摘要 一九九七年東亞金融風暴起因之一即為公司治理不佳，其影響所及至數年後仍餘波蕩漾，而根據2000年6月麥肯錫顧問公司所做的全球投資人意見調查發現，有高達80％的美國投資人願意多付18％的價格來買良好公司治理企業的股票；自2001年底以來，美國「恩隆」（Enron）與「世界通訊」（WorldCom）等弊案又陸續爆發，其中所暴露的公司治理問題，讓世人驚覺這已是全球企業刻不容緩的議題，並亟思未來如何防止類似事件之發生。 公司治理經緯萬端，但都與如何確保資金提供者的投資能夠獲得應有的報酬有關。據此，公司治理的重要議題之一即為如何使小股東的權益不受內部人（即大股東與管理者）的侵犯；尤其在當今大企業紛紛進行事業轉投資之際，大股東常身兼轉投資事業之經營者，如何確保外在投資人（小股東與債權人）應得的報酬，並兼顧其他利害關係人的利益，為公司治理中實際且有趣之課題。我國大股東往往基於營運效率、自身利益與控制權的考量，會做出許多便宜行事卻不利公司治理的行為，如轉投資事業與母公司之間的透明度不足、大股東交叉持股或持有間接股權、所有權與經營權不分、母公司與轉投資事業之間可能的利益衝突、乃至於大股東個人風格等，這些大股東在轉投資事業中的角色定位與公司治理間的相互關係是本論文論述之重點。同時，為了加強研究的深度與實證性，作者特別藉由個案公司的實際案例來驗證文獻上的觀點，結論所得與研究相符合，並更能增添對企業經營之變化多端與不易控制之親身體驗。 本文最後並討論世界銀行、OECD及我國所規範之公司治理架構，希望公司治理能實際有助於我國企業之轉投資行為。因為制度的設計與執行若能加強公司治理與監督管理者的行為，當能強化公司競爭力，此乃公司治理積極面的貢獻。 / Abstract One of the reasons for the East Asia 1997 financial crisis is because of the careless corporate governance. The impact of this financial crisis actually has had deep and board affection even afterward. According to one investigation by Mckinsey & Company in June 2000, there are about 80% of global investors who are willing to pay 18% extra money to buy those stocks belong to companies have better corporate governance. On the other hand, starting from the end of year 2001, the successive collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and other USA companies has exposed the serious and urgency about corporate governance. It makes people in worldwide enterprises realize how significant the corporate governance is and try to avoid similar events occurred. Although corporate governance has many aspects, it all related to how to secure the deserved return of the capital providers. Accordingly, one of the important topics of corporate governance is to protect the minority shareholder rights from being invaded by the insiders (controlling shareholders and top executives). This topic become even more important especially when controlling shareholders are also top executives of the equity-invested companies. Thus, how to secure the investors’ (minority shareholders and creditors) rights is an interesting and practical issue of corporate governance. Controlling shareholders in Taiwan are used to manage firms based on their own convenience such as the efficiency of operation, interest of themselves, and control rights, instead of considering corporate governance. This attitude, however, will easily result in some negative behaviors such as the lack of transparency between mother company and her equity investment, cross holding or private holding of controlling shareholders, indifferences between ownership and management, the potential interest impact between mother company and equity investment, and even the affection of firms’ performance by the characteristics of controlling shareholders. This thesis emphasize in the above correlation between corporate governance and equity investment. We also examine a real firm’s case to enhance its conviction. This thesis also discusses the corporate governance structure of World Bank, OECD, and Taiwan. It is the author’s hope that corporate governance can be practically useful for a firm’s performance as its aggressive contribution.

現今，世界經濟脈動迅速，科技發展日新月異，如何在瞬息萬變的趨勢洪流中掠取先機，端賴自身競爭力強弱而定。然而管理當局短視行為的發生，卻易損及企業的競爭優勢，甚至對企業未來有不利影響。造成管理當局短視之因源於多方面，來自資本市場投資人的影響即為其一。而資本市場中，機構投資人往往是大家注目的焦點，因此本研究乃對機構投資人持股比例與管理當局短視行為的關係進行探討，並期望能對公司治理制度的擬定上有所助益。 本研究以民國八十四年至民國九十年為研究期間，針對我國上市公司研究其管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例間的關係，並探究在電子與非電子產業間兩者關係是否相同。此外，本研究亦比較機構投資人與個人投資者，各自持股比例與管理當局短視行為的相關情形，進以探尋真正能發揮監理機制的投資人類別。 實證結果顯示：(1)管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例高低有顯著之負向關係，而與個人投資者持股比例間則有顯著的正向關係。(2)在非電子產業中，機構投資人持股與管理當局短視行為呈顯著負向關係，而電子產業中兩者則無顯著關係。(3)管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例變動的幅度有顯著之負向關係，而與個人投資者持股比例變動則有顯著的正向關係。(4)在非電子股產業方面，機構投資人持股比例變動幅度與管理短視行為間無顯著關係；但在電子產業中，則兩者間呈現顯著之負向關係。 / Nowadays, the economy situation is changing so fast and the development of new technology has altered with each passing day. To be ahead of their competitors, firms must sharpen their competitive edge. However, management myopia often damage their competitive advantages and would do harm to the firms in the future. The phenomenon of management myopia is derived from many reason, one of them is the effect of the investors in the capital market. Furthermore, participants in the capital market always pay attention to the behavior of institution investors. Thus, this research explores the relationships between the ownership of institution investors and management myopic. We hope it would be beneficial to the enactment of the system of corporate governance. This research focuses on the relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of institution investors of the listed companies in Taiwan Stock Exchange from 1995 to 2001. It also explores if the relationship is the same in both electronic industry and non-electronic industries. Besides, the study also compares the effect of the ownership of individual or institution investors on the management myopia in order to point out the type of investors that can provide monitory function clearly. The empirical study indicates that (1) there is a significant negative relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of institution investors. Conversely, there is a significant positive relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of individual investors. (2) In the electronic industry, the relationship between the ownership of institution investors and the myopic behavior of management is not significant. However, it is significant negative in other industries. (3) The change of percentage of ownership of institution investors has significant negative relationship with the management myopia. However, it is opposite to the individual investors. (4) No significant relationship between the institution investors and the management myopic in non-electronic industries. But in the electronic industry, it is significant negative.

原住民部落資源自主治理（self-governing）之概念已陸續地推展於原住民地區，過去有關於部落資源自主治理相關議題之討論與研究鮮少從原住民族土地問題切入，少數結合原住民族土地問題與部落資源自主治理者，研究場景也僅著重於原住民族單一族群內的自主治理組織發起與運作過程描述分析，至於在現實政經環境背景下，不同族群間自主治理的過程究竟該如何運作？以及藉由分析其運作過程產生的相關問題，進一步檢視現行原住民族自主治理部落土地資源之政策與地權及地用等相關法令規定者，尚乏相關論著。 本研究選取苗栗縣南庄鄉蓬萊村為實證研究對象，以Elinor Ostrom（1990）所提出的成功自主治理共用資源（common pool resources）八個設計原則（design principles）為檢驗基礎，分析蓬萊溪封溪護魚與八卦力民宿村部落土地資源自主治理制度設計成功與否、歸納制度脆弱或未成功的原因，並且透過社會關係網絡（social context）與取得權（access theory）等相關概念，分析兩案例之社會關係網絡與利益流樣態，以理解制度規範建構之互動過程與核心理由，發掘置於國家權力統治與資本主義貨幣經濟（cash economy）之現實場景下，原╱漢「多族群間」、以及「同族群內部」到「多族群間」自主治理部落土地資源之問題，並指出現行部落自主治理之地用與地權政策規劃與部落現實場景間之差距。 由實證案例分析可知，原住民族傳統部落組織的瓦解與重構過程中，原住民與平地人之間的政經稟賦差異加大，原住民族自主治理之立意往往被扭曲，平地人卻能掌控部落土地資源進而分享大部分之利得。此外，原住民族自主治理部落土地資源之政策走向，忽略漢人使用原住民族傳統領域土地亦有其特殊歷史背景或政策因素，是以在政策層面上當有再深入研究及通盤檢討之必要。而多族群間亦須放棄成見、加強溝通以謀求彼此共識，增加地方自主治理的社會資本，方可妥善管理部落土地資源，朝共同治理之目標邁進。 / The concept of indigenous resources self-governing has been promoted to the indigenous areas one after another. However, there have been few issues and studies about tribal resources self-governing observed from the viewpoint of indigenous land management. Even though minority of issues and studies link up indigenous land problems with tribal resources self-governing, their research background also only puts emphasis on the analysis of a single indigenous race, which describes the establishment of organization and operation for self-governing. How is the self-governing mechanism operated among different races under the realistic political and economical background? How is the self-governing policy of tribal land resources manipulated further? How are laws related to land ownership and land use implemented? All of these topics still lack correlative studies. Therefore, this research takes the tribe of the Penglai Village in Nanjhuang Township Miaoli County as an example, using eight design principles proposed by Elinor Ostrom (1990) to examine the case, which the Penglai stream blocking for fishing resources protection and the self-governing for tribal land resources in the Baguali B&B(bed-and-breakfast) village. The context of illustrations are: (1) analyzing whether the design of institution for the case is successful; (2) inducing the reason why institution is unsuccessful or weak; (3) analyzing the social context and benefit flows of the case to understand the interactive process and the core reason for the establishment of institution standard by the concept of social context and access theory; (4) finding the self-governing problems of tribal land resources among indigenous /Han multi-races(the case of Penglai River) and from one single race to multi-races(the case of Baguali B&B Village) under the realistic background of state right governing and cash economy of capitalism; and (5) pointing out the gap between the current land use and landownership policy plan for tribal self-governing and the realistic situation of tribe. By the analysis of the case, we can find that the disintegration and restructuring of the indigenous tribal organization because of the difference of the political and economical endowment from Han people results in the phenomenon, which the purpose of the indigenous tribe self-governing for land common pool resources has been twisted. In addition, the formulation of the self-governing policy for indigenous land resources ignores that the Han people using the indigenous traditional territory also have its special historical background or resulted from policy implementation. Therefore, it is necessary to study further and overall review, to strengthen the communication to seek a consensus among multi-races and to gain the social capital of local self-governing. In this way, it will be possible to manage the tribal land resources well and achieve the goal of common governance.

In response to the changing financial environment both internally and externally, the government endeavored to pass the Financial Holding Company Act, which is intended to provide an environment conducive to financial integrations. According to the Principal-Agent theory, agency problems tend to take place when misalignment occurs between an ultimate owner’s cash flow rights and voting power. It is of interest whether the financial holding company structure actually increases or decreases such misalignment. The shareholdings of the Hong family of SinoPac Holdings is the subject of this research, and the essence of the research is to examine the Hong family’s shareholding and their actual control based on the one-share-one-vote principle before and after the holding company structure. The findings conclude that the misalignment between the Hong family’s ownership and control in fact increases under the holding company structure, which is generally viewed as a negative sign of corporate governance. Notwithstanding, the Hong family has adopted some measures to strengthen corporate governance despite the widening misalignment.

本研究將財務危機分為『經營不善型財務危機』以及『舞弊型財務危機』兩種類型，運用離散時間涉險方法，探討何種公司治理與財務資訊最有可能發生舞弊型的財務危機。同時本研究也探討財務危機對負債比率的敏感性如何受到公司治理中介變數的影響。 實證結果發現當公司治理機制情形不好，但財務報表資訊良好時，發生舞弊型財務危機的可能性將大於經營不善型的財務危機。而財務危機對負債比率的敏感度會受到公司治理中介變數的影響。 / With financial distress being classified as operating-failure financial distress and fraud financial distress, this study employs discrete-time survival model to characterize the fraud financial distress by corporate governance and financial performance. It also investigates the moderate effect of corporate governance on the sensitivity of financial distress to debt ratio. The empirical results indicate that companies with weak corporate governance and good financial performance are more likely to encounter fraud financial distress than operating-failure financial distress. In addition, corporate governance positively moderates the sensitivity of financial distress to debt ratio.

本研究依據Ohlson and Juettner(2005)所提出新的衡量權益資金成本方式，異常盈餘成長評價模型(Abnormal Earnings Growth Valuation Model)，探討其是否適合台灣企業作為有效衡量權益資金成本方式之一。並進一步研究已實現報酬與OJ模型估計之權益資金成本關聯性，OJ模型估計之權益資金成本可否作為投資人選擇投資標的時之參考資訊，所得之結論可作為企業管理者與投資人之重要參考依據。最後本研究將OJ模型估計之權益資金成本應用於公司治理之角度，探討權益資金成本與董事會特性關聯性。 實證發現，蒐集台灣企業資料，推算OJ模型估計之權益資金成本與過去研究認為影響權益資金成本的重要風險因子，皆有顯著相關性存在。因此認為OJ模型適用於台灣企業權益資金成本之估計，亦為有效的估計權益資金成本之方式一。另外，利用三因子模型進行複迴歸分析發現，已實現報酬與OJ模型估計之權益資金成本呈顯著正相關，顯示OJ模型估計之權益資金成本愈大的公司，其股票報酬愈高。且以迴歸之局部判定係數分析，於加入ROJ解釋變數後，模型的解釋力增加了，顯示OJ模型估計之權益資金成本對已實現報酬率具有增額之解釋能力，故OJ模型估計之權益資金成本具有解釋股票報酬波動之能力。最後，在權益資金成本與董事會特性之關聯性方面，實證發現權益資金成本與董監事股票質押比率、控制股東掌握之董監事席次比率和現金流量權比率的偏離程度呈顯著正相關。 / In this study, we use Ohlson-Juettner model to generate a market implied cost of capital. We then examine the correlation of cost of capital and risk factors, and the correlation of cost of capital and ex post returns. Additionally, we would like to discuss the relationship between the cost of capital and characteristics of the board of directors and supervisors. Our empirical results show that cost of capital has expected correlation with risk factors, so the cost of capital estimated through Ohlson-Juettner model can be a effective method to estimate cost of capital in Taiwan. The cost of capital also has expected an economically significant association with ex post returns. Additionally, we find that the percentage of shareholding pledged by board members and supervisors is significantly positively associated with cost of capital. The deviation between the percentage of directors and supervisors controlled by controlled stockholder and cash flow rights owned by controlled stockholder is also significantly positively associated with cost of capital.

員工認股權之發行，可降低企業代理成本，並達激勵員工之效果。過去研究指出，公司股權結構及董事會組成特性的不同，將對員工認股權獎酬政策產生影響。據此，本研究以員工認股權證發行比例及員工認股權價值，作為衡量員工認股權獎酬指標，並以民國九十年至九十五年間發行員工認股權之台灣上市櫃公司為樣本，探討員工認股權與公司治理間之關聯性。實證結果顯示如下： 一、董監事持股率與員工認股權獎酬無顯著關係。 二、經理人持股率與員工認股權價值呈顯著負相關。 三、內部董事持股率與員工認股權證發放比例及價值皆具有顯著正相關，並與後者呈先增後減之倒U型關係。 四、機構投資人持股率與員工認股權證發行比例呈顯著負相關，與價值呈顯著正向關係。 五、董事會規模與員工認股權證發放比例及價值皆呈顯著正相關。 六、董事長兼任總經理及獨立董事席次比例皆對員工認股權價值具顯負相關。 / Employee stock option plans are often used to alleviate agency cost and to serve as a tool for motivation. Previous studies have indicated that different ownership structure and composition of board members have impact on employee stock option compensation policy. Accordingly, this study used the ratio of stock option granted to the common shares outstanding and the market value of the total option shares granted as the indication of stock option compensation to test whether employee stock option plans are related in some way to corporate governance. Sample firms are selected from listed companies in Taiwan Stock Exchange and OTC firms granting stock options during the period of 2001 to 2006. Empirical results are as follows: 1.There is no significant relationship between the percentage of stock holdings of board members and employee stock option plan. 2.The percentage of top management stock holdings is negatively associated with the market value of employee stock option with statistical significance. 3.Internal directors’ stock holding ratio is positively associated with the employee stock option ratio and market value. Specifically, the relation between the internal directors’ stock holding ratio and the market value of the employee stock option is convex. 4.The institutional investors’ stock holding ratio is negatively associated with employee stock option ratio but positively associated with market value of employee stock option. 5.The board size is positively associated with both the ratio and market value of the employee stock option. 6.Both the duality of Chairman/CEO and the percentage of independent directors are negatively associated with the market value of employee stock option.

面對所謂棘手議題（wicked issues），本文有別於傳統府際管理及其他解析理論的分析觀點，改以跨部門治理概念探討行政轄區界線模糊，多部門、多組織同時參與標的個案之狀況。同時為處理治理概念定義模糊的問題，爰採文獻分析法將治理概念內涵區分為政府中心、市場中心及社會中心三類，並發現多數跨部門治理議題的研究，偏重應用政府與市場觀點，爰本文主張以社會中心治理途徑針對「洛杉磯河整治計畫」進行分析。簡言之，本文的研究問題包括： 一、過往國、內外跨部門治理議題，採取哪些治理途徑？何謂社會中心治理途徑？以跨部門治理議題之規劃過程為例，其治理原則、治理結構與治理結果應有何具體主張？ 二、「洛杉磯河整治計畫」的草案規劃過程，應用哪些制度性安排，藉以產生該計畫之集體規劃成果？ 三、在前述參與機制的安排之下，研究個案的集體規劃過程是否在治理實務與理論主張之間出現落差？各部門參與狀況為何？存在哪些爭議問題？ 四、「跨部門治理」個案，在集體規劃過程應採用何種治理架構，有助於落實跨部門治理原則，以及提高各部門利害關係人對治理結果的滿意程度。 透過上述研究問題與個案，本研究探討三個部門（sectors）間如何（How）「合作」（collaboration）或如何促進合作，以達成共識的問題；又或者從反面來說，是探討哪些因素影響了跨部門合作，三個部門之間存在哪些衝突。從個案研究出發，則關心個案為何（Why）合作成效不佳或無法合作的問題，同時以提出促進合作、參與的制度性安排（What）為目標。 文獻歸納指出，為促進跨部門治理的成效，應堅持公共性、課責與公共參與作為治理原則。就治理結構而言，必須觀察各部門利害關係人於個案參與機制中落實治理原則的程度，並指出應以合作性公共管理作為促進部門間合作的工具。就治理結果而言，則建議對政策利害關係人進行態度調查，詢問對政策結果的滿意與支持程度，亦即以正當性與承諾作為治理結果的指標。 本研究內文在介紹洛杉磯河整治計畫的推動過程、內容與規劃草案結果後，指出其乃是洛杉磯市府會高度共識下的政策產物，並由議會發動的跨部門治理個案。在個案之規劃過程，執行重心乃是由市政府團隊所主導，安排「社區座談會、諮詢委員會、同儕評論委員會、利害關係人委員會、任務小組會議」等五類官方主辦的參與機制，以期落實公眾參與該政策規劃過程的目的；草案規劃期間，洛杉磯河特別委員會則擔任監督的角色。 研究發現各部門參與者多數認同也支持整治計畫的願景與草案規劃內容。但整體而言，仍發現部分有待改善的重要問題，分別為受訪者對治理原則的落實存在權變的觀念，政府部門以外的參與者代表性仍嫌不足，對於社會弱勢議題缺乏討論與回應，缺乏明確的責任歸屬與課責結構安排，未臻透明的決策議價過程。再者，從治理結果的角度來分析，對草案規劃結果抱持不滿態度者多數來自整治區，對規劃結果未表支持者多為男性、30歲以上、政府部門以外之受訪者、來自整治區、參與時間點較早；特別是針對整治的經濟利益與所需經費來源的估算，表示了高度的質疑。 儘管個案規劃過程仍有前述疑義，但在參與觀察的過程，研究者發現個案所處系絡具有較為成熟的社會條件，對於治理原則的認同程度彰顯了公民社會的成熟，也奠定尋求部門間合作的可能性。就跨部門治理之規劃個案而言，本文建議以樹立治理原則為先，進而逐步將其落實於參與過程及相關機制設計之內，最後則可透過正當性與承諾對集體參與之規劃成效加以評估。在研究調查資料與參與觀察的基礎之上，本文運用John Clayton Thomas所提出之「公共涉入形式矩陣」，將洛杉磯河整治計畫草案之規劃過程定位為「修正的獨立自主管理決策」，意指徒具參與形式的決策類型。依據本研究之個案分析架構，本文為洛杉磯河整治計畫之規劃過程提出十三項建議，於下分述之： 一、就制度性安排而言 （一）規定弱勢團體最低代表制；（二）公布各委員會之委員遴選標準、程序與職權；（三）訂定跨部門治理個案之責任宣言；（四）增辦弱勢團體公共會議；（五）善用既有公、私渠道以彙整利害關係人的建議。 二、就部門參與而言 （一）建立主動的意見回饋系統；（二）提高各類資訊的曝光度；（三）擴大計劃團隊、減小公共會議規模。 三、就提高規劃草案結果的「正當性」而言 （一）進行部門間的規劃溝通會議；（二）進行二度訪視／會談計畫；（三）避免由上而下的事前提議。 四、就提高利害關係人對草案結果的「承諾」而言 （一）進行施政成效行銷；（二）縮小計畫範圍，推動先導型計畫為先。 總結研究「洛杉磯河整治計畫」所獲得之啟示，在研究層面確認政府機關在跨部門治理議題中，其扮演的角色不因營利及非營利部門的涉入而被取代，反倒是承擔關鍵整合者的角色，應以合作促進政策議題得以被妥善解決。對本土的啟示而言，社會條件的成熟程度乃是推動跨部門治理的重要因素，無論是公民資格的養成或公民社會的建立，都將有利政策參與環境的鞏固。對土本同質個案的啟示而言，以台北市政府目前積極推動的「活化淡水河系」政策為例，其政策倡議的源頭與洛杉磯河整治計畫絕然不同，規劃、整合、執行及監督的分工亦尚未明朗，民間力量的參與渠道亦尚未建立。質言之，若以洛杉磯河整治計畫草案的規劃經驗為鑑，要避免陷落於「獨立自主決策」類型，建議除了持續健全社會條件之外，在參與機制的安排上，應妥善顧及公共性、課責及公共參與等治理原則，以社會中心治理途徑平衡過渡傾向政府主導、市場取向的規劃觀點。

在目前相關文獻中，在全球治理架構下所制定的政策，必將對於各國內部相關政策造成影響。然而，這樣的聯想常被視為是理所當然，卻鮮有實證資料，證明一個國家的公共政策在全球治理的架構下，是否真正受到影響？在哪些面向會受到影響？這些面向實際受到影響的程度為何？需要藉由何種工具，來衡量國家政策受到全球治理影響的程度？ 為了解答上述之問題，本文之研究目的可歸納為以下三點： 1.經由全球治理、全球治理與國家公共政策間關係等文獻探討建立全球治理影響國家公共政策之理論架構 2.藉由理論架構與政策德菲法建立全球治理影響國家公共政策之指標系統 3.透過指標系統實證檢驗京都議定書對於台灣公共政策之影響 本研究最後獲致三大重要成果。首先，建構出全球治理影響國家公共政策之「GG-NPP理論架構」；其次，經由政策德菲法的徵詢結果，彙整出適合用以衡量全球治理對於國家公共政策影響之指標系統，共可分為三大面向、六大變數以及十六項指標。再者，透過前述的指標系統，以京都議定書為個案檢證台灣現行因應之政策。透過數據的整理，發現我國在十六項指標項目中，有十項是呈現因應京都議定書的正向趨勢；但是其餘六項指標，由於受到如主權、國際現實環境等外在因素的侷限，或者是受制於政府自己內部的組織、人事、預算、府際關係等因素，故而全球治理並未對於國家公共政策的結果必然造成影響。 / In some relative literature, we can see the policy outcomes in the national governance level “could” be affected by those in the global level. But there is little practical evidence to affirm such cause and effect. How can we evaluate exactly such relation, dimension and degree? This paper will be grouped into third parts. First, I will review the literature of global governance, the relations between global governance and public policy. By doing so, the theory framework could be formulated. Second, I will select and construct the dimensions, variables and indicators that are related to the relations between global governance and public policy. And I will check and confirm the dimensions and indicators through the “Policy Delphi” method to build the indicator system completely. Third, I will evaluate the impacts of Kyoto Protocol on public policy in Taiwan. Finally, I got three important outcomes. First, I formed a “GG-NPP theory framework”. Second, I constructed an indicator system that can be formed to measure the relation between global governance and public policy by two round “Policy Delphi” process. There are three dimensions, six variables and sixteen indicators in this indicator system. Third, I examine the indicator system by the case of “Kyoto Protocol”. I checked the impacts of Kyoto Protocol on public policy in Taiwan and found some interesting outcomes. And I knew the impacts of Kyoto Protocol on public policy will be affected by some external and internal elements.

本研究以中國大陸上市公司為研究對象，探討股票報酬與公司治理間之關係。此外，為了檢視中國大陸公司治理是否為股票市場上之系統風險，本研究採用學術上廣為使用之四因子模式（Carhart 1997）作為基本迴歸模型，藉由控制住影響大部分股票變異之四因子，純粹探討公司治理指標對於股票報酬之解釋能力。最後，本研究進一步比較各公司治理指標對於股票報酬變異之解釋力相對強弱為何。 實證結果發現： （1）國家股股東持股比率相對較高、董事會規模相對較大、董事長兼任總經 理之公司具有較高股票報酬；而機構法人持股比率相對較高、公眾股股東持股比率相對較高、獨立董事占董事會比率相對較高之公司則具有較低股票報酬。 （2）絕大部分公司治理指標對於超額股票報酬具有顯著影響力，本研究進而推論中國大陸公司治理為股票市場上之系統風險之一。然而，公司治理指標對於提升四因子模式解釋力之程度相當有限。 （3）在原本四因子模式中加入「國家股股東持股比率溢酬因子」、「獨立董 事占總董事人數溢酬因子」二公司治理指標，會比加入「公眾股股東持股比率溢酬因子」、「董事會規模溢酬因子」指標具有較佳之模式解釋力。而在模式中加入「公眾股股東持股比率溢酬因子」、「董事會規模溢酬因子」二公司治理指標又比「機構法人持股比率溢酬因子」指標具有較佳之模式解釋力。 / This study investigates the relation between corporate governance and stock returns in China’s listed companies. Additionally, I apply four-factor model (Carhart 1997) to examine whether China’s corporate governance mechanisms are systematic risks in stock market. At last, I compare the explanation power of excess returns among all corporate governance indexes. I find that: (1) Firms, with higher level of nation ownership, larger board size and dual roles of chairman and managing director, have higher returns; firms ,with higher level of legal person ownership, of public ownership, of independent directors’ ratio, have lower returns. (2) Most Corporate governance indexes have significant impacts on excess stock returns, so we infer that corporate governance in China is one of systematic risks in stock market. However, I also find that corporate governance indexes add few margin contributions to four-factor model. (3) Governance indexes of nation ownership and of independent directors’ ratio have more impact on stock returns than the index of public ownership and of board size. Meanwhile, index of public ownership and of board size have more impact on stock returns than the index of legal person ownership.