Ce mémoire s'intéresse aux rôles des groupes communautaires LGBT et à leur influence sur le processus de formulation de la Politique québécoise de lutte contre l'homophobie. Il analyse les dynamiques entre les groupes représentant les intérêts des minorités sexuelles et de genres et le Gouvernement du Québec, pendant la période 2000-2011. Notre recherche mobilise un cadre théorique basé sur la théorie de la mobilisation des ressources, ainsi qu'une approche qui combine les outils de l'approche corporatiste et de l'approche pluraliste. Sur la base d'une analyse documentaire et de 6 entrevues menées avec des leaders communautaires LGBT et un.e fonctionnaire du Ministère de la justice, l'analyse révèle comment la question de l'homophobie au Québec a contribué à la création d'une relation corporatiste entre l'État et certains des groupes les mieux dotés en ressources. Elle offre également un regard nouveau sur les relations entre les groupes communautaires et les stratégies d'influences employées en fonction de leurs ressources / This masters thesis is about the roles of LGBT community groups and their influence on the creation of the Politique québécoise de lutte contre l'homophobie (Quebec's national policy against homophobia.) It analyses the dynamics between the groups representing the interests of sexual and gender minorities and the Quebec government, from 2000 to 2011. Our research uses a theoretical framework based on resource mobilization theory as well as an approach that combines the tools of the corporatist and pluralist approaches. On the basis of a documentary analysis and 6 interviews held with LGBT community leaders as well as official from the Ministry of Justice, the analysis reveals how the issue of homophobia in Quebec contributed to the creation of a corporatist relationship between the State and some of the groups controlling the most resources. It also offers a new perspective on the relations between community groups and the strategies they employ, as a function of their resources, to influence the State.

Notre travail se penche sur le financement de la formation professionnelle continue tel qu'il a été négocié par les partenaires sociaux dans les pays européens post-fordistes. A travers une approche des associations patronales centrée sur la distribution inégale des ressources entre grandes firmes et PME, nous montrons que l'émergence d'une gestion corporatiste (les fonds de mutualisation) peut s'interpréter comme le résultat d'alliances inter-classes entre les syndicats, les associations patronales et les PME, contre les grandes entreprises. Bien que nous mobilisions un corpus centré sur les employeurs à l’image de ce que fait l'approche en termes de Variétés du Capitalisme (VoC – Hall et Soskice, 2001), la thèse soutenue est plus proche de l’institutionnalisme historique de l'Ecole française de la Régulation. En effet, l'attention accordée à l'hétérogénéité des firmes et au rôle du politique est difficilement compatible avec l’institutionnalisme rationnel de la VoC et sa conception des associations patronales comme simples outils de coordination des firmes / Our work tackles the issue of the financing of the continuous vocational training as it has been negotiated by social partners in the post-fordist European countries. The reflection is centered on the unequal distribution of resources among the large and small firms affiliated to employer associations. It is shown that the emergence of a corporatist governance (the training funds) can be interpreted as the result of cross-class coalitions between trade unions, employer association and SMEs, against big companies. Although we mobilize a theoretical corpus centered on employers as the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ approach does (VoC – Hall and Soskice, 2001), our dissertation is closer to the historical institutionalism of the French Régulation School. Indeed, the attention granted to the firms’ heterogeneity and to the role of politics is hardly compatible with the VoC rational institutionalism and its conception of employer organizations as mere employer coordination instruments.

This study identifies the characteristics of seven key principles of good/corporate governance at three levels: as notions that originated in business; in their applications to sport through systematic review; and in relation to the interpretations given to them in the Olympic Movement. The aims of this study are, thus, to establish and utilise the IOC s definitions/interpretations and operationalisations of corporate and/or good governance developed in a western framework and apply to a non-western NOC, the Korean Olympic Committee (KOC). This study adopts critical realist assumptions which give rise to the hypothesis that both the regularities of the Korean society and its unobservable social structures have an impact on the corporate governance of the KOC. It also uses Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to examine each interviewee s discourse in order to identify the knowledge embraced by it and to interpret social practice(s) and the exercise of power. CDA is employed in relation to four selected events follows: the KOC/KSC merger, budgetary planning, the recruitment of staff in terms of gender and disability equity and the processes used for selecting the KOC President and the Chef de Mission. The unobservable deep structure is shown to be real domain in Korean society by the social practices exhibited in the four events. The government and, in particular, the State President represent the highest and most influential authority in decision-making on Korean sports policy. That power relationship coupled with the pre-existing structure of the KOC/KSC s financial dependency on the government has resulted in a situation where the government has been able to interfere greatly in the KOC/KSC s overall decision-making on sports policy including the election of the President of the KOC. The KOC/KSC President is the most influential stakeholder in the decision-making within the organisation including the selection of Chef de Mission. As the pre-existing structure of cultural expectations determines that women should usually quit their jobs after marriage and that people with disabilities are incapable of working, the strongly male with abilities-dominated organisational culture has resulted in a social phenomenon whereby few females or people with impairments have succeeded in being promoted to senior positions. From the macro-level perspective, the first KOC/KSC merger accomplished on the orders of the State President shows the dominance of economic power as suggested in Marxist influenced forms of analysis. The incumbent KOC President, who is at the pinnacle of the business elite, contributed to the KOC/KSC merger, which illustrates the aspect of elitism. In connection with the budgetary process, this may be viewed as evidence of the existence of a neo-corporatist structure in which the state plays a central role and acts in a unitary way with the involvement of a limited number of actors. With respect to the meso-level perspective, the aspect of clientelism is exhibited since the government habitually appoints its political aides to be the heads of various sporting organisations. Concerning political governance, it becomes obvious that the government has direct control over KOC/KSC s policy. In terms of systemic governance, the relations among the domestic stakeholders of the KOC are more likely to follow a hierarchical type of governance, as the government has adopted the highest position and the National Federations are under the control of the KOC/KSC. With reference to Lukes (1974) second dimension of power this can be evidenced in the context of the non-decision making roles of women and the disabled. The IOC s interpretations of the key principles of corporate governance in a western framework are applied to the KOC. Accountability, responsibility, transparency and democracy are established but the KOC s governance practices are not equivalent, while effectiveness and efficiency are interpreted as the same ways of the IOC s. In general, power centralisation is apparent throughout the Korean cultural context. The KOC s power structure and organisational culture is likely to be concentrated to the KOC President within the organisation and broadly, the Korean government enjoys its power centralisation decision-making in the Korean context which gives rise to a peculiarly Korean way of interpreting and applying the principles of corporate governance. In such circumstances, nevertheless, where the KOC is making an effort to align its practices with the IOC s recommendations as much as possible, the indication is that the KOC is on course to reflect the IOC s governance practices.

本論文強調以國家中心論的觀點 並從新國家主義的研究途徑 分析臺灣地區國家與勞工之間關係 運用該新國家主義的兩個概念 國家自主性與國家能力 以之比較臺灣地區不同勞工政策在自主性及能力之高低演變本論文參考諾丁傑的國家自主性類型觀點 並約化為兩個重點 一國家偏好如何強化進而取代社會導向 導向公共政策 二當前述兩者偏好不一致時 國家如何轉化社會偏好?透過國家與勞工團體對事業單位關場歇業政策及引進外勞政策兩項勞工政策偏好做論證以取得國家自主性程度評估 並進而與國家能力做關連性比較 是否國家自主性高低與國家能力強弱有必然關係 而最主要不同於以往研究論點 在不能忽略國家中心論者的論點亦即必須觀察國家在政策上的自主性 以及其執行政策的能力 避免僅以社會中心論的單面向研究途徑 而獲致對研究議題更正確及深刻的了解

This research constructs the theoretical framework through documentary analysis; it utilizes the approach of ¡§state and society relations¡¨ on the micro-level of the comparative politics, supplemented with the concept of ¡§corporatism¡¨. This research includes ¡§in-depth interview¡¨ and ¡§case study¡¨ to aim at examining two issues. While the Chinese government has been the central power, the enterprises are the key players in the businesses of modern China. When the private sector has prospered vigorously, the government faced increasing pressure from economic system reform. This indicates that the power of government will shift to the industry and trade association. This research finds that the trade association, deriving from ¡§top down¡¨ model, which can gain more self-Governance, is the successful case of transformation. Its character is that it neither seeks for power from the government during the transformation nor interest from the private sector, but, instead, serves for social welfare and receives more credibility from the public and better organizing autonomy. Since the south patrolling of Deng Xiaoping in 1992, the socialist market economy has been the goal China pursues. In 1998, the ninth session national representatives passed Decision of the structural reform of the State Council plan, and it pointed out ¡§establish a government administrative system with the Chinese characteristics and suitable to the socialist market economic system¡¨. In October 2003, the Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China passed Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Issues concerning the Improvement of the Socialist Market Economy . Obviously, in addition to the concept of open policy of the trade market, the policy on decentralization of governmental structural reform is in place. Those changes push the market mechanism to expand gradually, and accelerate the transformation of trade association. It makes the influence of trade association on industrial policy making grow. Particularly, Guangdong Province's economy opened early and also led the development of trade association. This research found that the system and development of trade association in Guangdong Province has exceeded that of the central government. ¡§Guangdong Food Profession Union¡¨ is one of the best examples. This research analyzes the development of food industry of both China and the Guangdong Province, in order to explain the relations among government, the business (market) and the society. Second, to analyze the development of trade association's of China and Guangdong Province to explain the formation of civil society. Third, using the case of ¡§Guangdong Food Profession Union¡¨ to study on its philosophy, institution and interest setting in order to map out the interaction among ¡§Guangdong Food Profession Union (GFPU)¡¨, government and business. Finally, it induces the relations among state, the market, the civil society. This research not only points out the similarities and differences between the study case and the general situation in China, but also classifies three kinds of trade association and within which the trade association of successful transformation might be called ¡§NGO with the Chinese characteristic¡¨. In brief, the social scope of trade association derived from ¡§top down¡¨ model, will de unavoidably deprived by the government. In the social scope formed by the trade association of successful transformation, the administrative authority is (Economic and Trade Commission) no longer in charge of them, but the ideology of Chinese Communist Party still exists. It was the ¡§civil society with the Chinese characteristic.¡¨

我國全民健康保險政策是屬於社會保險，早期在推行健保時決策模式是傾向國家主義，然而隨著民主化時代的來臨，人民權利意識抬頭，各種利害關係團體相應而生，因此民主治理變成重要的課題。在重要政策參與中各個利害關係人皆希望能夠被納入決策。我國目前健保政策體制內的參與管道最主要為費用協定委員會及監理委員會，主要監督及決定健保預算分配，這兩會在2013年整併為健保會。不論整併前後，委員會基本上是以統合主義的精神運作，邀進行決議，最大的優點在於能夠藉由與多方政策利害關係人的溝通，凝聚社會共識。然而哪些團體能夠代表參與政府制定決策的過程，參與的代表能否充分表達團體的意見？因此代表性正是統合主義中最具爭議的，故如何找出遴選團體的標準是刻不容緩的。 　　本文嘗試以社會統合主義的觀點，套用在健保會運作上。然而社會統合主義要運作的良好，基本上必須要在水平及垂直方面的機制建構完善，垂直層面必須要各級組織匯集各級團體的意見，並由代表進入水平的平臺進行協商；而在水平溝通平臺上也需要各方代表皆能有平等及有效的決策。本文最主要了解的是垂直面的整合情形，亦即這些被派入健保會的政策利害關係團體代表是否有充分的被賦權，在會中討論的結果能否充分落實，因此要衡量團體內部本身的治理。本文欲透過專家座談建構組織內部運作的指標，建構指標測量健保會內部實際運作情況，對於好的健保會參與組織建構初探性的評估。希望未來能夠作為健保會遴選組織進入委員會的參考依據。 / National Health Insurance (NHI) policy is a part of social insurance in Taiwan. In the early stages of the program, the pattern of decision-making tended to be based on a Statist model, but as Taiwan democratizes, citizens and various interest groups have become increasingly aware of their rights. Therefore, the democratic governance of National Health Insurance policy has also become an important issue, as stakeholder groups all hope to be included in the NHI’s decision making process. In Taiwan, the two main participation channels within the system are the Medical Expenditure Negotiation Committee and the Supervisory Committee. The main missions of these two committees are to control health care costs and to allocate medical resources. In 2013, these two committees were merged to form a single National Health Insurance Committee. Whichever their merger status is, the committees basically function according to the principles of Corporatism, whereby peak-level organizations are invited to take part of the committee’s decision-making processes. The biggest advantage of the merger is that the committee would be able to achieve social cohe-sion and consensus through its direct communication with various policy stakeholder groups. But the problem with this arrangement is the following: Which groups can participate in the government’s decision-making process? Can the representatives fully express the views of their respective groups inside the committee? Therefore, the question of representation is the most controversial issue in Corporatist theory, and it is imperative to develop the proper criteria by which major interest or corporatist groups are selected. This study attempts to observe the National Health Insurance Committee from the perspective of social corporatism. For social corporatism to function well in society, basically both its horizontal and vertical mechanisms have to work perfectly. Vertically, groups must be able to amass and integrate the views of their sub-organizations at all levels; horizontally, the group’s representatives must all have equal capacity to make effective decisions. This paper will focus on understanding the vertical dimension of social corporatism, which means asking the following questions: Can/do the representatives fully and adequately represent their group? And whether the outcomes discussed at the committee meetings are fully implemented? To answer these questions it is thereby necessary to measure the internal governance of the groups themselves. This paper will examine various internal operating indicators developed through experts’ panel discussions, with the primary objective of determining good committee participation measures. It is hoped that the construction of these internal governance indicators will serve as the criteria by which future corporatist groups or stakeholder organizations are selected into the National Health Insurance Committee

Submitted by Ivan Candido da Silva de Franco (ivan.csfranco@gmail.com) on 2015-04-23T03:31:20Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Como sao julgados os juizes_Dissertacao protocolada Ivan.pdf: 1691172 bytes, checksum: 2249f9859f24c8f63bd3ca7ee7f4e53a (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Vera Lúcia Mourão (vera.mourao@fgv.br) on 2015-04-23T17:39:36Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Como sao julgados os juizes_Dissertacao protocolada Ivan.pdf: 1691172 bytes, checksum: 2249f9859f24c8f63bd3ca7ee7f4e53a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-23T17:47:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Como sao julgados os juizes_Dissertacao protocolada Ivan.pdf: 1691172 bytes, checksum: 2249f9859f24c8f63bd3ca7ee7f4e53a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-03-25 / Uma das principais modificações introduzidas pela Reforma do Judiciário (Emenda Constitucional 45/2004) foi a criação do Conselho Nacional de Justiça (CNJ). Dentre suas competências constitucionais, a do controle dos deveres funcionais dos magistrados por meio dos Processos Administrativos Sancionadores foi bastante questionada, chegando a ser objeto de controle concentrado de constitucionalidade pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF). A composição do Conselho foi também alvo de reiteradas críticas, pois considerável parte dos conselheiros (6 dos 15, representando 40% do total) é composta por membros não oriundos da magistratura – vindos do Ministério Público, da Advocacia, além dos Juristas indicados pelo Congresso Nacional -, os conselheiros não-juízes. O Poder Judiciário, historicamente hermético e corporativista, passava a ser controlado por um órgão novo, um Conselho de Justiça que não contava apenas com conselheiros juízes entre seus membros. O presente trabalho estudou o CNJ a partir desses dois pontos mais controversos, com enfoque no controle disciplinar exercido pelo órgão sobre a magistratura nacional. Conselhos de Justiça, em especial em sua feição disciplinar, devem lidar com e existente tensão entre controle (ou accountability) e independência judicial. Observamos a atuação do Conselho Nacional de Justiça em vista dessa constante tensão ao longo de sua historia: por meio de uma análise que percorreu um período que vai da instalação do CNJ, em 2005, até o final do ano de 2013. Identificamos, com isso, as estratégias de legitimação institucional utilizadas para o exercício da competência disciplinar, analisamos as normas jurídicas surgidas nesse período, bem como descrevemos qual o perfil dos atores que ocuparam as cadeiras do colegiado enquanto conselheiros. Como resultado dessa observação, importante destacar que o Conselho Nacional de Justiça jogou luz sobre um Poder historicamente fechado, mas que ainda apresenta problemas de transparência. A dificuldade de localizar dados sobre matérias mais sensíveis (processos administrativos sancionadores) e as ausências de envio de informações quando solicitadas foram marcantes na pesquisa. Sobre o comportamento do órgão, mobilizamos a variável do profissionalismo (com especial enfoque na origem de carreira) para interpretar esse processo. Esperávamos um Conselho com duas características: corporativista e pouco harmônico. As análises empíricas quantitativas, que compuseram um retrato de todos os Processos Administrativos Sancionadores julgados até o final de 2013 pelo CNJ, mostraram um cenário inverso: um colegiado não corporativista e coeso. Mesmo em vista dessas características globais, identificamos que existem importantes diferenças no comportamento decisório e, quando elas estão presentes, o elemento da carreira é influente. / One of the main changes introduced by the Brazilian Judicial Reform (Constitutional Amendment 45/2004) was the creation of the National Council of Justice (CNJ). Among its constitutional powers, the control of magistrates’ duties through Administrative Sanctioning Proceedings was significantly questioned, being subject to concentrated control of constitutionality by the Supreme Court (STF). The composition of the Council was also target of criticism, because a considerable part of its members (6 of 15, representing 40% of the total) is not from the Judiciary - coming from the Prosecution, the Bar of Lawyers, in addition to Jurists appointed by National Congress - non-judges counselors. The Judiciary, historically airtight and corporatist, came to be controlled by a new body, the Council of Justice that included not only judges-counselors among its members. The present work studied the CNJ from these two most controversial points, focusing on the disciplinary control exercised by the body over the Brazilian Judiciary. Councils of Justice, especially in their disciplinary feature, must deal with the existent tension between control (or accountability) and judicial independence. We observed this tension in Brazilian National Council of Justice’s performance throughout its history: through an analysis which involved a period from the installation of the CNJ in 2005 until the end of 2013. From this standpoint, we identified the institutional legitimacy strategies used by CNJ for exercising its disciplinary competencies, we analyzed the legal rules arisen during this period, as well as described the profile of the players who occupied the collegiate chairs as counselors. As a result of this observation, it is important to highlight that the Brazilian National Council of Justice shed light on a historically closed Power, despite still presenting transparency issues. The difficulty of finding data on more sensitive matters (sanctioning administrative procedures) and the lack of information disclosure when requested were influent in the research. On Council’s behavior, we resorted to the variable of professionalism (with special focus on the career of origin) to interpret this process. We expected a Council with two characteristics: corporatist and not very harmonic. The quantitative empirical analysis, which constituted a picture of all sanctioning administrative procedures judged by CNJ by the end of 2013, showed a reverse scenario: a non-corporatist and cohesive collegiate. Even in view of these overall characteristics, we found that there are important differences in the decision making behavior and, when present, the career element is influential.

Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T18:33:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Caetano Carlos Bonchristiani Parte 1.pdf: 296914 bytes, checksum: cc6114ce26c6b8b24c2811df17f57548 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-02-14 / The study it has as objective to analyze the existing relation the coordination of the agro industry system of the cassava enters, with its current organizational environment, in the State of the Parana, from the analysis of the system of representation of interests: State and entities of class. To reach this objective it was used, as referential theoretician, the boarding of the new institutional economy that emphasizes the importance of the institutions in the agreement of the behavior and the economic results and politicians, the neo-corporatism as a system of representation of interests tripartite, involving the relations between the State, employers and entities of the workers and the agreement of its organizational environment, through the study of the configuration of the organizational structures. This study if it configures as theoretician-empiricist, of exploratory character, having as instruments of collection of data: statistical documents, publications, date and questionnaire. The questionnaire was applied in the Brazilian Producing of Starch of the Cassava - ABAM, Association of the Producing of Cassava of Parana - APROMAN, Union of you Elaborate of Cassava of Parana - SIMP, Technical Association of the you Elaborate of Cassava of Parana - ATIMOP and Industrial Association Derivate of Cassava of Parana - ASSIMAP, in the month of January of 2007, I contend closed questions and of multiple choice. As result, the current model of coordination of the system, it presents inefficiency in its relationship between the participant economic agents, mainly, for the lack of a system of information integrated, informal communication, lack of common objectives, extreme number of entities with diverse objectives and lack of regulatory actions of the State, generating absence of steady politician-economic relations and having as consequence little influence politics exerted together to the entities of class and government. These problems provoke the inexistence of a system of representation of interests, capable to defend all the economic, participant agents in the elaboration and efficient implementation of the politics and programs, not allowing to a reduction in the probabilities of opportunist behaviors and plea of the politics, creating an politician-institutional environment without power to decide influence / O estudo tem como objetivo analisar a relação existente entre a coordenação do sistema agroindustrial da mandioca, com seu ambiente organizacional atual, no Estado do Paraná, a partir da análise do sistema de representação de interesses: Estado e entidades de classe. Para atingir esse objetivo utilizou-se, como referencial teórico, a abordagem da nova economia institucional que enfatiza a importância das instituições no entendimento do comportamento e dos resultados econômicos e políticos, o neocorporativismo como um sistema de representação de interesses tripartite, envolvendo as relações entre o Estado, entidades patronais e, entidades dos trabalhadores e o entendimento de seu ambiente organizacional, através do estudo da configuração das estruturas organizacionais. Este estudo se configura como teórico-empírico, de caráter exploratório, tendo como instrumentos de coleta de dados: documentos, publicações, dados estatísticos e questionário. O questionário foi aplicado na Associação Brasileira dos Produtores de Amido de Mandioca - ABAM, Associação dos Produtores de Mandioca do Paraná - APROMAN, Sindicato das Indústrias de Mandioca do Paraná - SIMP, Associação Técnica das Indústrias de Mandioca do Paraná - ATIMOP e Associação das Indústrias de Derivados de Mandioca do Paraná - ASSIMAP, no mês de janeiro de 2007, contendo perguntas fechadas e de múltipla escolha. Como resultado, o modelo atual de coordenação do sistema, apresenta ineficiências em seu relacionamento entre os agentes econômicos participantes, principalmente, pela falta de um sistema de informações integrado, comunicação informal, falta de objetivos comuns, número excessivo de entidades com objetivos diversos e falta de ações regulatórias do Estado, gerando ausência de relações político-econômicas estáveis e tendo como conseqüência pouca influência política exercida junto às entidades de classe e governo. Estes problemas provocam a inexistência de um sistema de representação de interesses, capaz de defender todos os agentes econômicos, participantes na elaboração e implementação eficaz das políticas e programas, não permitindo uma redução nas probabilidades de comportamentos oportunistas e de contestação das políticas, criando um ambiente político-institucional sem influência decisória

La magistrature occupe une place particulière au sein de l’administration de l’Etat. Elle est chargée de trancher les contestations juridiques entre particuliers (tribunaux civils, commerciaux, etc.), de réprimer les infractions aux lois pénales (tribunaux répressifs) et de contrôler les gouvernants agissant dans les limites du droit (tribunaux administratifs). Eu égard à la particularité et à la délicatesse de ses missions, les Etats proclament son indépendance dans leur constitution.Au Mali, de l’indépendance jusqu’en 1991, la magistrature est restée inféodée à l’Exécutif. C’est sous la IIIème République qu’elle a acquis les garanties formelles d’indépendance. Cependant, c’est sous cette République que les critiques les plus acerbes sont formulées à son encontre : lenteur des procédures, corruption des magistrats, collusions frauduleuses entre magistrats et avocats, etc.L’étude de la magistrature porte sur le cadre normatif dans son évolution historique (accès, organisation, fonctionnement, responsabilité etc.) et l’apport des luttes syndicales dans le sens du renforcement de l’indépendance des juges. Elle s’intéresse, aussi, à l’analyse des difficultés rencontrées par les juges dans leur interaction quotidienne avec l’environnement institutionnel et social (leurs relations avec les pouvoirs publics, les relations sociales, etc.). Cette approche permet d’apprécier de mieux comprendre les contraintes de la construction de leur indépendance pour faire face à leur rôle d’édification d’un Etat de droit.L’étude s’intéresse, enfin, à l’analyse des perceptions du justiciable sur les magistrats et au portrait commenté de deux d’entre eux que nous avons estimé « intègres » dans le respect des règles déontologiques et éthiques. / The judiciary has a special place witthin the state administration. It is responsible for settling legal disputes between individuals (civil courts, commercial, etc.), punishing infringement of the criminal laws (criminal courts) and controlling the rulers acting within the law (administrative courts). Given the uniqueness and delicacy of its missions, states proclaimed its independence in their constitution.In Mali, from independence to 1991, the judiciary remained subservient to the executive. It was under the Third Republic that it has acquired the formal guarantees of independence. However, it is in this republic that most trenchant criticisms are made against it: slow procedures, judicial corruption, fraudulent collusion between judges and lawyers, etc.The study of the judicial is the normative framework in its historical development (access, organization, operation, liability, etc.) and the contribution of labor struggles in the direction of strengthening the independence of judges. The study focused too on analysis of the difficulties faced by judges in their interaction with institutional and social environment (their relations with government, social relationships, etc.). This approach allows us to better appreciate the constraints of the construction of their independence to cope with their role of building the rule of law.The study finally, analyses the perceptions of litigants and the judges commented portrait of two of them that we considered “honest“ in accordance with the rules of professional conduct and ethics.

國民黨執政期間國家社會關係為上對下威權統治關係，而後威權時期台灣國家社會關係最突出的現象為社會自主性的提昇，國家社會關係轉變為平行合作伙伴關係，經濟自由化促進政治民主化，表面上「民意」成為台灣政經發展的主要推動力量，但支持台灣後威權時期民主政治發展之多元制度卻仍付之闕如，促使台灣發生類似民主民粹化現象。高漲的民意反噬民主政治賴以建立的根基—多元化民主，政治一元化論述撕裂了民主社會應有的基本共識與互信，並造成國家認同問題，筆者認為，民主民粹化現象使後威權時期台灣國家社會關係反而回到國家社會衝突對抗關係，多元與互補性認同是撫癒此種社會裂痕的主要關鍵。而缺乏制度性安排是造成此種緊張關係的主要原因，國家社會鑲嵌性不足，聯帶影響台灣整體國家能力。 後威權時期台灣所臨的困境主要在於如何以制度性安排重建國家社會鑲嵌性，社會需求、想法能循正常制度管道完全供輸至公部門，而公部門在制定重大政策時能同時整合私部門的需求與想法，但切忌以國家基礎建設能力為祭品，讓行政官僚體系無法發揮應有的效能，不僅社會鑲嵌性出現問題，也使貧富差距加大，造成社會不穩定。 台灣正處於政經轉型階段，如何以正面適切的回應解決來自全球化的挑戰，是政府和民間社會必需共同面對的問題，制度若無法成為民主政治的主要屏障，則民主化不必然保證多元社會的出現。