This thesis explores the connection between animal rights (abolitionism) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) in an animal-exploiting company. Looking at how companies should treat animals has long been neglected in academic research. For this reason, the thesis investigates how animal rights, in particular, relate to Carroll's pyramid of CSR. The research adopts qualitative research methods with semi-structured interviews. Carroll's pyramid of CSR and its four dimensions are used as the theoretical framework to both direct the data gathering and analyse the information that was acquired. The thesis concludes with several major findings. Firstly, it is found that animal-exploiting businesses do not address animal rights but animal welfare in their CSR strategy. Secondly, the findings identify relations between animal rights and the four levels of Carroll’s CSR framework, namely economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic levels. Finally, an adjusted version of the framework is developed correlating with abolitionism.

Within the area of animal ethics, there has been ongoing discussion around whether people in developed countries are justified in consuming animal based products or not, some argue that we are, and some argue that we aren't. In this paper I present a kind of middle-way position in response to the ongoing discussion, in which I argue that a decent chunk of a population in developed countries are justified in consuming certain animal products, but only so far as the exclusion of these animal based products would cause harm to the boycotter. Many of the arguments that are raised in order to defend the consumption of animal products, often rely on controversial assumptions or stances in order to make their claim. In this paper I attempt to distance myself from these types of arguments, by giving an argument that only relies on already commonly held moral beliefs that we all already take to be true, and the argument I make is therefore just an extension of a moral belief that we already have, which is that it is morally justifiable to consume animal products in order to avoid a personal harm. The claim very simply put is the following: We already believe that a person is morally justified to consume animal products from animals that yield relatively low amounts of food in order to survive, if we take this to be true, then we should also believe that a person is morally justified to consume animal products from animals that have a much greater yield of food, but where the food is used not to survive, but to avoid personal harms that stem from boycotting animal products. To give a more precise description on why the former (to survive) entails the latter (to avoid harms from boycotting) is because firstly, the amount of harm that's being done to the animal to avoid both cases is the same, and secondly, the level of harm that's being prevented by consuming the products that come from that animal are also the same. I conclude therefore, that if we want to remain morally consistent, we should accept the latter case to also be justified, which is that we are justified in consuming animal products in order to reduce a personal harm, but only so far as those harms would be prevalent if the person where to exclude animal based products from their diet.

I syfte att undersöka om, och i så fall hur, förskollärare arbetar med djuretik som en värderingsfråga undersöks (1) förskollärares tolkning av läroplanens skrivning om ”respekt för allt levande”, (2) hur förskollärare arbetar med värderingsfrågan djuretik och (3) vilken hänsyn de tar till läroplanens krav på saklighet och allsidighet i detta arbete. Empirin bygger på kvalitativa intervjuer med sex förskollärare varav 3 är vegetarianer. Analysen baseras på poststrukturalistisk teori och teori om den dolda läroplanen. Informanterna anger att de arbetar med djuretik i ringa omfattning men visar också att förskollärarna förmedlar omedvetna budskap om djuretik. Hur dessa förskollärare arbetar med djuretik kännetecknas av en relativt stor heterogenitet som delvis är beroende av de intervjuades kostval. Mot bakgrund av att lärarna i denna studie tolkar in djur i läroplanens direktiv om att arbeta för att barn utvecklar ”respekt för allt levande”, dras en slutsats att den lärare som vill arbeta för att barn ska utveckla respekt för djur kan hänvisa till denna skrivning för att rättfärdiga sitt arbete. / In order to examine whether and, if so, how preschool teachers work with animal ethics, I investigate (1) preschool teachers' interpretation of the the formulation of the Swedish curriculum about "respect for all living things", (2) how preschool teachers work with issues of animal ethics, and (3) which consideration they give in this work to the curriculum requirements of objectivity and comprehensiveness. The empirical data is based on qualitative interviews with six pre-school teachers whereof three are vegetarians. The analysis is based on poststructuralist theory and theory of the hidden curriculum. The informants tell that they are working with animal ethics to a small extent. However, the teachers do also mediate unconscious messages about animal ethics. How these preschool teachers work with animal ethics is characterized by a relatively high heterogeneity that partly depends on the food choice of the interviewees. Given that the teachers in this study do include the animals when they interpret the curriculum directives on working to ensure that children develop "respect for all living things", I conclude that the teachers who want to work for children to develop respect for animals may refer to this curriculum wording to justify their work.

Submitted by Ana Lúcia Torres (bfmhuap@gmail.com) on 2018-01-05T10:40:07Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) DISSERTAÇÃO Gabriela Pinto.pdf: 1007586 bytes, checksum: 38b6fd992778f20ddc26b917a95e17a2 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Lúcia Torres (bfmhuap@gmail.com) on 2018-01-05T10:40:17Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) DISSERTAÇÃO Gabriela Pinto.pdf: 1007586 bytes, checksum: 38b6fd992778f20ddc26b917a95e17a2 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-01-05T10:40:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) DISSERTAÇÃO Gabriela Pinto.pdf: 1007586 bytes, checksum: 38b6fd992778f20ddc26b917a95e17a2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016 / Universidade Federal Fluminense / O biólogo se depara com situações conflitantes e dilemas desde seu ingresso na graduação, essa profissão necessita de adequada formação crítica e ética, principalmente relacionada aos animais não humanos para uma atuação plena. A Bioética por ser um campo multidisciplinar da ética que inclui o estudo das dimensões morais, decisões e condutas relacionadas às ciências da vida (Reich, 1995), foi preconizada a ser inclusa disciplina ao currículo do curso em 2010 pelo Conselho Federal de Biologia para suprir essa formação. Porém não foram delimitados os temas a serem discutidos, por exemplo, a Ética Animal por tratar das relações éticas interespecíficas é imprescindível ao biólogo, mas acaba sendo exclusa do debate. Com isto, a presente pesquisa teve o objetivo de analisar os Projetos Pedagógicos do Curso de graduação em Ciências Biológicas das universidades públicas brasileiras visando à incidência da disciplina de Bioética, Ética Animal ou Ética Ambiental em sua Matriz Curricular e, por compreender a importância do tema, a verificação de presença do tema Ética Animal nas ementas das disciplinas de Bioética existentes. Foi utilizada metodologia de natureza quantitativa descritiva e os dados obtidos através de pesquisa de campo. Os resultados revelam que a maioria dos cursos não possui a disciplina de Bioética em sua matriz curricular e em nenhum dos Projetos foram localizadas as disciplinas de Ética Animal ou Ética Ambiental. Quantos a análise das ementas das disciplinas de Bioética existentes, a maioria não contempla a temática da Ética Animal, sendo verificada a grande incidência de bibliografia apenas relacionada aos aspectos legais e éticos da prática profissional. Deste modo, verifica-se a importância da revisão dos currículos para inclusão obrigatória da disciplina de Bioética e da temática ética animal, bem como de futuras pesquisas que apontem o conteúdo da Bioética necessário para uma formação mais completa e menos especista / The biologist is faced with conflicting situations and dilemmas since joining the graduation, this profession requires adequate critical and ethical training, mainly related to non-human animals for a full performance. Bioethics for being a multidisciplinary field of ethics that includes the study of the moral dimensions, decisions and related pipelines to life sciences (Reich, 1995), was recommended to be included as discipline to the course curriculum in 2010 by the Federal Biology Council to meet this training. But they have not defined the topics to be discussed, for example, the Animal Ethics for dealing with ethical interspecific relationships is essential to the biologist, but ends up being excluded debate. With this, the present study aimed to analyze the pedagogical projects of undergraduate course in Biological Sciences of the Brazilian public higher education institutions seeking to impact the discipline of Bioethics, Animal Ethics and Environmental Ethics in its Curriculum Matrix, and understand the importance of the issue the theme of the presence of verification Animal Ethics in the menus of existing bioethics disciplines. It was used methodology of descriptive and quantitative data obtained through field research. The results show that most courses do not have the discipline of bioethics in their curriculum and in any of the projects the disciplines of Animal Ethics and Environmental Ethics were located. How to analyze the menus of existing bioethics disciplines, most does not address the issue of Animal Ethics, and verified the high incidence of literature only related to legal and ethical aspects of professional practice. Thus, there is the importance of the revision of curriculum for compulsory inclusion of Bioethics discipline and animal ethics theme, as well as future studies that show the Bioethics content needed for a more complete training and less speciesist content

Dans ce mémoire, je cherche à expliquer comment politiquement intégrer les générations futures et les animaux non humains. Pour ce faire, je revisite les débats en philosophie concernant la valeur intrinsèque, les théories de justice, les droits et la représentation politique. J’avance que ce qui a été réalisé concernant les générations futures peut servir à la cause des animaux non humains, et inversement. J’analyse ainsi ce qui rassemble ces sans-voix. Après leur avoir accordé une valeur intrinsèque et politique, je leur reconnais des droits à l’intégrité physique, la vie et la liberté. Je propose finalement les solutions qui peuvent servir à contourner le problème de leur non audibilité en démocratie. / In this M.A. research, I try to understand how to politically admit future generations and nonhuman animals. To do this, I analyze debates in philosophy about intrinsic value, theories of justice, rights and political representation. I suggest that what has been accomplished about future generations can serve to the animal cause and conversely. I review what brings together this voices-less. After I allowed them an intrinsic and political value, I recognize them with rights to physically integrity, life and liberty. Finally, I suggest solutions to by-pass the problem of non-audibility in democracy.

Dans ce mémoire, je cherche à déterminer pourquoi les animaux non humains ne sont pas considérés comme étant autonomes dans les théories libérales contemporaines. Pour ce faire, j’analyse deux conceptions traditionnelles de l’autonomie, soit l’autonomie en tant qu’agentivité morale et l’autonomie hiérarchique (en tant que capacité à agir selon ses désirs de second ordre), et je soutiens que ces deux conceptions ne réussissent pas à bien justifier le respect des choix personnels même chez les agents humains. J’avance que ces deux conceptions de l’autonomie mènent à des conclusions perfectionnistes et paternalistes à certains égards, ce qui est pourtant contraire à leur fonction. J’analyse ensuite quelques versions alternatives de l’autonomie qui ne reposent pas sur la possession de facultés morales ou rationnelles, avant de proposer une nouvelle conception de l’autonomie qui pourrait répondre aux problèmes soulevés et potentiellement reconnaître l’autonomie des animaux non humains. / In this M.A. research, I try to understand why nonhuman animals are not considered autonomous in the contemporary liberal theories. To do this, I analyze two main conceptions of autonomy, autonomy as moral agency and hierarchical autonomy (as the capacity to act according to second-order desires), and I argue that these conceptions both fail to justify the respect of personal choices even for human agents. I suggest that these two conceptions of autonomy lead to perfectionist and paternalist conclusions, although this is inconsistent with their function. I then review a few alternative versions of autonomy that do not rely on possessing moral or rational faculties, before sketching a new conception of autonomy that could answer the different issues raised during this research and potentially recognize the autonomy of nonhuman animals.

Dans ce mémoire, je cherche à déterminer pourquoi les animaux non humains ne sont pas considérés comme étant autonomes dans les théories libérales contemporaines. Pour ce faire, j’analyse deux conceptions traditionnelles de l’autonomie, soit l’autonomie en tant qu’agentivité morale et l’autonomie hiérarchique (en tant que capacité à agir selon ses désirs de second ordre), et je soutiens que ces deux conceptions ne réussissent pas à bien justifier le respect des choix personnels même chez les agents humains. J’avance que ces deux conceptions de l’autonomie mènent à des conclusions perfectionnistes et paternalistes à certains égards, ce qui est pourtant contraire à leur fonction. J’analyse ensuite quelques versions alternatives de l’autonomie qui ne reposent pas sur la possession de facultés morales ou rationnelles, avant de proposer une nouvelle conception de l’autonomie qui pourrait répondre aux problèmes soulevés et potentiellement reconnaître l’autonomie des animaux non humains. / In this M.A. research, I try to understand why nonhuman animals are not considered autonomous in the contemporary liberal theories. To do this, I analyze two main conceptions of autonomy, autonomy as moral agency and hierarchical autonomy (as the capacity to act according to second-order desires), and I argue that these conceptions both fail to justify the respect of personal choices even for human agents. I suggest that these two conceptions of autonomy lead to perfectionist and paternalist conclusions, although this is inconsistent with their function. I then review a few alternative versions of autonomy that do not rely on possessing moral or rational faculties, before sketching a new conception of autonomy that could answer the different issues raised during this research and potentially recognize the autonomy of nonhuman animals.

Cette thèse présente une analyse comparée des œuvres de deux écrivains contemporains, John Maxwell Coetzee (1940-), originaire d’Afrique du Sud, et Wu Ming-yi (1971-), de Taïwan, que l’on associe au genre de la « littérature écologique postcoloniale ». À partir de leurs travaux, cette thèse propose une étude interdisciplinaire couvrant trois dimensions de leurs travaux : la théorie, la politique et le littéraire. Les textes choisis pour l’analyse sont ceux qui cherchent à la fois à fournir une image dystopique de l’exploitation des environnements naturels et des êtres non-humains et à représenter l’oppression coloniale des peuples colonisés et de l’exploitation des ressources naturelles dans différentes parties du monde. En ce qui concerne la dimension théorique, la thèse aborde le questionnement suivant : comment la philosophie occidentale contemporaine prend en compte les animaux et les êtres écologiques (êtres non-humains et non-animaux), afin de reconsidérer la question plus générale de l’altérité. Quant à la dimension politique, la thèse adopte une posture philosophique afin de questionner les contextes historiques des pays postcoloniaux, notamment ceux de l’Afrique du Sud et de Taïwan. Enfin, la dimension littéraire examine les écrits de Coetzee et de Wu afin de montrer comment leurs textes décrivent l’« autre écologique » (ecological other) en tant que moyen pour lutter contre l’identité politique postcoloniale. / This thesis presents the literary works of two contemporary writers—John Maxwell Coetzee (1940-), originally from South Africa, and Wu Ming-yi (1971-) from Taiwan—whom it analyses as key exponents of postcolonial eco-literature. The thesis offers an interdisciplinary study of their works in their theoretical, political and literary aspects. The texts selected for analysis are those that seek to present a dystopian image of the exploited natural environment or nonhuman entities, while, at the same time, associating and articulating these representations with the suppressions and exploitations carried out within colonial frameworks in different parts of the world. As regards the theoretical perspective of the thesis, it addresses the subject of how contemporary continental philosophy takes nonhuman animals and other kinds of ecological beings into account and rethinks the philosophical question of the other. With respect to politics, it contextualises this philosophical questioning by looking at the history of various postcolonial countries, notably South Africa and Taiwan. Lastly, as far as literature is concerned, it examines the writings of Coetzee and Wu in order to show how their texts depict the ecological other as a way of contesting postcolonial identity politics.

Dans un contexte où la reconnaissance de droits légaux à certaines entités non humaines apparaît comme une évolution juridique de plus en plus plausible, ce mémoire se veut une exploration de la littérature philosophique et juridique en faveur de l’octroi de la personnalité juridique aux animaux. Tout d’abord, nous offrirons un bref tour d’horizon historique de la notion de personne et pourrons constater que si celle-ci a fortement été associée à l’autonomie morale dans l’histoire du droit et de la philosophie, cette définition de la personnalité souffre d’importantes incohérences lorsque vient le temps de justifier l’extension de la personnalité aux êtres humains dépourvus de cette autonomie morale. C’est le cas, par exemple, des enfants, des êtres humains plongés dans le coma, des handicapés mentaux ou encore de certaines personnes âgées. Nous pourrons également constater que le geste qui consiste à octroyer des droits légaux à ces individus tout en refusant de reconnaître ces mêmes droits aux animaux repose sur des bases théoriques fragiles qu’il convient de revoir l’aide d’une analyse approfondie des théories des droits des animaux proposées depuis les années 1970. Ces théories, et plus particulièrement celles proposées par Peter Singer, Tom Regan et Gary Francione, feront l’objet d’un examen qui permettra de faire ressortir leurs forces et faiblesses respectives. Enfin, dans le dernier chapitre de ce mémoire, nous nous pencherons sur le rôle que peuvent jouer les appels aux droits moraux dans l’attribution de droits légaux. Nous y brosserons aussi une esquisse des différentes formes de personnalité juridique et de statut politique que pourraient se voir octroyer les animaux non humains. / In a context where the recognition of legal rights to certain nonhuman entities appears to be an increasingly plausible legal development, this master’s thesis proposes an exploration of the philosophical and legal literature in favor of granting legal personhood to animals. First, I will provide a brief historical overview of the notion of “person.” I will also note that, while it has been strongly associated with moral autonomy in the history of law and philosophy, this definition of personhood suffers from substantial inconsistencies in justifying the granting of legal personhood to non-autonomous human beings. It is the case, for instance, of children, comatose human beings, the mentally disabled, and the elderly. We will also see that granting legal rights to these individuals while refusing to recognize these same rights to nonhuman animals is based on fragile theoretical foundations that need to be rectified with a thorough analysis of the theories of animal rights proposed since the 1970s. These theories, specifically the ones put forward by Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and Gary Francione, will be examined to identify their respective strengths and weaknesses. Finally, the final chapter of this research will examine the decisive role that appeals to moral rights can play in granting legal rights to animals. It also outlines the various forms of legal personhood and political status that might be attributed to nonhuman animals.

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