O aumento de gastos com a atenção à saúde apresenta-se como um fato econômico de merecida relevância no cenário internacional, sendo resultante da elevação progressiva de preços dos produtos e serviços deste mercado. Pela sua importância social e peculiaridades recebe um tratamento especial nos estudos econômicos. A economia da saúde avalia os fatores que influenciam demanda e oferta neste mercado, direcionando suas observações à interação entre seus agentes e atores, destacando seus comportamentos em relação às suas reações com o tratamento do risco de ficar doente. Possíveis falhas de mercado, envolvendo risco moral, assimetria de informação e seleção adversa, podem ser atribuídas como causas de uma demanda que foge às regras de equilíbrio econômico e favorece a elevação da oferta. Esses problemas remetem à discussão sobre como a mudança de incentivos pode acarretar aumento de gastos e perda de eficiência no provimento dos bens e serviços de saúde dos Estados Unidos da América (EUA) e no mercado de saúde suplementar brasileiro, levando em conta que a situação de elevação dos gastos com saúde, que se agrava no Brasil nos últimos dez anos, já vem sendo vivida há mais tempo em outros países e particularmente nos EUA, mostrando que o problema apresenta tendência de ser persistente. / The health care expenditure increase that presents itself as an economic fact of worldly relevance on the international scene, being the result of the gradual increase of prices of products and services in this market. Due to its social relevance and peculiarities it deserves a special treatment in economic studies. Health economics evaluates the factors influencing supply and demand in this market, directing its comments to the interaction between actors and their agents, highlighting their behaviors in relation to their reactions to the treatment of the risk of getting sick. Possible flaws in this market , involving moral hazard, information asymmetry and adverse selection can be attributed as causes of a demand that evades the rules of economic equilibrium and favors lifting the offer. These problems relate to discuss how changing incentives may lead to increased expenses and loss of efficiency in the provision of goods and services of health of United States of America (USA) and the Brazilian health plan market, taking into account the situation of rising health spending, which deepens in Brazil over the past ten years, as has been the longest lived in other countries and particularly the USA, showing that the problem shows a trend to be persistent.

Este trabalho apresenta três extensões ao modelo de reputação proposto por Shapiro (1983). A primeira torna o modelo original mais adequado para avaliar o problema de informação assimétrica de bens de busca e bens credenciais, a segunda permite identificar o ganho de eficiência gerado pela inclusão de um sistema de informação adicional e, a terceira mostra que a provisão de um volume maior de informação pode gerar efeitos adversos quando o produto em questão possui vários atributos. Em seguida, os desenvolvimentos teóricos são utilizados para avaliar os efeitos da introdução do Exame Nacional de Cursos sobre o mercado de cursos superiores do Brasil. Algumas das predições do modelo são testadas empiricamente, fornecendo indicações de que este Exame possui um papel relevante para mitigar o problema de informação identificado neste mercado. / This essay presents three extensions to the model first proposed by Shapiro (1983) regarding reputation. The first extension adjusts Shapiro’s original model in order to make it more suitable in dealing with the problem of asymmetric information of search goods and credence goods. The second one allows the identification of the efficiency gains obtained after the inclusion of an additional information system, while the third extension demonstrates that additional information could generate adverse effects when the good under consideration has several attributes. These theoretical extensions are then applied to evaluate the effects of the Brazilian experience regarding the introduction of the Courses National Exam - Exame Nacional de Cursos – on Brazil’s market of undergraduate school courses. Some of the theoretical predictions of the model are empirically tested, offering indications that such exam plays a relevant role while diminishing the informational problem that characterizes this market.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:26:34Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Francisco Carlos Tadeu S Rodrigues.pdf: 1498803 bytes, checksum: f63bb1bb5cfc2b5d376768c226ee0e41 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-02-14 / Instituto Presbiteriano Mackenzie / The evidences that the quality management practices contribute positively to the financial performance of a firm do not produce a consensus. It is important to take off the impression ISO 9000 is so popular that it could not deserve more intense and effective academic production; there are many effects promoted by the introduction of this standard at the organizational level in brazilian companies and they were not yet well studied. Thus, it is opportune to evaluate this world phenomenon and, certainly, in Brazil of ISO 9000 quality certification and its relation to superior financial performance of the companies. There is, in Brazil, an absence of researches related to this subject, using secondary public data, focused in publicly traded firms and using robust econometric models, to permit a certain conclusion to the brazilian context. The Akerlof-Spence approach was adopted to discuss, from the asymmetric information point of view, the adverse selection imposed to the consumers. To mitigate this, a firm should signalize its hidden attributes, creating a better image to the market and better reputation. The Akerlof-Spence approach allows to predict that, if the firms got certified, so they can search for better sales performances and, as a consequence, for better financial performances. When a firm choose to get certified, it would be signaling to the market, to its suppliers and consumers, that it has, in fact, products an services with high quality. This would allow a smaller asymmetric information and a smaller adverse selection; this also would enable a competitive advantage and would distinguish certified firms from that not certified. The certification age lasts two decades and more than 700,000 firms are certified in 161 countries around the world. Following the research line developed by two groups of researchers Terlaak and King (2006) and Corbett, Montes-Sancho and Kirsch (2005) , in this research, 207 brazilian publicly traded firms were studied for 12 years, from 1995 to 2006. There are 116 firms certified according to the 1987, 1994 and 2000 versions of ISO 9000 standard and other 91 not certified in the sample. It was employed an econometric regression model with data in static and dynamic panels, using pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects. A non-balanced panel data with 207 firms and 2,484 observations, and a balanced panel data with 60 firms and 720 observations were assembled to research this problem. The addressed question is answered: do ISO 9000 certification permit a superior financial performance to brazilian public firms? Six hypotheses were tested, all of them related with financial performance. The six hypotheses were rejected, revealing significative results that ISO certification has a strong, direct and positive relation with financial performance of the brazilian public firms. The results of this research indicate that shareholders and managers could choose the certification as a signaling mechanism, reputation and sales growth, reduction of production costs, and improvement in ROA, ROS and ROE. ISO 9000 certification is a relevant strategic tool for competitiveness improvement. / As evidências de que as práticas de gestão da qualidade contribuem positivamente para o desempenho de uma empresa não produziram um consenso a respeito. É importante se tirar a impressão de que a ISO 9000 é tão popular que não mereça uma produção acadêmica mais intensa e efetiva: afinal, são muitos os efeitos provocados pela introdução da norma no tecido organizacional das empresas brasileiras e que ainda não foram estudados. Assim, é oportuno e apropriado avaliar esse fenômeno mundial e certamente, também no Brasil da certificação da qualidade pela ISO 9000 e sua relação com o desempenho financeiro das empresas. Ainda há, no Brasil, uma ausência de estudos a respeito dessa temática, que tenham se utilizado de dados secundários públicos, focados em companhias abertas e que tenham se utilizado de modelos econométricos robustos que permitissem uma conclusão acertada à realidade nacional. Adotou-se a abordagem de Akerlof Spence para discutir, a partir da informação assimétrica, a seleção adversa a que os consumidores estão expostos. Para mitigar isso, uma empresa deveria sinalizar seus atributos escondidos, criando melhor imagem no mercado e maior reputação. A abordagem de Akerlof Spence permite prever que, se as empresas se certificam, então elas podem ir em busca de melhores performances de vendas e, conseqüentemente, melhores performances financeiras. Ao optar pela certificação, uma empresa estaria sinalizando ao mercado, aos seus fornecedores e consumidores que ela possui produtos e serviços com alta qualidade. Isso tornaria a informação menos assimétrica e a seleção menos adversa; possibilitaria vantagem competitiva e distinguiria empresas certificadas das não certificadas. Essa era da certificação dura duas décadas e mais de 700.000 empresas foram certificadas em 161 países do mundo. Seguindo a linha de estudo de dois grupos de pesquisadores Terlaak e King (2006) e Corbett, Montes-Sancho e Kirsch (2005) , acompanhou-se 207 companhias abertas brasileiras durante 12 anos, entre 1995 e 2006. A amostra contém 116 companhias certificadas pelas versões 1987, 1994 e 2000 da norma ISO 9000 e 91 não certificadas. Utilizou-se um modelo econométrico de regressão com dados em painel estático e painel dinâmico, com agrupamento de dados de corte transversal, efeitos fixos e efeitos aleatórios. Foram utilizados um painel não balanceado com 207 companhias e 2.484 observações e um painel balanceado com 60 companhias e 720 observações. Responde-se, portanto, ao seguinte problema de pesquisa: a ertificação ISO 9000 permite às companhias abertas no Brasil obterem um desempenho financeiro superior? Seis hipóteses foram testadas, todas relacionadas com desempenho financeiro. Todas as seis hipóteses foram rejeitadas, revelando resultados significativos que sugerem haver uma relação forte, direta e positiva entre a certificação ISO 9000 e o desempenho financeiro das companhias abertas brasileiras. Os resultados desta pesquisa indicam que acionistas e gestores podem optar pela certificação como mecanismo de sinalização, aumento da reputação e das vendas, diminuição dos custos dos serviços vendidos, melhoria dos retornos sobre ativos (ROA), vendas (ROS) e patrimônio líqüido (ROE). A certificação ISO 9000 configura-se em importante instrumento estratégico de aumento de competitividade.

Abstract The aim of this thesis is to propose an array of novel cooperative content delivery (CCD) methods and related incentive mechanisms for future fifth-generation (5G) and beyond networks. CCD using multiple air interfaces is a powerful solution to mitigate the problem of congestion in wireless networks, in which the available multiple air interfaces on smart devices are utilized intelligently to distribute data content among a group of users that are in the vicinity of one another. The requirements for higher capacity, reliability, and energy efficiency in the 5G networks have warranted the development of methods focusing on CCD. Moreover, critical to the efficiency of a CCD process are incentive mechanisms to induce cooperation among the mobile users engaged in CCD. The first part of the thesis studies an ideal condition of reliable and error-free distribution of content using cellular and short-range links. The main contribution is to introduce different device selection CCD methods that take into account only the link quality of the devices’ primary (cellular) interfaces. The proposed methods provide frequency carrier savings for the operator while allowing users to enjoy higher downlink rates. The second part of the thesis studies a more realistic CCD situation where users with low data rate wireless links can be a bottleneck in terms of CCD performance. The main contribution is to propose a novel device selection CCD method that considers the link quality of both primary (cellular) and secondary (short-range) interfaces of the devices. Additionally, a carrier aggregation-based incentive mechanism for the proposed method is introduced to address the challenge of selfish deviating users. The proposed mechanism maximizes individual and network payoffs, and is an equilibrium against unilateral selfish deviations. The third part of the thesis addresses the adverse selection problem in CCD scenarios. The operator is assumed to have incomplete information about the willingness of the users to participate in CCD. The main contribution is to introduce contract-based methods through which the operator could motivate users to reveal their true willingness towards participation. The proposed methods incentivize users according to their willingness and improve system performance in terms of the utility of the operator and the users. / Tiivistelmä Tämän väitöskirjan tavoitteena on kehittää menetelmiä yhteistyössä tapahtuvaan sisällön jakamiseen (cooperative content delivery, CCD) sekä siihen liittyviä kannustinmekanismeja viidennen sukupolven (5G) ja sen jälkeisille matkaviestinverkoille. CCD:n käyttö hyödyntämällä älylaitteessa olevia useita ilmarajapintoja on tehokas ratkaisu välttää langattomien verkkojen ruuhkautumista. CCD-menetelmissä laiteen ilmarajapintoja käytetään älykkäästi datan jakamiseen käyttäjäryhmälle, kun käyttäjät ovat lähellä toisiaan. 5G-verkkojen vaatimukset korkeammalle kapasiteetille, luotettavuudelle ja energiatehokkuudelle ovat motivoineet CCD-menetelmien kehitystyötä. Erityisen tärkeää CCD-menetelmien tehokkuudelle on kannustinmekanismien kehittäminen mahdollistamaan yhteistyö mobiilikäyttäjien välillä. Väitöskirjatyön ensimmäinen osuus käsittelee ideaalista tilannetta luotettavalle ja virheettömälle sisällön jakamiselle hyödyntämällä solukkoverkkoa ja lyhyen kantaman linkkejä. Tässä osuudessa päätuloksena on kehitetty käyttäjien valinnalle menetelmiä, jotka huomioivat linkin laadun solukkoverkon ilmarajapinnassa. Ehdotetut menetelmät tuovat operaattorille säästöjä taajuusresurssien käytön osalta ja käyttäjät saavuttavat korkeampia laskevan siirtotien datanopeuksia. Työn toinen osuus tutkii todenmukaisempaa CCD-tilannetta, jossa alhaisen datanopeuden linkkien käyttäjät voivat olla pullonkaula CCD:n suorituskyvylle. Päätulos tässä on uusi käyttäjien valintamenetelmä, joka ottaa huomioon linkkien laadun sekä solukkoverkossa että lyhyen kantaman linkeissä. Lisäksi esitellään eri taajuuksien yhdistämistä hyödyntävä kannustinmenetelmä, joka ottaa huomioon itsekkäiden käyttäjien aiheuttamat ongelmat. Ehdotettu mekanismi maksimoi yksittäisen käyttäjän ja verkon hyödyt ja saavuttaa tasapainotilan käyttäjien yksipuolista itsekkyyttä vastaan. Väitöskirjan kolmannessa osuudessa tutkitaan haitallisen valikoitumisen mahdollisuutta CCD:ssä. Operaattorilla oletetaan olevan epätäydellistä tietoa käyttäjien halukkuudesta osallistua yhteistyöhön CCD:ssä. Tämän osuuden päätulos on esitellä sopimuksiin perustuvia kannustinmenetelmiä, joiden avulla operaattori voi motivoida käyttäjiä paljastamaan heidän todellinen tahtotilansa osallistua yhteistyöhön. Ehdotetut menetelmä kannustavat käyttäjiä heidän todellisen tahtotilan perusteella ja parantavat järjestelmän suorituskykyä operaattorin ja käyttäjien saavuttamien hyötyjen osalta.

Ma thèse intitulée “Gouvernance d'entreprise et concurrence sur le marché des produits” est composée de trois chapitres théoriques relevant essentiellement de l'Économie Industrielle. L'objectif principal est d'étudier comment le marché des produits interagit à la fois avec l'intérêt des parties prenantes lorsque l'information est parfaite et avec les incitations managériales (statiques et dynamiques) lorsque l'information est imparfaite.Le premier chapitre porte sur les interactions entre le mode de concurrence sur le marché des produits (Cournot vs. Bertrand) et les relations (conflictuelles ou conciliantes) entre les principaux acteurs (actionnaires, consommateurs et employés) lorsque l'intérêt des consommateurs est pris en compte dans la fonction objectif de la firme. Nous considérons un duopole symétrique où les firmes négocient préalablement avec les syndicats sur le salaire versé aux employés et puis se concurrencent entre elles sur le marché des biens. Nous montrons que l'orientation client (mesurée par le degré de prise en compte du surplus des consommateurs) peut inverser la hiérarchie traditionnelle entre les équilibres de Cournot et les équilibres de Bertrand. Une concurrence en prix (par rapport à une concurrence en quantité) est à même d'atténuer les conflits entre les actionnaires et les consommateurs et entre les actionnaires et les employés.Le deuxième chapitre examine comment les incitations managériales pourraient interagir avec la concurrence sur le marché des produits dans un contexte de sélection adverse et d'aléa moral. Nous considérons un oligopole de Cournot composé de n firmes identiques dont le coût marginal initial est une information privée du manager. L'effort du manager, qui est non observable, réduit indirectement le coût marginal initial. Dans un tel contexte, nous montrons qu'à l'optimum les paiements incitatifs versés aux managers ne sont pas nécessairement influencés par la concurrence sur le marché des produits.Le troisième chapitre étudie comment le contrat optimal entre l'actionnaire et le manager (résolution d'aléa moral répété) peut influencer la stabilité d'un cartel. Nous considérons un cartel composé de deux firmes identiques et dans chaque firme un actionnaire neutre à l'égard du risque offre un menu de contrats à un manager averse au risque. L'effort du manager influence le coût marginal de la firme (comme au chapitre 2) à chaque période. Nous montrons que, contrairement au cas où l'information est parfaite, le degré d'aversion au risque du manager n'impacte pas la stabilité du cartel lorsque le contrat optimal à long terme est mis en place. Le contrat optimal résout le problème d'aléa moral répété et limite également le pouvoir discrétionnaire du manager sur la décision de conduite du marché (collusion, déviation, ou compétition). / My thesis entitled « Corporate governance and product market competition : three essays » is a theoretical research in industrial organization. The primary objective is to investigate how product market (competition or collusion) interacts with the top-level design of corporate governance, which concerns specifically the stakeholders' relationships and managerial incentives (static and dynamic) under imperfect information. It is mainly based on three chapters dealing with different subtopics of this theme.The first chapter examines how social concern and product market competition (Cournot vs. Bertrand) may influence the relationships (conflicting or conciliating) between main stakeholders (shareholders, consumers and employees). We consider two identical firms, both taking care of the interests of consumers in their objective functions and allowing their employees' wages be negotiated with labor unions. We show that social concern may reverse the traditional ranking between Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. Our model also shows that price competition (compared to quantity competition) can to some extent attenuate the shareholders' conflicts with both consumers and employees.The second chapter investigates how managerial incentive payment under both adverse selection and moral hazard might interact with product market competition. We consider a Cournot oligopoly market consisting of n identical managerial firms, of which the initial marginal cost is the manager's private information and his unobservable effort indirectly reduces the initial level of marginal cost. We show with this setting that the optimal incentive payment solving informational problems is not necessarily influenced by product market competition.The third chapter studies how the optimal contract between shareholder and manager (solving repeated moral hazard) may influence the stability of a cartel. We consider a cartel consisting of two identical firms, within each a risk neutral shareholder offers a menu of contracts to a risk-averse manager who may shirk in each period. The manager's unobservable effort influences the firm's marginal cost (as in chapter 2). We show in contrary with the benchmark case (under perfect information) that the degree of risk-aversion plays no longer a role upon the stability of collusion: when the managerial compensation is independent of gross profit, the implementation of the optimal long-term contract solves repeated moral hazard but also constrains the manager's discretion over the decision of market conduct (collusion, deviation, or competition).

In cooperation with a consumer credit company based in Stockholm, this bachelor thesis investigates if the customer profitability in the consumer credit market can be predicted with multiple linear regression. Data collected before the initial credit was accepted and data connected to the account activity of the customers' first nine months are analyzed. Further, it is examined if the findings could be useful in a profitability analysis and as a reduction of adverse selection. The findings show that a number of covariates express promising correlations with the costumer profitability. However, the prediction error is high and not efficient in individual cases. Further, some reduction in adverse selection, due to a decrease in asymmetric information between the customers and the company, can be identified, but further research is encouraged. Finally, potential improvements are discussed, especially concerning the choice of regression algorithm. / I samarbete med ett konsumentkreditbolag baserat i Stockholm undersöker detta kandidatexamensarbete om kundlönsamhet inom marknaden för konsumentkrediter kan förutsägas med hjälp av multipel linjär regression. Data består av information som insamlades innan den initiala kreditförfrågningen accepterades, och av kontoaktivitet under kundens nio första månader. Vidare undersöks om resultatet kan användas i en lönsamhetsanalys och som en metod för att minska snedvridet urval.  Resultatet visar att ett antal kovariat uttrycker en lovande korrelation med kundlönsamheten. Dessvärre är felen från förutsägelserna stora och därför ineffektiva gällande estimering av individuella kunder. Fortsättningsvis kan det identifieras viss reduktion av snedvridet urval som en följd av minskad informationsasymmetri mellan kunderna och företaget, men vidare undersökning uppmuntras. Avslutningsvis diskuteras ett antal förbättringsmöjligheter, framför allt gällande val av regressionsalgoritm.

Cette thèse est composée de trois essais en économie forestière. Les deux premiers s'intéressent à la fixation de la redevance optimale à laquelle fait face le propriétaire d'une ressource forestière dans un contexte d'information asymétrique. Le troisième analyse l'impact à long terme du recyclage sur la surface de terre affectée à la forêt. La gestion des ressources forestières implique souvent la délégation des droits de coupe par le propriétaire forestier à une entreprise exploitante. Cette délégation prend la forme d'un contrat de concession par lequel le propriétaire forestier octroie les droits d'exploitation aux compagnies forestières, en contrepartie d'une redevance (transfert monétaire). L'octroie des droits d'exploitation s'effectue généralement sous plusieurs modes, dont les plus répandus sont les appels d'offres publics et les contrats de gré à gré, où le propriétaire forestier et la firme exploitante spécifient entre autres la redevance dans les clauses d'exploitation de la forêt. Pour déterminer le mécanisme optimal (choix de la firme, âge de coupe et redevance), le propriétaire forestier a idéalement besoin de connaître les coûts de coupe et de reboisement. Or en réalité, les firmes sont mieux informées sur leurs coûts que le propriétaire forestier. Dans ce contexte d'information asymétrique, le mécanisme optimal doit donc prendre en considération des contraintes informationnelles. Les deux premiers essais caractérisent, sous ces conditions, l'âge de coupe optimal (la rotation optimale) et la redevance optimale. Le premier essai examine le contrat optimal quand le propriétaire forestier cède les droits de coupes à une firme par un accord de gré à gré ou par une procédure d'appel d'offre public au second prix. L'analyse du problème est menée premièrement dans un contexte statique, dans le sens que les coûts de coupe sont parfaitement corrélés dans le temps, puis dans un contexte dynamique, où les coûts sont indépendants dans le temps. L'examen en statique et en dynamique montre que la rotation optimale va satisfaire une version modifiée de la règle de Faustmann qui prévaudrait en information symétrique. Cette modification est nécessaire afin d'inciter la firme à révéler ses vrais coûts. Dans le cas statique, il en résulte que la rotation optimale est plus élevée en information asymétrique qu'en situation de pleine information. Nous montrons également comment le seuil maximal de coût de coupe peut être endogénéisé, afin de permettre au propriétaire d'accroître son profit espéré en s'assurant que les forêts non profitables ne seront pas exploitées. Nous comparons ensuite la redevance optimale en information asymétrique et symétrique. Les redevances forestières dans un arrangement de gré à gré étant généralement, en pratique, une fonction linéaire du volume de bois, nous dérivons le contrat optimal en imposant une telle forme de redevance et nous caractérisons la perte en terme de profit espéré qui résulte de l'utilisation de ce type de contrat plutôt que du contrat non linéaire plus général. Finalement, toujours dans le contexte statique, nous montrons à travers un mécanisme optimal d'enchère au second prix qu'en introduisant ainsi la compétition entre les firmes le propriétaire forestier augmente son profit espéré. Les résultats obtenus dans le contexte dynamique diffèrent pour la plupart de ceux obtenus dans le cas statique. Nous montrons que le contrat optimal prévoit alors que chaque type de firme, incluant celle ayant le coût le plus élevé, obtient une rente strictement positive, laquelle augmente dans le temps. Ceci est nécessaire pour obtenir la révélation à moindre coût à la période courante du véritable type de la firme. Comme implication, la rotation optimale s'accroît aussi dans le temps. Finalement, nous montrons qu'il y a distorsion en asymétrique d'information par rapport à l'optimum de pleine information même pour le coût le plus bas (la réalisation la plus favorable). La concurrence introduite dans le premier essai sous forme d'enchère au second prix suppose que chaque firme connaît exactement son propre coût de coupe. Dans le deuxième essai nous relâchons cette hypothèse. En réalité, ni le propriétaire forestier ni les firmes ne connaissent avec précision les coûts de coupe. Chaque firme observe de manière privée un signal sur son coût. Par exemple chaque firme est autorisée à visiter un lot pour avoir une estimation (signal) de son coût de coupe. Cependant cette évaluation est approximative. Ainsi, le coût de chaque firme va dépendre des estimations (signaux) d'autres firmes participantes. Nous sommes en présence d'un mécanisme à valeurs interdépendantes. Dans ce contexte, la valeur d'une allocation dépend des signaux de toutes les firmes. Le mécanisme optimal (attribution des droits d'exploitation, redevance et âge de coupe) est exploré. Nous déterminons les conditions sous lesquelles le mécanisme optimal peut être implémenté par une enchère au second prix et dérivons la rotation optimale et le prix de réserve dans le contexte de ce type d'enchère. Le troisième essai de la thèse analyse l'impact à long terme du recyclage sur la surface de terre affectée à la forêt. L'un des principaux arguments qui milite en faveur du recours au recyclage est que cela entraînerait une réduction de la coupe de bois, épargnant ainsi des arbres. L'objectif est donc d'aboutir à un nombre d'arbres plus important qu'en l'absence de recyclage. L'idée d'accroître le stock d'arbre tient au fait que les forêts génèrent des externalités: elles créent un flux de services récréatifs, freinent l'érosion des sols et des rives des cours d'eau et absorbent du dioxyde de carbone présent dans l'atmosphère. Étant donné la présence d'externalités, l'équilibre des marchés résulterait en un nombre d'arbre insuffisant, justifiant donc la mise en oeuvre de politiques visant à l'accroître. Le but de ce troisième essai est de voir dans quelle mesure la promotion du recyclage est un instrument approprié pour atteindre un tel objectif. En d'autres mots, comment le recyclage affecte-t-il à long terme la surface de terre en forêt et l'âge de coupe? Nous étudions cette question en spécifiant un modèle dynamique d'allocation d'un terrain donné, par un propriétaire forestier privé, entre la forêt et une utilisation alternative du terrain, comme l'agriculture. Une fois les arbres coupés, il décide d'une nouvelle allocation du terrain. Il le fait indéfiniment comme dans le cadre du modèle de Faustmann. Le bois coupé est transformé en produit final qui est en partie recyclé comme substitut du bois original. Ainsi, les outputs passés affectent le prix courant. Nous montrons que, paradoxalement, un accroissement du taux de recyclage réduira à long terme la surface forestière et donc diminuera le nombre d'arbres plantés. Par contre l'âge de coupe optimal va s'accroître. L'effet net sur le volume de bois offert sur le marché est ambigu. Le principal message cependant est qu'à long terme le recyclage va résulter en une surface en forêt plus petite et non plus grande. Donc, si le but est d'accroître la surface en forêt, il pourrait être préférable de faire appel à d'autres types d'instruments de politique que celui d'encourager le recyclage. / This thesis consists of three essays. The first two deal with the design of optimal royalty contracts for forestry exploitation under asymmetric information. The third examines the impact of recycling on the long-run forestry. The management of forest resources often involves the delegation of the harvesting operation by the forest owner to a harvesting firm. This delegation takes the form of a concession contract in which the forest owner leases logging rights to companies specialized in planting and harvesting, in return for preestablished royalty payments. The royalty (monetary transfers) can be set through different methods. For example, the forest owner can organize an auction among firms. Another way is to negotiate directly with a single firm the terms of the exploitation of the forest and hence the monetary transfers. To set the royalty schedule, the forest owner ideally needs to know the firms' costs, namely the harvesting and planting costs. In practice however firms are better informed about their costs than the forest owner. Under this asymmetry of information, the optimal royalty must therefore take into account informational constraints. The first two essays characterize the optimal royalty and the optimal rotation period under those conditions. The first essay analyzes the optimal contract under the assumption that the harvesting cost of each firm is perfectly known to itself but not to the forest owner. The problem is examined both in a static context, where the costs are perfectly correlated over time, and in a dynamic context where the costs are intertemporally independent. It is shown that both in the static and in the dynamic cases, the optimal rotation will satisfy a modified version of the Faustmann rule which holds under symmetric information, the modification being necessary in order to induce cost revelation on the part of the harvesting firm. As a result, looking first at the static case, the optimal rotation period will be longer in the asymmetric information case than in the symmetric information case. It is also shown how the cut-off cost can be endogenized, thus increasing the owner's expected profit by making sure that unprofitable forests are not exploited. Finally the comparison is made of the royalty in the symmetric and asymmetric information cases. Because forest contracts are in practice typically linear in the volume harvested, the optimal royalty is derived under the constraint that it is a linear function of the volume harvested and the loss in expected welfare from using a linear contract instead of the theoretically more general nonlinear contract is characterized. Finally, still in the static context, it is shown that the forest owner could raise its expected profit by allowing competition among firms through public auctions. It is shown in the dynamic context that, unlike in the static case, all firms, including the highest-cost type, get a strictly positive rent. It is also shown that the firm's rent rises over time. This is necessary in order to get revelation at a lower cost in the current period. Therefore, the optimal rotation increases over time as well. The optimal contract under asymmetry of information also has the effect of distorting the lowest-cost firm in this case. In the second essay, the assumption that the harvesting cost of each firm is perfectly known to itself is dropped. Indeed, in practice neither the forest owner nor the firms know the costs perfectly. Each firm only observes a signal of its cost. For example each firm may be allowed to survey a tract of forest to obtain an estimate (signal) of its cutting cost. Given that its observation is imperfect, a firm's cost will therefore depend on estimations (signals) by the other firms as well, which are private information. This second essay then raises the problem of auction design with firms whose values (costs) are interdependent. In this context, the value of an allocation will depend on the signals of all of the participating firms. The optimal contract is characterized and the conditions under which the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a second price auction are explored. The optimal rotation and the reservation price are derived under this auction mechanism. The third essay studies the effect of recycling on the land area devoted to forestry in the long run. Interest in recycling of forest products has grown in recent years, one of the goals being to conserve trees or possibly increase their number to compensate for positive externalities generated by the forest and neglected by the market. This paper explores the issue as to whether recycling is an appropriate measure to attain such a goal. We do this by considering the problem of the private owner of an area of land, who, acting as a price taker, decides how to allocate his land over time between forestry and some other use, and at what age to harvest the forest area chosen. Once the forest is cut, he makes a new land allocation decision and replants. He does so indefinitely, in a Faustmann-like framework. The wood from the harvest is transformed into a final product which is partly recycled into a substitute for the virgin wood, so that past output affects the current price. We show that in such a context, increasing the rate of recycling will result in less area being devoted to forestry. It will also have the effect of increasing the harvest age of the forest, as long as the planting cost is positive. The net effect on the flow of virgin wood being harvested to supply the market will as a result be ambiguous. An important point however is that recycling will result in less trees in the long run, not more. It would therefore be best to resort to other means if the goal is to conserve the area devoted to forestry.

本文考慮當資訊不對稱下的逆向選擇問題存在時,如何遵循Myerson(1979)提出的揭露原則 (the revelation principle)來設計一套具備誘因相容性 (incentive compatibility)的存款保險契約,契約中的自有資本比率為要保機構的自我選擇變數 (self-selection variable),而保險費則為存保公司用來控制要保機構決策行為的控制變數(control var iable),依此可以建立一套自我選擇機能(self-selection mechanism),來促使要保機構誠實揭其風險類型的私有訊息(private information),進而將要保機構依風險高低正確分類,徹底解決訊息不對稱下的逆向選擇問題。

<p>Sammanfattning</p><p>Vi har undersökt hur kreditprocessen påverkas ur kredithandläggarens perspektiv, av att det kreditsökande småföretaget använder sig av en extern rådgivare eftersom tidigare forskning tyder på att det blivit svårare för dessa företag ett erhålla finansiering från banker. Ändringen i förmånsrättslagen 2004 är en bidragande faktor till småföretagens prekära situation eftersom det försämrade bankens utdelning vid en eventuell företagskonkurs. När en småföretagares kunskaper inte räcker till, kan en extern rådgivare konsulteras för vägledning i kreditprocessen. Vårt syfte med uppsatsen var att beskriva kredithandläggarnas uppfattning om den externa rådgivarens olika funktioner i kreditprocessen samt att analysera hur kreditprocessen påverkas av att en extern rådgivare agerar i småföretagets intresse. Vi har genom en kvalitativ undersökning och studerat fyra kredithandläggare i fyra olika banker med erfarenhet av vårt ställda problem och fångat deras respektive betraktelser. Resultaten pekar på att respondenterna upplever problemet på ett liknande sätt och våra huvudsakliga slutsatser har framkommit efter att vi studerat den externa rådgivarens olika funktioner i kreditprocessen. Konsultation av extern rådgivning innebär att kunskap tillförs i kreditprocessen vilket leder till att ett mer genomarbetat beslutsunderlag kan presenteras för banken. Vidare ger en extern rådgivare legitimitet åt kredithandläggarens beslutsunderlag och ökar därmed förtroendet för småföretaget vilket kan förbättra relationen mellan de två sistnämnda parterna. En risk har belysts för kredithandläggaren med att den externa rådgivaren undanhåller viktig information eftersom denne har ett egenintresse av att småföretaget beviljas krediten då det kan leda till ett fortsatt framtida samarbete dem emellan. </p><p>Abstract</p><p>We have investigated the effect on the credit process out of the creditor’s point of view, when a small business consults an external adviser since earlier research indicates that it has become more difficult for these businesses to provide capital from banks. The alteration in the Law of priority in debtor’s property on credits 2004 is a contributory cause to the small businesses precarious situation since it deteriorated banks dividends in a possible liquidation. If a small businessman’s knowledge doesn’t ad up, an external adviser can be consulted as guidance in the credit process. Our purposes with this essay were to describe the creditor’s opinion regarding the external adviser’s different functions in the credit process and to analyze the effect on the credit process when an external adviser acts in the small business interest. Through a qualitative investigation we have studied four creditors in four different banks with experience from our named problem and captured their respective reflections. The result indicates that our creditors experience the problem in a similar way and our main conclusions have emerged by studying the external adviser’s different functions in the credit process. Consultation of an external adviser represents that knowledge provides the credit process which lead up to more thoroughly decision-making data to present for the bank. An external adviser also concedes legitimacy towards the creditor’s decision-making data and increases thereby the confidence towards the small business which can improve the relation between the two last mentioned parties. A risk have become elucidated for the creditor which means that the external adviser withhold important information due to ones own interest that the small business gets granted the credit since it can lead to a continuous future collaboration between them.</p>

Sammanfattning Vi har undersökt hur kreditprocessen påverkas ur kredithandläggarens perspektiv, av att det kreditsökande småföretaget använder sig av en extern rådgivare eftersom tidigare forskning tyder på att det blivit svårare för dessa företag ett erhålla finansiering från banker. Ändringen i förmånsrättslagen 2004 är en bidragande faktor till småföretagens prekära situation eftersom det försämrade bankens utdelning vid en eventuell företagskonkurs. När en småföretagares kunskaper inte räcker till, kan en extern rådgivare konsulteras för vägledning i kreditprocessen. Vårt syfte med uppsatsen var att beskriva kredithandläggarnas uppfattning om den externa rådgivarens olika funktioner i kreditprocessen samt att analysera hur kreditprocessen påverkas av att en extern rådgivare agerar i småföretagets intresse. Vi har genom en kvalitativ undersökning och studerat fyra kredithandläggare i fyra olika banker med erfarenhet av vårt ställda problem och fångat deras respektive betraktelser. Resultaten pekar på att respondenterna upplever problemet på ett liknande sätt och våra huvudsakliga slutsatser har framkommit efter att vi studerat den externa rådgivarens olika funktioner i kreditprocessen. Konsultation av extern rådgivning innebär att kunskap tillförs i kreditprocessen vilket leder till att ett mer genomarbetat beslutsunderlag kan presenteras för banken. Vidare ger en extern rådgivare legitimitet åt kredithandläggarens beslutsunderlag och ökar därmed förtroendet för småföretaget vilket kan förbättra relationen mellan de två sistnämnda parterna. En risk har belysts för kredithandläggaren med att den externa rådgivaren undanhåller viktig information eftersom denne har ett egenintresse av att småföretaget beviljas krediten då det kan leda till ett fortsatt framtida samarbete dem emellan. Abstract We have investigated the effect on the credit process out of the creditor’s point of view, when a small business consults an external adviser since earlier research indicates that it has become more difficult for these businesses to provide capital from banks. The alteration in the Law of priority in debtor’s property on credits 2004 is a contributory cause to the small businesses precarious situation since it deteriorated banks dividends in a possible liquidation. If a small businessman’s knowledge doesn’t ad up, an external adviser can be consulted as guidance in the credit process. Our purposes with this essay were to describe the creditor’s opinion regarding the external adviser’s different functions in the credit process and to analyze the effect on the credit process when an external adviser acts in the small business interest. Through a qualitative investigation we have studied four creditors in four different banks with experience from our named problem and captured their respective reflections. The result indicates that our creditors experience the problem in a similar way and our main conclusions have emerged by studying the external adviser’s different functions in the credit process. Consultation of an external adviser represents that knowledge provides the credit process which lead up to more thoroughly decision-making data to present for the bank. An external adviser also concedes legitimacy towards the creditor’s decision-making data and increases thereby the confidence towards the small business which can improve the relation between the two last mentioned parties. A risk have become elucidated for the creditor which means that the external adviser withhold important information due to ones own interest that the small business gets granted the credit since it can lead to a continuous future collaboration between them.