政府透過法律制度將原先具有非排他性及非敵對性等公共財性質之專利財產化，藉此鼓勵發明人進行研發，間接為整體社會帶來促進創新與阻礙創新等不同面向之影響，而專利之私有化使擁有專利之所有人取得排他獨佔權限，如此累積創新所帶來之結果便是形成專利叢林現象，使單一產品生產時須取得眾多專利，增加未取得專利之侵權風險，該專利叢林現象後續更促使訴訟成為新興專利聚集型態獲取利益之手段。 從專利取得之角度觀察，其取得專利之方式可系統化分為自行研發、併購等內化形式或取得專利授權等外部形式，而專利取得之動機則從單純產業利用轉變為企業策略性考量；現今專利市場中，更經常將取得之專利以授權或出售方式商品化，甚或以專利作為商業談判、利益交換之籌碼，使專利有貨幣化現象。從經濟學之角度思考，專利貨幣化或有交易、預防及投機等動機，並得從專利本質上與後續發展上之特性觀察到專利貨幣化之因素。 由於本文將專利市場分為專利聚集、專利交易平台、專利資訊提供者及一般個人、實際從事生產公司與研究機構等不同類型參與者，並將研究對象著重在專利聚集與專利交易平台二者，因此特於本文中討論專利聚集形成之階段與交易模式，且因應專利交易模式而衍生探討專利交易價金之計算。從本文可知，專利聚集得區分為攻擊型、防禦型、以授權營利型及混合型四大類，各類型專利聚集及專利交易平台皆有其創造價值之價值鏈活動安排、整體產業競爭作用力之五力分析與支援核心競爭優勢之相對應策略活動系統，並從各市場參與者之運作模式中亦得觀察可能存在之缺失。 攻擊型專利聚集表面上雖提供授權服務，然手段上具有強制性，以訴訟等手段迫使下游實際從事生產等公司支付授權金以取得專利授權，從模式上觀察，其存在未經挑選專利、擁有專利過多及組織體系過於龐雜等缺失；而防禦型專利聚集則從下游買方之迫切需求角度出發，以防禦目的之專利授權或出售為訴求，藉由廣泛涵蓋不同領域之專利組合滿足下游買方對於專利侵權風險之控管，然其現有模式可能因支付有限年費導致難以確保購買大量專利之品質，並有為符合眾多會員需求使專利相關性降低以及整體產業難以避免搭便車現象等缺失；至於以授權營利型專利聚集透過技術或產品標準定義之專利組合，包裹式將下游實際從事生產廠商需要之專利一次性授權，雖不見得有授權之急迫需求，但顯然降低下游買方取得授權之交易成本，惟其缺失為權利金分配制度之公平性與專利組合之區別標準。混合型專利聚集則涵蓋上述三種專利聚集之優勢，並以特殊之智財資本市場重新定位無形資產能夠創造之價值，對於下游買方及上游專利供應者而言，皆帶來產業結構變化之衝擊，同時以專利組合授權來滿足下游專利被授權人之需求，不過，混合型專利聚集管理複雜度高、經濟利潤有下降可能，並且長期將有價格扭曲之應變風險。 專利交易平台與專利聚集不同之處在於其不直接取得專利或專利授權，僅以專利供給方與需求方之交易中介者自居，然從廣義概念上，其亦為專利聚集之一種形態，有助於專利買賣雙方取得資訊，降低搜尋、談判或執行等交易成本，並透過其他業務互補專利交易平台業務可能之不足，惟其仍舊有所缺失，亦即價格決定機制之困難、服務範疇過大導致成本控管之不經濟與交易公開之接受程度等問題。從本文各章節之分析中，可比較各市場參與者之不同，亦得觀察彼此間之互動與缺失，從而提出未來可能之研究方向，並針對專利市場之管制與開放給予建議。 / The propertization of patents which intrinsically show the traits of public goods including non-excludable and non-rival was established to encourage inventors and therefore leads to positive and negative influence to the society indirectly. The privatization of patents protects the exclusive rights of the owners, whereas what we called the accumulated innovation set up the patent thickets that enhance the risks of infringement and promote the strategic litigations raised by new patent aggregators. The methods of acquiring patents could systematically divided into internalization which includes R&D and M&A, and externalization which includes licensing and so on. While the motivations of acquiring patents transform from industrial applications to strategic considerations, and the patents gradually become commercialized and even express its monetization. This paper classifies different players in the patent market, such as patent aggregators, patent transaction platforms, patent information providers and operating companies, while with the focus on patent aggregators and patent transaction platform. Besides, the patent aggregators could be categorized into “offensive patent aggregators”, “defensive patent aggregators”, “running by licensing patent aggregators” and “hybrid patent aggregators”. Moreover, the findings of this paper stand on what each patent aggregator and patent transaction platform has its scheduled activities of the value chain, the five forces model to the analysis of its industry and the strategic activities system for supporting its core competence, and even the demerits of its operating model. The offensive patent aggregators provide licensing services, while its services apparently contain compulsive licensing model by raising claims against the operating companies. Instead, defensive patent aggregators help the downstream buyers in need to fight against the offensive patent aggregators by licensing or selling patent portfolios which cover broad technological areas and benefit risk management. Next, the running by licensing patent aggregators package their patents by standards of technologies or products and provide “one-stop-shop licensing solutions” to the downstream buyers to save the transaction costs. Furthermore, the hybrid patent aggregators embrace the advantages of three kinds of patent aggregators mentioned above and try to create the IP capital market leading to the transformation of the industry structure. On the other hand, the patent transaction platforms are different from the patent aggregators in the ownerships of patents. The patent transaction platforms will never become the owner of the patents or acquire the rights of patent licensing, it just named themselves intermediaries of transaction that reduce the transaction cost and enhance the transparency of information. Nevertheless, the diversified operating models of different patent aggregators and patent transaction platforms exist its improvable or inevitable drawbacks. The analysis of each chapter in this paper could help to compare the players in patent market and contribute to observe the shortages and interactions between the ones. What’s more, this paper gives some suggestions for further researches in the future as the conclusion.

本研究以實質選擇權的觀點出發，針對高科技產業中各家競爭廠商投入R&D費用所研發出的創新技術與所對應的專利權進行評價。由於企業在競爭的環境中可藉由R&D過程獲取生產新商品所需的關鍵技術，進而申請專利權以保護公司的研發成果，提昇經營與獲利能力。然而，在技術上的小幅領先並不足以擺脫競爭對手的威脅而獲取絕大部分的市場商機，唯有競爭環境中的領導廠商成功地在技術上明顯的領先其競爭對手，方能取得該產品利基市場的獨占地位，獲取市場的絕大部分的潛在商機。針對高科技產業中不斷研發出來的創新技術所帶來的價值，本研究將以實質選擇權的觀點出發，評價此類創新技術所帶來的專利權之價值與此類研發投資所帶來的企業價值增值。 論文中將針對高資本支出、研發時間具有高度不確定性以及未來產品價格波動性高的高科技產業作為研究目標。定義在市場競爭下的個別公司必須藉由領先競爭環境內的所有對手多達兩代的創新技術方能取得市場的獨占地位。如此一來，企業一開始面對一個潛在的市場需求時，由於投入的研發費用將會影響企業的研發速度、市場獨占地位取得的可能性以及此投資案所能帶來的預期報酬，因此企業應針對此投資計畫決定投入多少研發預算，才能達到最大的預期報酬。

隨著全球3G行動通訊產業的快速發展，行動通訊服務市場正從傳統的單純語音走向與資料傳輸整合的趨勢，並發展出多種不同型態的通訊服務方式與系統設備，其中所牽涉到的3G技術範圍十分廣泛而複雜，其技術標準規格的發展則是由3G的技術標準組織所負責制定。本論文研究針對3G行動通訊產業進行解析，並探討3G行動通訊技術標準組織的運作及功能，並進一步瞭解在3G行動通訊技術標準的制定過程中所衍生出來的關鍵性專利問題，此外也特別針對專利聯盟公司3G Licensing Ltd.的成立與運作做一說明，以進一步瞭解3G產業中專利平台運作的情形，最後並總結對台灣行動通訊產業所可以參考的結論與建議。 / 3G technologies are being deployed to worldwide markets rapidly. The mobile services are converging with voice and data transmission. There are various companies involving in 3G system and terminal business. The relative technologies are complicated and quite broad. The 3G standard organizations are the main bodies responsible for the establishment of 3G technical specifications. This article would describe an overview of 3G industries and 3G standard organizations. It would specify how the 3G standard organizations function and discuss the issues of 3G essential patents. Regarding 3G patent platform, this article would also talk about the history and status of 3G Licensing Ltd. In the last chapter, it would try to summarize the key points as the references for Taiwan mobile industry.

在競爭激烈的產業環境中，企業必須具有產品價值的創造能力，才能開發新產品以滿足顧客的需求。故本研究欲探討當企業宣告取得專利權、專利授權與代理權促使競爭優勢提升之資訊內涵。本研究以民國94年及95年宣告取得專利權、專利授權與代理權之公司，及依同產業及相似公司規模配對之公司組成研究樣本。首先以事件研究法探討宣告樣本是否能獲得正向報酬，並將樣本分為專利權、專利授權與代理權三組子樣本以觀察不同競爭優勢對報酬影響之程度是否有差異，最後再將專利權樣本分為發明專利與新型式專利兩組子樣本以瞭解不同種類專利權對報酬影響之程度是否有差異。實證結果如下：一、當企業宣告取得專利相關競爭優勢時，有正向報酬產生。但惟有當企業宣告取得專利授權與代理權時才能獲得顯著正報酬；二、企業宣告取得不同競爭優勢對報酬影響之程度有差異，企業宣告自行研發專利與取得專利授權所能獲得的報酬有顯著差異，宣告自行研發專利與取得代理權在事件宣告後的報酬有顯著差異，而宣告取得專利授權與代理權所能獲得的報酬則無論短期或長期皆無顯著差異；三、企業宣告取得發明專利或新型式專利，兩者所能獲得的報酬並無差異。 / In the keenly competitive environment、enterprises must have the abilities of product value creation to develop new products and to satisfy customers』 demand. So this essay want to discuss the information content that enterprises announced that they acquired patent、patent licensing、and authority of agency to enhance competitive advantage. Based on the use of a control sample design and the firms selected have announced acquiring patent、patent licensing、and authority of agency in 2005 or 2006、and are listed on the Taiwan Security Exchange or the OTC. At first、this research employs event study to discuss whether sample of announcement could acquire positive abnormal returns. And then、in order to compare the degree of returns affected by different competitive advantage、this research divided the whole sample into three subsamples including patent、patent licensing and authority of agency. Finally、it also divided patent sample into two subsamples including invention and non-invention in order to compare the degree of returns affected by different types of patent. The empirical finding indicates that (1) when enterprises announced that they acquired competitive advantage、they will have positive abnormal returns significantly. However、only enterprises announcing that they acquired patent licensing and authority of agency could have positive abnormal returns significantly. (2) The degree of returns affected by information is different from different kinds competitive advantage、especially between patent and patent licensing、and between patent and authority of agency. (3) When enterprises announced to acquire different types of patent、they will have insignificant variance of abnormal returns.

本研究旨在探討民國88年至94年台灣IC設計產業之研發效率分析。採兩階段資料包絡分析法(Data Envelopment Analysis, DEA):第一階段以保證區域資料包絡分析法(Assurance Region DEA，AR/DEA)衡量績效，以避免傳統DEA方法可能出現產出或投入的乘數為0之狀況。第二階段採資料切齊的(censored) TOBIT迴歸模型探討影響研發效率值的效率因子。 研究發現: (1)只考量專利數量與納入專利品質考量下之統計檢定結果，雖沒有顯著的差 異，但對少數的廠商的研發效率值與排名確實有變動，納入專利品質考 量，可以掌握更多研究發展資訊，了解廠商專利真正的價值。 (2)專利被引證次數與研發效率值呈現顯著正相關。 (3)TOBIT迴歸實證結果顯示: 研發效率與公司規模無顯著關係；研發效率與研發人力密集度無顯著相 關；研發效率與研究發展費用率呈負向關係；研發人員年約收入對研發技 術效率無顯著影響；外來知識流量占自有知識存量比例會正向影響研發效 率表現。 / This study investigates R&D efficiency analysis of IC design industry in Taiwan from 1999 to 2005 by using the two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). To avoid the situations that the multiplier of the input or output might be zero, we adapt the method of Assurance Region DEA (AR/DEA) to measure achievements in the first stage. We then use censored TOBIT regression model to study the factors that influence the efficiency value in the second stage. Through our study, we conclude that: (1) Although there is no significant difference in the results of statistical test whether we take patent quantity into account or not, both the value of R&D efficiency and ranking of a few firms do change. We can grasp more information of research and development and understand the true value of firm’s patent as we put patent quality into account. (2) The correlation coefficient between the amount of patent cited and the value of R&D efficiency is positive significantly. (3) The empirical results of TOBIT regression show that: a. There is no significant relationship between the R&D efficiency and the company’s scale. b. There is no significant relationship between the R&D efficiency and the density of R&D workers. c. There is a negative relationship between the R&D efficiency and the ratio of R&D expense. d. The yearly revenue of R&D workers does not significantly influence the R&D and technology efficiency. e. The ratio between the flow rate of external knowledge and the owned knowledge storage affects positively on R&D efficiency.

本研究從DNA定序產業之美國專利侵權訴訟，了解該產業中廠商的訴訟行為與系爭專利之特性。本研究由商用資料庫取得DNA定序產業之美國專利侵權訴訟共100件及其系爭專利共168件，分析訴訟資訊、訴訟主體資訊(原告及被告)和訴訟客體資訊(系爭專利和被控侵權產品)。本研究也由次級資料中歸類各廠商在DNA定序產業鏈中之位置和其各世代產品技術之發展。由訴訟主體資訊可得知在DNA定序產業中，主要發起美國專利侵權訴訟之廠商為中游的儀器平台廠商，被控專利侵權的廠商也多為具有相同商業模式在同樣產業鏈位置上的競爭者。而由訴訟客體資訊中，除了以產品技術結構定位系爭專利之保護標的和技術特徵外，也從專利的被引證數、專利家族大小、所有權移轉次數、國際分類號分佈等指標比較系爭專利和一組同樣專利權人在相同時間間隔內申請的同技術領域之對照組專利，可發現系爭專利和對照組專利相比屬於較有價值的專利。 / The present research analyzes the U.S. patent infringement cases of the DNA sequencing industry to understand the features of patent-in-suit and litigation behaviors in said industry. The present research obtains 100 U.S. patent infringement cases and 168 patent-in-suit from commercial databases. The litigation history, parties in the litigation (plaintiff and defendant), subject matter of the litigation (the patent-in-suit and the infringing products) are analyzed. The present research identifies the position of different corporate entities in the DNA sequencing industry chain and the development of each generations of DNA sequencing technology. By analyzing the parties in the litigation, the present research identifies that most of the plaintiffs are corporate entities developing sequencing instrument, and most of the defendants are competitiors having the same business model with the plaintiffs. By analyzing subject matter of the litigation, the present research identifies the technical features and subject matter of the patent-in-suit. The present research compares the citation, patent family size, number of ownership transfer and IPC distribution between the patent-in-suit and a control group patents of the same technical field within the same time frame. The patent-in-suit is more valuable than the control group patents.

University of Macau / Faculty of Law

在知識經濟時代中，企業擁有的無形資產佔企業資產的比重已逐漸凌駕於一般有形資產，並能為企業創造最大價值。而代表企業研發創新能力的專利權也漸漸於公司內部扮演舉足輕重的角色。本研究選定一家電子產業中以專利授權為主要業務之公司為研究對象，採用個案研究法輔以內部問卷分析以及因素分析，自辨認公司所重視之專利價值影響因素與項目為出發點，伴隨專利策略之連結，探討企業內部管理制度運作之情形，並提出專利報導之建議。經彙整與分析後，得出以下三個研究結論： 一、個案公司重視之專利價值影響因素包含成本、技術、市場、授權、商品實現潛力以及法律與風險六大構面，共計38個項目。 二、針對六大專利價值影響因素與38個項目，個案公司設有10項管理制度進行專利管理與價值之蓄積。 三、本研究結合日本特許廳所提出之專利評價表的內容架構以及問卷與實地訪談結果，設計了一套專利報導表。

本論文為單一冊，共分五章十五節，約計十萬字餘。本文乃基於台灣對技術的輸入極 為仰賴、而於技術移轉的過程中，授權人往往梜其優勢的地位，對實施人課以許多的 限制。而在這些限制中，或為合法、或為非法，至於應如何判斷其為合法、或為非法 ，此乃本論文的重點。所以在本文第二章先闡述專利之獨占地位的合法性及專利權檻 用的一般判斷標準，第三章則進而分析六個限制條款：（１）地域限制、（２）搭售 設計、（３）回饋讓與、（４）競爭品交的限制、（５）再販賣價格的維持、（６） 交互權及專利總匯等等限制條款之合法性的判斷標準。而當此等限制條款涉及國際間 時，由於各國對上述各限制條款的判斷標準均有所差異，則一國之反托拉斯法的域外 管轄權應基於何種管轄原則，方不致於擴大一國之主權而侵害他國之主權，此乃第四 章的重點。第五章則提出建議以做為訂立授權契約時的參考及做結論。

基因治療係利用正常基因或治療基因移轉至標的細胞，使其修飾缺陷基因或表現正常蛋白質，或是以特定核酸序列干擾缺陷基因之表現，以回復細胞正常功能之一種治療方法。該治療方法配合人類基因組之解碼，將是未來治療遺傳性疾病或是癌症等疾病最重要之發展趨勢。 基因治療技術門檻高，所需投入之資金與人力相當龐大，為促進該技術之研發創新，實需專利制度之保障。然而關於基因治療技術過程相關之診斷或治療方法，因為存在著倫理上之爭議，為大多數國家不予專利之標的。因此本文係從基因檢測、基因藥物以至於基因移轉之治療方法，探討目前相關專利法制之規定及其爭議，以為我國專利法制修法之參考。 基因藥物關於基因或DNA成分之可專利性，先前爭議不斷，然目前國際之規定已趨一致，凡是經過人工努力，經過技術過程所純化而分離之DNA產物，只要符合專利保護要件者，均可獲予專利。DNA是否予以專利之法制爭議，雖然暫時告一段落，但是關於倫理之爭議卻仍方興未艾，而與基因治療相關之診斷或治療方法專利也因為醫護政策之倫理考量，引起不少之譴責與衝擊。在醫護政策予專利制度相互衝擊下，適度權衡二者，將是立法者未來一重要任務。病人受治療權益之維護以及專利制度促進研發投資之經濟效益必須同時兼顧，雖我國目前不予其專利，僅給予體外基因治療獲予專利之機會，但在醫療趨勢與科學研究之發展之下，未來不妨參酌美國立法例，或許將治療方式予以類型化後，適度開放治療方法之專利，但同時限制專利權對醫療人員在醫療院所實施之效力，以維護病人權益以及國家政策之最大效益。