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Den här dokumentstudien har en kvalitativ ansats och ämnar analysera förarbeten till lagen om barnfridsbrott. Syftet med studien är att undersöka hur barns rätt till skydd samt barns aktörskap, i relation till barnkonventionens artikel 19 och 12, hanteras i förarbetena. Studien lyfter även den spänning som tidigare forskning visat finns mellan olika artiklar i barnkonventionen och i barns ökade autonomi kontra deras behov av samhällets skydd. Teorier om medborgarskap och barns medborgarskap används för att synliggöra och förklara barns ställning i samhället och det som händer med deras position när lagar verkar för en ökad ställning. Teori om barn som aktörer har använts som teoretisk utgångspunkt för att ge en förklaring till hur synen på barn i en svensk kontext har förändrats över tid, där individen nu fått en starkare ställning. De valda teorierna har även gett möjlighet att förklara hur lagen vi studerat förarbetena till kommer att verka i förhållande till barns delaktighet och ansvar.Metoden som använts är en innehållsanalys av regeringens proposition Barn som bevittnar brott (Justitiedepartementet 2021a) samt Statens offentliga utredning Straffrättsligt skydd för barn som bevittnar brott mellan närstående samt mot uppmaning och annan psykisk påverkan att begå självmord (Utredningen om skydd för barn som bevittnar våld eller andra brottsliga handlingar och ansvar för uppmaning att begå självmord 2019). Resultatet visar att när barnet får en ökad rättslig ställning som målsägande tenderar det att försvaga skyddet. Barn kommer bland annat behöva medverka i en rättsprocess mot en närstående, vilket kan vara riskfyllt för barnet utifrån flera synvinklar. Spänningen mellan barns rätt till skydd och barns aktörskap existerar och behöver tas hänsyn till när lagar inom området skrivs fram, vilket det material som analyserats i studien inte gjort.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is one of the fastest developing technologies globally. AI has recently entered warfare and thus taken a place in international law. Today the use of AI in warfare is through machine learning and autonomous weapon systems. Autonomous weapons are expected to play a decisive role in future war- fare and therefore have a major impact on both civilians and combatants. This gives rise to an examination of the role of artificial intelligence, machine learning and autonomous weapon systems in international law, specifically international humanitarian law (IHL).  The purpose and main research question of the thesis is to examine how the use of AI, machine learning and autonomous weapon systems is regulated within international law. Further the thesis examines if the regulations sufficiently can ensure the protection that is guaranteed within IHL or if additional regulation is needed. The research question is answered by examining the relevant rules in IHL, compliance with the protection stated in the principles of distinction, pro- portionality and precautions in attack and lastly by analyzing the consequences for civilians and combatants.  Conclusions that can be made is that the rules of IHL are both applicable and sufficient to, in theory, regulate autonomous weapon systems. However the weapon itself must be capable to follow IHL and in order to guarantee this ad- ditional regulation is needed on the use of autonomous weapons. The use of autonomous weapon systems does not necessarily violate the principles of dis- tinction, proportionality and precaution in attack. On the contrary, the use of autonomous weapons can possibly ensure that the principles are respected even further. This however depends on the actual capabilities of autonomous weapon systems and whether they can make the complex judgments required for each principle. It is although still of importance to ensure that the element of human control is never completely lost. The issue that keeps returning is the potential loss of human control. At all times human control must be guaranteed to ensure that the final decision always remains with a human. If humanity in warfare is lost the consequences and risks for civilians will increase. Not only is there a possibility of increase in use of violence but also an increase of indiscriminate attacks. The rules of IHL aim to protect civilians as well as combatants, and the use of this new weapon will lead to difficulties to navigate armed situations for combatants. This will increase the suffering of civilians, but also risk overriding the protection of combatants that IHL ensures.

The Court of Justice of the European Union has in its case law been strict in its approach towards Member States’ legislative measures providing for retention of and access to data relating to electronic communications. In recent case law the Court has made clear that also such provisions with the object of safeguarding national security need to comply with EU law and the Court’s jurisprudence. This might mean that the Swedish cable-based signals intelligence is within the scope of EU law contrary to the previous conception. It is decisive for whether the Swedish signals intelligence is within the scope of EU law whether the requirement on the providers of electronic communications systems to transfer all signals crossing the Swedish border to collaboration points, in order for the signals intelligence to be carried out, is to be interpreted as a requirement on the providers to process personal data. If within the scope of EU law, a great majority of the Swedish signals intelligence could be disproportionate in the light of the Court’s case law and thus contrary to EU law. Since the signals intelligence is considered to be an indispensable tool to solve all tasks the Swedish foreign intelligence encompasses this could affect the capability of the foreign intelligence.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, European states have taken numerous measures to prevent the spread of the coronavirus. Several states have introduced various forms of compulsory vaccination against COVID-19. While vaccines are one of the most effective tools for protecting people against COVID-19, it raises the question to which extent states may justifiably make vaccination schemes compulsory in the pursuit of public health. This paper, therefore, analyses the compatibility between compulsory vaccination and the right to respect for private life as set out in Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the ECHR). As of today, the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR) has not decided whether vaccine mandates are compatible with the right to respect for private life.  An interference in the right to respect for private life must be in accordance with the law and fulfil one of the legitimate aims that are set out in Article 8.2 of the ECHR. An interference also needs to be necessary in a democratic society in order to achieve that legitimate aim. The protection of health as well as the protection of the rights and freedoms of others are two of the legitimate aims stipulated in Article 8 of the ECHR that are relevant in relation to the introduction of compulsory vaccination in society. In assessing whether an interference is necessary in a democratic society, the states enjoy a certain margin of appreciation. However, their assessment remains subject to review by the ECtHR. The principle of proportionality is an important part in assessing whether the interference has been necessary in a democratic society or not. The interference in question must remain proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. In this paper, the compatibility between compulsory COVID-19 vaccination and the right to respect for private life is examined primarily by analysing prior case law of the ECtHR concerning vaccination and other medical interventions. This paper concludes that the states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation when assessing the necessity of introducing compulsory COVID-19 vaccinations, mainly because of the lack of European consensus regarding such vaccination schemes. Furthermore, it is concluded that compulsory COVID-19 vaccinations can be compatible with the right to respect for private life as set out in Article 8 of the ECHR, provided that the vaccines are considered safe and efficient by the research community, the vaccines used are monitored and the vaccine mandate is only indirectly imposed by sanctions of a protective nature. In addition, necessary precautions must be taken by prior assessment of potential contraindications and there must exist a possibility to receive compensation as a result of potential injuries caused by the vaccine.

This paper addresses the principle of care in the recast asylum procedure directive (2013/32/EU). The purpose of the study has been to analyze how the principle of care is expressed in the directive regarding procedures for granting or rejecting asylum, as well as to analyze how the directive was implemented in Sweden. The recast asylum procedure directive aims to harmonize EU’s member states' procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection. Initially, this paper describes how the directive was created and how the principle of care is expressed in the directive and the meaning and content of the principle of care at EU level as well as its content and meaning according to Swedish law. To conclude, the Swedish implementation of the directive’s provisions directly connected to the principle of care will be discussed. The principle of care is one of the principles of good governance. The principles of good governance have been important in EU law to ensure legal protection for individuals when they are in contact with authorities of EU or Member States. In the analysis, what is found is that the principle of care can be divided into several sub-principles or requirements: individuals’ right to get their affairs treated; the obligation of authorities to investigate a request in an impartial manner; fair procedure and handling; authorities’ duty to take individual interests in consideration; authorities’ obligation to act within reasonable time and also other requirements regarding routines and procedure. Since a major part of this paper regards analyzing the relationship between EU law and national Swedish law, a discussion about the Member States’ institutional and procedural autonomy towards EU is also included. A conclusion is that the Swedish implementation of the directive's provisions related to the principle of care was deficient and that the directive itself restricts the Member States’ institutional and procedural autonomy. / Den här uppsatsen behandlar omsorgsprincipen i det omarbetade asylprocedurdirektivet (2013/32/EU). Syftet med arbetet är att analysera hur omsorgsprincipen uttrycks i direktivet avseende procedurer för beviljandet eller avslag av asyl, samt hur direktivet har genomförts i Sverige. Det omarbetade asylprocedurdirektivet syftar till att harmonisera EU- medlemsstaternas förfarande vid ansökan om internationellt skydd. Inledningsvis redogörs för hur direktivet skapades och hur omsorgsprincipen uttrycks i direktivet, vad omsorgsprincipen omfattar på EU-nivå, liksom principens omfattning i svensk rätt. Avslutningsvis analyseras genomförandet av direktivets bestämmelser med anknytning till omsorgsprincipen i svensk rätt. Omsorgsprincipen är en av principerna om god förvaltning. Principerna om god förvaltning har varit viktiga inom EU-rätten för att säkerställa ett rättsskydd för enskilda när dessa är i kontakt med EU:s eller medlemsstaternas myndigheter. Analysen kommer fram till att omsorgsprincipen kan delas in i flera mindre principer eller krav: enskildes rätt att få sina angelägenheter behandlade; myndigheters skyldighet att på ett opartiskt sätt undersöka en begäran; rättvis procedur och handläggning; myndigheters skyldighet att väga in enskildes intresse; myndigheters skyldighet att agera inom rimlig tid; samt andra krav på handläggningsrutiner. Eftersom en huvuddel av den här uppsatsen handlar om att analysera relationen mellan EU-rätt och svensk rätt, förs också en diskussion om medlemsstaternas institutionella och processuella autonomi gentemot EU. Slutligen presenteras slutsatsen att det svenska genomförandet av direktivets bestämmelser som anknyter till omsorgprincipen varit bristande och att direktivet har begränsat såväl medlemsstaternas institutionella som processuella autonomi.