Sammanfattning Vi har undersökt hur kreditprocessen påverkas ur kredithandläggarens perspektiv, av att det kreditsökande småföretaget använder sig av en extern rådgivare eftersom tidigare forskning tyder på att det blivit svårare för dessa företag ett erhålla finansiering från banker. Ändringen i förmånsrättslagen 2004 är en bidragande faktor till småföretagens prekära situation eftersom det försämrade bankens utdelning vid en eventuell företagskonkurs. När en småföretagares kunskaper inte räcker till, kan en extern rådgivare konsulteras för vägledning i kreditprocessen. Vårt syfte med uppsatsen var att beskriva kredithandläggarnas uppfattning om den externa rådgivarens olika funktioner i kreditprocessen samt att analysera hur kreditprocessen påverkas av att en extern rådgivare agerar i småföretagets intresse. Vi har genom en kvalitativ undersökning och studerat fyra kredithandläggare i fyra olika banker med erfarenhet av vårt ställda problem och fångat deras respektive betraktelser. Resultaten pekar på att respondenterna upplever problemet på ett liknande sätt och våra huvudsakliga slutsatser har framkommit efter att vi studerat den externa rådgivarens olika funktioner i kreditprocessen. Konsultation av extern rådgivning innebär att kunskap tillförs i kreditprocessen vilket leder till att ett mer genomarbetat beslutsunderlag kan presenteras för banken. Vidare ger en extern rådgivare legitimitet åt kredithandläggarens beslutsunderlag och ökar därmed förtroendet för småföretaget vilket kan förbättra relationen mellan de två sistnämnda parterna. En risk har belysts för kredithandläggaren med att den externa rådgivaren undanhåller viktig information eftersom denne har ett egenintresse av att småföretaget beviljas krediten då det kan leda till ett fortsatt framtida samarbete dem emellan. Abstract We have investigated the effect on the credit process out of the creditor’s point of view, when a small business consults an external adviser since earlier research indicates that it has become more difficult for these businesses to provide capital from banks. The alteration in the Law of priority in debtor’s property on credits 2004 is a contributory cause to the small businesses precarious situation since it deteriorated banks dividends in a possible liquidation. If a small businessman’s knowledge doesn’t ad up, an external adviser can be consulted as guidance in the credit process. Our purposes with this essay were to describe the creditor’s opinion regarding the external adviser’s different functions in the credit process and to analyze the effect on the credit process when an external adviser acts in the small business interest. Through a qualitative investigation we have studied four creditors in four different banks with experience from our named problem and captured their respective reflections. The result indicates that our creditors experience the problem in a similar way and our main conclusions have emerged by studying the external adviser’s different functions in the credit process. Consultation of an external adviser represents that knowledge provides the credit process which lead up to more thoroughly decision-making data to present for the bank. An external adviser also concedes legitimacy towards the creditor’s decision-making data and increases thereby the confidence towards the small business which can improve the relation between the two last mentioned parties. A risk have become elucidated for the creditor which means that the external adviser withhold important information due to ones own interest that the small business gets granted the credit since it can lead to a continuous future collaboration between them.

在保險市場中，保險商品主要透過保險經紀人、保險代理人以及保險人所掌握的直接通路予以販售，特別是在大型商業財產及責任保險的行銷通路上，保險經紀人扮演了舉足輕重的角色。本論文主要是以商業財產及責任保險市場為研究重心，並由經濟觀點探討保險經紀人的仲介角色、市場競爭態勢、報酬結構以及業務安排方式等，同時以保險監理的角度檢討保險經紀行業存在的誠信自律、利益衝突以及客戶公平對待等問題。 不同於保險代理人，保險經紀人係基於保單持有人之利益為其安排保險。因此，保險經紀人必須透過多家保險人提供報價的方式，從中選擇價格及條件最佳者做為保險業務安排之對象；換言之，誠實的報價程序，方足以保障客戶之利益並維繫保險市場的健全。然而國外近年發生的大型保險經紀人與部分保險人共謀提供不實之報價事件，不僅嚴重影響到保單持有人的權益，更引發了對於保險經紀人不當市場力量運用以及或有佣金（contingent commissions）制度存廢的廣泛討論。2004年10月14日紐約州總檢察官Eliot Spitzer向紐約州最高法院針對全球最大保險經紀商Marsh & McLennan及部分保險人所涉及的投標詐欺、操縱價格、收受保險公司或有佣金等三大罪狀提出了民事訴訟。此案例不僅使得涉案公司付出鉅額賠償，更暴露出大型保險經紀人公司存在已久的市場壟斷、價格操控、利益衝突等問題。 對照於英、美等國在保險經紀人制度方面的成熟與發達，我國在此方面尚屬新興發展階段，所謂他山之石可以攻錯，借重先行者的經驗，不僅可以避免重蹈覆轍，更可加快成長的腳步；在全球化的浪潮衝擊之下，保險經紀市場唯有與國際充分接軌，並健全相關制度，才能為國內保險市場的業務成長，帶來蓬勃生機，並立下永續發展的堅固磐石。 / In the insurance market, policies are sold through direct channels controlled by insurance companies or intermediaries, such as brokers and agents. Brokers play a vital role in the property & casualty insurance market and serving commercial clients with complex and large exposures. This report focusing on the commercial property & casualty insurance market, we look at the economic performance by brokers, the competitive structure of the marketplace, the compensation arrangements for brokers, and the placement with insurers. Furthermore, we also from regulators’ point of view to study and review a variety of issues, such as the ethics and conduct , conflict of interest, treating customers fairly, which are raised from insurance brokers industry. In contrast to captive agents, brokers act on behalf of the insured, for this circumstance, the role of the brokers is to increase price and coverage competitiveness, by providing the customers access to a wider range of possible insurers. Clearly the integrity of the bidding process is very important to protect the interest of customers and to the health of the insurance brokers market. Unfortunately, the integrity of the placement process by brokers has been questioned due to the allegations of bid rigging in which one or more global brokers and a few insurers appear to have conspired to submit non-competitive bids. This anti-competitive practice is not only detrimental to the customers but also cause public concerned that too much market power lead to abuses by brokers and that contingent commissions should be abolished. On October 14, 2004, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer filed suit against Marsh & McLennan alleging that the insurance brokers engaged in bid rigging and received widespread kickbacks from insurance companies. On January 31, 2005, Marsh agreed to pay $850 million in restitution to buyers as part of an agreement to settle the suit, but lawsuits still in progress. The above-mentioned case has revealed conflict of interest, anti-competitive and market manipulation for meg-brokers, in fact, these problems existed for a long time. Comparing with US and UK insurance brokers market, Taiwan is belong to emerging market, to gain knowledge of pioneer’s developing experience, we could shorten the time to get more progress. When we deal with the globalization challenge, local insurance broker market should be complied with international practices, improve relative rules and regulations is also necessary, once above situations are available, it could help domestic insurance market rapid and healthy growth.

Cette thèse est composée de trois essais en économie forestière. Les deux premiers s'intéressent à la fixation de la redevance optimale à laquelle fait face le propriétaire d'une ressource forestière dans un contexte d'information asymétrique. Le troisième analyse l'impact à long terme du recyclage sur la surface de terre affectée à la forêt. La gestion des ressources forestières implique souvent la délégation des droits de coupe par le propriétaire forestier à une entreprise exploitante. Cette délégation prend la forme d'un contrat de concession par lequel le propriétaire forestier octroie les droits d'exploitation aux compagnies forestières, en contrepartie d'une redevance (transfert monétaire). L'octroie des droits d'exploitation s'effectue généralement sous plusieurs modes, dont les plus répandus sont les appels d'offres publics et les contrats de gré à gré, où le propriétaire forestier et la firme exploitante spécifient entre autres la redevance dans les clauses d'exploitation de la forêt. Pour déterminer le mécanisme optimal (choix de la firme, âge de coupe et redevance), le propriétaire forestier a idéalement besoin de connaître les coûts de coupe et de reboisement. Or en réalité, les firmes sont mieux informées sur leurs coûts que le propriétaire forestier. Dans ce contexte d'information asymétrique, le mécanisme optimal doit donc prendre en considération des contraintes informationnelles. Les deux premiers essais caractérisent, sous ces conditions, l'âge de coupe optimal (la rotation optimale) et la redevance optimale. Le premier essai examine le contrat optimal quand le propriétaire forestier cède les droits de coupes à une firme par un accord de gré à gré ou par une procédure d'appel d'offre public au second prix. L'analyse du problème est menée premièrement dans un contexte statique, dans le sens que les coûts de coupe sont parfaitement corrélés dans le temps, puis dans un contexte dynamique, où les coûts sont indépendants dans le temps. L'examen en statique et en dynamique montre que la rotation optimale va satisfaire une version modifiée de la règle de Faustmann qui prévaudrait en information symétrique. Cette modification est nécessaire afin d'inciter la firme à révéler ses vrais coûts. Dans le cas statique, il en résulte que la rotation optimale est plus élevée en information asymétrique qu'en situation de pleine information. Nous montrons également comment le seuil maximal de coût de coupe peut être endogénéisé, afin de permettre au propriétaire d'accroître son profit espéré en s'assurant que les forêts non profitables ne seront pas exploitées. Nous comparons ensuite la redevance optimale en information asymétrique et symétrique. Les redevances forestières dans un arrangement de gré à gré étant généralement, en pratique, une fonction linéaire du volume de bois, nous dérivons le contrat optimal en imposant une telle forme de redevance et nous caractérisons la perte en terme de profit espéré qui résulte de l'utilisation de ce type de contrat plutôt que du contrat non linéaire plus général. Finalement, toujours dans le contexte statique, nous montrons à travers un mécanisme optimal d'enchère au second prix qu'en introduisant ainsi la compétition entre les firmes le propriétaire forestier augmente son profit espéré. Les résultats obtenus dans le contexte dynamique diffèrent pour la plupart de ceux obtenus dans le cas statique. Nous montrons que le contrat optimal prévoit alors que chaque type de firme, incluant celle ayant le coût le plus élevé, obtient une rente strictement positive, laquelle augmente dans le temps. Ceci est nécessaire pour obtenir la révélation à moindre coût à la période courante du véritable type de la firme. Comme implication, la rotation optimale s'accroît aussi dans le temps. Finalement, nous montrons qu'il y a distorsion en asymétrique d'information par rapport à l'optimum de pleine information même pour le coût le plus bas (la réalisation la plus favorable). La concurrence introduite dans le premier essai sous forme d'enchère au second prix suppose que chaque firme connaît exactement son propre coût de coupe. Dans le deuxième essai nous relâchons cette hypothèse. En réalité, ni le propriétaire forestier ni les firmes ne connaissent avec précision les coûts de coupe. Chaque firme observe de manière privée un signal sur son coût. Par exemple chaque firme est autorisée à visiter un lot pour avoir une estimation (signal) de son coût de coupe. Cependant cette évaluation est approximative. Ainsi, le coût de chaque firme va dépendre des estimations (signaux) d'autres firmes participantes. Nous sommes en présence d'un mécanisme à valeurs interdépendantes. Dans ce contexte, la valeur d'une allocation dépend des signaux de toutes les firmes. Le mécanisme optimal (attribution des droits d'exploitation, redevance et âge de coupe) est exploré. Nous déterminons les conditions sous lesquelles le mécanisme optimal peut être implémenté par une enchère au second prix et dérivons la rotation optimale et le prix de réserve dans le contexte de ce type d'enchère. Le troisième essai de la thèse analyse l'impact à long terme du recyclage sur la surface de terre affectée à la forêt. L'un des principaux arguments qui milite en faveur du recours au recyclage est que cela entraînerait une réduction de la coupe de bois, épargnant ainsi des arbres. L'objectif est donc d'aboutir à un nombre d'arbres plus important qu'en l'absence de recyclage. L'idée d'accroître le stock d'arbre tient au fait que les forêts génèrent des externalités: elles créent un flux de services récréatifs, freinent l'érosion des sols et des rives des cours d'eau et absorbent du dioxyde de carbone présent dans l'atmosphère. Étant donné la présence d'externalités, l'équilibre des marchés résulterait en un nombre d'arbre insuffisant, justifiant donc la mise en oeuvre de politiques visant à l'accroître. Le but de ce troisième essai est de voir dans quelle mesure la promotion du recyclage est un instrument approprié pour atteindre un tel objectif. En d'autres mots, comment le recyclage affecte-t-il à long terme la surface de terre en forêt et l'âge de coupe? Nous étudions cette question en spécifiant un modèle dynamique d'allocation d'un terrain donné, par un propriétaire forestier privé, entre la forêt et une utilisation alternative du terrain, comme l'agriculture. Une fois les arbres coupés, il décide d'une nouvelle allocation du terrain. Il le fait indéfiniment comme dans le cadre du modèle de Faustmann. Le bois coupé est transformé en produit final qui est en partie recyclé comme substitut du bois original. Ainsi, les outputs passés affectent le prix courant. Nous montrons que, paradoxalement, un accroissement du taux de recyclage réduira à long terme la surface forestière et donc diminuera le nombre d'arbres plantés. Par contre l'âge de coupe optimal va s'accroître. L'effet net sur le volume de bois offert sur le marché est ambigu. Le principal message cependant est qu'à long terme le recyclage va résulter en une surface en forêt plus petite et non plus grande. Donc, si le but est d'accroître la surface en forêt, il pourrait être préférable de faire appel à d'autres types d'instruments de politique que celui d'encourager le recyclage. / This thesis consists of three essays. The first two deal with the design of optimal royalty contracts for forestry exploitation under asymmetric information. The third examines the impact of recycling on the long-run forestry. The management of forest resources often involves the delegation of the harvesting operation by the forest owner to a harvesting firm. This delegation takes the form of a concession contract in which the forest owner leases logging rights to companies specialized in planting and harvesting, in return for preestablished royalty payments. The royalty (monetary transfers) can be set through different methods. For example, the forest owner can organize an auction among firms. Another way is to negotiate directly with a single firm the terms of the exploitation of the forest and hence the monetary transfers. To set the royalty schedule, the forest owner ideally needs to know the firms' costs, namely the harvesting and planting costs. In practice however firms are better informed about their costs than the forest owner. Under this asymmetry of information, the optimal royalty must therefore take into account informational constraints. The first two essays characterize the optimal royalty and the optimal rotation period under those conditions. The first essay analyzes the optimal contract under the assumption that the harvesting cost of each firm is perfectly known to itself but not to the forest owner. The problem is examined both in a static context, where the costs are perfectly correlated over time, and in a dynamic context where the costs are intertemporally independent. It is shown that both in the static and in the dynamic cases, the optimal rotation will satisfy a modified version of the Faustmann rule which holds under symmetric information, the modification being necessary in order to induce cost revelation on the part of the harvesting firm. As a result, looking first at the static case, the optimal rotation period will be longer in the asymmetric information case than in the symmetric information case. It is also shown how the cut-off cost can be endogenized, thus increasing the owner's expected profit by making sure that unprofitable forests are not exploited. Finally the comparison is made of the royalty in the symmetric and asymmetric information cases. Because forest contracts are in practice typically linear in the volume harvested, the optimal royalty is derived under the constraint that it is a linear function of the volume harvested and the loss in expected welfare from using a linear contract instead of the theoretically more general nonlinear contract is characterized. Finally, still in the static context, it is shown that the forest owner could raise its expected profit by allowing competition among firms through public auctions. It is shown in the dynamic context that, unlike in the static case, all firms, including the highest-cost type, get a strictly positive rent. It is also shown that the firm's rent rises over time. This is necessary in order to get revelation at a lower cost in the current period. Therefore, the optimal rotation increases over time as well. The optimal contract under asymmetry of information also has the effect of distorting the lowest-cost firm in this case. In the second essay, the assumption that the harvesting cost of each firm is perfectly known to itself is dropped. Indeed, in practice neither the forest owner nor the firms know the costs perfectly. Each firm only observes a signal of its cost. For example each firm may be allowed to survey a tract of forest to obtain an estimate (signal) of its cutting cost. Given that its observation is imperfect, a firm's cost will therefore depend on estimations (signals) by the other firms as well, which are private information. This second essay then raises the problem of auction design with firms whose values (costs) are interdependent. In this context, the value of an allocation will depend on the signals of all of the participating firms. The optimal contract is characterized and the conditions under which the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a second price auction are explored. The optimal rotation and the reservation price are derived under this auction mechanism. The third essay studies the effect of recycling on the land area devoted to forestry in the long run. Interest in recycling of forest products has grown in recent years, one of the goals being to conserve trees or possibly increase their number to compensate for positive externalities generated by the forest and neglected by the market. This paper explores the issue as to whether recycling is an appropriate measure to attain such a goal. We do this by considering the problem of the private owner of an area of land, who, acting as a price taker, decides how to allocate his land over time between forestry and some other use, and at what age to harvest the forest area chosen. Once the forest is cut, he makes a new land allocation decision and replants. He does so indefinitely, in a Faustmann-like framework. The wood from the harvest is transformed into a final product which is partly recycled into a substitute for the virgin wood, so that past output affects the current price. We show that in such a context, increasing the rate of recycling will result in less area being devoted to forestry. It will also have the effect of increasing the harvest age of the forest, as long as the planting cost is positive. The net effect on the flow of virgin wood being harvested to supply the market will as a result be ambiguous. An important point however is that recycling will result in less trees in the long run, not more. It would therefore be best to resort to other means if the goal is to conserve the area devoted to forestry.

Submitted by Gustavo Silva Araujo (00araujogs@gmail.com) on 2013-12-11T15:36:37Z No. of bitstreams: 1 tese Gustavo Araujo.pdf: 1480340 bytes, checksum: 7f293b1022a44c6056c471633c80981d (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by ÁUREA CORRÊA DA FONSECA CORRÊA DA FONSECA (aurea.fonseca@fgv.br) on 2013-12-16T12:31:03Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 tese Gustavo Araujo.pdf: 1480340 bytes, checksum: 7f293b1022a44c6056c471633c80981d (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2013-12-19T16:32:32Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 tese Gustavo Araujo.pdf: 1480340 bytes, checksum: 7f293b1022a44c6056c471633c80981d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-12-19T16:32:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 tese Gustavo Araujo.pdf: 1480340 bytes, checksum: 7f293b1022a44c6056c471633c80981d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-03-31 / This thesis is dedicated to studies in finance. The topics are distributed in two subareas, microstructure and asset pricing. There is also an insertion of the study in corporate finance, since we deal with the corporate governance of firms. In the first chapter I estimate the adverse selection cost component embedded in the spreads of Brazilian stocks. I also study the patterns of spreads and adverse selection costs as a function of the size and time of the trade. In chapter two, I implement an extensive research through a series of regressions in order to determine characteristics of the companies that are correlated with the adverse selection component and the spread. In particular, we analyze the relationship between the adverse selection and corporate governance levels. In the third chapter I detect which corporate governance mechanisms cause an opposite relationship between the returns of Brazilian stocks and corporate governance levels, as shown by Carvalhal and Nobili (2011). In this analysis, I emphasize the ownership concentration of Brazilian companies, which is extremely high when compared with more developed countries. / Esta tese se dedica a estudos na área de finanças. Os estudos se subdividem nas subáreas de microestrutura e apreçamento de ativos, mas há uma inserção do trabalho em finanças corporativas, uma vez que trato da governança corporativa das empresas. No primeiro capítulo estimo o coeficiente de assimetria de informação embutido no spread de compra e venda de ações brasileiras. Além disso, verifico se há padrões para esse coeficiente e para o próprio spread em relação ao tamanho da transação e à hora de negociação. No capítulo dois, eu investigo quais características ligadas às empresas têm relação com as variáveis estimadas no capítulo 1, o coeficiente de assimetria de informação embutido no spread de compra e venda de ações brasileiras e o próprio spread. A governança corporativa das empresas é uma das características examinadas. No terceiro capítulo, eu observo quais mecanismos de governança corporativa fazem com que haja uma relação antagônica entre os retornos das ações brasileiras e o índice de governança corporativa, conforme mostrado por Carvalhal e Nobili (2011). Nesta investigação, dou ênfase à concentração acionária das empresas brasileiras que, em comparação com países mais desenvolvidos, é extremamente alta.

Magister Artium - MA / The study concludes that the existence of HTAs in the USA is explained by the socially enforced institution of the hijos del pueblo (sons of the town) having a duty to help their hometowns, as well as the private benefits of preserving Garífuna traditions and the possibility of helping repatriate dead immigrants. Fulfilling this duty (and the consequent prestige attained) provides the incentives to send CRs home. In the cases studied, CRs were used to partly finance potable water projects, electricity projects, road paving, a community centre and the construction of a Catholic temple. In most of the cases HTAs worked with a local development organisation, known as Patronato, which formed specific committees for executing projects, for example the water and the electricity committees. For the construction of the temple, a religious organisation known as Pastoral was the local partner. The term Collective Remittances (CRs) refers to the money sent by migrant associations, known as Hometown Associations (HTAs), to Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) in their hometowns for financing public works projects. Few cases of CR are known in Honduras. The only ones reported are among the Garífunaethnic group living on the Caribbean Coast, and with a large migrant community in New York City (NYC). This mini-master’s thesis is the first study written on CRs in Honduras. It studies CR experiences in four Garífuna hometowns and their corresponding HTAs in NYC. It answers three questions: How do CRs work in each case? What are the determinants for HTAs to provide CRs to the hometowns? And what are the determinants for local CBOs in the hometowns to use the CRs effectively to provide public goods in the hometowns? CR is conceptualised as a that chooses which local group and project to finance, and the local CBO, which is the agent