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The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers
to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is
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Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
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Showing 261 to 265 of 265 (0.046 seconds)Spelling suggestions: "subject:"har"" "subject:"hard""
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Perspective vol. 20 no. 5 (Oct 1986) / Perspective (Institute for Christian Studies)VanderVennen, Robert E., Pitt, Clifford C., Terpstra, Nicholas, Smidstra, Henry, VanderVennen, Robert E. 26 March 2013 (has links)
No description available.
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Identidad del orden jurídico y régimen políticoVilajosana Rubio, Josep M. (Josep Maria) 20 December 1993 (has links)
A la primera part, l'autor tracta de demostrar que certs criteris formals d'identitat d'un ordre jurídic (com els defensats per Austin, Kelsen y Hart) no resulten satisfactoris, perquè ignoren la repercussió que sobre aquesta qüestió té la connexió entre el dret i la política. La solució passa, aleshores, per trobar un criteri material d'identitat dels ordres jurídics. A la segona part es proposa que aquesta identitat es defineixi en termes d'identitat dels règims polítics. Això permet emprar l'instrumental analític de la teoria política (des de Easton a Morlino). La conclusió: dins d'un cert ordre estatal, un ordre jurídic manté la seva identitat fins que el règim polític segueixi sent el mateix. Al seu torn, un règim polític manté la seva identitat fins que els seus elements són modificats de tal manera que ens porten a haver de incloure'l en una categoria diferent, dins d'una determinada classificació. / En la primera parte, el autor pretende demostrar que ciertos criterios formales de identidad de un orden jurídico (como los defendidos por Austin, Kelsen y Hart) no resultan satisfactorios, dado que ignoran la repercusión que sobre esta cuestión tiene la conexión entre el derecho y la política. La solución pasa por delinear un criterio material de identidad de los órdenes jurídicos en términos de identidad de los regímenes políticos, como se hace en la segunda parte. Ello permite usar el instrumental analítico de la teoría política (desde Easton hasta Morlino). La conclusión: dentro de cierto orden estatal, un orden jurídico mantiene su identidad hasta que el régimen político sigue siendo el mismo. A su vez, un régimen político mantiene su identidad hasta que sus elementos se modifican de tal manera que nos llevan a clasificarlo en otra categoría en el seno de una clasificación dada. / In the first part, the author attempts to demonstrate that certain formal criteria of identity of a legal order (the Austin's, Kelsen's and Hart's criteria) are not satisfactory, because they ignore the repercussions of the link between law and politics. The solution can only be found in trying to delineate a material criterion for the identity of legal orders. In the second part, the author defines the identity of legal orders in terms of the identity of political regimes. In this way, he can make use of the analytical tools devised of political theory (from Easton to Morlino). The conclusion: within a certain State order, a legal order maintains its identity as long as the political regime stays the same. The political regime, in turn, maintains its identity until its elements are modified in a way that forces us to attribute it to another category, within a given classification.
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Law in 3-Dimensions2013 March 1900 (has links)
This project, overall, involves a theory of law as dimensions. Throughout the history of the study of law, many different theoretical paradigms have emerged proffering different and competing ways to answer the question ‘what is law’? Traditionally, many of these paradigms have been at irreconcilable odds with one another. Notwithstanding this seeming reality, the goal of this project was to attempt to take three of the leading paradigms in legal theory and provide a way to explain how each might fit into a single coherent theory of law. I set out to accomplish this by drawing on the field of theoretical physics and that field’s use of spatial dimensions in explaining various physical phenomena. By engaging in a dimensional analysis of law, I found that I was able to place each paradigm within its own dimension with that dimension being defined by a specific element of time, and in doing so much of the conflict between the paradigms came to be ameliorated.
The project has been divided into two main parts. PART I discusses the fundamentals of legal theory (Chapter 1) and the fundamentals of dimensions (Chapter 2). These fundamentals provide a foundation for a dimensional analysis of law which takes place throughout PART II. In Chapter 3, I argue that the three fundamental theses of Positivism coalesce with the 1st-dimension of law, which is defined as law as it exists at any one point in time. From there, I argue in Chapter 4 that the 2nd-dimension of law, being law as it exists between two points in time (i.e. when cases are adjudicated), is characterized by Pragmatism. I then turn, in Chapter 5, to argue that the 3rd-dimension of law, being law as it exists from the very first point in legal time to the ever changing present day, coalesces with the fundamental theses of Naturalism. Ultimately then, I argue that a theory of law as dimensions, through the vantage points of the specific elements of time, provides a more complete account of the nature of law.
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Uncanny modalities in post-1970s Scottish fiction : realism, disruption, traditionSyme, Neil January 2014 (has links)
This thesis addresses critical conceptions of Scottish literary development in the twentieth-century which inscribe realism as both the authenticating tradition and necessary telos of modern Scottish writing. To this end I identify and explore a Scottish ‘counter-tradition’ of modern uncanny fiction. Drawing critical attention to techniques of modal disruption in the works of a number of post-1970s Scottish writers gives cause to reconsider that realist teleology while positing a range of other continuities and tensions across modern Scottish literary history. The thesis initially defines the critical context for the project, considering how realism has come to be regarded as a medium of national literary representation. I go on to explore techniques of modal disruption and uncanny in texts by five Scottish writers, contesting ways in which habitual recourse to the realist tradition has obscured important aspects of their work. Chapter One investigates Ali Smith’s reimagining of ‘the uncanny guest’. While this trope has been employed by earlier Scottish writers, Smith redesigns it as part of a wider interrogation of the hyperreal twenty-first-century. Chapter Two considers two texts by James Robertson, each of which, I argue, invokes uncanny techniques familiar to readers of James Hogg and Robert Louis Stevenson in a way intended specifically to suggest concepts of national continuity and literary inheritance. Chapter Three argues that James Kelman’s political stance necessitates modal disruption as a means of relating intimate individual experience. Re-envisaging Kelman as a writer of the uncanny makes his central assimilation into the teleology of Scottish realism untenable, complicating the way his work has been positioned in the Scottish canon. Chapter Four analyses A.L. Kennedy’s So I Am Glad, delineating a similarity in the processes of repetition which result in both uncanny effects and the phenomenon of tradition, leading to Kennedy’s identification of an uncanny dimension in the concept of national tradition itself. Chapter Five considers the work of Alan Warner, in which the uncanny appears as an unsettling sense of significance embedded within the banal everyday, reflecting an existentialism which reaches beyond the national. In this way, I argue that habitual recourse to an inscribed realist tradition tends to obscure the range, complexity and instability of the realist techniques employed by the writers at issue, demonstrating how national continuities can be productively accommodated within wider, pluralistic analytical approaches.
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A Pragmatic Standard of Legal ValidityTyler, John 2012 May 1900 (has links)
American jurisprudence currently applies two incompatible validity standards to determine which laws are enforceable. The natural law tradition evaluates validity by an uncertain standard of divine law, and its methodology relies on contradictory views of human reason. Legal positivism, on the other hand, relies on a methodology that commits the analytic fallacy, separates law from its application, and produces an incomplete model of law.
These incompatible standards have created a schism in American jurisprudence that impairs the delivery of justice. This dissertation therefore formulates a new standard for legal validity. This new standard rejects the uncertainties and inconsistencies inherent in natural law theory. It also rejects the narrow linguistic methodology of legal positivism.
In their stead, this dissertation adopts a pragmatic methodology that develops a standard for legal validity based on actual legal experience. This approach focuses on the operations of law and its effects upon ongoing human activities, and it evaluates legal principles by applying the experimental method to the social consequences they produce. Because legal history provides a long record of past experimentation with legal principles, legal history is an essential feature of this method.
This new validity standard contains three principles. The principle of reason requires legal systems to respect every subject as a rational creature with a free will. The principle of reason also requires procedural due process to protect against the punishment of the innocent and the tyranny of the majority. Legal systems that respect their subjects' status as rational creatures with free wills permit their subjects to orient their own behavior. The principle of reason therefore requires substantive due process to ensure that laws provide dependable guideposts to individuals in orienting their behavior.
The principle of consent recognizes that the legitimacy of law derives from the consent of those subject to its power. Common law custom, the doctrine of stare decisis, and legislation sanctioned by the subjects' legitimate representatives all evidence consent.
The principle of autonomy establishes the authority of law. Laws must wield supremacy over political rulers, and political rulers must be subject to the same laws as other citizens. Political rulers may not arbitrarily alter the law to accord to their will.
Legal history demonstrates that, in the absence of a validity standard based on these principles, legal systems will not treat their subjects as ends in themselves. They will inevitably treat their subjects as mere means to other ends. Once laws do this, men have no rest from evil.
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