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The Transgressor's Response to a Rejected Request for ForgivenessJennings, David 12 May 2010 (has links)
Although the scientific study of forgiveness has flourished in recent years, little is known about transgressors when seeking forgiveness, particularly regarding how they respond when their request for forgiveness is denied. The present thesis reviews the literature related to how transgressors might react to a denied request for forgiveness and factors that likely influence their response. In two studies, interactions between sex and responses to requested forgiveness, and interactions between two personality variables (agreeableness and neuroticism) and responses to requested forgiveness were examined. Generally, when people refuse or even partially refuse a bid for forgiveness, it is considered by the requestor to be a wrong perpetrated by the original victim. Even after considering the hurtfulness and severity of that wrong, there were differences in the degree to which original offenders held unforgiveness, experienced positive emotions, and forgave the original victim, depending on how starkly the original victim denied the request.
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[en] THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE ACTE OF DENIAL IN TELEVISION INTERVIEWS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH IN PORTUGUESE AS L1 APPLICABLE TO PORTUGUESE AS L2 / [pt] A CONSTRUÇÃO DOS ATOS DE NEGAR EM ENTREVISTAS TELEVISIVAS: UMA ABORDAGEM INTERDISCIPLINAR DO FENÔMENO EM PLM COM APLICABILIDADE EM PLEADRIANA FERREIRA DE SOUSA DE ALBUQUERQUE 17 November 2003 (has links)
[pt] O tema desta pesquisa é a construção dos atos de negar em
entrevistas televisivas. No trabalho realizado,
identificamos, descrevemos e analisamos as formas de
realização das estratégias discursivas relativas aos atos
de negar, interpretamos as razões pelas quais o falante
nativo do português do Brasil escolhe as referidas
estratégias para construir atos de negar diretos ou
indiretos e explícitos ou implícitos e apresentamos uma
proposta pedagógica de aplicabilidade da análise
empreendida no processo de ensino/aprendizagem de português
língua estrangeira (PLE). Para o desenvolvimento deste
estudo utilizamos referenciais teóricos da Análise da
Conversação, da Sociolingüística Interacional e da
Antropologia Cultural. / [en] The theme of our research is the construction of denying
acts in television interviews. In our work, we identify,
describe and analyze the realization of speech strategies
concerning denying acts, we interpret the reasons why the
Brazilian Portuguese native speakers choose such strategies
to build direct or indirect, implicit or explicit denying
acts and we present a teaching proposal of the appliance of
the analysis undertaken in the teaching/learning process of
Portuguese as L2. In order to develop our research, we have
used theoretical background from Conversational Analysis,
Interactional Sociolinguistics and Cultural Anthropology.
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[en] FOR A LEARNED RESIGNATION: SAYING AND SHOWING IN WITTGENSTEIN / [pt] POR UMA DOUTA RESIGNAÇÃO: DIZER E MOSTRAR EM WITTGENSTEINMARIA PRISCILLA VIEIRA C FAMILIAR 07 May 2012 (has links)
[pt] Wittgenstein introduz, em seu Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, sua célebre distinção entre dizer e mostrar. Segundo ele, o inefável é aquilo que se mostra. Denomina-o de o místico. O lugar na arquitetônica da obra das proposições que o concernem é extremamente enigmático. Como as outras passagens são classicamente mais discutidas e aquelas concernentes ao místico costumam ser consideradas mais obscuras, deter-se-á nelas de forma especial na tentativa de que uma melhor compreensão delas ajude a lançar nova luz sobre a referida distinção. Pretende-se mostrar que talvez essas passagens finais do Tractatus não sejam um elemento tão estranho quanto possa parecer. Para isso, será abordada, primeiramente, a crítica da linguagem que Wittgenstein faz no Tractatus de modo a contextualizar a elaboração da distinção entre dizer e mostrar. A seguir, mas ainda no primeiro capítulo, a operação de negação ajudará a apontar os limites entre o que pode e o que não pode ser pensado. Em um segundo capítulo, serão apresentadas algumas questões a respeito da não conformidade entre seu livro e sua teoria semântica, bem como observações sobre a inserção do místico nesta sua obra. Após delinear a proposta do Tractatus e os conflitos envolvidos em sua interpretação, em um terceiro capítulo, se tentará contribuir para o esclarecimento de alguns aspectos obscuros concernentes à referida distinção. Receberá particular atenção, neste momento, a noção de místico e a ética tractatiana. / [en] Wittgenstein introduces, in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, his famous distinction between saying and showing. According to him, the ineffable is what shows itself. He called it the mystical. The place in the architecture of his work of the propositions that concerns it is extremely enigmatic. Since the other passages are classically more discussed and those concerning the mystical used to be considered more obscures, we will focus on them in a special way in the attempt that a better understanding of them help to throw new light upon the mentioned distinction. We intend to show that perhaps these final passages of the Tractatus are not an element as strange as it may seem. In order to accomplish this, we will address first Wittgenstein’s critique of language in the Tractatus, so as to contextualize the development of the distinction between saying and showing. Next, but still in the first chapter, the operation of negation will help to point out the limits between what can and what cannot be thought. In a second chapter, we will present some issues regarding the non-conformity between his book and his semantic theory, as well as comments on the inclusion of the mystical in his work. After outlining the proposal of the Tractatus and the conflicts involved in its interpretation, in a third chapter, we will attempt to contribute to the clarification of some unclear features concerning such distinction. It will receive particular attention in this part the notion of mystical and the ethics of the Tractatus.
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[en] PROPERTY, NEGATED PROPERTY AND PREDICATE NEGATION: LOGICAL AND ONTOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF NEGATION / [pt] PROPRIEDADE, PROPRIEDADE NEGADA E NEGAÇÃO PREDICATIVA: ASPECTOS LÓGICOS E ONTOLÓGICOS DA NEGAÇÃOSERGIO RICARDO SCHULTZ 17 June 2010 (has links)
[pt] Desenvolvemos na presente tese uma análise de aspectos lógicos e
ontológicos concernentes à negação, em especial, aqueles referentes à existência e
natureza de propriedades negadas e à relação entre negação e diferença. Partindo
da concepção de acordo com a qual propriedades, em contraposição a objetos, são
aquelas entidades que correspondem a predicados, propomos uma concepção de
propriedades e da relação entre estas e predicados. A seguir, examinamos a
distinção entre sujeito e predicado, procurando tornar clara a extensão da noção de
propriedade, em particular, se e em que medida podemos afirmar que existem
propriedades logicamente complexas como propriedades da forma não-F. Por fim,
investigamos o que são propriedades negadas, com ênfase na relação entre as
noções de negação, propriedade negada e diferença. Ao longo de nosso trabalho
procuramos desenvolver uma concepção de propriedade, negação e propriedade
negada partindo da premissa - poucas vezes considerada - de que propriedades
são condições de aplicação de predicados e não simplesmente a denotação ou
referência de expressões predicativas. Como conseqüência, a noção de
propriedade desenvolvida por nós possui estreita ligação não somente com a
noção de verdade como também com as noções de falsidade e diferença.
Lançamos, assim, uma nova perspectiva sobre a noção de propriedade de acordo
com a qual a aceitação de propriedades negadas e sua análise em termos de
diferença são desdobramentos naturais da noção geral de propriedade. / [en] In this thesis we develop an analysis of the logical and ontological aspects
of negation, and especially, those associated with the existence and nature of
negated properties and the relationship between negation and difference. From the
idea that properties - contrary to objects - are those entities which correspond to
predicates, we offer an understanding of properties and of the relationship
between them and predicates. After that, we discuss the distinction between
subject and predicate, trying to make clear the scope of the notion of predicate,
and if, and to what extent, we can acknowledge the existence of logically complex
properties like non-F proprieties. Lastly, we inquire into the nature of denied
properties, emphasizing the relationship between the notions of negation, denied
property, and difference. Throughout our work we tried to develop a conception
of property, negation, and denied property, taking for granted the premise - rarely
taken into account - that properties are applicability conditions of predicates, and
not merely their denotation or reference. Consequently, the notion of property we
have developed is connected not only with the notion of truth, but also with the
notions of falsity and difference. Hence, we launch a new perspective over the
notion of property, according to which the acceptance of denied properties and the
analysis of denied properties in terms of difference are natural consequences of
the general notion of property.
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[pt] IMAGENS PARA O COLAPSO ECOLÓGICO: A NEGAÇÃO COMO SENSIBILIDADE MODERNA / [en] IMAGES FOR THE ECOLOGICAL COLLAPSE: DENIAL AS A MODERN SENSIBILITYRACHEL PIRES DO REGO 11 October 2022 (has links)
[pt] A presente dissertação percorre a exposição Zonas Críticas: observatório
para políticas terrestres, com curadoria de Bruno Latour e Peter Weibel (2020), que
aborda a oposição entre as ideias de Globo e de Zona Crítica –, apontando para
formas distintas de pertencimento e agência no contexto do colapso ecológico. A
partir da exposição e das imagens por ela mobilizadas ao longo de seis seções,
analiso o modo como a incongruência entre o que Latour chama de os territórios
dos quais dependemos e aqueles nos quais de fato vivemos existe não apenas como
um sintoma de desconexão, insensibilidade ou indiferença, como argumenta o
autor, mas também como resultado de um profundo investimento psíquico, afetivo
e desejante dos sujeitos modernos que mediam suas relações com o mundo através
do privilégio da negligência e da falta de cuidado com as condições que possibilitam
suas existências, minimizando inseguranças e incômodos na busca por estabilidade.
Proponho que essa desconexão é uma forma particular de negação, que não
representa uma inflexão ou ponto fora da curva da trajetória moderna, mas antes
nos mantém apegados à fantasia dessa modernidade como horizonte de
possibilidades. Nesse sentido, investigo os entraves ao movimento de aterragem
proposto pela exposição e a falta de perspectivas futuras não como consequências
de uma incapacidade imaginativa ou paralisia, mas como uma insistência em
direcionar os nossos desejos e sensibilidades para soluções supostamente fáceis,
que na verdade inviabilizam o luto e o desapego dos vínculos que nos prendem a
um mundo já em ruínas – cujo apelo ainda parece irresistível. Ficar com a negação,
no sentido mobilizado por Donna Haraway ao afirmar que devemos ficar com o
problema, aparece enquanto estratégia para reconhecermos as contradições que
atravessam os sujeitos, a fim de não mais suprimi-las, e sim, compreender como
elas têm sido mobilizadas politicamente enquanto oportunidades de corroborar
fantasias de ordem e estabilidade que seguem, paradoxalmente, retardando o
enfrentamento do colapso ecológico. / [en] This dissertation walks through the exhibition Critical Zones: observatory
for land politics, curated by Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel (2020), which addresses
the opposition between the ideas of Globe and Critical Zone - pointing to distinct
forms of belonging and agency in the context of ecological collapse. Drawing on
the exhibition and the images it mobilizes over six sections, I analyze how the
incongruence between what Latour calls the territories we depend on and those in
which we actually live exists not only as a symptom of disconnection, insensitivity,
or indifference, as the author argues but also as a result of a deep psychic, affective,
and desiring investment of modern subjects who mediate their relations with the
world through the privileging of neglect and lack of care for the conditions that
make their existence possible, minimizing insecurities and discomforts in the search
for stability. I propose that this disconnection is a particular form of denial, which
does not represent an inflection or a point outside the curve of the modern trajectory,
but rather keeps us attached to the fantasy of this modernity as a horizon of
possibilities. In this sense, I investigate the impediments to the grounding
movement proposed by the exhibition and the lack of future prospects not as
consequences of an imaginative incapacity or paralysis, but as an insistence on
directing our desires and sensibilities toward supposedly easy solutions that
actually make it impossible to mourn and detach from the bonds that bind us to an
already crumbling world-whose appeal still seems irresistible. Staying with the
denial, in the sense mobilized by Donna Haraway when she says that we should
stay with the problem, appears as a strategy to recognize the contradictions that
cross the subjects, in order to no longer suppress them, but to understand how they
have been politically mobilized as opportunities to corroborate fantasies of order
and stability that continue, paradoxically, delaying the confrontation of ecological
collapse.
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[en] THE TRAGIC IN CHARLES BUKOWSKI / [pt] O TRÁGICO EM CHARLES BUKOWSKILUIS FERNANDO GONCALVES BALBY 18 May 2015 (has links)
[pt] Esta dissertação pretende lançar luz sobre a escrita poética de Charles Bukowski pela relação por ela estabelecida com a filosofia trágica de Nietzsche lida, a sua vez, com o auxílio da obra Nietzsche e a filosofia de Deleuze. Tal aproximação entre a atividade do poeta e o pensamento dos filósofos sustenta-se nas referências comuns pelos conceitos de força, corpo, vontade, potência e arte. Sendo assim, a perspectiva de análise da dissertação afasta-se das noções de biográfico e auto ficcional normalmente atribuídas a Bukowski — de onde sua escrita é avaliada reativamente a partir das categorias da metáfora, da antítese e da representação — para, de um ponto de vista ativo e paradoxal, tomar sua poesia como sintoma e registro reais da vontade do artista, vontade pensada pelos desdobramentos das tensões força-corpo propostas por Nietzsche. Dos devires impostos por tal tensão de forças, a pesquisa acompanhará a metamorfose da arte de Bukowski como sintoma de um corpo ora engajado nas radicais vivências de um niilismo que afirma a negação, ora manifestando-se pela dupla afirmação de Dionísio: a arte como potência da diferença, como poder de afirmar a afirmação. / [en] This dissertation aims to shed light over the poetic writing of Charles Bukowski through its relation with Nietzsche s tragic philosophy, which, in its turn, follows the guidance of Deleuze s Nietzsche and Philosophy. This approach between the poet s activity and the philosophers thought holds up based on the common references provided by the concepts of force, body, will, power and art. Thus, this dissertation s analytical perspective differs from the biographical and self-fictional notions normally assigned to Bukowski — where his writing is reactively assessed by the categories of metaphor, antithesis and representation — to depart from a both active and paradoxical point of view that takes his poetry as a concrete symptom of the artist s will, which is conceived by the developments of the force-body tensions proposed by Nietzsche. From the becomings imposed by such tension of forces, the research will follow the metamorphosis in the art of Bukowski as a symptom of a body at times engaged in the radical experiences of a nihilism that affirms the denial, sometimes manifesting Dionysus double affirmation: art as a power of the difference, as the power that affirms the affirmation.
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The Social Construction of Economic Man: The Genesis, Spread, Impact and Institutionalisation of Economic IdeasMackinnon, Lauchlan A. K. Unknown Date (has links)
The present thesis is concerned with the genesis, diffusion, impact and institutionalisation of economic ideas. Despite Keynes's oft-cited comments to the effect that 'the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood'(Keynes 1936: 383), and the highly visible impact of economic ideas (for example Keynesian economics, Monetarism, or economic ideas regarding deregulation and antitrust issues) on the economic system, economists have done little to systematically explore the spread and impact of economic ideas. In fact, with only a few notable exceptions, the majority of scholarly work concerning the spread and impact of economic ideas has been developed outside of the economics literature, for example in the political institutionalist literature in the social sciences. The present thesis addresses the current lack of attention to the spread and impact of economic ideas by economists by drawing on the political institutionalist, sociological, and psychology of creativity literatures to develop a framework in which the genesis, spread, impact and institutionalisation of economic ideas may be understood. To articulate the dissemination and impact of economic ideas within economics, I consider as a case study the evolution of economists' conception of the economic agent - "homo oeconomicus." I argue that the intellectual milieu or paradigm of economics is 'socially constructed' in a specific sense, namely: (i) economic ideas are created or modified by particular individuals; (ii) economic ideas are disseminated (iii) certain economic ideas are accepted by economists and (iv) economic ideas become institutionalised into the paradigm or milieu of economics. Economic ideas are, of course, disseminated not only within economics to fellow economists, but are also disseminated externally to economic policy makers and business leaders who can - and often do - take economic ideas into account when formulating policy and building economic institutions. Important economic institutions are thereby socially constructed, in the general sense proposed by Berger and Luckmann (1966). But how exactly do economic ideas enter into this process of social construction of economic institutions? Drawing from and building on structure/agency theory (e.g. Berger and Luckmann 1966; Bourdieu 1977; Bhaskar 1979/1998, 1989; Bourdieu 1990; Lawson 1997, 2003) in the wider social sciences, I provide a framework for understanding how economic ideas enter into the process of social construction of economic institutions. Finally, I take up a methodological question: if economic ideas are disseminated, and if economic ideas have a real and constitutive impact on the economic system being modelled, does 'economic science' then accurately and objectively model an independently existing economic reality, unchanged by economic theory, or does economic theory have an interdependent and 'reflexive' relationship with economic reality, as economic reality co-exists with, is shaped by, and also shapes economic theory? I argue the latter, and consider the implications for evaluating in what sense economic science is, in fact, a science in the classical sense. The thesis makes original contributions to understanding the genesis of economic ideas in the psychological creative work processes of economists; understanding the ontological location of economic ideas in the economic system; articulating the social construction of economic ideas; and highlighting the importance of the spread of economic ideas to economic practice and economic methodology.
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