concourir à la définition des stratégies de design émotionnel d’interface susceptibles de susciter un ressenti positif des utilisateurs. Deux étapes sont considérées :1. l’identification de patterns de design émotionnel, au travers des pratiques existantes des designers et des modèles théoriques afférant ; 2. la définition d’une méthode d’évaluation des patterns de design préalablement identifiées. Considérant l’hédonomie comme paradigme succédant à l’utilisabilité, nous proposons une synthèse de patterns de design émotionnel structurés autour de la notion de personnalité applicative. Les patterns d’empathie et de sympathie apparaissent ainsi particulièrement pertinents. En ce sens, nous proposons une déclinaison de l’hédonomie pour le « design sympathique » d’interfaces. Une seconde étape de ce travail s’oriente vers l’évaluation des patterns de design. Nous proposons ainsi une sélection de méthodes de mesure de l’émotion adaptées aux spécificités d’une utilisation d’interface. Les expérimentations menées permettent de proposer une méthode d’évaluation du ressenti suscité par le design d’interface. Enfin, nous proposons des orientations de recherche alternatives ou complémentaires afin de guider les futurs travaux vers la définition de recommandations pour le design émotionnel d’interface. / Beyond usability, the question of the emotion has turned preponderant for application design teams wishing to get differentiated by the quality of use. But despite the important issues, good practices of design for emotion are not or poorly documented.The purpose of this thesis is therefore to contribute to the definition of emotional interface design strategies to create a positive feeling by the users.Two steps are considered:1. the identification of emotional design patterns, through the practices of designers and the related theoretical models;2. the definition of a method of assessment for the previously identified design patterns.Considering hedonomics as a new paradigm succeeding to usability, we propose a synthesis of emotional design patterns structured on the notion of applicative personality. Empathy and sympathy patterns thus appear particularly relevant. In this sense, we propose a variation of hedonomics for the “sympathetic design” of interfaces.A second phase of this work is oriented towards the evaluation of design patterns. We offer a selection of emotion measurement methods adapted to the specificities of an interface use. The conducted experiments allow to propose a method of evaluation of the emotion elicited by the interface design.Finally, we propose alternative or complementary research directions to guide future work towards the definition of recommendations for emotional interface design.

Die Dissertation besteht aus drei empirischen Beiträgen zur Analyse moralischer Emotionen sowie einer zusammenfassenden und integrierenden Synopse. Im Rahmen der Arbeit wird dabei zunächst (1) eine umfassende Theorie zur Klassifikation und Entstehungsbedingungen moralischer Emotionen entwickelt. Darauf aufbauend wird (2) die Entstehung moralischer Emotionen im Setting der Schule anhand der Urteile von Lehrern und Schülern sowie (3) unter entwicklungspsychologischer Perspektive überprüft. Die vorgeschlagene und empirisch überprüfte Theorie ermöglicht erstmals eine übergreifende Analyse der Entstehungsbedingungen moralischer Emotionen. Die Befunde werden vor dem Hintergrund der bisherigen Forschung zu einzelnen moralischen Emotionen diskutiert.

I början av 2020 drabbar covid-19-pandemin världens befolkning. Den livsfarliga smittan sprids snabbt världen över och forskare och läkemedelsbolag börjar arbeta intensivt för att utveckla ett vaccin som kan stoppa sjukdomens framfart. Knappt ett år senare godkänns världens första vaccin mot covid-19 och massvaccinering inleds. Världens politiker, forskare, epidemiologer och läkare påtalar otaliga gånger att vaccinet är lösningen på pandemin och vikten av att alla som kan ska tacka ja till erbjudandet om att vaccinera sig. Vaccinationsviljan världen över är generellt sett god, men det är också många människor som väljer att inte ta vaccinet och vaccinationsgraden varierar på internationell-, nationell- och lokal nivå. Syftet med den här uppsatsen är att undersöka om det finns lokala förhållanden som påverkar vacci­nat­ions­graden mot covid-19 i Sveriges kommuner under pandemin och om kommunernas verkliga vacci­nationsgrad avviker från vad som kan förväntas utifrån de lokala förhållandena. Baserat på tidigare studier och teori skapas och testas hypoteser genom att använda linjär regression för att skapa modeller som beskriver förväntad vaccinationsgrad. Studien undersöker sambandet mellan vaccinat­ions­grad och variabler som beskriver könsfördelningen i kommunerna, andel utrikesfödda, befolk­ningens ålder, utbildnings-, inkomst-, och hälsonivå, andel arbetslöshet, valdeltagande och befolk­ningens partisym­pa­tier.  De viktigaste resultaten är att faktorerna andel kvinnor, utrikesfödda, arbetslöshet och hälsonivå korre­lerar negativt med vaccinationsgrad, och faktorerna ålder, utbildningsnivå och valdeltagande korrelerar positivt. I univariat analys förklarar variabeln utrikesfödda 78 procent av skillnaden i vaccinationsgrad mellan kommunerna och valdeltagande förklarar 57 procent av skillnaden. Resultatet i riksdagsvalet 2018 på kommunnivå kan delvis förklara skillnaden i vaccinationsgrad mellan Sveriges kommuner. Utmärkande vid undersökningen av befolkningens partisympatier är att univariat analys med Center­partiet som oberoende variabel enskilt förklarar över 20 procent av skillnaden i vaccinationsgrad.  Baserat på regressionsmodeller beräknas varje kommuns förväntade vaccinationsgrad, vilken jämförs med den verkliga vaccinationsgraden. Haparanda och Ljungby kommun avviker mest positivt respek­tive negativt från sitt förväntade värde (+10,42 procent och -6,10 procent). En möjlig förklaring till kommunernas stora avvikelser är deras geografiska läge och dess påverkan på befolkningens behov av att resa till utlandet. Alla kommuner i Uppsala län har en högre vaccinationsgrad än förväntat, medan alla kommuner i Blekinge län har en lägre vaccinationsgrad än förväntat. En möjlig förklaring är att det beror på länens olika vaccinationsstrategier. / In early 2020, the covid-19 pandemic hit the world. The deadly infection spread rapidly, and researchers and pharmaceutical companies worked intensively to develop a vaccine which could stop the progres­sion of the disease. Barely a year later, the world’s first vaccine against covid-19 is approved and mass vaccination begins. The world’s politicians, researchers, epidemiologists, and medical personnel point out countless times that the vaccine is the solution to the pandemic and the importance of getting vac­cinated. In general, the willingness to get vaccinated is high, but there are also many people who choose not to take the vaccine and the degree of vaccination varies at international, national, and local level. This study aims to investigate whether local conditions affect the vaccination rate against covid-19 in Swedish municipalities during the pandemic, and whether municipalities’ actual vaccination rate devi­ates from what can be expected based on these local conditions. Based on previous studies and theory, hypotheses are created and tested by using linear regression to create models that describe the expected degree of vaccination. The study examines the relationship between vaccination rate and variables that describe gender distribution in the municipalities, proportion of foreign-born, age of population, level of education, income and health, proportion of unemployment, turnout, and the population’s party sym­pathies. The main findings are that the factors proportion of women, foreign-born, unemployment and health level negatively correlate with vaccination rate, and the factors age, level of education and turnout cor­relate positively. In univariate analysis, the variable foreign-born explains 78 percent of the differ­ence in vaccination rate among the municipalities, and turnout explains 57 percent of the difference. The result of the 2018 parliamentary elections at municipal level can partly explain the difference in vac­cination rate between Sweden’s municipalities. Notable when examining the population’s party sym­pathies is that univariate analysis with Centerpartiet as an independent variable individually explains over 20 percent of the difference in vaccination rate. Each municipality’s expected vaccination rate is calculated and compared to the actual vaccination rate based on regression models. The municipalities of Haparanda and Ljungby deviate most from their expected value (+10.42 percent and -6.10 percent). A possible explanation for the municipalities’ large deviations is their geographical location and its impact on the population’s need to travel abroad. All municipalities of Uppsala County have a higher vaccination rate than expected, while all municipalities of Blekinge County have a lower vaccination rate than expected. One possible explanation is that it depends on the counties’ different vaccination strategies.

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