知識經濟時代，企業為了維持競爭地位，重視技術與專利，原是為防止特定企業技術被複製或模仿。可是因為科技創新研發產品生命週期縮短、產品所涵蓋的專利權量多而複雜、與專利法規制度設計等因素，專利市場也因此而活絡，專利中介者的價值就此產生。專利中介者的存在使企業得以開放式之創新模式，進行組織內外部技術交流，為節省交易成本的種種問題，以及避免侵權爭議，專利中介經營型態開始多樣化，並隨著時間演進，不同型態的營運效益也開始呈現差異。過去中介者偏重於攻擊訴訟、防禦功能、移轉買賣，然而現今最大的專利中介者美國高智公司，其營運模式角色演化類型、價值創造，都與舊有的中介者營運模式不同。 本研究以個案研究與文獻整理方式大略了解高智實際運作方式為何。高智已經擁有自己的實驗室，並且積極與研究單位合作提供研發預算，不同於其他專利事業體被動防禦、積極主張的角色，高智創造出與客戶發展長期的合作關係價值，高智發揮一般中介者降低交易成本之功能，更是主動引進學術研發使其專利商業化。另外，高智近年來也有主動發起專利訴訟，企圖維護該公司的專利資產價值，高智的營運模式在實際運作上雖未有明確的法律爭議，或許未來可能還是會有相關專利法與競爭法的問題。 / In the era of knowledge economy, entrepreneurs gradually take technologies and patents seriously. Patents have been traditionally used to prevent others from copying or imitating valuable technologies. During the past decade, the market for patent application, licensing and transaction began to grow rapidly. Because of shorter production of life cycle, overlapping set of patent rights, and complicated patent systems, many managers adopt the concept of open innovation. There are many obstacles while trading patents; therefore, patent intermediates are arising. As time goes on, these business models changed a lot. Intellectual Ventures, the brand new largest intermediate company, is regarded as a successful intermediary model with a unique business model attempting to bring more performances to the patent market. The major purpose of this study is to explore Intellectual Ventures real operation in the patent market. Intellectual Ventures has its own research lab, monetizes new inventions and cooperates with scholar research units. Intellectual Ventures creates a long term relationship with its clients and develops a different role from other traditional patent entities. Intellectual Ventures not only functions as a traditional intermediate to reduce the transaction costs, but also focuses on the commercialization of new patents and scholar ideas. But recently Intellectual Ventures has been involved in some civil legal activities to assure its own patent asset values, revealing that in the future the practice of Intellectual Ventures business can possibly cause some legal disputes about civil patent activities and antitrust conducts respectively.

本研究採用資料包絡分析法整合專利權產出價值與專利權效率來探討其對公司價值之關聯性。本研究除探討公司新發明與新型式專利的績效差異外，並同時以修正式Ohlson模型、股價報酬模型、及資產報酬率模型分別比較專利權在納入效率概念後與一般專利權產出何者對公司價值有較高的解釋能力。 實證結果亦發現，新型與新式樣專利雖沒有較發明專利可以創造出較高的銷售價值，但相對而言，其投入成本卻可大幅減少，因此反而有較高的績效表現。此外專利權效率與公司價值之關聯性，在控制其他變數後僅修正式Ohlson模式顯示規模效率達到統計上之顯著水準。而在比較專利權效率與專利權產出對公司價值之測試中，不同模式下之Vuong test都顯示兩者並無差異。此結果顯示大部份的投資人多只注重創新的結果，而較不注重公司創新過程中成本效益的問題。

本論文主要是在探討現行公平交易法第四十五條「依照著作權法、商標法或專利法行使權利之正當行為，不適用本法之規定」，其中有關專利權之部分。蓋專利權屬於智慧財產權之一種，係國家以法律授予私人的一種獨占、排他權利，亦即，專利權人就其所獲之專利請求範圍，係處於一種法定專有排除他人未經其同意而製造、販賣、使用或進口該專利之獨占權能地位。專利法藉由此一賦予專利權人特定期間之專屬排他權 (Exclusive Right)/獨占壟斷權，以提供一定之經濟上利益為誘因，藉此鼓勵發明人『公開』符合可專利要件；而競爭法制係為維護公平、自由競爭秩序與環境而必須規範獨占、聯合、結合等限制競爭行為及不公平競爭行為，兩者之糾結關係應如何釐清？素有經濟憲法高地位之稱之競爭法制，應如何在法律特設專利獨占權之制度目的考量下，揮舞它這把大刀？又法律特設專利獨占權之制度目的，又會如何影響競爭法制規制專利權利之界線，是本文想要探究、嘗試解決之議題亦為本文研究目的所在。 鑑於目前我國對於公平交易法第四十五條之法律定位爭議甚大，復以目前我國對於專利權之正當權利行使行為之實務摸索尚處於萌芽之未臻成熟階段，本文擬以專利制度之制度目的及專利財產之本質出發，再借鏡國美國法制百餘年之行政執法、司法實務之實證觀察方式，試圖對目前我國越來越多之專利權權利行使與公平交易法之交錯相關議題及爭議，提出一些可能的思考方向與解決之道，並以法律體系解釋、法律目的解釋、市場經濟以及專利制度之制度目的等思維角度，嘗試定義公平交易法第四十五條之專利權正當權利行使行為，並將本文所建議之審查基準與審查步驟作成審查流程圖，作為本文之總結。

近年來，提昇專利品質的觀念已在企業間蔓延開來，而擁有一套能夠有效衡量的分析評量工具，為企業評估專利價值的先決條件。目前坊間評估專利價值較普遍的方式為CHI Research所發展，以「專利引證資訊」及「專利數量」作為公式的計算基礎。然而專利之品質要素並非現行專利分析公式及其指標所能完全涵蓋及內化，與商業價值亦無直接對應關係。為了改善上述之問題，本研究試圖從實務的觀點出發，找出並分析品質優良之專利說明書，其共通之特色為何，以及如何評估專利實際替企業創造的利益。本研究擬就下列問題進行討論： 問題一：目前常用的以「專利引證資訊」及「專利說明書可量化數據」為基礎之專利價值評量模式是否可靠？ 問題二：專利的品質與價值如何定義與區分開來評估？ 問題三：影響專利說明書品質之指標因子及流程為何？ 問題四：評估專利價值之流程應為何？ 問題五：由產業結構切入之專利評量模型可行性？ 本研究之架構乃由現有理論基礎配合產業實務，首先將專利之評估方式分成「品質」及「價值」兩階段。接著以TFT-LCD產業之著名訴訟專利及廣視角技術作為研究對象，討論擁有優良品質之專利其特色為何。再連結產業結構、價值鏈、供應鏈、產品結構、技術結構、營收結構等市場面議題以實證專利之價值，並分析探討本研究之專利評量模型可行性。最後，針對提出之問題歸納出研究結論，給予學界及產業界一個專利評量之方法參考。 / In recent years, the concept of improving patent quality is spread over companies and cooperations. Analysis system, as a tool for effectively measuring patent quality, is the prerequisite of patent evaluation. The most general way of patent evaluation is developed by CHI Research, which bases on the information of “patent citation” and “patent quantity” for formulas. However, the essential factor of the patent quality can not be suitably presented by the foregoing indices and formulas. Furthermore, there is no direct relationship between the commercial value and such evaluation process. In order to improve the evaluation process, this research focuses on analyzing the common characteristics of high quality patents and how to value the actual commercial profit earned by patents, form the points of views of practice. Therefore, the objects of the research were to answer the questions as the follows: 1. Are the existing patent evaluation methodology which base on the information of “patent citation” and “countable indices in patent disclosure” dependable. 2. How to define and evaluate “patent quality” and “patent value” respectively. 3. What is the essential factors and evaluation process of patent quality. 4. What is the evaluation process of patent value. 5. The feasibility of patent evaluation model initialed from the industrial structure. This method of the research combines current theory and industry practice. First, the evaluation process is devided into two steps: “quality” and “value”. Then it takes TFT-LCD industry for example, by analyzing a famous litigation patent and VA technology to discuss the common characteristics of high quality patents. Then, from the business point of view, the research links with several indices such as industry structure, value chain, supply chain, product structure, technology structure and revenue structure to derive the patent value. The feasibility of patent evaluation model by this research will also be discussed. At last, the research summarize the result to present an evaluation methodology of patent quality and value, which may be a useful reference to industry and the academia.

本研究使用中國大陸製藥工業之上市公司及部分非上市公司1999年至2010年之財務與非財務資訊做為樣本觀察值，探討研發密集度在企業競爭與經營績效中所扮演的角色，研究結果顯示企業專利佔有率與經營績效具有顯著正向關係，而企業專利佔有率的變動數與企業產值排名的變動情形亦呈現顯著正向關係，顯示研發密集度與企業競爭優勢息息相關。本研究並以前項結果作為基礎，進一步分析產業內績效領先企業群專利佔有率異常上升時，競爭企業是否會透過提升研發密集度或是行銷支出密集度來做為因應，而研究結果指出領先企業群之專利佔有率異常上升時，會導致研發密集度較高的企業異常提升其研發密集度，並導致研發密集度較低的小型企業大幅提升行銷支出。本研究結論專利對企業經營績效具有正向影響，並能替企業帶來競爭優勢，同時企業亦將專利視為競爭優勢之主體，對於競爭者的專利策略會予以因應。本研究建議企業在形成策略時，應綜合考量產業結構、核心資源以及競爭者的競爭性行為或可能的回應。 / The present study investigates the role of granted patents in determining industry competition and operating performance. The sample consists of Chinese public and private companies in the pharmaceutical industry from 1999 to 2010. The findings show that the quantity of patent is positively associated with operating performance and that the change of patent count is also positively associated with the ranking of market share. Moreover, the results show that the change of patent counts of leading companies has a positive impact on followers’ innovation activities and marketing activities. Overall, the evidence suggests that patent plays an important role in company competition and that companies response to the R&D(patent)strategy of their competitors in the market.

根據過去文獻公司經常以管理階層之薪酬契約來解決代理問題，激勵經理人做出股東財富極大化之決策。而過去企業衡量經理人績效時，大多使用財務性指標，然而知識時代來臨，傳統財務性指標已不足衡量獎酬制度，尤其當公司策略重視創新及品質導向時，若獎酬只與傳統財務績效指標做連結，可能會導致經理人做出不當的決策，故亦應加入非財務性指標來決定獎酬。本文主要探討專利權對高階經理人超額薪酬之影響，由於專利權對於獲利存在遞延效果，本文推論董事會可能依據外部人無法觀察到的當期非財務性績效指標，給予相對應之超額薪酬。 由於專利權對於高科技業更為重要，因此本研究以高科技產業公司為樣本，進行實證研究，結果顯示公司專利權申請數、核准數及被引證次數愈多，高階經理人超額薪酬愈高。 / Traditionally, firms use financial performance measures to reward managers and thus align managerial incentives with the interest of shareholders. However, recent evidence shows that firms are increasing using non-financial performance measures to evaluate CEO performance, especially when firms emphasize on innovation and quality. The purpose of this study is to examine the relation between patents information and CEO excess compensation for high-tech firms. The empirical results show that CEO excess compensation is positively associated with patent counts and patent citations after controlling for financial performance measures. Overall, the evidence suggests that non-financial performance measures provide incremental information about CEO efforts over financial measures and thus compensation committees adjust CEO compensation for non-financial performance.

本論文主要是研究美國專利審查品質對產業競爭的影響，以探討專利申請案的審查品質是否對會對產業競爭產生影響。 從企業對智慧財產權保護手段的選擇與思考的研究中可發現，企業對於無形資產的保護手段經常不選擇專利權，可能導致這種現象的原因很多，包括企業不願公開創新成果、企業無法實際自專利權交易中獲利及企業透過法院行使專利權經常遭受挫折。根據學者的研究，透過法院行使專利權的權利人只有少數能取得有利判決，同時近半的專利權被法院認為無效。本文以為，專利權的有效性不易透過法院證實是使企業不願以專利權保護企業創新成果的主因。 美國近年興起的專利改革運動企圖藉一連串專利制度的改革而改善美國專利商標局（USPTO）的專利審查品質。在美國的專利改革運動中，各利益團體的影響、競爭法主管機關的意見及各律師協會的意見都使專利改革運動有更充分的討論及更廣泛的思考，但也使整個改革運動的修法程序發生遲滯的現象。 為證明美國專利審查品質的瑕疵會影響產業競爭，本文第三章舉出曾實際發生在電子連接器產業的一實例──Alan專利，以該Alan專利為例說明美國專利商標局核准的專利權對產業的影響。該Alan專利核准後，產業中各競爭者分別採用不同的迴避設計，而這些迴避設計大多是不易製造或不可靠的設計。同時，美國專利商標局另核准近百個專利權都以Alan專利為審查基礎，但美國聯邦法院最後卻因申請前的習知技術而判決Alan專利無效。 本文第四章研究美國專利改革運動中的習知技術相關議題，包括是否改採先申請主義、專利申請人的申請案相關資訊揭露及專利核准後的異議程序等。 由於美國專利改革草案2009及2010均未通過美國國會審查，因此無法取得實證資料驗證是否能改善目前美國專利制度的缺失。雖然美國專利改革草案是企圖修正現行制度中的缺失，但未來仍待實證研究證據驗證是該專利改革草案的成效。

自美國聯邦巡迴上訴法院於一九九八年State Street Bank一案，肯認商業方法軟體得為法定之專利標的後，全球之金融業、電腦業與網路公司莫不尋求以專利作為保護其商業方法之武器，商業方法專利申請之案件遂絡繹而來。惟商業方法軟體是否得為專利之標的，至今美國學界仍有爭議而見解不一，日本專利局係採與美國專利局相同之立場，然歐洲專利局目前似仍採否定見解。對此一議題，我國已有相當文獻討論，並均採肯定之見解。惟並未對何以可專利性之理由詳予闡述，至於專利侵害之問題，亦未就我國法深入分析。 本文擬自比較法之觀點，分析美國實務運作及學界之論述、歐洲發明專利公約及專利局實務之見解、日本法之規定與特許廳之意見，汲取其中之經驗與見解以為借鏡。第二章首先就商業方法軟體加以定義，並探究現今商業方法軟體之架構及其特殊性，以作為專利標的適格性分析之基礎。第三章分析商業方法軟體之施以專利保護，對產業與實務造成之影響。包括實務所面臨的困難﹙如先前技術資料庫之建立、審查人員之訓練、法院面臨之困難等﹚，及我國軟體產業應如何調適。第四章係探討商業方法軟體之專利標的適格性分析，依次分析美國法之規定與學說實務之見解、歐洲專利公約與專利局之立場、日本特許法之規定與特許廳之態度，以及國內學說實務之見解，並由我國專利法之立法意旨與商業方法軟體架構之特殊性，論述商業方法軟體在現今軟體發展之架構下，應非發明專利保護之標的，另亦就我國智慧財產局所公布之「電腦軟體相關發明專利審查基準」，加以探討並提出個人淺見，並摘錄智慧財產局已核准若干商業方法軟體專利之個案，加以分析。第五章自發明專利保護要件之觀點，探究商業方法軟體專利保護之問題。第六章則自美國法之觀點，分析商業方法軟體於網際網路上，所發生之跨國界專利侵害問題，並試從國際私法之角度，處理此類問題。最後，於第七章提出個人對商業方法軟體專利之淺見，並就我國現行專利制度提出未來保護方向之建議，以為結論。

中國近年來為因應經濟快速發展，除極力追求技術自主與維護中國本土企業利益外，更注重自有知識產權之研發與保護。尤其兩岸地區經貿活動交流之頻繁，臺灣對中國投資方面，2011年一年間，核准對大陸投資件數575件，核准投(增)資金額更高達131億美元，且臺灣企業申請大陸專利件數逾21,600件，在在可見臺灣科技產業大規模佈局中國市場，顯見中國已成為臺灣企業專利爭訟之戰場，深入探討中國現行專利法制自刻不容緩。 2008年中國針對專利法進行第三次修法，嗣於2009年10月1日實施，在新法施行前，原侵犯專利權的賠償數額係按照權利人所受的損失或者侵權人所獲得的利益確定為依據，權利人的損失或侵權人的利益難以確定時，參照該專利許可使用費的倍數合理確定。修正後《專利法》第65條規定賠償數額按照權利人因被侵權所受實際損失確定；實際損失難以確定的，可以按照侵權人因侵權所獲的利益。權利人之損失或侵權人之獲得的利益難以確定的，參照該專利許可使用費的倍數合理確定，並明定法定賠償，將最高人民法院司法解釋規定的法定賠償提高到專利法層次，法定額度從人民幣（下同）5,000元至50萬元提高到1萬元至100萬元，更明確化適用賠償數額之順序。 本文從探討中國新專利法中專利侵權損害賠償制度出發，再透過法學實證研究之方法，檢視修法後，中國人民法院就專利糾紛適用新法之情形，據以觀察不同屬性之專利侵權糾紛與法院判賠金額間之關聯性，探究中國人民法院現行審判實務上判定賠償額之現況，並提出相關修法建議。 / In response to the fast economic growth of recent decades, the Chinese government has begun to contemplate the protection of intellectual property rights and emphasize on pursuing independent technological development. In 2011, Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs has approved 575 investments in China by Taiwanese enterprises which the total amount has reached to US13.1 billions. The number of patent applications filed by Taiwanese firms reached to 2,100 in the same year. It is therefore foreseeable that China will become a major battlefield for patent disputes between companies from around the world, especially those from Taiwan. The third round of amendments to the patent law of the P.R.C came into effect. Before this change, the amount of compensation for damages was based on the losses suffered by the right holder or the profits earned through the infringement; if it was difficult to determine the right holder’s loss or the violator’s profit, the amount was assessed by referring to the appropriate multiple of the amount of royalties of that patent under contractual license. Article 65 of the new patent law codifies that the amount of compensation for the damage caused by the infringement of the patent right shall be assessed on the basis of the actual losses suffered by the right holder; if the actual losses are difficult to determine, it may be assessed on the basis of the profits earned through the infringement; if it is difficult to determine either, the amount is assessed by reference to the appropriate multiple of the amount of royalty of that patent under contractual license. In the event that none of these amounts can be fairly ascertained, the court has the discretion to award compensation in the range of RMB 5,000 to 50,000 provided by a Supreme People’s Court judicial interpretation. Article 65 also codifies the statutory damages to between RMB 10,000 and RMB 1,000,000. This article discusses damage compensation in China’s patent litigation and develops quantitative methodologies by means of empirical study, which includes examinations on 400judgments of patent infringement cases issued by Chinese courts and interviews with scholars and Chinese judges. The research results provide a reference for estimating litigation efficiency, as well as a proposal to corporations for framing patent enforcement strategies in China.

專利是各藥廠及生技公司保護藥物利潤的重要手段之一，全世界各國因藥物專利而起的侵權訴訟亦持續增加，也因此專利已成為藥廠及生技公司的必爭之地。過去台灣於美國的專利申請量全世界排名第五，但實際從專利而獲得的利益卻非對等，由此可見過去台灣企業在專利的佈局與利用尚待精進。近年來，台灣藥業及生技業蓬勃發展，許多研發成果亦開始走向臨床階段，然生技公司仍需有更完整專利佈局方能立足全球生技業。因此，本研究透過研究國際諾華大藥廠的基利克膜衣錠之美國專利佈局，以及專利佈局與研究開發時程之對應關係，總體觀察國際藥廠對於一小分子化學藥物所執行之專利佈局情況，並依據其專利佈局結果，歸納、分析及提出適用於台灣生技公司之專利佈局策略。美國的專利制度對於全世界的影響相當廣泛，再且其國內藥物市場亦屬全球最大，因此本研究將專注分析基利克膜衣錠於美國之專利佈局策略。 本研究係透過研閱、分析與分類與基利克膜衣錠相關之專利及研發資訊，並透過文獻檢索方法彙整其研究與發展之各事件及其時程，及透過分析與拆解專利之申請專利範圍，組織歸納並統計其專利之類型(其主張之標的物)、申請時程、專利申請時程與研發時程的關係，以及其美國專利家族(主張優先權的各種延續案)及各國專利家族之應用狀況。 本研究結果顯示，諾華大藥廠針對基利克膜衣錠在美國至少提出超逾40件以上之專利申請，且其涵蓋面向甚廣，至包含化合物專利、晶形專利、衍生物專利、用途專利、代謝物專利、鹽類專利、合成方法專利以及合併療法專利等，是一相當全面性的專利佈局。此外，本研究亦發現其各類型之專利申請時間點，與其研發成果產出時間點有一定關係。由此現象可見，其研發團隊與智慧財產團隊有緊密的互動關係。依據基利克膜衣錠的專利佈局結果以及考量台灣生技業的資源受限情況，本研究提出下列建議以提供台灣生技業作為其專利佈局策略之思考。(1) 於有限資源中，仍須投入資源申請關鍵專利，其中關鍵專利至少包含化合物專利以及晶形專利。關鍵專利重要之處在於，其所主張的保護範圍在各種專利類型中是最廣的同時也最難迴避。(2) 一般而言，專利的申請可在研發成果產生後的一至二年左右提出。研發成果包含一般實驗室的功能性試驗，以及/或初步動物實驗結果。於此一時點提出是為了確保申請之專利具新穎性及進步性，同時又不因過早提出申請而致使專利期覆蓋藥物實際上市銷售期的時間縮短。然而，專利申請時間尚須考量相同領域的競爭程度、技術發展水平以及標的物商業化之潛力等。(3) 於全球各國提出關鍵專利申請。先於各大醫藥國提出專利申請，後再利用優先權制度擴展專利保護的國家。(4) 利用美國專利制度之彈性。美國專利制度包含臨時案、延續案、分割案等，這些彈性提供了生技公司一段較長的時間來產生更多研發成果、評估是否持續執行研發專案、延後正式專利申請及申請費用、研究競爭對手佈局等，因此對於生技公司而言是一重要手段。 總結而言，藥物之專利佈局並非僅是向專利局提出申請如此而已，其需要一縝密、多面向且事先規劃的專利佈局。藥物的專利佈局包含的面向相當廣泛，涉及了藥物研發各類資訊與產出的了解、各種法規事件之掌握、全球各國專利制度的深入了解與應用，以及研發團隊與智慧財產團隊之緊密合作等。儘管專利佈局涉及之知識、技能與人員深且廣，然所需投入之資源並非集中於同一時間點，而是遍佈整個藥物的產品生命週期，若能掌握本研究所提出四點架構性建議，台灣生技公司應能在早期研究開發階段，將投入資源所產生的效益最大化，達到同時具有效能與效率的專利佈局。 / Patenting is one of the most important measures in securing the profits of a drug and has gained traction in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries for several decades. However, in Taiwan, past experience in obtaining and utilizing patent rights has not been a successful story. In addition, a small biotechnology company is usually in tight budget and needs a cost effective and feasible patenting strategy. With the booming development of biotechnology companies in Taiwan, the study aims to provide Taiwanese companies insights of patenting strategies and delineating the relationships between the patents and the corresponding research and development (R&D) and regulatory activities. The study focused on the drug patenting strategy in the United States (US) since its patent system is one of the most influential and is the largest pharmaceutical market in the world. Gleevec, which is developed by Novartis group, is a global blockbuster and has accumulated billion dollars of sales around the world. The study takes Gleevec as a case study object and analyzes its patent deployments in US. In terms of the scope of the strategy, the study focuses on the patent types (the subject matter), patent application time, filing time in correspondence with the R&D and regulatory events, and the resulting patent families (including US patents claiming priority of previously filed applications and the same invention filed globally). Patents and independent claims are studied and are categorized into several categories which are predetermined according to the patent types. Literature research is conducted to delineate the timeline of R&D and regulatory events. The study showed a comprehensive patent deployment of Gleevec in US and the patent deployment is in dynamic relationships with the R&D and regulatory events of a drug. Protecting a drug through patents requires professional understanding of patents and patent systems, close collaboration between R&D team and patent team, and a well-organized deployment strategy. Based on Gleevec patent deployment in US, the study provides the following insights for a biotechnology companies in Taiwan. First, dedicate capital resources at least in obtaining key patents, mainly compound patents and crystalline form patents. These key patents have the biggest scope of protection of a drug. Second, in general, file patents around one to two years after the first laboratory results and/or preliminary animal study results. This is to insure the validity of the patents and yet won't cut short too much of the sales protection period. However, the filing time is also subject to considerations including the competition status in the same field, the overall scientific development and the commercial potential of the candidates. Third , file the key patents globally in early stages. Obtaining patents in different countries could expand protection geographically. Last, taking advantage of the flexibility of the US patent system. The flexibility gives a company a prolonged period to evaluate the potential of the candidate, defer patent timing and costs and make the final decision. In summary, patent deployment isn't just applying patents in the patent office. It require a detailed and comprehensive plan. A patent deployment plan needs various professionals who have deep knowledge in drug research, clinical development, regulatory activities and global patent regulations and who are very experienced in utilizing the knowledge. It also requires these professionals to complement their knowledge with other professionals and to work closely. Despite such resources might require a lot of capital resources, these resources are not a lump sum cost, instead, the cost are dispersed throughout the whole product life cycle. If a biotechnology company with limited resources could employ the aforementioned suggestion, it would maximize the cost benefit of patent deployment plan and generate a patent deployment with effectiveness and efficiency.