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51	La présence en droit processuel. / The presence in procedural law Danet, Anaïs 05 September 2016 (has links) A l’heure du développement des nouvelles technologies et de la multiplication deshypothèses de représentation, la présence physique et personnelle des différentsprotagonistes du procès dans les lieux de justice interroge. Mode traditionnel d’organisationdes rapports processuels, la présence paraît aujourd’hui remise en cause, notamment enraison des lourdeurs de la procédure qu’elle entraînerait. Pourtant, dans le même temps, desvoix s’élèvent pour reconnaître l’existence d’un principe de présence.La présence des acteurs du procès doit en effet conserver sa place au sein du droitprocessuel, en raison de sa légitimité tant juridique qu’économique dans l’organisation duprocès. Elle apparaît alors comme le substrat d’un principe directeur du procès selon lequelles opérations procédurales déterminantes sur l’issue du litige se déroulent en présence desparties, duquel découleraient de nombreuses situations juridiques présentielles. Ce nouveauprincipe de présence, encore à l’état latent à l’heure actuelle, gagnerait à être renforcé afinde préserver une justice à visage humain. / At the time of the development of new technologies and the increase of legalrepresentation cases, physical and personal presence of trial actors in the justice‘s premisesquestions. The presence, which is considered as the traditional method of organizingprocedural relationships, seems to raise some doubts today, especially because of thecumbersomeness of the procedure involved. Nevertheless, at the same time, voices makethem heard to recognize the existence of a principle of presence.Indeed, the presence of the trial actors should hold its place in the procedural law, becauseof its legal as well as economic legitimacy in the organization of the trial. It appears as thebasis of a guiding principle of the trial according to which the determining proceduraloperations on the outcome of the trial occur in the presence of the parties. From this basis, itfollows many legal situations of presence. This new principle of presence, still at a latentstate for the moment, would benefit from being strengthened in order to preserve the humanface of justice. Accès au juge Comparution personnelle Défaut Droit au témoin Efficacité de la justice Présence Principes directeurs du procès Procédures orales Procès Procès équitable Représentation Visioconférence Access to justice Alternative dispute resolution Default Due process of law Efficiency of justice Fair trial Guiding principles of procedure Legal representation Oral procedure Personal appearance Presence Principle of immediacy Trial Lawsuit Videoconference 340
52	O tempo do processo: os processos judiciais envolvendo a educação no Poder Judiciário de Minas Gerais Cusciano, Dalton Tria 28 November 2011 (has links) Submitted by Dalton Tria Cusciano (dtc006@hotmail.com) on 2012-01-04T00:14:21Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Dalton FINAL JANEIRO 2012.pdf: 1052103 bytes, checksum: ba38a6f8fa4816d05f768d2a4ce6c6ba (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel (gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2012-01-04T11:08:24Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Dalton FINAL JANEIRO 2012.pdf: 1052103 bytes, checksum: ba38a6f8fa4816d05f768d2a4ce6c6ba (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-01-04T11:17:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Dalton FINAL JANEIRO 2012.pdf: 1052103 bytes, checksum: ba38a6f8fa4816d05f768d2a4ce6c6ba (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-11-28 / Este trabalho tem como objetivo medir o tempo de duração dos processos judiciais envolvendo direitos sociais na seara educacional e verificar de que forma esse tempo afeta a fruição desses direitos. Visando atingir tais objetivos, foram identificados e analisados os processos judiciais, desde a sua entrada na 1.ª instância da justiça estadual até a data da sessão de julgamento do acórdão na 2.ª instância do Tribunal de Justiça de Minas Gerais. De forma subsidiária, o trabalho também identificou quem eram os litigantes, a influência da concessão das liminares no tempo de duração dos processos, a variação do tempo do processo com base na localização da comarca em que se inicia o processo e a existência de etapas mortas na tramitação dos processos judiciais. O pressuposto que guiou a pesquisa é o da possibilidade do perecimento de determinados direitos, como o direito ao oferecimento de vagas em creches e o direito ao acesso ao ensino superior público de forma gratuita, ante uma duração excessiva do tempo do processo judicial. / This study aims to measure the duration of court cases involving education social rights, seeing how this time affects the enjoyment of those rights. In order to achieve such objectives I identified and analyzed the legal cases, since its entry in a state court until the date of the trial session of Court of Appeals of Minas Gerais. Subsidiary this work also identified who the litigants are, the influence of granting injunctions in the duration of the processes, the time variation of the process based on the location of the county in which the process begins and the existence of dead steps in court proceedings. The assumption that guided the study is the possibility of extinction of certain rights, such as the right of places in day care and the right to access public higher education free of charge, in face of an excessive length of time of the lawsuit. Tempo do processo e fruição do direito Creches e pré-escolas Taxa de matrícula Fruição de direitos Education social rights Right of places in day care Direito Direito à educação Processo judicial Prazos (Direito) Poder judiciário - Minas Gerais
53	Litígio e Lide: uma construção, analítico-distintiva, terminológicoconceptual e empírico-crítica SANTOS, Uziel Santana dos 29 September 2005 (has links) Submitted by Sandra Maria Neri Santiago (sandra.neri@ufpe.br) on 2016-04-18T18:26:00Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) UFPe.FDR.Dissertação.UzielSantana..pdf: 3772684 bytes, checksum: 48d7f4655b26e4e7cd0a59cd4b7d3026 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-18T18:26:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) UFPe.FDR.Dissertação.UzielSantana..pdf: 3772684 bytes, checksum: 48d7f4655b26e4e7cd0a59cd4b7d3026 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005-09-29 / Este trabalho de pesquisa científica, de natureza dissertativa, tem como objeto de estudo uma construção terminológico-conceptual, por certo analítica e distintiva, dos institutos jurídico-processuais, Litígio e Lide, incluindo nesta perspectiva de investigação, apriorística e eminentemente, teorética, uma análise empírico-crítica do fenômeno da teleologicidade processual e da decidibilidade de conflitos, apontando-se e aplicando-se, a posteriori, as implicações teorético-conceptual-metodológicas e tecnológico-pragmáticas que tal distinção traz, como corolário, para a Ciência Jurídico-Processual – e suas instituições e institutos fundamentais – e para a resolução de questões aparentemente aporemáticas da teoria jurídico-processual. Para a consecução deste objeto/problema, fizemos, preliminarmente, uma análise teórico-conceptual e histórico-descritiva dos institutos Litígio e Lide a partir da leitura da dogmática jurídico-processual clássica e moderna, posto que, até então, tais institutos são tomados como elementos conceptuais de mesma referibilidade fenomênica e terminológica. Em seguida, para justificar e mostrar a razão de ser da distinção proposta, demonstramos que tal indiscernibilidade e imprecisão terminológicas resultam numa série de aporias conceptuais para a teoria do processo e, em assim sendo, assentimos, peremptoriamente, como um imperativo categórico e como um verdadeiro pressuposto das teses aqui assentidas, que não há que se falar em conhecimento científico, em Ciência Jurídico-Processual, caracterizada pelos atributos da neutralidade axiológica, da asseptabilidade método-epistemológica, da assertibilidade do discurso científico e da verdade científica, sem a construção de uma terminologia jurídico-conceptual, por certo, específica, apurada e precisa. Nesta perspectiva, assentimos que os termos Litígio e Lide são elementos conceptuais de bedeutung (referência) e sinn (sentido) diferentes, sendo o Litígio um pressuposto processual de natureza fáctico-causal-sociológica, de referibilidade extrínseca, portanto, exoprocessual, caracterizado pela contendere de sujeitos em face de uma pretensão – resistida ou insatisfeita – vetorialmente contrária ao interesse da outra parte e a Lide, por sua vez, um suposto processual – conditio sine qua non do processo – de natureza jurídico-processual stricto sensu, de referibilidade intrínseca, portanto, endoprocessual, caracterizada por uma relação jurídico-processual sinalagmática entre partes e o Estado-juiz. Em síntese, a Lide seria o resultado da dedução quantitativa e qualitativa em juízo do Litígio. Tal construção analítico-distintiva teria, assim, um alto grau de aplicabilidade, sobretudo, para se elucidar algumas aporias da teoria jurídico-processual, tais como a asserção do atributo da jurisdicionalidade na chamada jurisdição voluntária e na aplicação do conceito de Lide na processualística penal. Do mesmo modo, agora do ponto de vista da análise empírico-crítica consecutada, chegamos à conclusão de que a teleologicidade processual, a priori, é a decidibilidade da Lide e, tão-somente, a posteriori – sem isso constituir um telos necessário – a decidibilidade do Litígio; assim também, concluímos que as técnicas processuais de estruturação e formatação de procedimentos diferenciados (especiais) e de limitação da cognição do juiz (Lide < Litígio) são utilizadas, muitas vezes, com influências ideológicas que repercutem, assim, no âmbito de abrangência da res judicata, no direito de acesso à justiça e nos princípios da inafastabilidade do controle jurisdicional e da congruência. / This scientific research project, presented in the format of a dissertation, has as study object a terminological and conceptual construction, more correctly analytic and distinctive, of the institutes legal and procedural, Dispute and Lawsuit, including in this investigation perspective, aprioristic and eminently, theoretical, an empiric and critical analysis of the phenomenon of the teleologicity and the decidability, indicating itself and applying, a posteriori, implications theoretic, conceptual, methodological, technological and pragmatic that such distinction brings, as corollary, for the science legal procedural – and their institutions and fundamental institutes – and for the resolution of questions apparently of difficult solution (aporematicas) of the theory legal procedural. For the development of this problem we have, in the first time, a descriptive conceptual and historic theoretical analysis of institutes Dispute and Lawsuit from the dogmatist’s reading legal procedural classic and modern, in such way that, here such institutes are taken as the conceptual elements in the same way reference phenomenalist and terminological. To justify and show the existence of this proposition we demonstrate then, that such an indiscernibility and terminological imprecision resulting in a set of aporias (of difficult solution) conceptual for the theory of the process and, we approve this form, peremptorily, like a categorical imperative and like a presupposed truly of theses here approved, that cannot speak himself in scientific knowledge, in science legal procedural, characterized by attributes of neutrality axiological, of the acceptability method epistemological, of the assertibility of the scientific speech and scientific truth, without the development of a legal and conceptual terminology, more precisely, specific, refined and precise. In this perspective we approve that terms Dispute and Lawsuit are the conceptual elements of bedeutung (reference) and sinn (sense) different, being Dispute one presupposition procedural of artificial, causal, and sociological nature, of reference extrinsic, therefore, exoprocedural characterized by contendere of litigants in face of a pretension – resisted or unsatisfied – vectorially contrary to the interest of the other party and the Lawsuit, in turn, a presumption procedural – condition sine qua of the process – of natural legal procedural stricto sensu, intrinsic reference, therefore, characterized by a relation legal procedural synallagmatic between parts and the state judges. In synthesis Lawsuit would be the result of the quantitative and qualitative deduction in judgment of the Dispute. So such a distinctive analytic construction would have a high degree of applicability, especially, for the resolution of difficult solution questions (aporias) of the theory legal procedural, as the affirmation of the jurisdictional attribute in the voluntary jurisdiction and in the application of the concept of Lawsuit in the criminal process. Of the point of view of the critical empiric analyses achieved we arrive now to the conclusion in a similar way of which teleologicity procedural, a priori, is the decidability of Lawsuit and, only, a posteriori – without this to constitute a necessary telos – the decidability of the Dispute; thus also, we conclude that the technical procedurals of structuring and formatting of procedures differentiated (special) and of limitation of the judge’s knowledge (Lawsuit<Dispute) are used, several times, with the ideological influences that reverberate, so, in the context of the res judicata, in the law of access to the justice and in principles of the jurisdictional control and of the congruence. Litígio Lide Terminologia Jurídico-Conceptual Decidibilidade de Conflitos Teleologicidade Processual Ciência Jurídico-Processual Dispute Lawsuit Conceptual Legal Terminology Social Conflict Decidability Ideology Technique-Legal-Procedural Science Legal-Procedural
54	論網路匿名言論之保障－以身分揭露程序為中心 / A Study on the Protection of Anonymous Online Speech: Focusing on the Procedure for Disclosing the Identity of Anonymous Speakers 鍾安, Chung, An Unknown Date (has links) 在網路世界中，人們以匿名表達意見遠比現實生活中更為容易，這件事已劇烈地改變了匿名言論的量與質。從好的面向看，匿名帶來自主，讓異議者可以透過網路匿名，表達可能永遠都不敢在眾人面前說出來的真正想法，讓觀念市場變得多元豐富；另一方面，匿名提高了追究責任的困難。相較於現實世界的言論，損害他人或構成犯罪的惡質網路匿名言論，將造成影響更深遠且永久的傷害。　　目前，關於網路匿名言論的管制方式，世界各國政府都是仰賴「事後追懲模式」和「實名認證模式」的其中一種。前者是網路使用者原則上可以匿名地發表言論，但如果發表不當言論並造成傷害，受害者或國家可以揭露其身份以對其展開司法追訴；後者是網路使用者在張貼言論前，必須先向國家機關指定的網路業者交出個人真實身份資料以進行驗證後，才能匿名發言，或甚至完全禁止以匿名方式發言，讓網路使用者感受到被眾人監督的壓力，不敢發表不當內容。　　本文主張，網路匿名言論是受到憲法所保障的權利，而「事後追懲模式」相較於「實名認證模式」，較能調和不同權利間的衝突。不過，儘管我國政府採取此模式，卻在設計民刑事訴訟制度時，漏未導入匿名言論權利的思考，導致網路匿名表意者一經策略性訴訟攻擊，真實身份就會立即暴露，使得匿名表意自由不過徒有虛幻表象。因此，本文建議，為落實對匿名言論自由的保護，立法者宜參考美國法，修改部分訴訟法來處理此問題。 / On the internet, people can express themselves anonymously far easier than in the physical world. This fact has dramatically changed both the quantities and qualities of anonymous speech. On the bright side, anonymity brings more autonomy. Dissenters can express their real opinions, which they might never have the courage to speak out in public. It, in turn will promote the diversity and integrity of the marketplace of ideas. Yet, anonymity also makes it more difficult to hold the speakers accountable. In addition, compared to speech in the real physical world, malicious online anonymous speech will cause more serious permanent harms. 　　Today, governments around the world are either relying on the “Ex Post Compensation and Punishment” approach or the “Real-Name Verification System” to regulate online anonymous speech. Under the former approach, internet users can express their opinions anonymously, but if the content of their speech is malicious and causes damages to other people, the victim can seek disclosure of the speaker’s identity in order to take legal actions against the speaker. In contrast, under the latter system, internet users have to provide their personal information (real identities) to the ISPs or ICPs appointed by governments and complete the verification process before they can post their words. Some real name systems go even further by banning anonymous speech completely. By making users feel like they are being supervised by the public, the real name system wishes to deter indecent contents 　　This thesis argues that online anonymous speech is protected by the Constitution, and the ‘Ex Post Compensation and Punishment’ is a preferred approach because it can better balance the conflicting rights. In Taiwan, although the government has chosen the ‘Ex Post Compensation and Punishment’ approach, current civil/criminal procedural laws and practices afford little protection to online anonymous speakers. The plaintiff, who is allegedly harmed by the anonymous speech, can easily bring a “Strategic Lawsuit,” with the sole purpose of obtaining the identity of the online anonymous speaker. Consequently, this thesis suggests that, in order to better protect the freedom of anonymous speech, the legislators of Taiwan should refer to U.S. laws and practices and revise several provisions of Taiwan’s Code of Civil Procedure and Code of Criminal Procedure. 匿名言論資訊隱私匿名性網路匿名言論網路鬆綁效應責任網路實名制策略性訴訟網路服務提供者網路內容提供者個人資料保護法 Anonymous Speech Information Privacy Anonymity Online Anonymous Speech Online Disinhibition Effect Liability Real-Name Verification System Strategic Lawsuit Internet Service Provider Internet Content Provider Personal Data Protection Act
55	Försäkringsskydd för skadeståndsansvar vid dataskyddsöverträdelser : En undersökning av försäkringsvillkorens omfattning och eventuella begränsningar i förhållande till art. 82 GDPR och grupptalan / Insurance coverage for liability in case of data protection breaches : An investigation into the extent and potential limitations of insurance terms in relation to art. 82 GDPR and class action lawsuits Nahlbom, Robin January 2024 (has links) I uppsatsen utreds försäkringsskyddet för skadeståndsansvar vid dataskyddsöverträdelser. GDPR är den centrala regleringen för personuppgiftsbehandling och fastställer ett antal principer som måste upprätthållas för att den ansvarige ska få behandla personuppgifter. Bryter den ansvarige mot förordningens principer har den registrerade rätt att kräva skadestånd enligt art. 82.1 GDPR. Förordningen fastställer tre kumulativa krav som måste vara uppfyllda för att skadeståndsskyldighet ska föreligga. Det innefattar att en överträdelse av GDPR har skett, att materiell eller immateriell skada till följd av denna överträdelse har uppstått och att det föreligger ett orsakssamband mellan skadan och överträdelsen. Förordningen innehåller även en bestämmelse som tar över medlemsstaternas nationella skadeståndsrättsliga bestämmelser, vilket innebär att GDPR ska tillämpas enligt sin ordalydelse och att de kumulativa kraven enligt art. 82.1 GDPR måste följas. Det innebär att nationella skadeståndsrättsliga begrepp inte bör jämställas med begrepp som framgår av art. 82.1 GDPR eftersom begreppen har tillkommit i en helt annan kontext. Exempelvis översätts i vissa fall materiella och immateriella skador till ekonomiska och ideella skador. Begreppen är inte synonyma och bör inte tillställas samma betydelse eftersom terminologin i art. 82.1 GDPR kan misstolkas. Försäkringsvillkoren som reglerar skadeståndsskyldigheten för dataskyddsöverträdelser och som även hänvisar till art. 82.1 GDPR, innehåller i vissa fall nationella skadeståndsrättsliga begrepp och även andra begrepp som inte framgår av förordningen. Det kan leda till att kongruensen mellan villkorens utformning och förordningens ordalydelse medför tolkningsproblematik vid bedömning om skadeståndsskyldighet föreligger. Därför bör försäkringsvillkoren endast innehålla sådan terminologi som framgår av art. 82.1 GDPR. Dataskyddsöverträdelser medför oftast att en stor grupp människor lider skada varför förordningen tillåter registrerade att föra grupptalan med hjälp av en ideell organisation enligt art. 80 GDPR. Teoretiskt sett kan skadeståndsbeloppen bli högre än försäkringsbeloppen varför det i sådana fall saknas ett försäkringsskydd för grupptalan för den personuppgiftsansvarige. Försäkringsvillkoren anger däremot ingenting om att försäkringen inte täcker ett sådant anspråk. Därmed ställs försäkringsbolagen inför utmaningen att hantera sådana anspråk, varför försäkringen bör uppdateras för att möta skadestånd i en grupptalan vid dataskyddsöverträdelser. / The essay investigates insurance coverage for liability for damages in the event of data protection breaches. GDPR is the central regulation for the processing of personal data and establishes a number of principles that must be upheld for the data controller to process personal data. If the data controller breaches the principles of the regulation, the data subject has the right to claim damages under Art. 82.1 GDPR. The regulation sets out three cumulative requirements that must be met for liability for damages to arise. This includes that a breach of the GDPR has occurred, that material or immaterial damage as a result of this breach has arisen, and that there is a causal link between the damage and the breach. The regulation also includes a provision that supersedes the national tort law provisions of Member States, which means that the GDPR shall be applied according to its wording and that the cumulative requirements under Art. 82.1 GDPR must be followed. This means that national tort law concepts should not be equated with concepts as set out in Art. 82.1 GDPR as the concepts have arisen in a completely different context. For example, in some cases, material and immaterial damages are translated into economic and non-economic damages. The concepts are not synonymous and should not be attributed the same meaning as the terminology in Art. 82.1 GDPR can be misinterpreted. The insurance terms and conditions that regulate liability for damages in the event of data protection breaches and also refer to Art. 82.1 GDPR, in some cases contain national tort law concepts and other concepts that are not evident in the regulation. This may lead to a lack of congruence between the wording of the terms and conditions and the wording of the regulation, resulting in interpretation issues when assessing whether liability for damages exists. Therefore, the insurance terms and conditions should only contain terminology as set out in Art. 82.1 GDPR. Data protection breaches usually result in harm to a large group of people, which is why the regulation allows data subjects to bring a collective action with the assistance of a not-for-profit organization under Art. 80 GDPR. Theoretically, damages awarded may exceed insurance coverage, which means there is no insurance coverage for collective actions for the data controller in such cases. However, the insurance terms and conditions do not specify that the insurance does not cover such a claim. Therefore, insurance companies are faced with the challenge of handling such claims, which is why the insurance should be updated to cover damages in a collective action in the event of data protection breaches. GDPR General Data Protection Regulation protection Insurances breach insurance Class action lawsuit terms and conditions Personal data Personal data protection Registered Privacy protection Insurance coverage sum insured Damages compensation Tort law Material damages Immaterial damages Violation Economic loss Insurance company European Union Personal Data Act Data integrity Confidentiality Confidentiality protection Information protection Personal data protection Insurance contract Liability for damages Data controller DPO Data processor Compensation for damages Claim for damages Insurance coverage Principles Data protection principles Compliance Insurance compensation Tort law Regulation Directive Law Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection Data protection officer European Data Protection Board Article 29 workgroup Article Article 82 Data controller responsibility Sanctions Administrative fines Data Protection Directive Artikel 82 GDPR Dataskydd Försäkring Försäkringar Databrottsförsäkring Grupptalan Försäkringsvillkor Personuppgift Personuppgifter Personuppgiftsskydd Registrerad Registrerade Integritetsskydd Försäkringsbelopp Skadestånd Skadeståndslag Materiell Immateriell Kränkning Förmögenhetsskada Försäkringsbolag Dataskyddsförordningen EU Personuppgiftslag Dataintegritet Sekretess Sekretessskydd Informationsskydd Personuppgiftsskydd Försäkringsavtal Skadeståndsskyldighet Skadeståndsansvar Personuppgiftsansvarig Personuppgiftsbiträde Skadeståndsersättning Skadeståndskrav Försäkringsskydd Principer Dataskyddsprinciper Regelefterlevnad Försäkringsersättning Skadeståndslagen Förordning Direktiv Lag Integritetsskyddsmyndigheten IMY Dataskyddsombud Data EDPB Artikel 82 Personuppgiftsansvar Sanktioner Sanktionsavgifter Dataskyddsdirektivet DPO Artikel 82 GDPR Artikel 82 Europeiska unionen Law and Society Juridik och samhälle

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