員工分紅制度用以激勵員工，卻對股東權益有『稀釋效果』，其對股東財富之關係如何？本研究將探討員工分紅制度是否能提高公司的市場績效與財務績效，進而彌補因為稀釋效果所造成股東報酬的減少。此外，本研究認為企業在制訂員工分紅政策時，必定會受到公司特性的影響，故本研究亦探討公司特性與員工分紅政策之間是否具有關連性。實證結果發現，員工分紅制度與公司績效之關連性方面，現金紅利與會計績效間呈現正向相互影響，與市場績效呈現負向相互影響，而股票紅利與市場績效間存有負向相互影響，且無法顯著提升會計績效。員工分紅政策與公司特性之關連性方面，公司規模、人力資源重要性、成長機會與員工紅利成現正相關，唯成長機會與現金紅利無顯著相關。 / The employee bonus policy in Taiwan makes manifest contribution to the upgrade of local high-tech firms. Such policy attracts eminent employees while causing direct losses to the equity of stockholders. Is it definitely a good policy? This study investigates if this policy improves firms’ accounting performance and market performance and if there exists an association between the employee bonus policy and firms’ characteristics. The results indicate that there is a positive relationship between the employee bonus and accounting performance, but accounting performance doesn’t have significant positive effect on stock bonus. Negative association between the employee bonus and accounting performance exists, but the negative relationship between cash bonus and market performance is not significant. The firm size, importance of human resource and opportunity of growth all have positive effects on the employee bonus, but opportunity of growth has no significant effect on cash bonus.

回顧台灣過去數十年科技業的蓬勃發展，大部分的科技公司透過優渥的員工分紅方式留住優秀人才，保持企業的競爭力，然而隨著中華民國員工分紅費用化的實施，科技公司紛紛遇到了分紅費用化後面臨的相關管理與經營的問題，尤其是台灣的IC設計產業，因為他們過去一直依賴以高報酬的條件吸引高知識人才的策略為主要的經營模式，今日不得不重新思考及定位公司未來的生存法則該如何的轉變。 　　有鑑於此，本研究主要針對台灣上市櫃IC設計公司，在員工分紅費用化之前後，以 Herzberg 的雙因子理論對員工在工作中的身心理行為進行深入探討，透過與員工面對面訪談執行研究和資料樣本之分析，拆解在受到員工分紅費用化之衝擊，企業在失去過去以高額紅利留住員工的法寶情況下，接下來可以透過何種員工激勵管理保持其競爭力，進而與企業本身的經營策略做緊密的連結。 　　本研究最後之結果建議，期望能受到產業界的參照，從新以不一樣的角度以公司經營策略與員工激勵管理來思考解決因員工分紅費用化所造成之衝擊，達到治本的目的而非透過其他讓員工取得更高報酬之取代方法所能做到治標的彌補。 / Reviewing Taiwan's booming technology industry in the past few decades, the majority of technology companies keep their competitiveness through paying fertile bonus to talented employees. With the implementation of bonus expense in the Republic of Taiwan, technology companies have encountered some managerial and operational problems regarding bonus expensing. Especially in Taiwan's IC design industry, companies have been relied on the offerings of high rewards to attract highly educated talents as their main operational strategy. These enterprises now have to re-think and position their survival rule in the future. With this in mind, this study focuses on employees’ physical and psychological behavior at work before and after the bonus is expensed within Taiwanese listed IC design companies, using Frederick Herzberg's two factor theory. To dismantle the impact of bonus expensing and loss of the magic attraction of high bonuses to retain employees in the past, this study implements face-to-face interviews with staff and analyzes the results. Finally this study discusses how to keep a company’s competitiveness with employee incentive management, which relates closely to its business strategy. The suggestion of the final results of this research is hopefully to be the reference of the industry. With a different point of view, this research tries to fundamentally solve the impact of bonus expensing through a company’s business strategy and employee motivation management methodology, rather than just providing high compensational bonus to employees in the past.

財務會計準則公報第39 號「股份基礎給付之會計處理準則」於2008 年起正 式實施，強制規定公司所發放之員工分紅必須認列為費用而非視為盈餘之分配，如此一來，公司管理階層是否會因此考量其盈餘報導之美觀性，導致減少發放員工分紅，以及員工分紅費用化後，是否仍會造成公司管理階層採行盈餘管理。此外，本研究以員工分紅費用化作為一重大事件，深入研究經理人對其分紅之行為模式是否會因而受到改變並趨向利益掠奪假說，並探討經理人持股與獎酬分紅兩者間之關係是否因公司治理程度不同以及發放對象為經理人與一般員工時是否有所不同。 實證結果發現，不論有無排除費用化前一年之影響，員工分紅費用化後公司 確實會考量其盈餘之美觀性而傾向減少發放員工紅利，另雖然過去研究指出，於費用化前，資本市場早已認知員工紅利為公司費用，但公司管理階層仍會考慮投資者間仍存在的功能固著現象，針對員工分紅費用化此一事件進行盈餘管理；然而，若以未預期盈餘將樣本公司加以劃分，則在未預期負盈餘之樣本公司中，無法證實其會利用負向之裁決性應計項目進行洗大澡；最後，在分紅費用化之後，經理人持股比例與分紅金額呈正比，顯示經理人在代理問題上從利益收斂趨向利益掠奪公司，並且在公司治理較差的公司中尤為明顯；此外，經理人會同時增加對於經理人與一般員工之分紅金額。 / Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No.39 has beening implemented since year 2008, and it is a mandatory requirement for the company to recognized employee bonus as an expense rather than as a surplus of assignment. Therefore, the management might consider company’s earnings performance and result in paying less employee bonus, as well as adopt the earnings management. In addition, this paper apply the employee bonus expense as a major event to study whether the patterns of managers’ behavior on their dividends will be affected and correspond to entrenchment hypothesis. Also, this paper investigates the relationship between manerger’s ownership and bouns under the different levels of corporate governance as well as different payment objectives (e.g. managers and staff). The empirical results indicate that whether excluding the effect of the previous non-expnsing year or not, the company did consider its earnings performance and tend to pay less employee bonus after expensing employee bonus. Although other studies point out the capital market has already seen employee bonus as an expense, the company will manage earnings due to functional fixation hypothesis. However, it can’t be verified that taking big bath would exist by using negative discretionary accruals. Finally, after expensing employee bonus, managers’ ownership is directly proportional to the amount of bonus and the companies with poor corporate governance is particularly significant. In addition, managers will also increase their own and staff’s dividend amount as well and it implies the angency problem towards entrenchment hypothesis from convergence of interest hypothesis.

公司的順利有效運作仰賴企業整體共同努力，透過發放以公司績效為計算基礎的酬勞及紅利，期望能增加董監與員工的工作動機，進而達到提升公司績效之目的。然而，我國於費用化制度實施前，董監酬勞與員工紅利之會計處理係作為盈餘分配項，而非列為薪資費用，此作法受到外資及投資法人的批評，認為台灣企業的財務報表無法允當表達其實質經營狀況。為消除相關人士的抨擊，並與國際會計準則接軌，我國陸續修訂法律、頒布公報及解釋函令，規定自2008年1月1日起，員工分紅及董監酬勞費用化制度正式開始實施。 本研究欲探討在費用化制度實施後，公司的酬勞及紅利制度將產生什麼變化，且該項制度的變動是否會改變對董監及員工的激勵誘因，進而影響公司績效。本研究實證結果顯示，員工分紅費用化制度實施後，公司發放的董監酬勞佔稅後淨利比例無顯著變化。在員工紅利部分，現金紅利比重提高，股票紅利比重則降低。無論於費用化制度實施前或後，給予員工現金或股票紅利，皆有助於公司提升經營績效；惟費用化後，現金紅利之激勵效果變差，股票紅利則變好。此外，若同時比較員工現金與股票紅利兩者，可發現無論是費用化實施前或實施後，現金紅利對於提升公司經營績效之效果皆較佳。 / The success of corporate operations relies on the efforts of all people in the firm. By distributing compensation and bonus which are based on corporate performance, it not only can enhance directors’ and employees’ work motivation, but also achieve the purpose of better corporate performance. The accounting treatment for director compensation or employee bonus used to be recognized as a part of corporate earnings distribution, not as an expense. This method was, however, criticized for its failure to present the true operating results of a company. In order to solve this problem and in accordance with the IFRS treatment, the government amended the related laws and required that both director compensation and employee bonus be recognized as salary expense after January 1, 2008. The purpose of this study is to investigate the changes in director compensation and employee bonus after the above new regulation took effect. This study also examines whether this change alters the incentives to directors and employees. The empirical results show that after the new accounting treatment, no significant changes in the percentage of director compensation to net income. When it comes to employee bonus, the percentage of cash bonus increased, but the stock bonus declined. In addition, employee cash and stock bonus, no matter being treated as an expense or not, did help the firms to enhance performance. However, cash bonus’ motivation effect became lesser, whereas stock bonus’ effect increased. Furthermore, cash bonus was more effective than stock bonus in improving corporate performance before and after the expense treatment for employee bonus.

本研究以2000年至2004年台灣上市櫃的623家電子業為研究對象，探討員工分紅制度對企業經營績效的影響。本研究採用兩階段法，第一階段，採用DEA併用單變量統計之變異數分析法(ANOVA)及無母數分析法(Wilcoxon兩樣本檢定；K-W多樣本檢定)，來驗證電子業實行員工分紅對企業經營績效的影響。第二階段，DEA併用Tobit迴歸模型，比較第一階段單變量統計檢定的研究結果。研究結果發現： (1)電子產業內有發放員工分紅者的企業經營績效顯著較低，同時電子業發放前一年度員工分紅者對當年度的經營績效為負向顯著相關。 (2)電子產業內發放員工現金紅利對企業經營績效的影響顯著高於股票紅利者，同時電子業發放前一年度員工股票紅利者對當年度的企業經營績效為負向顯著相關。 (3)電子產業內員工分紅佔公司市值比例高者對企業經營績效的影響劣於員工分紅佔公司市值比例低者，且在增加其他控制變數後，電子業發放前一年度員工分紅佔公司市值比例高者對當年度的企業經營績效為負向顯著相關。 (4)電子產業內員工分紅佔薪資比例高者對企業經營績效的影響優於員工分紅佔薪資比例低者，且在增加其他控制變數後，電子業發放前一年度員工分紅佔薪資比例高者對當年度的企業經營績效為正向顯著相關。

本論文從員工認股權制度之意義和功能出發，了解該制度之基本構成要件、優點，實施該制對公司、員工、股東三方之影響，以及探討員工認股權契約之性質及內容。有關員工認股權制度之基本規範，包括：認股權人之資格條件、決策機關、認股價格、認股條件、等待期間和權利行使期間等本文亦逐一探討，並以我國制度為出發點，參考外國立法例上之相關規定，探討這些規範之妥適性。 員工認股權憑證之發行須依處理準則之規定為之，惟員工認股權憑證不得轉讓，其性質已和證券交易法上之其他有價證券有所差異，且員工認股權憑證之發行對象為公司員工，發行目的係作為員工薪酬，也和其他有價證券以投資大眾為對象、以募集資金為目的不同，基於這些性質上之差異，證交法介入之需要性已然降低，則員工認股權憑證是否有依循處理準則發行之必要性？ 美、日二國公司法中有關認股權之規定並不多，而賦予企業依其需要設計適合該公司之制度，但另於稅法中針對符合特定條件之認股權予以租稅上之優惠。反觀我國卻在處理準則中對於員工認股權制度之作了完整之規範，此種方式是否壓縮了員工認股權制度之彈性？ 員工認股權憑證發展自認股權憑證，但基於作為對員工長期性之誘因報酬制度，在特性上已和認股權憑證有所差異，本文將討論二者之異同。同時也探討員工認股權憑證和認購（售）權證、選擇權契約等制度之差異。除了新引進之員工認股權制度外，公司法上尚有員工分紅制度、員工分紅入股制度、員工新股優先承購權等其他員工激勵或員工持股制度，這些制度和員工認股權制度有那些差異及其適用時機本文也將一一討論。

2008年1月1日起員工分紅之會計處理，將與IFRS國際財務報告準則接軌，即員工分紅不再是盈餘分配，而是作為當期的費用；此外，公司以股票作為員工獎酬，原則上亦須以公平價值衡量，並以費用認列入帳。預計此一會計處理之變革，將對公司、股東及員工均產生重大衝擊。而公司為減緩這些衝擊，會產生何種因應措施，即為本研究探討之對象。 由於太陽能產業在近兩三年之EPS及股價高漲。因股價為影響股票獎酬的重要因素之一，因此受員工分紅費用化之衝擊較大，故選擇兩家太陽能電池之上櫃公司為分析及訪談研究之對象，係因獎酬制度的變革對其影響較可明顯觀察。 獎酬員工之態樣甚多，經訪談兩家樣本公司後，兩家公司之管理當局均不希望政策的改變對公司的EPS造成太大的影響，然以2006年度為例，在維持員工原獲配股數不變的假設下，設算修法後對兩家公司在獲利方面分別下降了32%及15%，股東所得亦呈等額下降，員工個人綜合所得稅總稅負有可能最高分別增加161,893千元及29,383千元；而在公司分配之帳列盈餘不變的假設下，兩家公司之EPS分別減少1.5元及0.5元，股東所得降幅分別為9％及3％，員工總所得減少輻度分別為97.2%及97.4%。綜上可見在不做任何因應的情形下，其對樣本公司的EPS影響甚鉅，故兩家樣本公司勢必在此間尋求一個均衡點，修正其目前的獎酬措施，即可能會降低股票的分配比例，相對增加現金分紅的比例。 又以2005年度兩家公司員工紅利實際分配之情形分析，兩家公司員工紅利配股中分別有27％及44％，分配給公司重要管理當局，所以在此波獎酬制度的變格中，公司的管理當局也是重要的受衝擊者。另董事會及高階經理人通常是公司擬訂員工獎酬計畫的重要決策者，如公司利益與其個人利益相衝突時，是否會影響其決定員工獎酬制度的獨立性，是值得深入探討的問題。 在考量各獎酬制度之特性後，及分析整理員工分紅費用化及適用39號公報對個案公司之影響，本研究彙總結論如下: 一、公司應設算決定固定的員工分紅比例，以免超過公司章程所訂定的配比，同時可控制此對公司EPS的衝擊。 二、降低分紅配股之比重，增加現金股利之比重。 三、透過發放現金及發行員工認股權憑證或限制性股票方式，取代部分員工分紅配股。 四、在公司股價較低的時候買回庫藏股再轉讓給員工，以減少對原股東權益的稀釋程度。 本研究對實務提出下列建議： 一、法令規定員工分紅費用化後，應依費用性質列於營業成本或營業費用項下，惟該費用之估列時點與實際員工分紅分配時點可能差距一年半載，其費用性質分類如涉及有資本化之問題時，是否有操弄損益的空間？建議法令規定有更明確之規範。 二、公司的管理當局，尤其是董事會及高階經理人，為擬訂公司員工獎酬制度重要的決策者。在多數董事又身兼公司重要職務的情形下，為避免董事個人與公司、員工或股東的利益相衝突，建議應制訂法令，規範兼任員工之董事於擬訂公司員工獎酬制度時，應予利益迴避，或委由獨立董事來代表研討及擬訂新的員工獎酬制度。 三、39號公報的適用屬估計變動或會計原則變動，依目前對外公告的39號公報版本看，以估計變動的方式來處理，即不追溯調整以前年度的財務報表，此規範適切與否值得探討。 / In order to converge with International Financial Reporting Standard, the accounting treatment for distribution of employee bonus should be considered as current expense and not be deemed as part of earnings distribution starting from January 1, 2008. Besides, share compensation also has to be recognized as current expense using it’s fair value to measurement. This accounting process changed will result in significant impact on the enterprise, shareholders and employee. This study will discuss what kind of approach might be adopted by those enterprises to mitigate this huge challenge. The EPS and share price for those solar energy related industry are increasing dramatically recently. This study decided to select two solar cell IPO companies as sample to interview and analysis the impact on employee compensation scheme changed, due to the impact will be more observable compare with other industries. There are variety types of employee compensation programs. After interviewed, the management of these two sample companies stated that they are not expecting to impact the company’s EPS significantly. By using these two sample companies’ 2006 financial figures as a base, to understand the effect after amendment of the regulation. Under the assumption of non-amended employees’ distributed shares recalculating