高階主管薪酬計畫與股權結構是解決公司代理問題的重要機制，代理理論提出以績效決定酬勞的制度，可提供高階主管努力誘因，促使股東與高階主管之間的目標一致；同時股權結構也會影響高階主管的努力，進而對公司的。故本研究旨在探討我國上市公司股權集中度、酬勞計畫與公司經營績效之關係，並利用模式推導相關的命題與假說。 本研究利用混合迴歸就四年度主管薪酬資料加以分析，Scheffe檢定檢驗高階主管的持股比例與薪酬計畫的關係，實證結果整理如下： 1.董事長持股比例與薪酬無關，總經理持股比例與薪酬有關。 2.公司價值與董事會持股比例呈非線性的關係。 3.機構投資人偏向效率監督假說。 4.總經理薪酬計畫中的項目比薪酬水準的高低重要。 5.公司經營績效與高階主管薪酬呈正相關。 / In agency theory, executive compensation contracts and ownership structures provide primary mechanisms for solving agency problems. Top executive compensation linked to performance can align the incentives of firms' top executive with firms'stockholder. Ownership structure can influce the effort of the top executive. The main purpose of this study is to examine the relationship among top executive compensation　scheme, ownership structure and firm performance for listed companies in Taiwan, and use modelling to develop related propositions and hypotheses. Pooling regressions using four years' pool data and Scheffe test are performed to test hypothese, Empirical results are summarized as follows: 1.The holdings of chairman has nothing to do with the level of compsation and that of CEO has something to do with. 2.The non-linear relationship between firm value and holdings of board of directors. 3.The role of institution tends to be efficinet monitoring hypothesis. 4.Incentive component of CEO compensation scheme tends to be more important than level of that sheme. 5.Firm performance is positively associated with top executive's cash compensation.

本論文的研究目的，主要是希望利用Martingale評價方法與蒙地卡羅模擬法評價出結構型商品條款中隱含的新奇選擇權（Exotic Options）價格，並進而推導出結構型商品的理論價值，並且，期望藉由對個案商品的評價與損益分析，讓讀者瞭解結構型商品的產品結構、報酬型態與成本及潛在風險；此外，本文也從發行券商的角度，探討券商所面臨的潛在風險並提出可行的避險策略。 Martingale評價方法(The Martingale Pricing Method)由Cox與Ross(1976)及Harrison與Kreps(1979)所提出，是一種求解衍生性商品評價的方法，在Martingale評價方法下，衍生性商品的理論價格可經由折現該商品未來期望現金流量而得，且期望值折現可在風險中立環境下進行，折現率使用無風險利率。Martingale評價法在財務工程界是一項沿用已久的數學工具。本論文的主要貢獻，就是延伸Martingale評價法，透過機率測度轉換，推導出多資產股權連動式商品的評價公式解，進而求算出商品的理論價值。 本論文採用在市場上銷售的兩個結構型商品作個案分析，兩個案分別為多資產股權連動式票券與路徑相依指數連動式債券，主要研究成果如下： □ 以Martingale評價法作為本論文的評價模型，採用多資產股權連動式票券為個案，延伸評價模型求出產品的封閉解，並探討此種商品的報酬型態與潛在風險。 □ 以蒙地卡羅模擬法評價本論文的另一項個案—路徑相依指數連動式債券的理論價值，並分別從投資人與發行商的角度，探討產品的利潤與風險。 □ 在程式應用方面，運用MATLAB軟體，以模擬並求算產品的理論價格。

台灣屬於島國經濟，對外貿易為主要命脈，近年來由於比較利益逐漸改變，國內資金 充裕，對外投資活動日漸增加；然而不論是國際貿易或是國際投資，勢必與當地國有 某種程度的接觸資源的涉入 (Involvement)，在本研究中將依股權涉入程度分為： (一)高涉入(High Involvement)策略： 如：獨資經營(Wholly Owned)及合資經營 (Joint Venture)。 (二)低涉入(Low Involvement) 策略； 如：授權(Licensing) 契約生產(Contract Manufacturing)及出口。 此兩類國際市場進入策略，將視企業能力、企業之國際事務專業性、企業與當地熟悉 度、國外總體經濟環境、國外非經濟環境、國外產業環境、及產品特性等七個構面， 而有不同的策略選擇。 此外，將依不同之企業目的，歸類出不同策略群，以供企業進入國際市場時決策之參 考，並且依不同之企業內部狀況及外部環境所形成之優劣勢和機會威脅，產生進入國 際市場之策略矩陣。

私募制度是在「便利企業籌資」跟「投資人保護」間取得平衡的制度。本論文分為四大部分針對此議題加以探討。第一部份是比較法的介紹，以美國跟日本的立法例為主，分別在第二章跟第三章中討論；第二部分是我國法制的檢討，在第四章中說明；第三部分則是我國私募實證狀況的介紹，配置在第五章前半段；最後第五章的後半段，則用來說明對我國私募制度的展望。 □ 美國私募制度是以三三年證券法第四條第二項為起點，再透過章則D、RULE 144、RULE 144A、以及章則S等行政命令加以規範，由於其發展久遠，架構健全，因此屢為各國私募立法之參考對象。日本立法例則是以日本證券取引法第二條第三項為基礎，區分為「專業私募」與「少人數私募」G部分分別發展，再透L證券取引法施行令、還有關於第二條的定義府令加以補充。 □ 我國私募法制之架構係於證券交易法第四十三條之六到第四十三條之八訂有最基礎之私募規範。另包括公司法、金融資產證券化條例、不動產證券化條例，以及民國九十三年六月才通過的證券投資信託及顧問法中，對於私募制度也都針對個別法律的特性有所規範。而主管機關亦透過大量之行政命令對技術性、細節性之事項加以補充。對此，本文分別作解釋論之探討與立法論之分析。 □ 歸結我國實證狀況，可發現辦理私募的公司可分為財務艱困公司、組織調整公司以及亟需龐大資金公司三大類。且私募制度關於籌資時程的縮短以及成本的降低，均有一定助益。然我國較特殊之的情形乃，私募之應募對象以符合主管機關所定條件的自然人、法人或基金最多，機構投資人反而極少。此或與辦理私募的企業多為財務狀況不佳的公司，無法吸引機構投資人的興趣有關。 □ 最後，關於私募制度展望部分，本文探討私募與網際網路運用的配合，以及私募與海外籌資的關連。對私募制度而言，網際網路運用上的最大問題就是利用網路的優點卻剛好是私募法規的瓶頸，因網路之優點即可以無遠弗屆的接近各層面使用者，但私募制度卻禁止一般性廣告跟公開勸誘，故如何調配二者間的衝突，便有研究必要。而海外籌資是企業資金來源的延伸，在企業國際化與全球化的的趨勢下，將會越來越重要。私募也是海外籌資的一種手段。目e財政部已經以行政命令開放海外私募，但是海外私募還必須兼顧國外私募法規，故此亦為我國私募制度之發展可注意之方向。

本論文主要由三大研究主題組合而成：第一個主題是依照中國金融體系的現況，針對國有銀行、政策性銀行、股份制商業銀行及城市商業銀行等四種不同類型銀行的獲利績效進行比較實證研究。其中的股份制商銀與城市銀行，其資本組成除少數仍有國務院持股（即中央政府持股）外，股東成員擴及地方政府、國有企業及民間企業，股本結構明顯較國有商業銀行及政策銀行多元化。不同的股本結構，尤其是官股比例（政府持股比例）是否對各家銀行的獲利能力產生影響，是本文主要研究興趣所在。本文採用Bankscope資料庫，涵蓋1997至2004年中國大陸49家銀行的財務及股東資料。結果發現：銀行股權結構中，中央政府持股比例越高，銀行獲利表現越差，地方政府持股的影響則較不明顯；而四類銀行中，股份制商銀與城市商銀的表現遠優於國有銀行及政策銀行。但1999年以後中國國有銀行的財務整頓措施的確使得國有銀行的相對表現有所提升。 鑑於外商銀行大舉進入中國金融市場，勢必對中國銀行帶來更多的競爭壓力，本論文第二個研究主題進一步將研究範圍擴及至世界資產排名前一百大的銀行，企圖比較中國銀行與世界百大銀行經營績效的差異。在這個主題中，延續前一主題「股權結構」的重要性，除了官股比例，同時考慮外資持股及本國人持股，分析三類持股對績效的影響，又鑑於總體面的政府治理因素可能對股權與銀行績效的關係產生變化，本研究也將政府治理變數，包括文獻中經常提到的證券市場內線交易情況、政府政策透明度及政府貪污情況等因素納入考量，比較這些因素對中國銀行與百大銀行影響有何差異。實證結果如下：對中國銀行及世界百大銀行而言，政府持股對銀行獲利的影響是負向的，而外資持股的影響則恰相反，開放程度愈高、銀行自由度愈高越有利於銀行績效提升。中國政府越無貪污情況時，越有助於外資持股對銀行績效的正向影響。對世界百大銀行而言，政府越無貪污情況時，越有助於外資持股對銀行績效的正向影響。而政府政策透明度越高，越有助於政府持股與本國人持股的正向影響。 第三個主題探討我國上市櫃公司不同的對外與大陸投資決策對母公司獲利性的影響。本文將投資決策對公司獲利的影響視為內生，也就是投資決策受公司特性因素的影響。同時，我們進一步假設公司的投資決策是分兩階段完成，第一步會先決定是否進行海外投資，一旦確定後，再決定是否赴大陸投資。因為有兩層的投資決策，本文以延伸的Heckman’s Two Stage Method進行估計。 實證結果顯示，在投資決策的影響因素方面，對第一層赴海外投資而言，規模愈大、國際化程度愈高、愈勞力密集的公司愈傾向赴海外投資；對第二層赴大陸投資的決策，影響因素也類似，只是公司規模不再是重要影響因素。至於獲利的影響因素方面，第一類「赴大陸投資的公司」與第二類「未赴大陸但赴其他國家投資的公司」的利潤型態較類似，長期負債對獲利都有負向顯著影響，總資產也傾向負向影響，至於第三類「未從事任何海外與大陸投資公司」的利潤型態則與前兩類不同，總資產與研發支出都呈現顯著負向影響。而三類公司的績效比較部分，第一類公司的平均預期資產報酬率雖若高於第二類，第二類公司又高於第三類公司，但三類公司兩兩之間平均預期資產報酬率的差距並未達統計上的顯著性。 / This dissertation contains three main parts. The first part studies the effects of government owned share on Chinese banks’ performance. After a series of financial reforms in the 1990s, joint stock commercial banks and city commercial banks started to boom and play an increasingly important role in China’s banking industry which had previously been monopolized by four state-owned commercial banks. These two new bank-types are considerably more diversified in that the primary shareholders include the central government, local governments, state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, not just the central government. Using 49 Chinese banks’ financial data retrieved from Bankscope, this part examines the effect of different ownership structures, in general, and government-owned-shares, central vs. local, in particular, affect the profitability and risk of banks in China. It also compares the profitability of four types of banks, namely state-owned banks, policy banks, joint-stock commercial banks and city commercial banks. We conclude that, without equivocation, the higher the ratio of state-owned shares is, the worse is the profitability of the bank. And we also note the profitability of joint-stock commercial banks and city commercial banks is much better than that of state-owned and policy banks. In light of the ever-growing foreign competition facing Chinese banking industry, the second part expands the sample banks to World’s top 100 banks and studies the differences between Chinese banks and foreign banks from the respects of ownership structure, government governance and bank regulations. Our empirical results reveal that for both Chinese banks and top 100 banks, government owned share has a negative effect on banks’ profitability, while foreign owned share has an opposite effect. For both of them, the more the foreign institutions have access to the banking market and the more freedom the banking industry enjoys, the better the bank performs. For Chinese banks, lesser corruption helps strengthen foreign share’s positive effect on banks’ performance. Furthermore, higher transparency would increase the positive effect of government owned share and domestic owned share. The third part studies the profitability of Taiwan’s listed companies with and without investment in China. Unlike past studies which deal with the decision of investment in overseas and China as exogenous, the decision is endogenous in this paper. That is, the decision making is based on the firm’s characteristic factors. We further assume that there are two hierarchy decisions made by firms when they decide in investing in overseas and China. The first decision is whether it should invest overseas. Once the first decision is made, the next one is whether a firm should invest in China. This two decision model, which allows us to extend Heckman’s two-step method, is referred to as an extended-Heckman method in this paper. Our empirical results regarding the determinants of investing overseas and China are as follows. With respect to the investment in overseas, firm size and export ratio show positive influence on the decision of investment, while capital labor ratio shows negative effect. Next, with respect to the investment in China, determinants are similar except that firm size is no longer significant. Our results regarding the profit performance reveal that for ‘the firms with investment in China’ and ‘the firms without investing in China, only investing other countries’, long term liability ratio has a significantly negative impact on profitability, whereas total asset, R&D expenditure show a negative effect on profitability for ‘the firms without investing overseas, nor investing in China’. As for the performance comparison among firms of these three investment types, the differences are insignificant. This result implies that there are still considerable individual differences among the firms of the same investment type.

. / Corporate acquisitions are classified as part of “the market for corporate control” in which management teams are facing constant competition from other management teams. If the team that currently controls a company is not maximizing the value of the company’s assets, then an acquisition will likely occur and increase the value of the company by replacing its poor managers with good managers. This dissertation focus on two issues on mergers, the first compares the strategy between mergers and joint ventures. The second investigate how much liquidity should the acquirer preserve and what is the equilibrium price of the acquired firm in considering the merger strategy. Drawing upon the incomplete contract theory, I examine the criterion of the strategic choice between joint ventures (JVs) and mergers when two firms contemplate vertical integration. The model reaches the following conclusions: (1) some ownership provision to the acquired company after the mergers may prove to be more lucrative to the acquirer than 100% takeover; (2) given the same equity share arrangement for JVs and mergers I conclude that these two firms should choose to merge or be merged rather than JVs; (3) I derive the optimal equity share arrangement in both JVs and mergers when ownership provision is considered as a strategic means. In addition, I also compare the welfare and effort of both companies in JVs and mergers under symmetric cost structures, and find that mergers would provide greater social efficiency and welfare than 50-50 JVs when the acquirer’s equity share is between 30% and 65%. Firms are concerned that they may in the future be deprived of the funds that would enable them to take advantage of exciting growth prospects, strengthen existing investments or simply stay alive. I specifically examine a firm’s liquidity need in order to grasp any future opportunity of mergers and acquisitions. However, a firm’s manager (borrower) can shed his interim wrongdoings (misbehavior) under the pretext of further financial need for mergers and acquisitions because he knows that he can easily raise sufficient cash from lenders to cover any adverse shock. My study derives the conditions that when this soft-budget-constraint (SBC) problem will occur. It happens when the interim income is small. Moreover, I analyze how the purchase price of acquisition is affected by this soft-budget-constraint syndrome. If there is SBC problem, the acquisition price will be raised by the investors when the interim income is small. Besides, a firm with severe moral hazard problem will be merely able to offer a smaller purchase price for the acquisition. On the contrast, a firm with a stronger balance sheet will be able to secure a greater credit line and offer a more attractive price for the acquisition. The empirical study of U.S. firms during 1988 to 2006 supports my conclusions.

隨著經濟全球化的時代來臨，國與國之間的界線漸趨模糊，全球的產業及資源都不斷地加速整合，本研究嘗試以不同角度出發，分別以「全球化浪潮下之現代集團公司」、「境外控股公司的靈活機制」及「以股權規劃為中心的思考模式」三大核心為主題，先從全球佈局的觀點來定位企業，取代傳統緩慢演變逐漸拓展的方式，選擇在企業創立的最初，就以全球化的眼光來設計企業的組成架構，跳脫國界的藩籬；再經由比較英屬維京群島、開曼群島以及美國德拉瓦州設立境外公司的相關規定，闡述境外控股公司的各種優勢與操作機制；接著探討企業從設立到赴國際資本市場上市的籌資過程中，如何以股權規劃為中心，運用靈活的持股架構及特別股的概念，就公司的股東結構、董事會結構與組織制度，以及員工認股權各面向做出細緻的設計，來募集所需資金並鞏固未來發展。 最後，本研究以中芯國際集成電路有限公司與富士康國際控股有限公司兩家赴香港上市之台資企業個案，討論其上市前之集團架構、歷次資本形成與股權規劃等過程，一方面與本研究之分析作對照，另一方面亦闡述香港資本市場躋身國際資本市場之原因，並對台灣目前資本市場的法令與政策提出期許。 / In the coming era of globalization, boundaries between countries are blurring, and the global integration of industries and resources speeds up. This thesis tries to look into the phenomenon from three perspectives: group companies under the globalization trends, the flexible mechanism of offshore holding companies, and equity planning-centered thinking model for modern enterprises. By pointing out that, instead of expanding gradually, modern enterprises tend to arrange its organization from a global viewpoint on the first day it is established, this thesis interprets group companies with a new angle; second, it presents the respective criteria for setting up offshore companies in British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands and the State of Delaware along with the advantages and flexibilities of using offshore holding companies; and third, it introduces the concept of equity planning during the developing course of an enterprise from startup to listing company, including the formation of its capital structure, shareholder structure, board of directors, organization, and employee incentive plans in order to raise enough funding and secure the basis of future prosperity. At last, this thesis takes two Taiwan-based, Hong Kong listed companies, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation and Foxconn International Holdings Limited, as examples and studies their respective pre-IPO group structure, the capital formation and the equity planning course to reflect the analysis contained herein on the one hand, and also discuss the reasons why Hong Kong can become one of the most-favored international capital markets and finally proposes suggestions to the laws, regulations as well as policies with respect to the current capital market of Taiwan.

財務三大決策：投資、融資與股利政策一直是學術界研究探討的主題，也是實務界關心的重要課題。過去有關融資與股利支付宣告的文章不少，但投資支出相關研究則一直被視為股權結構下的控制變數，鮮少學者探討有關投資宣告對公司價值的影響。 本研究嘗試從資訊不對稱的角度，探討首度上市上櫃公司管理當局為傳遞公司經營績效及未來成長機會給予外部投資人，透過自身的持股與投資規模進行初次投資宣告，藉以傳遞公司真正價值予投資人，以追求公司與自身財富的最大化。本研究在訊號放射理論的架構下，透過完美貝氏的分離均衡解，經過模式推導獲致三個研究命題，並以此研究命題、個案訪談與文獻整理推衍出可驗證的八個假說。 在假說驗證方面，以民國80年至89年共225家新上市上櫃公司的初次投資宣告為研究樣本，並依未來前景看佳與否、股權集中度高低與初次宣告投資規模大小來分類，將研究樣本區分為八個子樣本，利用事件研究法對宣告公司事件日的平均異常報酬率反應以及累積異常報酬率反應進行假說的檢驗。並且，以產業類別、高階主管持股、高階主管持股的二次方、投資規模、初次投資支出類型為自變數，公司規模、市場景氣與負債比率為控制變數，對事件窗口(-1,+1)的累積平均異常報酬率進行橫斷面迴歸分析，探討宣告事件對股票異常報酬率反應的影響。經由上述的實證過程，本研究獲得以下主要結論： 1.初次投資宣告具有資訊內涵，當股權集中度越高的高科技股公司，若進行大規模的初次投資支出宣告，則公司股票異常報酬率的正面反應訊號越強。 2.投資人對高科技股與非高科技股公司的初次投資宣告有不同的評價，屬於未來前景看佳的高科技股，進行初次投資宣告的股票異常報酬率反應顯著為正，且顯著高於未來前景不佳的非高科技股公司。 3.屬於資本支出類型的初次投資宣告有利於公司價值的提升。 目錄 第壹章 緒論…………………………………………... 1 第一節 研究動機與研究目的……………………………… 3 第二節 研究範圍與研究限制……………………………… 8 第三節 研究流程與論文架構……………………………… 11 第貳章 文獻探討與個案訪談整理…… ……………. 17 第一節 代理理論與資訊不對稱…………………………… 18 第二節 股權結構與公司價值之關係……………………… 23 第三節 資本支出與公司價值之關係……………………… 28 第四節 股權、資本支出與公司價值相關實證文獻……… 31 第五節 文獻評述與個案訪談整理………………………… 50 第參章 理論模式建立…………………… …………. 59 第一節 模式背景……,,…………………………………… 60 第二節 模式架構與模式條件設定………………………… 63 第三節 模式推導與命題建立……………………………… 72 第肆章 研究設計… ………………………………… 81 第一節 實證架構與研究假說……………………………… 82 第二節 資料來源與樣本選取……………………………… 93 第三節 變數操作性定義…………………………………… 96 第四節 實證分析方法……………………………………… 102 第伍章 實證結果分析…… ………………………… 113 第一節 樣本資料統計分析………………………………… 114 第二節 全體樣本初次投資支出宣告的效果分析………… 121 第三節 研究假說的驗證……………………………………. 132 第四節 投資支出宣告異常報酬率影響因素分析………… 150 第五節 實證結果與涵義……………………………………. 154 第陸章 結論與建議…… …………………………… 163 第一節 結論………………………………………………… 164 第二節 建議………………………………………………… 166 參考文獻 中文部分……………………………………………………… 171 英文部分……………………………………………………… 173 表目錄 表2-1 國外其他股權結構與公司價值關係實證文獻整理… 36 表2-2 國外其他資本支出與公司價值關係實證文獻整理… 43 表2-3 個案訪談發現與對本研究的涵義……………………. 56 表3-1 研究模式的前提設計…………………………………. 67 表3-2 研究模式符號說明……………………………………. 68 表4-1 研究範疇的分類情形…………………………………. 86 表4-2 研究範疇的分類情形與對應的假說…………………. 90 表4-3 市場景氣劃分……………………………………… 101 表5-1 整體上市上櫃公司的分配狀況……………………… 115 表5-2 研究樣本按初次投資支出宣告年度分類…………… 116 表5-3 研究樣本按產業類別分類…………………………… 117 表5-4 研究樣本按高科技類股與市場景氣分類統計……… 118 表5-5 各研究變數的樣本統計量…………………………… 119 表5-6 全體樣本初次投資支出宣告的平均異常報酬率…… 122 表5-7 全體樣本事件窗口累積異常報酬率………………… 123 表5-8 高科技股公司初次投資支出宣告的平均異常報酬…. 125 表5-9 非高科技股公司初次投資支出宣告的平均異常報酬率126 表5-10 高科技股公司事件窗口累積異常報酬率…………… 127 表5-11 非高科技股公司事件窗口累積異常報酬率………… 127 表5-12 投資規模大的公司初次投資支出宣告的平均異常報酬129 表5-13 投資規模小的公司初次投資支出宣告的平均異常報酬130 表5-14 投資規模大的公司事件窗口累積異常報酬率……… 131 表5-15 投資規模小的公司事件窗口累積異常報酬率……… 131 表5-16 研究樣本交叉分類分布情形(n=225) ……………… 132 表5-17 第一種情況公司初次投資支出宣告的平均異常報酬率134 表5-18 第一種情況公司事件窗口累積異常報酬率 135 表5-19 第二種情況公司初次投資支出宣告的平均異常報酬率136 表5-20 第二種情況公司事件窗口累積異常報酬率……………137 表5-21 第三種情況公司初次投資支出宣告的平均異常報酬率138 表5-22 第三種情況公司事件窗口累積異常報酬率……………139 表5-23 第四種情況公司初次投資支出宣告的平均異常報酬率140 表5-24 第四種情況公司事件窗口累積異常報酬率……………141 表5-25 第五種情況公司初次投資支出宣告的平均異常報酬率142 表5-26 第五種情況公司事件窗口累積異常報酬率……………143 表5-27 第六種情況公司初次投資支出宣告的平均異常報酬率144 表5-28 第六種情況公司事件窗口累積異常報酬率……………145 表5-29 第七種情況公司初次投資支出宣告的平均異常報酬率146 表5-30 第七種情況公司事件窗口累積異常報酬率……………147 表5-31 第八種情況公司初次投資支出宣告的平均異常報酬率148 表5-32 第八種情況公司事件窗口累積異常報酬率……………149 表5-33 累積異常報酬率的橫斷面多元迴歸分析………………153 表5-34 各研究假說實證結果……………………………………158 圖目錄 圖1-1 研究流程………………………………………………. 12 圖3-1 初次投資支出宣告的信號放射………………………. 63 圖3-2 研究模式與觀念架構………………………………... 65 圖3-3 初次投資出宣告的樹狀機率分析…………………… 71 圖4-1 實證架構…………………………………………………82 圖4-2 實證分析方法與流程……………………………………102 圖4-3 事件研究的各時間參數的關係……………………… 105 / Previous foreign studies on corporate investment impact on market prices have revealed that investors react positively to the announcement of increases in capital expenditure. But, the few papers study the topic in Taiwan. This study applies the agency theory, the signaling theory which reduce the asymmetric information and agent problems between the management and external investors and the perfect Baysian Equilibrium to construct the theoretic model to analyze the effect of the initial investment announcement. Following the theoretical model, case interview and literature review, the study derives the three propositions and eight hypotheses. We test these hypotheses for the publicly traded corporations in Taiwan considering a sample composed of the initial investment announcement. The period of the study was January 1991 to December 2000, and the firms selected were all companies listed on the Taiwan Security Exchange or the OTC. The number of the initial investment announcements initially collected was 365 for publicly traded corporations. Nevertheless, the final sample was reduced to 225 after excluding the confounding events and other screen. Finally, we separated the full sample to eight sub-samples by corporate type, ownership and investment scale and used the event study and regression analysis to test the information effect of the initial investment announcement. Our empirical results are not hold in the full sample since no significant market reaction, but are supported in the sub-samples grouped by high-tech. Moreover, the initial investment announcements of high-tech, high ownership, and high scale companies lead the significant positively abcdrmal rate of return at the announcement day. In addition, the investors significantly positively react to the initial investment announcements belong to the capital investment.

本論文包含台灣壽險業資產配置國際化及匯率避險兩個主題。首先，探討台灣壽險業積極向主管機關申請核准提高國外資產配置比率，與美國投資人偏好投資自己國家資產不一致的現象，是台灣壽險業資產配置不得不的策略，或是國際化的迷思? 以25家壽險公司2004 年至2008年財務資料實證結果發現，國外資產納入投資組合對壽險業投資績效有利。如果將樣本公司依據所有權區分為本資公司與外資公司，資料顯示，本資公司國際資產配置較為積極，惟其報酬績效與外資公司差異並不顯著。研究亦發現，2008年美國次貸風暴顯著負向影響台灣壽險公司國外投資報酬，即提高國外資產配置雖可提高報酬，惟匯率風險、信用風險及系統風險暴露亦相對提高，建議壽險公司於追球較高報酬同時，應同時加強風險管理。另實證亦發現，資產規模愈大公司之投資報酬率相對較遜，建議於追求保費市占率成長時，應重視投資報酬績效的實質提升。 第二部分探討2004年至 2008年台灣壽險業國外投資匯率風險管理策略對投資績效影響。以整體產業觀察，匯率避險對投資報酬率有正面效果；本資公司避險策略相較外資公司積極，報酬率亦相對較優；股票上市公司有財報揭露股價波動之壓力，經理人有較強誘因採取避險策略，投資報酬率相較優於股票未上市公司，惟差異並不顯著。實證結果支持Glen and Jorion (1993) and Campbell et al. (2010)避險可以降低匯率風險提升投資報酬績效之研究結論，2006年實施之34號會計公報，顯著影響本資公司與上市公司之避險行為。 / In this study, we study two essays on international asset allocation and the currency hedging problem for Taiwan life insurer industry. In the first essay, we investigate the high percentage of foreign investments placed by Taiwan life insurers and how this phenomenon is at odds with the bias for investing at home common among American investors. The holdings of 25 Taiwan life insurance companies, between the years 2004 and 2008, are scrutinized with a view towards evaluating home bias and its financial impact. We find that foreign investment has proven profitable for the life insurance industry. However, if the life insurance industry is divided into two categories according to its ownership structure, i.e., domestic-owned and foreign-owned companies, and that while the performance of investments made by domestic-owned life insurers differs from that of foreign-owned life insurers, the difference is insignificant. We also found that global financial turmoil in 2008 had a massively negative impact on the foreign investments of Taiwan life insurance companies and firm size and return on investment is negative correlated, suggesting that life insurers should focus on enhancing investment performance and risk management. In the second essay, we examine the currency hedging strategy and its impact on the performance of Taiwan life insurance industry investments from 2004 to 2008. We find that currency hedging strategies have yielded positive results, overall, for the industry. However, if the life insurance industry is divided into two categories according to its ownership structure, i.e., domestic-owned and foreign-owned companies, the results show that the currency hedging strategies employed by the domestic-owned companies enjoy advantages over those of foreign-owned firms. If the sample is further divided into those publicly listed on the TAIEX and others, our results show that a hedging strategy has positive effects on listed company. Our findings support the work in Glen and Jorion (1993) and Campbell et al. (2010), which reveal that hedging strategies improve foreign investment returns and can reduce currency risks in comparison to non-hedging strategies. Our empirical results indicate that SFAS No. 34 has a significant effect on currency hedging behavior among domestically owned and listed companies.

本研究主要探討股權重組活動對公司治理的影響，以及股權重組與公司治理程度是否會影響經營績效。多角化原為企業增強經濟效率、發揮綜效的策略，但近年來發現，企業多角化有折價的現象。又諸多折價現象中，發現企業產生了內部價值衝突的狀況。推敲折價現象的發生，可能與管理者能力有關，當組織越廣大而多層下，管理能力不堪負荷企業的經營效率將因為業務種類越廣而降低。 從臺灣的個案訪談中，了解到小股東對分割宣告的態度多為保守而疑慮的，未若歐美文獻所探討的對股東財富具有正面的激勵。因此，本研究探討股權重組所欲達成的目的是否對公司治理有正面的幫助，並進一步以子公司的上市為基準點，討論上市前管理能力、公司治理與股權重組目的之前是否具備關聯性，並研究上市後股權重組目的、公司治理與經營績效之前是否具備關聯性。 主要貢獻如下: 1. 股權重組是企業從多角化走向分權、業務單純化的程序，股權重組有 利於讓外部投資人減少資訊不對稱的困境，在分別評價不同性質企業下，有助於回復多角化折價所失去的價值。 2. 管理能力隨著企業的發展，會提高或降低。管理者表現不佳未必要以撤換管理者為唯一手段，且要提高管理者努力程度也不盡然是以設計良好的獎酬制度，原因可能是內部資源配置不佳，而股權重組是協助企業改善內部資本市場缺乏效率性的重要手段。 3. 股權重組是讓單一實體企業創建兩個獨立的企業個體，他會引進新得股東、外部專家與讓管理者更可直接接受外部市場評價，股權重組是否可讓企業更進一步地改善公司治理結構或減少盈餘管理現象，仍有賴企業分割的真實目的。在臺灣，資產分割對股東財富的影響為負效果，有別於歐美資本市場；權益分割雖為正的財富效果，但反應也不如歐美市場的表現。 4. 管理能力與公司治理表現會影響股權重組的推動，股權重組的目的與公司治理的表現會影響經營績效。 / 1.Ownership Restructuring Relationships Equity Carveouts and Spin-offs were called “Ownership Restructuring Relationships”. Equity Carveouts are usually followed by spin-offs. Spin-offs are more often associated with controlled subsidiaries. In a spin-off, a company distributes on a pro rata basis all the shares it owns in a subsidiary to its own shareholders. Two separate public corporations with the same proportional equity ownership now exist where only one existed before. Equity Carveouts means “ A company sells up to 20% of the stock of a segment to raise funds followed by a tax-free spin-off. Spin-offs are distinguished from equity carveouts, in which some of a subsidiariy’s shares are offered for sale to the general public, bringing an infusion of cash to the parent firm without loss of control. In any cases, management may seek to split the company into small pieces through a series of restructuring techniques. Including initial equity carveouts and subsequent spin-offs. 2.Wants Taiwan listed Companies have incurred on conflict between subsidiaries in recent years. They usually take the step of Restructuring ownership relationship to approach their strategy, we exploring the cause and consequence among financial strategy, corporate governance and performance. The purpose of this paper is to explore the decision whether can impact on ability of manager or not. First, to develop a new path is main contribution in Corporate Governance. Second, to enhance the diversified field referred as Governance. Third, Which can increasing wealth of owner at the issue of spin-offs and carveouts in Taiwan. Fourth, After enacted the decision, What effect are their needs and the relationship between strategy and performance? 3.Literature Review (1)Restructure Several studies have examined the market reaction to the announcement of carve-outs (Schipper and Smith, 1986) and spin-offs (Hite and Owers,1983;Miles and Rosenfeld,1983; and Schipper and Smith,1983) These studies demonstrate that the announcement of a corporate spin-off or carve-out is associated with positive stock price movements in the parents’ stock. The continuity of ownership in a spin-off implies that any subsequent changes in value from the reorganization accure to the existing shareholders of the parent corporation. Galai and Masulis claim spin-offs may erode the position of the bondholders causing a wealth transfer from bondholders to stock holders while leaving the value of the firm unchanged. Schipper and Smith also contend that the creation of publicly-traded firms results in new information sources which enable shareholders to more closely monitor the activities of managers, thereby reducing agency costs and enhancing shareholder wealth. The asset focus explanation has viewed spin-offs as improving the focus of a firm, thus serving to remedy the loss of focus inherent in a diversified conglomerate. (2)Restructure and owners wealth A significant positive stock price reaction was surrounding spin-off announcements. The source of the gains in spin-offs, however, is difficult to identify and validate. Authors have argued that spin-offs:  Mitigate an unwieldy organizational structure by increasing focus.  Enhance contracting efficiency  Reduce regulatory or tax constraints  Reduce information asymmetries regarding the operatons of parent firms  Are possible corrections of acquisition mistake.  Improve managers’ incentives to maximize shareholder wealth in spun-off firms. Allen et al(1995)also document an inverse relation between the gains to spin-offs and losses associated with prior takeovers of those units by the parent firm. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam(1999) find that information symmetries in parent firms are positively related to the excess stock returns around spin-off announcements. While Daley, Methrotra, and Sivakumar(1997)report that focus-increasing spin-offs earn higher announcement-period excess stock returns relative to spin-offs that do not increase focus. Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge(1993)find that the market for corporate control has historically played a major role in the wealth gains to shareholders of firms involved in spin-offs. The sources of the increasing in shareholder wealth which accompanying the announcement of a corporate spin-off. However, are not apparent. Hite and Owers(1983) and Schipper ;and Smith(1983) document that shareholder gains are related to neither wealth transfer from other financial claimants nor to the beneficial resolution of inefficient legal to regulatory contractual relationships. (3) Information Asymmetry and Restructuring Practitioners and the popular press usually propose an information-related motivation for spin-offs. CEO of most firms involved in spin-offs claim that the spin-off improves the firm’s market value because investors are able to perceive value more clearly after the spin-off. As information asymmetry hypothesis that a spin-offs increasing value. because it mitigates the information asymmetry in the market about the profitability and operating efficiency of the different divisions of the firm. Several studies have empirically analyzed the source of shareholder gains around spin-offs. We may be classified as follow: (i) transfer of wealth from bondholders to shareholders. (ii) tax and regulatory advantages, (iii)restructuring of incentive contracts synergies hypothesis has received broad empirical support. As spin-offs transform a shingle firm into many firms that have separate stock market listings, they increase the number of traded securities and make the price system more imformative. (4) Internal Capital Market The relative efficiency of internal and external capital market transactions is a critical element in defining the boundaries of the firm. Mackie-Mason(1990) says that internal capital markets are an empirically important mechanism by which capital is allocated across and within lines of business. Alchian(1969) and Williamson(1970) argue that internal capital markets are more efficient than external markets because corporate headquarters is likely to be better informed than external suppliers of capital about investment opportunities. Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts (1992), Wulf(1997), Rajan et al(2000) and Scharfstein and Stein(2000) argue that rent seeking by division al managers can distort the functioning of internal capital markets, inducing corporate headquarters to allocate excessive capital to divisions with poor investment opportunities where rent-seeking incentives are strongest. Shin and Stulz(1998) evidence that when capital is reallocated across divisions, it does not seem to go in any systematic way to the divisions with the better investment opportunities. (5) Governance and Restructuring While a well-functioning system of corporate governance and control should contribute to the development of competitive advantage, internal control practices may not always operate effectively. The restructuring of the U.S. economy that followed this century’s fourth merger wave can be seen as inefficiencies associated with firms’ pursuit of financial self-sufficiently and conglomerate diversification. Having said this, the work on internal control is limited in two ways. First, there have been few studies that consider director attributes, as well as the identity and compensation of CEOs simultaneously. Most work considers each as a topic worthy of its own investigation. Of course, these CEO and director attributes all comprise interrelated aspects of internal corporate control. And second, While Walsh and Seward (1990) acknowledged that a voluntary corporate restructuring could be seen as an attribute of internal control. Relatively little empirical work has been done on the topic within a governance and control framework. Our goal is to examine the relationship between a voluntary corporate restructuring and the more traditional internal corporate control mechanisms identifies by Walsh and Seward (1990). 4. Research Design (1)Hypothesis H1: The Goal of Restructuring Ownership Relationship is positive related with enhancing Degree of Corporate Governance; also is positive related with reduce Earning Management. H1-1: A predictable variable is reducing diversification which has positive related with the share-hold-ratio increasing in institutional investor. H1-2: The more forecast error from analysts, the less do add-up share hold-ratio from institutional investor; also the more is earning management from managers. H1-3: Earning quality increasing is positive related with institutional investor add-up their holds; also is positive related with manager decreasing their earning management. H1-4: Capital Expenditure decreasing is positive related with institutional investor add-up their holds; also is positive related with manager decreasing their earning management. H2: Restructuring Ownership Relationship can enforce the structure of subsidiaries’ governance, also loft the ability of top management. H2-1: If Insider Trading Index is lower at the subsidiaries after restructuring, the relationship with reducing agency cost is positive. H2-2: Board is positive related with reducing the agency cost. H2-3: The more influence power index is, the less agency costs are at subsidiaries’ restructuring. H3: Announcement is positive related with wealth effect. H3-1: announcement has positive abnormal return during event window. H3-2: Spin-off has negative accumulate abnormal return during announcement. Carveout have positive accumulate abnormal return during announcement. H3-3: the long-term in wealth effect which after restructure is superior to before restructure. H4: Among governance, restructuring and performance have positive relationship. H5: the performance means after restructure is superior to before restructure. (2)Event study The original sample consisted of 101 firms parent companies had spun-off subsidiary common stock to their shareholders over the period 1990 to 2005, and either sample consisted of 79 firms parent companies had carved-out subsidiary common stock to outsiders. The mean adjusted return approached was used to compute abnormal returns. Recent evidence by Masulis(1994) as well as the more sophisticated market models in detecting abnormal performance when it is present. To determine the adjusted daily returns of a security, the average daily return over specified interval, the comparison period return(CPR), it taken as an estimate of the expected daily return for the period under study, the observaton period adjusted returns are then computed by subtracting the CPR from the daily return over the observation period. The CPR for the current study is based upon the average daily return from day –210 through day –21, the observation period extends from day –10 through day +10 using the following formula: a. Average standard abnormal return:ASR= 。 b. Accumulated standard abnormal return: CASR= 。 (3) Logistical regress model We will test the relationship between goal of restructuring and governance to use the method in logistical model. Because the binary variables can catch add or deduct from institutional investor. Institutional investor may be proxy variable of enforce structure of Corporate governance that is depended variable by us. In addition to proxy of governance, We select another depend variable which is transparency on finance to be a proxy variable of earning management in stead of agency cost. If hold-stock-ratio is adding means the structure is better in the wholly year. And if transparency-on-finance is deducting means the cost is saver in the wholly year. Through binary variable to test the relationship is worse than multi-regression model, we only want to know the meaning whether restructuring of owner relationship is function of corporate governance to find the effect on financial decision. Suppose that the strong relationship is existed between restructuring and governance, hence, we will explore relationships among governance, restructuring and performance in advance. (4) Simultaneous Equation model If ability can impact on financial decision and producing effect indirectly on governance, how do governance and performance can impact on financial decision? There are many papers to discuss the efficient of internal capital market where were related with governance and performance from inference. The evidence-paper is scarcity and also non-suitable on Taiwan. We Seemingly see the consequence is well between variables, their relationship may be interact to display on cause and consequence. 5. Conclusion (1) We get a strong evidence to support the goal can influence on governance. Institutional investors need the sign to adjust their stock and join the better governance. (2) To approve the refocusing hypothesis those improve the performance and manager’s ability. Their purpose of taking the corporate restructure is not only owner wealth but also to modulate the internal resource on conglomerate. (3) Spin-offs is difference from carve out on wealth effect from announcement period. But they also have the common effect is positive on announce day. Spin-offs have negative abnormal return prior to announcement and carve out have positive abnormal return through announce day. Our conclusion is different from west papers. (4) Ownership structure have influence on performance, Suppose that highly controlled parent company get more inflow than lower controlled parent company, in the meaning of controlling shareholder or block holders will influence on performance and ability of manager through corporate restructure.