L’approche de la qualification en droit pénal se fait traditionnellement sous l’angle d’une opération intellectuelle dominée par le principe de légalité et, en particulier, par le principe de l’interprétation stricte de la loi pénale. Une telle approche occulte la dimension procédurale de la qualification en droit pénal qui est, pourtant, essentielle à la sauvegarde des libertés individuelles. La conjugaison de ces deux aspects de la qualification en droit pénal aboutit à faire émerger une forme statique de qualification : la qualification pénale des faits. Située entre l’incrimination et l’infraction, la qualification pénale des faits offre un statut intermédiaire où la nature des faits pénaux va être représentée intellectuellement en tenant compte de l’évolution du procès pénal. Plus précisément, la qualification pénale des faits s’analyse en une représentation encadrée et appliquée de la nature pénale des faits. Encadrée doublement par le principe de légalité et le principe du procès équitable, la qualification pénale des faits offre une représentation légaliste et équitable de la nature pénale des faits. Mais l’encadrement de la qualification pénale ne suffit pas à lui seul à l’élaboration de la qualification pénale des faits. Son élaboration commence bien en amont, alors que la qualification pénale des faits n’est que pure présomption dans l’esprit de l’autorité qualifiante. C’est au cours d’une application répressive et symbolique que la qualification pénale des faits se concrétise, faisant ainsi apparaître la qualification pénale des faits comme un objet juridique. D’une opération particulière au droit pénal, la qualification pénale des faits devient, à l’analyse, un concept proposant à l’esprit une manière de concevoir la nature pénale des faits. / The approach of the characterization of the facts in criminal law is generally treated as an intellectual operation ruled by the principle of legality and more particularly by the principle of the strict interpretation of criminal law. Such an approach hides the procedural dimension of the characterization of facts in criminal law which is, however, essential to the protection of individual freedoms. The union of these two aspects of the characterization leads to a static form: the characterization of facts. Situated between the incrimination and the offense, it proposes an intermediate status where the nature of the criminal facts will be represented intellectually taking into consideration the evolution of the criminal trial. More precisely, the characterization of facts is analyzed as a framed and applied representation of the nature of the criminal facts. Framed by the principles of legality and of the right to a fair trial, the criminal characterization of facts offers a legalist and fair image of the criminal nature of the facts. But the frame alone is not sufficient to elaborate the notion of characterization of facts. Its elaboration begins upstream when it is a sheer presumption in the mind of the qualifying authority. It is during the process of a repressive and symbolic application that the characterization of the facts materializes, thus becoming a judicial object. In a manner peculiar to criminal law, the characterization of the facts becomes a concept which suggests a way to apprehend the criminal nature of the facts.

An important change wrought by the post-1994 South African Constitutions is the attempt to have South Africa recognised as a democratic and sovereign state in the "family of nations." The new Constitutions make extensive reference to the state's international obligations and represent an endeavour to [re]define the status of international law vis-a-vis national law. Some provisions utilise international law in the interpretation and formulation of national jurisprudence and represent an [albeit not totally successful] endeavour to attain greater harmonisation between international and national law. This is an attempt to systematize the various criticisms levelled against these provisions to date, and to highlight certain interpretational difficulties and problems that present themselves in the process. The distinction between the various terminologies and branches of international law is also taken to task. Lastly, this paper attempts to determine the extent to which international law is applied at national level under the post-1994 constitutions. / Jurisprudence / LL. M.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:33:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Isalino Antonio Giacomet Junior.pdf: 1126819 bytes, checksum: 32838bbb6682054d64262f508220dd4e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-08-08 / Dealing effectively with economic crimes is a fundamental need for fair and balanced development of society today, given the collective nature of legal interests protected by them and the special features of economic criminality, consisting of one of the most obvious legal limit on the economic power. The success of combating such crimes within which include crimes against the financial system and crimes against the capital market - depends directly on the adoption of specific legislative techniques of criminal law. Constant innovations in the means of transmission of wealth, associated with the evolution of products and services offered to users of the financial market and the necessity to preserve the constitutional economic order, require that the economy criminal law is endowed with mechanisms that would allow flexibility and adaptation to the economic reality of any given time. Therefore, it is crucial that the expertise and the regulatory powers inherent to normative and supervisor agencies of the National Financial System emanating from within their respective regulatory administrative functions - are also translated to economic criminal law. Among the instruments of criminal regulation that allow this administrative influence, are in the characterization of blank criminal laws, the use of normative elements of the crime and objective conditions for punishment. Despite these legislative techniques cause, as a rule, the creation of open criminal types, it is emphasized that these mechanisms of penal norms do not offend the principle of legality. / O enfrentamento eficiente aos delitos econômicos representa uma necessidade fundamental para o desenvolvimento justo e equilibrado da sociedade nos dias atuais, em virtude dos bens jurídicos de índole coletiva por eles tutelados e das características especiais da criminalidade econômica, consistindo em uma das formas mais evidentes de limitação jurídica sobre o poder econômico. O sucesso do combate a tais delitos dentro dos quais se inserem os crimes contra o sistema financeiro e os crimes contra o mercado de capitais depende diretamente da adoção de técnicas legislativas diferenciadas dos tipos penais. As constantes inovações nos meios de transmissão de riquezas, aliadas à evolução dos serviços e produtos oferecidos aos usuários do mercado financeiro e à necessidade de preservação da ordem econômica constitucional, requerem que o direito penal econômico seja dotado de mecanismos que permitam sua maleabilidade e adaptação constante à realidade econômica de determinado momento. Torna-se fundamental, portanto, que os conhecimentos técnicos e os poderes normativos inerentes aos órgãos normativos e supervisores do Sistema Financeiro Nacional exarados no âmbito de suas respectivas atribuições administrativas regulatórias sejam transpostos também para a seara do direito penal econômico. Dentre os instrumentos de normatização penal que permitem essa influência administrativa, situam-se a tipificação de normas penais em branco, a utilização de elementos normativos do tipo e as condições objetivas de punibilidade. Em que pese tais técnicas legislativas ensejarem, em regra, a criação de tipos penais abertos, destaca-se que esses mecanismos de normatização penal não ofendem o princípio da legalidade.

An important change wrought by the post-1994 South African Constitutions is the attempt to have South Africa recognised as a democratic and sovereign state in the "family of nations." The new Constitutions make extensive reference to the state's international obligations and represent an endeavour to [re]define the status of international law vis-a-vis national law. Some provisions utilise international law in the interpretation and formulation of national jurisprudence and represent an [albeit not totally successful] endeavour to attain greater harmonisation between international and national law. This is an attempt to systematize the various criticisms levelled against these provisions to date, and to highlight certain interpretational difficulties and problems that present themselves in the process. The distinction between the various terminologies and branches of international law is also taken to task. Lastly, this paper attempts to determine the extent to which international law is applied at national level under the post-1994 constitutions. / Jurisprudence / LL. M.

La norme pénale valide est celle qui possède la capacité de déployer ses effets. Elle est celle qui autorise le déclenchement des poursuites, le prononcé des condamnations et l'exécution de peines. En premier lieu, il a fallu montrer ce qui paraît s’imposer d’instinct : loin de se résumer au respect d'exigences formelles, la validité de la norme pénale dépend directement de la conformité à des exigences substantielles, portées par la Constitution et les conventions européennes. La preuve de la part substantielle de validité est apportée en deux temps. D’abord, l’entrée en vigueur de la règle pénale est subordonnée à sa bonne insertion dans la hiérarchie des normes. Ensuite, les normes répressives irrégulières sont systématiquement invalidées.En second lieu, la composante substantielle de la validité de la norme pénale a de multiples conséquences, qui sont tantôt bénéfiques, tantôt problématiques. En effet, les principes qui conditionnent substantiellement la validité de la norme pénale assoient la légitimité de la répression. En revanche, l’avènement du pouvoir prétorien, dans une discipline en quête de stabilité, soulève de nombreuses difficultés. Pour les surmonter, proposer des clefs de résolution s’est révélé nécessaire. / The valid criminal norm is the one that is able to have a legal impact. It allows for the commencement of a prosecution, the imposition of a sanction, and the enforcement of sentences. Firstly, we had to demonstrate what seems manifest: far from being only a matter of respecting the formal requirements, the validity of a criminal norm depends directly on its compliance to substantial requirements that are contained in the French Constitution and the European conventions. The substantial proportion of the validity is demonstrated in two steps. The entry into force of the criminal rule is at first subordinated to its correct integration in the hierarchy of norms. Then, the improper repressive norms are systematically invalidated. Secondly, the substantial part of the validity of the criminal norm has several consequences that are in some cases beneficial but not in others. Indeed, the principles that substantially determine the validity of the criminal norm make the punishment legitimate. However, the emergence of the judge-made law raises many difficulties in a discipline that yearns for stability. In order to overcome them, it appeared necessary to suggest some key elements of resolution.

La responsabilité civile est traditionnellement attachée à la réparation des préjudices individuels. Pour sa part, le droit pénal est présenté comme la branche du droit qui assure la protection de l’intérêt général par la sanction de comportements attentatoires à un socle commun de valeurs sociales. Cette distinction de finalités justifie une hiérarchie des disciplines qui se traduit par une primauté accordée au droit pénal. Pourtant, on se propose de démontrer que le législateur, au même titre que le juge d’ailleurs, semble s’engager dans une direction contestable en considérant qu’il y a une différence de degré entre droit civil et droit pénal là où existe en réalité une différence de nature. De ce postulat inexact naît une confusion généralisée qui conduit chaque discipline à s’approprier les considérations de l’autre : le droit civil devient punitif tandis que, dans le même temps, le droit pénal accorde une place sans cesse accrue à la réparation du préjudice. Ce mouvement nous semble porteur d’un double danger : en premier lieu, le droit pénal délaisse sa fonction protectrice de l’intérêt général lorsqu’il s’attache à réparer des préjudices purement individuels ; en second lieu, le droit civil punitif, délié des garanties fondamentales dont est assortie la matière répressive, peut se révéler être une menace pour les libertés individuelles. Ce mouvement croisé des deux disciplines met en péril la cohérence de leurs régimes respectifs : leurs influences réciproques doivent être révélées afin de mieux cerner les faiblesses du droit de la responsabilité et de proposer des remèdes en vue d’assurer un agencement cohérent et complémentaire des responsabilités civile et pénale. / Studying two separate disciplines, such as Civil and Criminal liability, it would not be expected to find any interactions between them: Civil Law repairs the damage caused to private interests; while Criminal Law punishes, thereby ensuring public interests. These differences in purpose justify a hierarchy of disciplines resulting in the supremacy of Criminal Law over Civil Law. However, it will be shown that the legislature and the judge are going in the wrong direction by considering that there is a difference of degree between Civil Law and Criminal Law where there is actually a difference in nature. This incorrect assumption has given rise to a widespread confusion where each discipline takes ownership of the considerations of the other: Civil Law becomes punitive, while, at the same time, Criminal Law becomes increasingly compensatory. The present work aims to denounce a double danger: first, Criminal Law abandons its protective function of public interests when it attempts to repair purely individual damages; second, a punitive Civil Law, detached from the fundamental safeguards that are attached to criminal matters, may prove to be a threat to individual freedoms. This cross-movement between the two disciplines jeopardizes the consistency of their respective systems: reciprocal influences must be revealed in order to better understand the weaknesses of legal liability and to propose remedies that ensure a consistent and complementary arrangement of legal rules.

Dans la plupart des disciplines juridiques, le motif légitime se présente comme un standard de justification des actes. Il fait obstacle à l’application de la norme, en fondant un droit ou en exonérant d’un devoir. Le droit pénal se montre réticent à l’endroit de cette notion floue qui connaît pourtant un essor sans précédent. Afin de justifier la marge d’appréciation laissée au juge, le motif légitime est généralement conçu comme un mobile, ce qui accentue la confusion entre les causes objectives et subjectives d’irresponsabilité. L’insuffisance de l’approche formelle du mécanisme justificatif explique sa subjectivation progressive. L’analyse du motif légitime suppose de revisiter la théorie de la justification à travers une conception substantielle de l’illicéité, apte à unifier son régime. L’étude de la finalité justificative du motif légitime permet de mieux comprendre la souplesse de ses conditions de mise en œuvre. Le motif légitime renverse la présomption d’illicéité fondant la responsabilité. Le jugement de valeur porté sur l’infraction est la raison d’être du reproche social. Elle se distingue de son attribution à l’auteur qui relève d’un jugement de réalité sur sa volonté. Le motif légitime procède des circonstances extérieures à l’infraction autorisant la vérification concrète de son illicéité. La nature objective du motif légitime est conforme à son effet exonératoire de responsabilité opérant in rem et non in personam. Ses conditions d’application semblent, en revanche, doublement dérogatoires au droit commun de la justification, tant à l’égard de ses critères larges que de son domaine étroit. Il est cantonné à des infractions de risque abstrait pour des valeurs secondaires dont la présomption d’illicéité est artificielle. Le prévenu doit rapporter la preuve de la légitimité concrète de son acte, alors que la légitimité abstraite de la répression est sujette à caution. L’expansion de ce domaine dérogatoire de la répression révèle l’insuffisant contrôle de sa nécessité abstraite. En tout état de cause, la mention spéciale du motif légitime est inutile car toute infraction en fait implicitement réserve, en sorte qu’il se conçoit comme un standard général de justification. Il confère au juge la libre appréciation de la nécessité concrète de la répression, au regard du contexte de chaque espèce qui échappe par nature à la loi ne pouvant régler a priori tous les conflits de valeurs. La justification a postériori des infractions socialement nécessaires ou insignifiantes renforce l’autorité de la loi en garantissant une application conforme à sa finalité de protection des valeurs. / In many legal disciplines, the legitimate reason is a model of justification of acts. The legitimate reason prevents the enforcement of the law, either by creating a right or by exempting someone from a duty. Despite an unprecedented boom, criminal law is hesitant about this vague notion. In order to justify judges' assessment margin, the legitimate reason is commonly considered as a motive. This accentuates the confusion between objective and subjective causes of irresponsibility. The formal approach of the justificatory process is inadequate, making the process increasingly biased. The analysis of the legitimate reason requires a re-examination of the justification theory using a solid understanding of unlawfulness which can help standardize its implementation. The study of the legitimate reason’s justificatory function allows a better understanding of the flexibility of its implementation requirements. The legitimate reason reverses the presumption of unlawfulness on which liability is based. The cause of liability is conditioned by the value judgment made about the offence, whereas the judgment of the reality of the offender’s intention is the condition of his imputation. The legitimate reason stems from circumstances that are external to the offence, and which enable the review of its lawfulness. The objective nature of the legitimate reason is aligned with the fact that it exempts from liability in rem and not in personam. However, the requirements for its application seem exceptional to the common law of justification in two regards: its broad criteria and its narrow field. It is limited to offences of abstract risk that protect secondary values for which the presumption of unlawfulness is artificial. The defendant must prove the legitimacy of his act whereas the abstract legitimacy of the suppression is unconfirmed. The expansion of this dispensatory field of suppression reveals an inadequate control of its abstract necessity. In any case, bringing up legitimate reason is useless as it is implicit to any offence and is considered as a general model of justification. It leaves the judge free to assess the necessity of the penalty on a case by case basis, as the law, by nature, cannot resolve all value conflicts. The post facto justification of socially necessary offences or even trivial offences reinforces the authority of the law by ensuring an enforcement that is aligned with the law's aim of protecting values.

Diese Arbeit befasst sich mit den Fällen von Repression, die während des Spanischen Bürgerkriegs 1936-1939 und der franquistischen Diktatur stattfanden und die seit den 2000er Jahren vor Gericht gebracht wurden. Im ersten Teil der Arbeit werden diese Fälle unter spanisches Strafrecht subsumiert. Im zweiten Teil der Arbeit wird untersucht, ob das vom spanischen Parlament im Oktober 1977 verabschiedete Amnestiegesetz mit den internationalen Menschenrechtsnormen vereinbar ist. Schließlich werden im dritten Teil der Arbeit die Fälle aus der Zeit des Spanischen Bürgerkriegs 1936-1939 nach internationalem Strafrecht und humanitärem Recht analysiert. / This work deals with the cases of repression that occurred during the 1936-1939 Spanish Civil War and the Francoist dictatorship and that have been brought to court since the 2000s. A first part of the work has subsumed these cases under Spanish domestic criminal law. A second part of the work examines the compliance of the amnesty law enacted by the Spanish Parliament in October 1977 with International Human Rights Law. Finally, a third part of the work analyses the cases occurred during the 1936-1939 Spanish Civil War under international criminal and humanitarian law.

財政援助をコントロールする仕組みは、国によって様々であり、立法的な統制、行政的な統制又は司法的な統制等があるが、本稿では、特に、裁判所による財政支出の統制に焦点を当て、アメリカ合衆国、スペイン及びメキシコ合衆国について検討する。本稿においては、主として、アメリカ合衆国、スペイン及びメキシコ合衆国の裁判所が、私企業に対する財政支出をどのような場合において違憲又は違法とするのか、又はどのような場合において合憲又は適法とするのかということを検討し、これらの国々の裁判所がその結論に到達するために、どのような要件又は判断基準に基づいて、財政支出を統制するのかということについて考察する。 / The mechanisms for controlling fiscal assistance vary from one country to another. Legislative, executive and judicial controls can be mentioned as broad examples of these mechanisms. This research will focus on the judicial control of fiscal expenditure in the United States of America, Spain and Mexico. It primarily examines in which cases financial expenditure on the private sector is declared unconstitutional or illegal and in which situations it is declared constitutional or legal by the American, Spanish and Mexican judiciary. It will also focus on an investigation of the legal requirements for fiscal stimulus, as well as in the judging criteria developed and used by the court of those countries to reach to those conclusions. / 博士(法学) / Doctor of Laws / 同志社大学 / Doshisha University