Jensen(1998)認為，當公司有過多的自由現金流量時，經理人基於自利動機，較有可能從事非最大化主理人的行為，加劇代理問題的產生。Jensen也認為，發行長期負債可以降低公司多餘的自由現金流量，進而減緩代理問題的產生。因此，本研究即由此一觀點出發，探討是否可藉由長期負債的發行，減緩代理問題的產生？以及當經理人持股比例低，代理問題較嚴重時，負債可否做為監督機制，以減緩代理問題？ 本研究以審計公費做為衡量代理問題之替代變數。當代理問題愈嚴重，即意味著公司有較高的固有風險，因此將增加查核努力，進而收取較高的審計公費。換句話說，當代理問題愈嚴重，審計公費將愈高。實證結果發現，低成長高自由現金流量的公司，發行長期負債可以降低自由現金流量，進而減緩代理問題。而在經理人低持股比例時，長期負債可做為替代的監督機制，以減緩代理問題的產生。故本研究認為，負債確實可做為減緩代理問題之機制。 / Jensen(1986)argued that when company own more free cash flow, based on the self-serving motivation, managers will tend to pursue his benefit rather than principal’s. In such situation, agency problem will become more serious. Jensen also point out that issuing long-term debt can reduce the free cash flow in the company, therefore, ease the agency problem. This study is based on the free cash flow theory, examining whether issuing long-term debt can reducing the free cash flow, therefore reducing the agency problem? Besides, we will examine when managers hold fewer stocks, whether issuing long-term debt can be a substitute monitor mechanism or not? Using audit fee as a variable to measure the agency problem. In auditing, serious agency problem means higher inherent risk and, in turn, audit fees. In other words, more serious agency problem means higher audit fee. The result finds that in low growth firm with higher free cash flow, issuing long-term debt can reduce free cash flow and, in turn, mitigate agency problem. Besides, when managers hold fewer stocks, long-term debt can be a substitute monitor mechanism. As a conclusion, debt can be a mechanism to mitigate agency problem.

本研究以大同集團為個案研究對象，從決策及資源分配掌控者觀點定義該集團企業之最終控制者，首先分析大同集團企業之董監結構及股權結構，並針對該集團之公司治理議題作探討，亦對相關之法令缺失，提出改善及政策建議。 研究結果顯示，大同集團企業之最終控制者林蔚山家族係透過交叉持股及掌握董事會席次控制權等控制途徑掌控集團企業，其集團內十一家公開發行以上公司的平均直接持股率、股份控制權、盈餘分配權分別為1.17%、21.83%、1.07%，但平均席次控制權則高達61.85%，股份控制權（席次控制權）與盈餘分配權偏離差之平均值則達20.76%（60.79%），席次控制權與盈餘分配權之偏離倍數為178.01倍，亦即最終控制者可以一單位的出資獲取178單位以席次控制力衡量的實質控制力。大同集團企業席次控制權與盈餘分配權嚴重偏離之個案研究發現，符合經營者之經營誘因不足，而財富侵佔動機較強之學術假設。此外，本研究探討該集團企業掏空資產案件、大幅減資、投資通達國際之相關財務資訊透明度，針對大同集團之股權結構與董監組成分析，提出公司治理相關議題討論。最後，本研究針對公司治理相關法令，提出改善及政策建議。 關鍵詞：集團企業、股權結構、公司治理、席次控制權 / This study employs the Tatung business group as our sample and defines the ultimate owner as the entity with ultimate influence over major decisions regarding the operation, management, and allocation of company resources. We first analyze the characteristics of different boards of directors and corporate ownership structure of the Tatung business group. Corporate governance related issues are then identified, followed by discussions on the deficiencies of relevant regulations and suggestions for improvements on government policies. The analysis indicates that cross-holdings, pyramid structure and seat control over the board members are approaches applied by the Lin Family to actively control the Tatung business group. An analysis on the measurement of voting rights, cash flow rights and board seat-control shows that direct shareholding, voting rights and cash flow rights are on average 1.17%, 21.83% and 1.07%, respectively, while the board seat-control ratio is 61.85%. The average deviation between voting right (board seat-control) and cash flow rights is 20.76% (60.79%). The number of board seats controlled by the owner is 178.01 times greater than cash flow rights. In other words, the ultimate owner gets approximately 178 units of controlling power through one unit of capital input. To the extent that ownership and control is highly deviated, a weaker disciplinary effect and a stronger entrenchment effect can be expected. In addition, in this study of the Tatung business group, we examine the emptied assets case, significant capital reduction, and the transparency of financial information of investment in Nature Worldwide Technology Corporation. For the corporate ownership structure and the characteristics of different boards of directors of the Tatung business group, we identify the critical issues regarding corporate governance. Finally, discussions on the deficiencies of relevant regulations and suggestions for improvements on government policies are provided. Keywords: Business group; Corporate ownership structure; Corporate governance; Board seat-control.

隨著社會與環境的快速變遷，政府傳統的單一權力控制模式已經無法有效解決公共問題與滿足民眾需求，因此世界各國政府改造趨勢多以治理取代過去由上而下的統治與管理思維，並且尋求政府體制以外的非政府夥伴加入公共事務管理與公共服務產出的行列，而公私協力治理模式之運作更是廣受學界與實務工作者的關注與重視。 本研究試以臺北捷運聯合開發制度檢視我國公私協力之運作執行，透過文獻分析與深度訪談，萃取相關學者與實務工作者的參與經驗，探討我國公私部門在捷運聯合開發之協力過程中所產生之限制與問題。 研究發現我國捷運聯合開發過程中的公私夥伴關係僅建立在制式化的契約基礎上，並無法有效回應開發作業所呈現的複雜動態變化，同時合作雙方也缺乏具體的協商機制與行為共識，因此本研究建議我國政府在政策規劃與設計階段必須將各行動者的參與動機和參與目的納入考量，同時在政策執行過程中，雙方亦須透過協商互動來確保彼此的合作意願，透過資源共用和權力互賴而完善我國捷運聯合開發之公私協力治理模式。 / With the social and environment rapid change, the traditional authority has been not solved the public problem. Hence, every country toward the governance to replace the top-down and seek for non-governments to be public administrators. Therefore, the Public-Private Partnerships is popular for scholar and practice workers. This study aims to review the Taipei Mass Rapid Transit(MRT) System with the respect of Public-Private Partnerships. We will discuss the Public-Private Partnerships’ limits and problem in MRT joint developments through the references and deep interview, gaining the experience from the scholars and practices workers. This study finds out that the Public-Private Partnerships in MRT joint development process are basic on the contracts. It could not respond efficiency the complex dynamic and both sides lack negotiation systems and arrangement at the same time. Consequence, the study suggests that the country have to consider the motivation and purpose from actors in the process of policy formulation. At the same time, both side have to ensure cooperation willing through the negotiation and to achieve the perfect Public-Private Partnerships through the resource dependence and interdependence of power in the MRT joint development.

極端之租稅規避活動可能導致較高之受查、受罰與聲譽風險。又由一企業之經營策略，可觀察該企業決定如何於選定市場中競爭，且部分上展現了該企業承擔風險與不確定性之意願。因此企業願意承受之風險越高，可能亦較願意從事較激進之租稅規避活動。亦即研究一企業之策略決策，就某種程度而言應可反映企業之租稅規避程度。此外，企業之治理單位，例如：董事會，於企業策略選擇扮演重要角色，因此，分析組織之公司治理特性亦應有助於解釋其租稅規避程度之高低。 針對2001至2011年台灣上市櫃公司實證結果，本研究得到以下結論：(1) 相對於採攻擊者策略之企業，採防禦者策略之企業之有效稅率偏高，表示其從事較低程度之租稅規避活動。(2) 組織之帳面有效稅率顯著受到董監席次控制比例、董監持股比率及經理人持股等三項本研究所採董事會特性為主之公司治理變數所影響。 / A firm’s choice of business-level strategy are likely to determine the level of tax avoidance because the firm strategies are, in part, based on a firm’s willingness to deal with risk and uncertainty. In addition, a firm’s board of directors is influential toward a firm’s major business strategies. Since a firm’s strategies are based on its intent to deal with risks, the choice made by the firm may be able to represent its governance unit’s willingness to bear risks. Therefore, this paper examines to what extent a Taiwanese firm’s business-level strategy and corporate governance characteristics affect its level of tax avoidance. This paper finds that defender firms tend to engage in less tax avoidance than prospector firms, as demonstrated by higher book effective tax rates. This paper also finds that firms with higher voting power hold by the ultimate controlling owner within the board of directors and supervisors tend to have higher book effective tax rates, which suggests lower level of tax avoidance activities. On the contrast, those firms with directors, supervisors, and managers holding more share interests tend to have a lower book effective tax rate, which indicates the firm engages in more tax avoidance activities.

企業在彼此競爭以爭食市場大餅時，除了須要持續監控外部商機，積極掌握市場脈動，並推出符合其需求的商品以滿足顧客需求之外、也須要有效率地運用有限資源，妥善處理如採購、資金規畫、廠房設置乃迄於人員調派等各類非屬核心的支援性創價活動，綜言之，即透過高效率的公司治理，才有可能達成永續經營的終極目標。本研究透過個案研究，利用個案公司– A公司各類資料，以公司治理之理論架構為基礎，據此深度觀察A公司所採取之各類關鍵策略、行動和結果，乃迄於最終的財務面經營績效，據此釐清決定個案公司經營績效的關鍵失敗因素，以及公司治理在其中發揮的功能，作為實務界的參考。 本研究針對A公司2003年至2008年發展及決策進行深入探討，據此瞭解A公司為何2006甫上櫃，2008年就因資金周轉不靈而跳票下櫃。經研析後，可得知A公司在2003年至2008年之間，遭遇以下各類關鍵經營問題： 1.本業經營績效逐年下滑 2.投資規劃過於樂觀，未考量當不如預期時對公司之可能影響。 3.對新產品營收過於樂觀，未考量由於新產品送樣期過長，產線建置過早，致使相關設備閒置。 由於A公司管理階層與外部股東之間存在「帝國建立」的代理矛盾，再加上A公司的董事長兼任總經理，因此具有「所有權與經營權重疊」現象。此時則A公司便極有可能因為負責人「帝國建立」的傾向，導致決策失誤，進而危害到公司所有利害關係人之利益。本研究利用中華公司治理協會所提出之公司治理實地評量表進行研析，亦得知造成A公司跳票下櫃之主要原因在於其未積極「強化董事會職能」，並未強化「管理階層的紀律與溝通」。 由於A公司管理階層具有「帝國建立」傾向，再加上A公司由於未能保持「經營權與所有權分離」，並「強化董事會職能」、「強化管理階層的紀律與溝通」，終而使得「本業經營績效逐年下滑」，但仍於短時間內進行大量投資，終而使得「投資過速且投資標的所產生之現金流量過少、速度過慢，投資效益未能顯現」等兩類原因，最終因跳票而黯然下櫃。 關鍵字：公司治理、董事會職能、被動元件產業 / Firms shall efficiently allocate limited internal resources, dealing with all kinds of activities including procurement, capital planning, etc. so as to raise up chances of effective competition against other competitors. In others words, firms must rely on effective company governance to assure sustainable development & profitability. Based on company governance related theory & structure, the paper pays attention to conducting cases study method on Company A. Via in-depth digging how Company A performed during the period of 2003 to 2008, why Company A over-invested during 2003 – 2008, why Board of Directors didn’t function well so as to correct the causing-disaster decision by kinds of analyses, this paper finds out below reasons to cause Company A to be delisted in 2008: 1.Performance of core business (manufacturing and sales of ferrite core) getting worse gradually. 2.Over-investment due to overconfidence regarding internal resources allocation. 3.Overconfidence regarding sales of new product. The root causes why Company made above mistakes could be generalized as below list: 1.“Empire Building” agency conflict existed between managers and stockholders. 2.The un-separation of Ownership and control. 3.Independent directors of Board of Directors don’t function well to provide insightful, effective-monitoring opinions. Managers are under loose monitoring of Board of Directors. 4.There is little discipline regarding how managers behave in daily operation and critical decision making. Keyword: Company governance, Board of Directors, Passive Component Industry

臺灣礦業採掘有關的政治環境衝突往往被概念化為治理問題。也就是說，治理政策產生的衝突，是由於礦業採掘活動中「收益分配、政治參與、透明度和原住民社區的就業機會」等四個指標。然而，在治理層面忽略了原住民族長期受到邊緣化的歷史過程以及持續接受殖民的統治的治理模式，因此本文的主要論述是， 礦業採掘活動有關的政治環境衝突並非源自 “治理” 問題， 而更重要的是，此問題本身超越了現行的政治體制架構，因為國家、礦業採掘公司、原住民部落之間在土地議題上顯現出不同的本質觀點，雙方在政治體制的範圍上，以及文化、社會體系上，兩者皆沒有共同之處，而基於這一論點，本研究將對於南澳泰雅族人土地議題的奮鬥案立加以研究。 / Political-environmental conflicts related to extractive industries in Taiwan tend to be conceptualized as problems of governance. These conflicts are generated from ill-designed policies that manage the distribution of revenues from extractive industries, formal political participation, transparency and employment opportunities for the indigenous community. The governance approach, however, does not take into account the history of marginalization and resistance of indigenous groups, or the permanence of colonial patterns of domination in Taiwan. The main argument of this paper is that the political-environmental conflicts related to extractive activities do not derive from problems of ‘governance’, but more significantly, they emerge as a consequence of divergences that transcend the current institutional framework. The different political ontologies among state, corporate, and the indigenous community over land revealed, each party operates within institutional parameters and socio-cultural systems which have nothing in common. This argument will be developed in the case study of the Atayal people’s territorial struggles in Nan’ao, Taiwan.

本研究分析各類型機構投資人持股份額及持股變動，與企業併購長短期績效的關聯性，藉以探討各類型投資人在公司治理中所扮演的角色。本研究結果發現，機構投資人持股對企業監督的功能在短期不明顯。然而就長期而言，外資持股對併購長期績效有正面影響。無論由法人、機構投資人及總持股等層面來看，外資持股皆與併購企業長期績效有顯著的正相關。 進一步將各類型投資人持股拆解為細項，發現外資信託基金持股與併購長期績效的關係由負轉正;反觀本國方面，本國信託基金持股對長期績效則有非常顯著的負向影響；而包含職工福利會及基金會持股的本國其他法人持股及證券自營商持股則對長期績效有顯著的正向影響。 由持股變動也能觀察到一致性的結果。機構投資人持股變動與對併購績效的影響，於短期多為不顯著且方向不一致；長期而言，雖然包含外資機構投資人在內的多數持股變動變數皆未有顯著結果，但本國信託基金的持股變動與併購績效仍然存在非常顯著的負相關。 由公司治理及外部監督的角度而言，本研究結果顯示外資整體投資人在企業中扮演著重要的監督者角色。以細項來看，外資信託基金、本國其他法人及證券自營商較能有效地監督企業決策，為企業帶來長期的價值提升；反觀本國信託基金則非良好的企業監督者，且帶來顯著的負向影響。 / In this paper, we examine the relationship between different types of institutional ownership and acquiring firms’ performance on M&A activities. We found that the monitoring effect is weak in the short-term horizon; however, there is a significantly positive relationship between foreign institutional ownership and long-term performance on M&A activities. More specifically, the result shows that the ownership of foreign mutual funds, domestic foundations and securities dealers is positively related to M&A performance, while the ownership of domestic mutual funds has a significantly negative relation with M&A performance. At the same time, we have a consistent result from change in institutional ownership. While the relationship between change in most kinds of institutional ownership and long-term M&A performance is weak, the change in domestic mutual funds’ ownership has a strong negative relation with M&A performance. This paper shows that foreign investors’ monitoring has a positive influence on firm’s M&A decision. On the contrary, domestic mutual funds is not a good monitor that their holdings lead to poor M&A performance.

營建業為國內重要的民生工業，同時也是影響國家經濟發展與競爭力的重要指標之一。由於營建業易受外部政治和經濟環境等因素影響且高度依賴財務槓桿操作，經營風險較高使營建業公司治理機制成為提高營運績效及永續發展的關鍵因素。而台灣家族企業比例高，其中又以製造業及營建業比例高於其他產業。因此，本研究亦加入家族特性來討論公司治理結構對公司績效的影響。而過去國內營建業相關文獻多以傳統會計指標作為績效衡量標準，本文採用附加經濟價值(Economic Value Added , EVA)作為公司績效衡量指標，並以董事會結構、所有權結構以及經營團隊等三個面向作為公司治理機制變數之衡量。 本研究得到實證結果如下，第一，營建業存在董事規模小，獨立董事比例低以及控制股東持股比例高的特性，使得公司董事會過於封閉、經營團隊獨立性低且缺乏外部獨立性制衡。第二，營建業家族企業公司績效劣於非家族企業公司績效，顯示良好的公司治理機制對於家族企業的永續發展更加重要。第三、相對於非家族企業，家族企業會強化董事會規模、獨立董事比例及監察人比例與公司績效之間的正向關係。而無論是家族或是非家族企業，董事長兼任總經理皆對公司績效帶來負面影響。第四、營建業家族企業當家族成員涉入管理階層比例高，由於個人利益與家族利益關係密切，使家族成員涉入經營團隊時，透過凝聚力與相同目標可以增加決策效率，並以極大化公司價值為目標，有助於公司績效的提升。最後，營建業家族持股比例越高，家族利益與公司利益緊密性越高，對於公司績效有正向的影響，而家族董事控制席次增加，加深負面影響。 / Construction industry is not only an important major household industry but an indicator of economic development and competitiveness. The external political and economic environment and highly financial leverage affect the construction industry. The impact of corporate governance on performance becomes a key issue to improve the operational performance of construction industry. While the proportion of family business in manufacturing and construction industry is higher than other industries. Therefore, family characteristics are also added to discuss the impact of corporate governance on performance. In this paper, the economic value added (EVA) is used as the measure of corporate performance, and the board structure, ownership structure and management team is used as measures of corporate governance variables. The study shows following results. First, the construction industry has three characteristics, small board size, low proportion of independence directors and high ownership concentration. Second, in the construction industry, non-family business enjoy better performance than family firms do. Third, Family business will strengthen the positive impact of board size, the proportion of independent directors and supervisors on performance. Forth, in the construction industry, family shareholder in the management team is found to be beneficial to performance. And a positive relationship exists between ownership and performance. While increase the number of directors from the family members will increase the negative impact on corporate performance.

當公部門遇到突發的災害事件時，會依據災害防救體系進行危機管理，然而各部門會有各自專業領域，需要摒除本位主義進行跨部門協力合作。因此在跨域治理時，機關間常常因權責劃分不清而導致管轄權緊張，如何去化解緊張關係為本研究重要的課題。本次以德翔臺北貨櫃輪擱淺事件進行探討，原本以為是單純的船舶擱淺事件，後續卻延伸海洋油汙染的重大問題，屬於海難導致油汙染的複合性災害，在事件處理過程中，如何讓各機關及私部門進行公私協力合作並且減少衝突發生，考驗者主政者如何進行溝通協調及建立信賴夥伴關係。而本次研究目的為瞭解發生海難事故的緊急應變及分工機制外，進一步探討過程中遭遇困難時如何跨域協調，並藉由學者Kettl所提到的跨域治理需突破五項疆界圍籬，分別為任務、資源、能力、責任及課責等五大原因進行分析，找出各部門間產生的關係緊張原因，再利用跨部門協力的管理策略，找出處理過程產生的跨域問題。本研究利用文獻分析、個案研究及深度訪談法，找出跨域問題的癥結點後，回頭檢視事件後修訂之重大海洋油汙染緊急應變計畫，其中最主要變革為海難導致油汙染事件將由交通部主政，在法規面向可將事權統一，然而修法並非萬靈丹，如何藉由管理策略達成跨部門協力才是主要目標。

京都大学 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(法学) / 甲第23659号 / 法博第279号 / 新制||法||175(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院法学研究科法政理論専攻 / (主査)教授 森川 輝一, 教授 唐渡 晃弘, 教授 島田 幸典 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Laws / Kyoto University / DGAM