On est consciemment ou inconsciemment influencé par le scientisme et le positivisme logique. Nous posons donc une question : Peut-on parler de Dieu aujourd’hui ? Pour répondre à cette question, nous choisissons deux philosophes : Wittgenstein et Simone Weil. Selon Wittgenstein, « sur ce dont on ne peut parler, il faut garder le silence ». Ce qu’il veut dire par là, ce n’est pas que Dieu n’existe pas ou que Dieu n’est pas intelligible comme le disent le scientisme et le positivisme logique. Ce qu’il veut dire par là, c’est que Dieu existe effectivement, mais que l’on ne peut parler de lui en raison de la limite de notre langage. Or, la faute de Wittgenstein consiste à détourner les yeux de l’intelligibilité religieuse ou métaphysique. En ce qui concerne Simone Weil, elle parle de Dieu dans ses écrits et ses lettres. Qu’est-ce qui lui permet de parler de Dieu ? C’est le premier intérêt de ce projet. Et le deuxième intérêt consiste à déterminer l’expérience mystique de Simone Weil, car l’utilisation du mot « mystique » dans les études sur elle est assez arbitraire. Le troisième intérêt est de mettre en relief la relation entre la non-lecture et l’intuition chez elle. Enfin, le cinquième intérêt est de traiter la relation entre le bouddhisme zen et la pensée de Simone Weil. A travers nos études sur le concept d’intuition chez Simone Weil, nous proposerons une autre vision du monde que le scientisme et le positivisme logique. / We are consciously or unconsciously influenced by scientism and logical positivism. So we asked a question: Can we speak of God today? To answer the question, we focus on two philosophers, Wittgenstein and Simone Weil. According to Wittgenstein, “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” What he means by that is not that God doesn’t exist or that God is not intelligible as say scientism and logical positivism. What he means by that is that God does exist, but we can’t talk about him because of the limits of our language. But the lack of Wittgenstein is to look away from religious or metaphysical intelligibility. As for Simone Weil, she speaks of God in her writings and letters. What allows her to speak of God? This is our first point of interest. And our second point of interest is to define the mystical experience of Simone Weil, because the use of the word “mystical” in studies of Weil is rather arbitrary. Our third point of interest is to highlight the relationship between “non-reading” and intuition in Simone Weil. Our fourth point of interest is to explore the relationship between Zen Buddhism and the thought of Simone Weil. Through studying them, we will answer this question and, through Weil’s concept of intuition, we propose a worldview that is different from scientism and from logical positivism.

Cette réflexion découle d’un constat simple, mais qui à la fois invoque la réévaluation en profondeur de notre lien à la pensée, au sens et au langage. L’expérience de l’inconnaissable, de tout ce qui n’est pas là, devant nous, demande de se détourner du langage conventionnel, logique et rationnel, afin de pouvoir l’exprimer. Les écrits mystiques, dans leur mise en forme langagière d’un contact direct avec Dieu, constituent un espace foisonnant et exemplaire, afin de réfléchir la pensée. Celle-ci est traversée de toutes parts d’un besoin pressant de dire l’ineffable, par l’entremise d’une inscription langagière qui déroge du sens convenu du monde, des liens communicationnels ordinaires. Cette manière particulière de dire est structurée par la métaphore, cette suspension de la pensée qui appelle à la recréer, à sortir de leur endormissement le sens et la langue cristallisée du quotidien. Ce mémoire se propose donc de penser les modes de l’expression et de concrétisation de l’expérience de l’ineffable, en se penchant sur ce que la métaphore, dans son inscription, permet de connaître, ailleurs que dans le langage discursif. En premier lieu, il s’agira de présenter les modalités générales de l’expérience mystique et ses différentes manières de s’inscrire au sein de l’existence. Je me pencherai plus précisément sur le propre de son inscription métaphorique dans le langage. En deuxième lieu, je voudrai réfléchir théoriquement et pratiquement la métaphore, par-delà le titre réducteur d’ornement ostentatoire que le langage logique lui fait vêtir, niant sa possibilité singulière de propulser la pensée et de créer une connaissance nouvelle. En troisième et dernier lieu, il s’agira d’exemplifier l’inscription métaphorique de l’expérience mystique, à travers deux figures mystiques singulières, soit Simone Weil (1909-1943) et Al-Hallâj (858-922), chez qui la constatation de l’absence matérielle de Dieu invite plutôt à se détacher de sa construction langagière imaginaire, et à l’aimer, dans toute son absence. Cela, en dépouillant le langage, métaphore imitant le mouvement de dépossession de soi qu’appelle leur conception unique de l’extase mystique. / This reflection comes from a simple observation, which at the same time demands that we deeply re-evaluate our relation to thought, meaning and language. In order to be expressed, the experience of the unknowable, of everything not there in front of us, requires a diversion from conventional, rational language. Mystical writings, shaping through language direct contact with God, constitute an abundant and exemplary space to reflect upon thought, which is met with a pressing need to express the ineffable through a kind of linguistic inscription capable of departing from the agreed meanings of the world, from ordinary communicational connections. This particular way of saying is structured by the metaphor, this suspension of thought asking to be recreated, so that language and meaning, crystallized in daily life, may awake from their slumber. Thus, this thesis proposes to reflect upon the modes of expression and concretization of the experience of the ineffable, by examining what knowledge the metaphor, in its inscription, allows to be understood outside discursive language. To begin with, the general modalities of the mystical experience, and the different ways in which it inscribes itself in existence, will be presented. I will consider more precisely its characteristic metaphorical inscription in language. I will then reflect theoretically and practically on the metaphor, beyond the reductive title of ostentatious ornament that rational language gives to it, denying its singular possibility to propel thought and create new forms knowledge. Finally, I will exemplify the metaphorical inscription of the mystical experience through two particular mystical figures: Simone Weil (1909-1943) and Al-Hallâj (858-922), for whom the observation of God’s material absence instead implies detachment from their imaginary linguistic construction and invites to love him in all his absence. This, by stripping down language, a metaphor imitating the movement of the dispossession of self, which is called for by their unique conception of mystical ecstasy.

Ce mémoire vise à explorer le thème de l’attention au sein de deux corpus théoriques : la philosophie de T.W. Adorno et les éthiques du care. L’attention est ici à comprendre comme une notion à la fois épistémique et morale, comme le moment de connaissance de l’autre et de ses besoins, qui vise et permet une réponse adéquate. Dans un premier temps, nous explorons le concept chez trois penseuses : Simone Weil, dont la notion d’attention a été influente dans les théories du care, qui s’y réfèrent fréquemment, puis Nel Noddings et Joan Tronto, deux éthiciennes du care. Malgré leurs différences, nous défendons que ces trois conceptions se rejoignent sur deux points : 1. l’attention y est considérée comme une disposition morale importante et 2. elle se caractérise par une attitude subjective de détournement de soi, de réceptivité et d’ouverture. Dans un second temps, nous retraçons les thèmes de la pensée d’Adorno à même d’esquisser ce en quoi consiste une attention juste aux besoins d’autrui. Plus précisément, nous abordons ses considérations sur les rapports de connaissance entre sujet et objet, et nous offrons une lecture de ses thèses sur le besoin. Par-là, nous entendons défendre que la philosophie adornienne offre des nuances intéressantes à la manière dont le thème de l’attention est théorisé dans le corpus du care : elle invite à une réflexion critique du sujet attentif sur lui-même, et à une compréhension du besoin comme pointant vers les relations sociales qui le produisent. Ainsi, elle approfondi le potentiel critique d’une théorie de l’attention. / This master’s thesis explores the theme of attentiveness within two theoretical corpuses: the philosophy of T.W. Adorno and the ethics of care. Attentiveness is to be understood here as both an epistemic and a moral notion, as the moment of knowledge of another and of his or her needs, which aims and allows for an adequate response. First, I explore the concept in three thinkers: Simone Weil, whose notion of attentiveness has been influential in care theories, which frequently refer to it, and then Nel Noddings and Joan Tronto, two care ethicists. Despite their differences, I argue that these three conceptions converge in two respects: 1. attentiveness is regarded as an important moral disposition; and 2. it is characterized by a move away from the self, a subjective attitude of receptivity and openness. Secondly, I retrace themes in Adorno's thought which may be relevant in outlining what constitutes a just attentiveness to the needs of others. More specifically, I address his considerations on the relation of knowledge between subject and object, and offer a reading of his theses on need. By so doing, I intend to argue that Adorno’s philosophy offers interesting nuances to the way in which the theme of attentiveness is theorized in the corpus of care: it invites to a critical reflection of the attentive subject on itself, and to an understanding of needs as pointing towards the social relations producing it. In this way, it deepens the critical potential of a theory of attentiveness.

The research is exploring the liminal space of aporía within the experience of film. How can film be a poetic experience and inviting philosophical thinking? Motivated by the works of filmmaker Chantal Akerman, I have come to investigate the gap within the filmic narrative of character creation. With the obligation to create an ethical relationship to my audience, I take a closer look into the aesthetics of mimesis in storytelling. Proposing that there is a shared created gap of nothingness, which works as a portal of reflection between audience and art where the aporía take place, I am influenced by the philosopher Merleau-Ponty´s phenomenological image of the chiasm. The research is accordingly discussing the actor as the embodied surface of this interplace. The liminal space is the journey of the pre-reflective mind working with the unknowable. My thesis tries to show how the image of the thinking actor can hold a space for one shared experience. Departing from a background of actor and writer, the use of writing art throughout the research is a description of different ways of expressing my artistic language; as in writing, filming, directing or acting. The research is situated within the artistic research and the material of focus is art film, ethical philosphical thinking and my own practice with an essay film of 12 minutes, [Her]barium. The locus of the discussion is my own embodied conciousness, as a spectator and in the position of filmmaker.

This bachelor thesis engages in a quest to understand the concepts of necessity and grace in Simone Weils thinking. The question in play, in which many more questions lie hidden, reads as follows: How does Weil understand the operations of grace in relation to the ”blind necessity” of the natural world, and what are the philosophical implications of this concept of grace? What are, for instance, given her understanding of the world as God’s creation, the metaphysical grounds for a basic human activitiy such as thinking or reflexion? A reading of Simone Weils works on necessity, grace, affliction and attention is contrasted with her thoughts on science, method and truth. The concept of necessity is compared to the one of Spinoza, especially on the subject of how the good or the just relates to the true and the necessary: it shows there are interesting similarities and illuminating differences between the two philosophers’ lines of thought. Here, the concept of attention becomes central to the image: the idea of a cultivated mode of reception of the world and of the Other. Attention is analogously understood as a method of prayer and a cultivated ethical attitude towards other human beings – and an ideal scientific state of mind. In the final chapter of the analytic part of the composition, Weils concept of grace is investigated in regard to concepts of thinking and understanding. Here, Leibniz idea of the divine world and the divine mind plays a concise but important role on the matter of a tentative metaphysical grounding of thinking as such – how this can be thought and how it reflects and deepens Simone Weils metaphysics, especially her understanding of the highest states of insight into the nature of the world as partly a work of divine grace. In the last chapter Walter Benjamins vision of the coming philosophy as a consolidation between Immanuel Kants transcendental philosophy and religious experience – and religious thought – show the way for further investigation into the field, a field that the thesis has outlined at the same time as it has attempted to answer some specific questions that seems to be the most urgent ones.

In this essay I explore how dance can be interpreted as a theological practice. I stage an encounter between the lived experience of the dancer’s body and word-based tradition of theological discourse. This encounter between the word and the image of dance reveals the limitations of theological discourse to account adequately for the full range of human and creaturely experience that have its sources in colonialism and imperialism. This paper argues that introducing the image of dance and the lived experience of the dancer into theological discourse then will serve to reduce the effects of these dangerous prejudices. This essay will use two of Simone Weil's most well-known concepts, attention and presence. They will serve as the interpretive bridge for a dialogue between dance and theology. I will focus on the experience of dancing and explain how this subjective, embodied practice of movement can enhance theology. At a time of great instability and uncertainty globally with ecological crises, racial injustice, and economic disparity on one hand and the rise of anxiety, depression, loneliness, and despair on the other hand, it is important that we find new ways to cultivate inner peace and encourage responsible action. And important way to do this is to welcome the creative opportunities of instability and uncertainty, of the unknown and the unexplored.  Dance and theology—in collaboration and conversation—can offer useful resources for cultivating these practices that allow us to meet these challenges with faith, hope, and love.

This thesis explores the commodity as a motif in the first volume of Lars Norén’s Diary of a Playwright, as well as how this motif relates to reification and alienation, and in addition is reflected in the work formally. The study is oriented both towards the text’s depiction of the commodity and its reflections on its own depiction. These descriptions are read in light of Marxist theory and through comparisons with Walter Benjamin’s Passagenwerk, where the latter work also forms a connection to Martin Heidegger and Simone Weil in their capacity of important influences for Norén. Much like in the Passagenwek, the commodity acts as a secret structure in Diary of a Playwright. It organises the text and its seemingly disparate elements on a deeper level. The study contributes to a new understanding of one the greatest Swedish writers in the 20th and 21st centuries. Although the diary has not been the subject of much research, the predominant understanding of the work is, as with Norén’s other writings, largely characterised by a psychoanalytic perspective.