本文計分五章，但主要內容分列於二、三、四章; 此三章分論現金的管理、應收帳款的管理、存貨的管理。現金的管理，探討其在企業營運中時，在流人及標出方面應如何妥加控制，以杜舞弊; 並討論以現金做短期投資時，其操作技巧及應行注意事項。應收帳款管理方面，則探討應收帳款造成的原因，及授信對象的評估、信用政策的規劃; 並就呆帳預防方面，其在銷售政策及法律上應行注意之事，加以論述; 同時對於應收帳款內部本身應如何做好控制及其融通問題，提出分析。存貨管理方面，除論述各種存量控制方法，並就存貨之請購、採購、驗收、領料、退料、盤點等程序，實實電腦化作業時，其流程及相互間的關係，提出結論。

本文以決策作成程序之四個單元- 建立目標、發展策略、分析策略、及選擇策略- 為架構，析論投資策略、籌資策略、與財務機動策略之形成。 第一章說明歪業決策結構、及理財功能之範圍、與財務調策略形成之步驟等三項論題。先由歪業決策結構界定理閉功能所涉之決策包括前述三項策略，次簡述財務調度策略形成之理性步驟。 第二章析論企業理財之目標。由企業決策環境就一般情況說明廠商經營目標之多元性，包括經濟與非經濟目標等，再由上述一般考慮中擇出廠商與其所有人之理財觀點，加以分析與比較，次說明企業理財之目標為最適化長期淨值投資報酬率。 第三章析論投資策略之形成。首先說明投資問題起源於策田性與營運性問題，次說明企業策略之形成，因投資策略均發因於此，再將投資策略按各種基準予以分類，而後就絕對報酬、相對報及風險因素分析投資策略，最後討論選擇之準繩，及NPV 與IRR 準繩之重投資報酬率及資本預算與投資策略之不可分割性等問題。 第四章析論籌資策略之形成。先說明籌資問題之特性，金融市場之功能，次說明籌資策略之發展，分析各項籌資策略之可能後果與影響，最後基於資金成本準繩建議選擇之順序為自內籌資金、舉債、而至於發行普通股。 第五章析論財務機動策略，先說明財務機動概念，或有事件之分析，次論財務機動策略之發展，應及於廠商所有可以動用之資源，再分析各種策略可能帶來之後果與影響，最後論及選擇，而建議合理之反應順序應由被動資源至主動資源，及由最小生產性之資源至最大生產性之資源。

台灣投資市場以散戶居多，控制股東常把持董事會運作，因此容易出現控制股東損害小股東權益之情形。不健全之公司治理是否提供一個管理當局較容易操縱盈餘的環境，並進而導致企業爆發財務危機，即為值得深究之議題。本研究以民國87年6月至91年12月間曾發生財務危機之上市公司為研究樣本，以產業、市值規模及成立年數為條件採1:1配對方式組成控制樣本，探討兩組樣本公司間在盈餘管理幅度、盈餘管理誘因及公司治理變數上之差異及前述因素與財務危機發生之關聯性。 以DeAngelo(1986)模型衡量異常應計項目，實證結果顯示，財務危機公司於危機發生前二年內有進行盈餘管理之現象。此外，危機發生前二年度，有較高比例的危機公司進行現金增資；於危機發生前一年度，危機公司內部人出脫股票的情形亦較正常公司嚴重，顯示管理當局似乎利用美化財務數字，以吸引外部投資者，一旦危機即將爆發則大量抛售手中持股，以獲利了結。 在公司治理議題上，本研究利用La Porta et al. (1999)及Claessen et al.(2000)之最終控制者概念，衡量並分析股權結構和董事會組成特性。實證發現，兩組樣本間之股份控制權、盈餘分配權及其偏離程度並無顯著差異，亦未發現危機公司有較顯著傾向採用金字塔結構或交叉持股來控制被投資公司。兩組樣本之最終控制者參與管理的比例相當，家族控股的型態居五成以上。以最終控制者觀點衡量之董監席次控制權則在兩組樣本上呈現顯著差異，實證分析顯示危機公司之最終控制者實際持股率不高，可享受之盈餘分配率較低，但卻擁有比控制樣本公司更高的董監席次控制權。 此外，本研究更進一步發現，在公司治理不佳、盈餘管理誘因愈強的情況下，企業發生財務危機之可能性較高，顯示公司治理之重要性。 / The Association of Earnings Management and Corporate Governance－on Companies Experiencing Financial Distress Abstract Small shareholders are the majority of the investors in Taiwan capital market. And also that controlling shareholders dominate the operation of board of directors, which might render occasions for controlling shareholders to expropriate easily the interests of the small shareholders. It is worth examining whether weaker corporate governance structure would provide management with cozy environment for earnings manipulation, and firms would therefore be inclined to experience financial distress? A group of firms listed in TSE experienced financial distress over the period of June 1998 to December 2002 and a control sample, using industry, market value and setup years as the matching criteria, compose the sample of this research. Specifically, this research examines the cross-group differences in earnings management and corporate governance, and the impact of the magnitude of earnings management and corporate governance structure on the occurrence of financial distress. Based on the accrual model in DeAngelo (1986), the empirical findings indicate that the management of financially distressed firms manipulates earnings two years earlier before the event day. As compared to the control sample, the financially distressed firms are found to issue more seasonal equity offerings and the insiders sell more of their shares one year prior to the event. It appears that management employs a strategy to manipulate earnings upward two years ahead in order to raise the capital and then cash themselves out before the bad news are disclosed to the market. This research adopts the concept of ultimate controlling shareholders used by La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000) to analyze the ownership structure and the composition of boards of directors. In general, we find no evidence that there are significant cross-group differences found in voting rights, cash flow right and the deviation from the two. Neither do we find that financially distressed firms are more inclined to adopt the pyramid structures or cross-holdings as means to enhance their influences. However, we find significant cross-group differences in seating rights. The result therefore suggests that with lower share-holding rights and cash flow rights, the ultimate owners of financially distressed firms exercise their influence on major decisions through procuring higher seating rights. In addition, this research finds that the occurrence of financial distress is associated with weaker corporate governance structure and higher magnitude of earnings management.

摘 要 本研究藉由分析台灣上市公司的控制權與現金流量請求權偏離程度，以及上市公司違反「重大訊息處理程序」的情況，探討上市公司發生財務危機與股權結構及即時性資訊揭露品質間的關聯性。在其他條件不變的情況下，上市公司控制股東的控制權越高，代理問題愈小，上市公司發生財務危機的可能性較低；當控制股東的現金流量請求權較高時，公司發生財務危機的可能性較低。當控制股東的現金流量請求權佔控制權的比率較低時，控制權與現金流量請求權的偏離程度較高，公司發生財務危機的可能性較高。上市公司違反「重大訊息處理程序」被罰款金額越高，表示公司即時性揭露品質越差，這類公司發生財務危機的可能性較高。本研究結果顯示上市公司的股權結構對於發生財務危機有顯著的關聯性；而發生財務危機的上市公司，其控制股東操縱即時性資訊揭露品質的情形較為嚴重，此結果和過去國內財務危機公司利用即時性資訊揭露品質的操縱介入股市的實際案例相符。 / Abstract By analyzing the deviation of control rights from cash flow rights, and the violation against ‘’Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation Procedures for Verification and Disclosure of Material Information of Listed Companies’’ of listed firms, we investigate the relationship between financial distress and ownership structures, and that between financial distress and the quality of immediate disclosures. We find (1) the higher the control rights of controlling stockholders, the lower the possibility of financial distress, (2) the higher the cash flow rights of controlling stockholders, the lower the possibility of financial distress and (3) the greater the deviation of control rights from cash flow rights, the higher the possibility of financial distress. Besides, the more frequent the violation of listed firms against TSEC’s regulation, the worse the immediate disclosure qualities and the higher the possibility of financial distress. The ownership structure of TSEC listed firms has significant impact on financial condition and the controlling shareholders in financial distress firms tend to defer disclosure material information. The findings are consistent with the real cases investigated in TSEC reports.

企業須揭露的資訊，並不以財務資訊，甚至營運資訊為已足。美國標準普爾公司所做的公司透明度與揭露調查，不僅包括財務資訊，也注重非財務資訊。這些非財務資訊包括所有權之結構及與投資者之關係，以及董事會結構與運作過程二類資訊。OECD建議，企業至少應揭露七項資訊中，有一項為「董事會成員及主要經營階層，及其報酬」，可見「董監經理人相關資訊」的重要性，不亞於財務資訊與營運資訊。但我國企業所揭露的非財務資訊，常有不足，且國際評等機構對我國企業資訊揭露的評價亦不高。 本研究認為，若能掌握影響企業董監經理人相關資訊揭露程度之因素，將有助於我國企業透明度之提升。在我國公司法制的設計下，企業資訊之揭露係由董事會負責，然董事會是否重視資訊揭露，可能與其成員之身份特性有關。因此，本研究欲檢視董事成員身份特性因素是否是影響董監經理人相關資訊揭露程度的重要因素。 本研究為我國首次關注企業非財務、營運資訊之揭露，所關心的資訊包括董監經理人之背景能力與薪資酬勞二類資訊。資訊揭露程度之衡量，係將樣本公司年報、財務報告中相關揭露內容，與本研究自行設計的揭露索引表之揭露項目逐一比對，並考慮資訊揭露詳細程度之差異，進行項目評分，再加總得出一揭露總分之方式。提出探討的董事身份特性變數包括家族董監事、法人機構董監事、法人股東是否同時選任為董事與監察人、獨立董監事，以及董事長是否兼任總經理等五項。 研究樣本為民國90年度已在台灣證交所上市之公司，排除金融保險業、官方色彩濃厚公司、判斷資料不全公司後，共計樣本數426家。實證結果顯示非關係法人董監事席次比例、獨立董監事席次比例與資訊揭露程度呈正向顯著關係，表示二者之監督，有助於提升企業資訊揭露程度。法人股東同時選任為董事與監察人時，資訊揭露程度較低，可見此情形有削弱企業監管機制，有礙資訊揭露的傾向。但家族董監事席次比例、董事長是否兼任總經理二變數，則與資訊揭露程度間未發現顯著關係。 / The information that enterprises should disclose is not limited to financial and operating information. The “Company Transparency and Disclosure Survey” by Standard & Poor’s not only includes financial information, but also focuses on nonfinancial information, including ownership structure and investor relations, and board structure and process. OECD suggests enterprises at least disclose seven kinds of material information, and one of them is “ members of the board and key executives, and their remuneration.” Thus it could reveal that “the information related to board and executives” is no less important than financial and operating information. But in our country enterprises disclosure level in nonfinancial information is not enough. Besides, national evaluation institutions set a low value on information disclosure level of our country’s enterprises. This study presumes that if we can control the influential factor of the disclosure level about information related to board and executives, it will help to enhance enterprises’ transparency in our country. In our country’s Company Law system, board is responsible for the information disclosure of enterprises. We surmise whether board emphasizes on information disclosure has relationship with characteristics of directors’ identities. So the study wants to examine if the characteristics of directors’ identities are the important factors influencing the disclosure level of the information about board and executives. This is the very first study in our country to focus the information disclosure on nonfinancial and nonoperating information, that related to background and remuneration of board and executives. The way to measure the disclosure level is that the study designs a disclosure checklist to examine if these disclosure items appear on sample enterprises’ information disclosure of annual report and financial report, and also scrutinize to what extent the disclosure detail of information reaches. Finally the study gives each item a point, and sums up a total grade. The study has five directors’ identities characteristics variables, including family directors, institutional directors, whether institutional shareholder serves as director and supervisor simultaneously, independent directors, and whether the board chairman serves as the CEO simultaneously. The study samples are companies listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange in 2001, but exclude banking and insurance industry, and government-involved companies or companies with insufficient judging information are excluded. The rest amount to 426 samples. The empirical result indicates that the proportion of nonrelated institutional directors and independent directors on board are positively related to the extent of information disclosure. If a company has an institutional shareholder serves as director and supervisor simultaneously, it has lower extent of information disclosure. The proportion of family directors on the board and whether the board chairman serves as the CEO simultaneously reveal no significant relationship with the extent of information disclosure.

1997年亞洲發生金融風暴後，國內亦發生多起企業舞弊案件，再加上2001年底美國大型公司會計醜聞案，公司所揭露的資訊是否仍為投資人所相信，似乎存有許多問號，加強公司治理機制應是一個較佳的解決方案，也逐漸為世界各國所重視。本研究以董監事會特性做為衡量公司治理機制良窳的代理變數，探討其與財務預測準確性之關聯性為何。 本研究以曾發佈民國九十年及九十一年強制性財務預測之上市公司為樣本，實證結果發現，當公司控制股東佔全體董事席次之比例愈高、次大股東佔全體董事席次之比例愈低、次大股東佔全體監察人席次之比例愈低、董事及監察人異動之比例愈高、公司有參與管理的情形、公司沒有獨立監察人的存在以及總經理發生異動時，公司所發佈之財務預測愈不準確，且其更新幅度愈大。 / Since the Asia financial crisis in 1997, there were much fraudulence of the listed companies in Taiwan. Then in the United States, Enron and Xerox were suffered from scandals in 2001. Do investors still believe the information companies disclose? We never know. But one way to recover the belief of investors is to reinforce the corporate governance mechanism and many countries have placed importance on it. Using the characteristics of board of directors and supervisors as the proxy of corporate governance mechanism, this paper examines the relationship between the characteristics of board of directors and supervisors and the financial forecast accuracy. The research data are collected from listed companies that have released the financial forecast in 2001 and 2002. The empirical result suggests the larger proportion of board seats the controlling shareholders hold, the smaller proportion of board seats and supervisor seats the secondary major shareholders hold, the higher rate of changes of directors and supervisors, participation in management, no independent supervisor and the change of CEO would lead the financial forecast less accurate and the range of renewal larger.

為釐清經理人異動對公司日常營運決策及績效之影響及資訊內涵，本研究透過分析國內近五年來上市櫃公司樣本後發現，大多數發生經理人異動之公司多為一次且自願性之異動，而不是經常性之活動，此為一家公司經營權輪替之正常行為。至於其他發生非經常性異動之公司則多在5年內有高於2次以上之異動行為，此和該類公司經營績效不佳及集團內部有爭權行為有很大之關係。關於經理人異動事件宣告效果方面，本研究實證結果顯示，無論是何種異動原因，市場似乎皆呈現負向反應，且以非自願性異動事件負向反應程度為大。 至於經理人異動對公司投資及融資比例之影響方面，本實證結果顯示，不同之異動原因對公司投資、融資比例之影響亦不同。以自願性異動事件來說，事件發生前之固定資產成長率呈現遞增的現象，顯示經理人異動前其投資決策普遍較同業為積極，而事件發生後卻轉而成為較同業保守，顯示新上任者可能因為經驗之不足而不敢採行太積極的策略，而其負債比例在事件發生前逐年遞減，發生後則呈逐年遞增的現象。至於非自願性異動事件，本研究發現其在事件發生前即開始採行較保守的投資策略，推論可能和此類公司基本面較差，或是經理人進行資產誤置之行為所導致，異動後新繼任者之投資轉趨積極；而其於事件發生前負債比例增加，發生後則呈現減少的現象。 至於經理人異動後公司之績效情況，本研究結果顯示無論是會計指標或是市場績效指標，自願性異動樣本之結果在事件發生後公司經營績效皆較之前為差，和市場對事件宣告之反應相符合；但以非自願性異動樣本來說，事件發生後公司經營績效之指標皆較之前為佳，顯示當初事件發生時市場之反應似乎太過悲觀，但這部分的結果可能存在有存在偏誤(survival bias)之問題。 上述的實證結果使得台灣公司經理人異動和市場宣告反應、經營決策及績效首次獲得連結，對投資人在未來從事投資時可作為參考依據。 / In order to understand the information content of CEO turnover to corporate operating decision and performance, from analyzing the listing companies between 1997-2002 in TW, this research found that the most CEO turnover is once and voluntary activity, this is normal in the daily operation. As for the other involuntary turnover activity, which often happened in the company with bad performance or takeover. As for the announcement effect about CEO turnover, the article found that no matter what reasons, the effect is negative, and more significant in involuntary turnover. About the CEO turnover influence on corporate investing and financing decision, this article shows that different turnover reason would result in different decision. Take the companies with voluntary turnover for instance, the fixed asset growth rate grew before turnover but fell afterward. I assume that’s because new CEO takes more conservative investment decision than original one. And the leverage rate in this kind of companies falls before the event but grows afterward. As for the companies with involuntary turnover, this article found that the original CEO took more conservative investment decision than new CEO, this might be because of the worse fundamental situation in this kind of companies or the asset misallocation of the original CEO. And the leverage rate of involuntary turnover grows before the event but falls afterward.

隨著知識經濟時代來臨，知識在組織經營中扮演日益重要的角色，知識擁有者對於組織而言即為人力資本。組織應瞭解知識擁有者能為組織創造多少效益，從而進行人力資源管理，以求長期競爭優勢。因此人力資本在組織中益顯重要，故本研究擬探討人力資本對組織市場價值與財務績效之影響情況。 本研究以我國上市及上櫃公司為研究對象，包含資訊電子（光電、半導體、資訊通訊服務、資訊家電）、生物科技、食品、化學材料、紡織等產業進行探討。研究期間為2001年至2003年，以複迴歸方式從事實證模型分析。 本研究主要探討議題共分為兩部分： 一、人力資本對組織市場價值之影響：本研究以市場價值及M/B Ratio當為應變數，研發人數、員工向心力為自變數。 二、人力資本對組織財務績效之影響：以每人營業收入、每人營業毛利、每人稅前營業利益為應變數，自變數為：研發人數、員工向心力等。 本研究之實證結果發現：研發人數對組織市場價值與組織財務績效有正向影響，而員工向心力對組織M/B Ratio也有正向影響。另外，智慧資本的投資通常會為企業帶來數年的效益，人力資本也不例外，因此本研究另外針對遞延一期之組織市值及財務績效進行分析，實證結果研究也發現：研發人數對組織財務績效具有部分遞延效益。 根據實證結果，本研究建議組織應加強對人力資本之重視，俾提升其市場價值及財務績效。另外，對於後續研究者而言，由於人力資本之指標因各文獻採用不一，故未來學者應再針對不同指標進行探討，並加以彙整，或許對組織市場價值與財務績效影響因子可能會有更深入及明確之瞭解。 / With the coming of the age of knowledge economy, knowledge plays a very important role in organizations. Knowledge-owners are regarded as “Human Capital” in organizations. Managers should understand how many benefits the knowledge-owners will bring to the organizations, and use their Human Resource Management (HRM) policies effectively to retain the long-term competition advantages. Human capital becomes more and more important, so this study is intent to examine the effect of human capital upon the market value and financial performance of the organizations. The two main themes of this study are: 1. The effect of human capital on market value of the organizations. The dependent variable are: market value and M/B Ratio; and the independent variable are: number of R&D workers and employee loyalty. 2. The effect of human capital on financial performance of the organizations. The dependent variable are: revenue per employee, gross profit per employee, and operating income per employee; and the independent variable are: number of R&D workers and employee loyalty. The results show that “R&D workers” has both positive effect on market value and financial performance of the organizations; “employee loyalty” has positive effect on M/B Ratio, too. In addition, human capital has partial lagged effects. According to the results, this study suggests that the organizations should pay more attention to their human capital to promote their market value and financial performance. Moreover, for future researchers, they could examine different human capital indexes. It may allow us to have a thorough understanding about the influence of human capital on market value and financial performance of the organizations.

本研究是以Logit迴歸模型建立台灣2004年Q1至Q3某一本國銀行授信 行業別為電子科技產業、定義為大額授信戶之公開發行公司共46家，特性為同質性電子產業其中資產及營收達一定規模以上之樣本公司作為研究對象，並運用Logic模型導入變數，將此類財務危機樣本公司予以分析，探討發生財務危機是否在銀行借款比率、財務操作比率、或有負債比率等方面產生相關性之研究。 本研究實證結果顯示，在銀行借款變數方面，銀行借款金額佔營收之 比率與發生財務危機企業呈現正相關，顯示危機企業的銀行借款比率偏高，對金融機構舉債過高易週轉不靈; 在財務操作方面，衍生性金融商品部位佔營收比率與發生財務危機企業呈現正相關，顯示危機企業對衍生性金融商品之財務操作太過度，易發生財務危機; 在或有負債方面，對子公司之背書保證金額佔營收之比率與發生財務危機企業呈現正相關，顯示危機企業對子公司或有負債之過度保證，易發生財務危機。 由實證結果得知將這些變數納入模型，會增加模型的預測能力，因此可 以從這些變數歸納出一些端倪，達到事先預防的功能。

本篇論文藉由行為財務學為橋樑，試圖利用法律經濟分析來檢視證券交易法的制定。結合了行為學、法律以及財務。首先利用認知心理學來介紹投資人行為偏誤的現象。整理出三項投資人處理資訊的偏誤，分別為有限注意、過度自信以及框架效果。在資本市場上投資人因為這些偏誤產生的無效率現象分別有，會計資訊解讀不完整、股價報酬產生動能現象、投資人過度交易、對公司事件宣告產生反應不足的現象、忽略資產配置的重要、處分效果以及偏好現金股利等等的現象。 而在了解行為模型對於投資人的行為預測以後，我們試著去進行法律經濟分析。行為財務學點出了效率市場假說不存在的證據，並試著以心理學的角度來解釋這些現象，但是行為財務學仍然缺乏一個良好的預測模型，它無法預測投資人何時會有反應不足，何時會有過度反應。不過行為財務學仍然提供了一些觀點值得政策制定者考慮。1.投資人偏好是不一致的，可能會因為情境改變而改變。2. 投資人只有有限的理性。3. 投資人會受到資訊揭露形式而有不同的判斷。根據這些觀點，我們以行為學的角度來分析證券交易法對於詐欺、操縱以及資訊揭露的規定。