Num mundo de difusão de imagens, por meios eletrônicos ou gráficos, onde conceitos, mensagens (publicidade comercial, estatal e política) e acontecimentos (por exemplo, no jornalismo) são mostrados, o direito humano à imagem é colocado à prova, pois detentores do direito reclamam do seu uso indevido. Para o Direito, algumas questões mostram-se relevantes, à medida que se busca a tutela do direito à imagem. O que é a imagem de uma pessoa? O que é imagem retrato e imagem atributo? Existe uma representação de grupo, imagem do grupo? Um determinado grupo pode reclamar direito à imagem? Quais as características de tal direito? Se imagens divulgadas (ex: imagens transmitidas pelas ondas eletromagnéticas) informam características fenotípicas de raça e cor, há uma imagem retrato das pessoas da cor/raça negra? Como os negros (as) querem ser representados na mídia? A pesquisa empírica mostra que as pessoas querem ser representadas na mídia com respeito. Tal postura comporta uma compreensão das pessoas como seres únicos, com suas próprias características. / In a world broadcast images, electronically or graphs, where concepts, messages (commercial advertising, political and state) and events (eg, journalism) are shown, the human right to the image is put to the test, as holders of rights complain about its misuse. To the Right, some questions show up relevant, as it seeks the protection of the right to the image. What is the image of a person? What is portrait image and image attribute? There is a group representation, group picture? A particular group can claim any rights to the image? What are the characteristics of such a right? If images released (eg images transmitted by electromagnetic waves) inform phenotypic characteristics of race and color, there is a portrait of people of color / black race image? How blacks want to be represented in the media? Empirical research shows that people want to be represented in the media with respect. This attitude involves an understanding of people as unique individuals with their own characteristics.

La tesi doctoral Publicidad comercial y libertad de expresión analitza les conseqüències jurídiques de la protecció de la publicitat i d'altres formes de comunicació comercial mitjançant la llibertat d'informació i d'expressió prevista en els articles 20.1 a) i d) de la Constitució. S'examina, en primer lloc, la jurisprudència dictada pel tribunal Suprem Federal dels Estats Units, el Tribunal Europeu de Drets Humans, el Tribunal Europeu de Justícia i el Tribunal Constitucional Alemany. En segon lloc, la tesi analitza els fonaments econòmics, socials i legals que advoquen per la protecció constitucional de la publicitat comercial. Les conclusions bàsiques del treball apunten a què les comunicacions comercials compleixen les funcions que tradicionalment s'associen a la llibertat d'expressió entre d'altres, promoció de l'autogovern democràtic i foment de l'autonomia individual i que els límits a la seva realització han d'enjudiciar-se d'acord amb el principi de proporcionalitat. / La tesis doctoral Publicidad comercial y libertad de expresión analiza las consecuencias jurídicas de la protección de la publicidad y otras formas de comunicación comercial mediante la libertad de información y expresión prevista en los artículos 20.1 a) y d) de la Constitución. Se examina, en primer lugar, la jurisprudencia dictada por el Tribunal Supremo Federal de los Estados Unidos, el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, el Tribunal Europeo de Justicia y el Tribunal Constitucional Alemán. En segundo lugar, la tesis analiza los fundamentos económicos, sociales y legales que abogan por la protección constitucional de la publicidad comercial. Las conclusiones básicas del trabajo apuntan a que las comunicaciones comerciales cumplen las funciones que tradicionalmente se asocian a la libertad de expresión entre otros, promoción del autogobierno democrático y fomento de la autonomía individual y que los límites a su realización deben enjuiciarse de acuerdo con el principio de proporcionalidad. / The PhD dissertation Publicidad comercial y libertad de expresión explores the legal consequences of protecting advertising and other forms of commercial speech through freedom of information and expression set forth in articles 20.1 a) and b) of the Spanish Constitution. It discusses, on the one hand, the case-law by the U.S. Supreme Court, the European Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Justice and the German Constitutional Court. On the other hand, the dissertation analyses the economic, social and legal underpinnings which support the constitutional status of commercial speech. The basic conclusions of the research assert that commercial communications perform functions traditionally associated to freedom of expression among others, fostering democracy and promoting individual autonomy and that limitations to commercial speech ought to be scrutinized with resort to the principle of proportionality.

Les faits justificatifs de la diffamation témoignent de la difficile conciliation entre le droit à la protection de l’honneur et le droit à l’information. Le domaine de l’exception de vérité (art. 35 de la loi du 29 juillet 1881), délimité par trois exceptions en 1944, fut rapidement critiqué, en ce qu’il ne permettait pas la justification des imputations les plus utiles à la société. En outre, la sévérité des conditions de fond et de forme de la preuve de la vérité fit le plus souvent obstacle à la relaxe. En réaction, la jurisprudence créa le fait justificatif de la bonne foi, fondé sur quatre critères accessibles (but légitime, sérieux de l’enquête, prudence et mesure dans l’expression, défaut d’animosité personnelle et favorisant un droit du public à l’information de qualité. À la fin du XXème siècle, ce système fut profondément mis en cause, comme étant contraire à la jurisprudence de la CEDH relative à l’article 10 CESDH, laquelle impose une protection accrue des propos d’intérêt général ou politiques. En conséquence, le Conseil constitutionnel supprima deux des trois limites à l’exception de vérité, qui n’est plus interdite que dans domaine de la vie privée. Ce nouvel arbitrage entre les deux valeurs en conflit n’apparaît pas satisfaisant, d’autant que la preuve de la vérité est toujours entravée par des conditions drastiques. En 2008, la Cour de cassation intégra de manière radicale les critères strasbourgeois à sa jurisprudence sur la bonne foi. Elle se dirige aujourd’hui vers une formule plus équilibrée, fondée sur l’application proportionnelle des quatre critères traditionnels corrigés à la lumière des principes de la CEDH. Cependant, elle applique également les critères strasbourgeois à d’autres infractions attentatoires à la liberté d’expression, qui ne bénéficient pas de la structure d’accueil des faits justificatifs de la diffamation. Pour ces cas, au lieu de l’adoption du contrôle de proportionnalité envisagée, la création d’un fait justificatif générique fondé sur l’article 10 de la CESDH est proposée, plus respectueuse de la logique pénale. / The special justifications applicable to defamation bare witness to the difficult conciliation between the right to protect ones honor and the public’s right to information. The area of the defence of truth (art. 35 of the 29 July 1881), delineated by three exceptions in 1944, was rapidly critiqued, preventing the justification of some of the most socially useful imputations. Furthermore, the defence of truth was subjected to highly rigourous formal and substantial requirements that often prevented ones acquittal on the basis of that demonstration. In reaction, the case-law created another special justification for defamation, based on good faith, and founded on four accessible criterias (legitimate aim of the information, serious verification, moderation of tone and caution in the choice of words, lack of personal animosity) that favorise the public’s right to quality information. At the end of the 20th century, this system was profoundly questioned, as being against the case-law of the CEDH, that requires a stronger protection of freedom of speech (article 10 CESDH) in connexion with debates of general interest or political discussions. Consequently, the Constitutional council repealed two of the three limits within the defence of truth, which is now only forbidden in the area of ones private life. This new arbitration between the two conflicting values doesn’t seem satisfying, especially since the defence of truth is still impeded by drastic conditions. In 2008, the Court of cassation integrated in a radical manner the CEDH criterias to its case-law on good faith. The case-law today steers towards a more balanced formula, founded on a proportional application of the four traditional criterias corrected in the light of the principes of the CEDH. However, the Court of cassation equally applies the CEDH criterias to other detrimental offences towards the freedom of expression, that do not benefit from the structural support of the special justifications of defamation. For those offences, instead of adopting the envisioned control of proportionality, it is proposed to create a generic justification, founded on the article 10 of the CESDH, that would be more consistent with the logic of criminal law.

[pt] Esta tese pretende contribuir para a melhor compreensão e aplicação do denominado direito ao esquecimento na sociedade contemporânea, notadamente caracterizada pela intensa circulação de informações viabilizada pela permanente evolução tecnológica. Para o desenvolvimento do estudo foi necessário tecer considerações críticas à expressão utilizada no Brasil para identificar o direito em exame, conceituá-lo como uma forma de restrição à ilimitada divulgação de informações individuais pretéritas e desprovidas de interesse público, além de definir sua configuração jurídica de direito fundamental da personalidade decorrente da cláusula geral de tutela da dignidade humana. A partir do reconhecimento de evidentes limites para a aplicação do direito ao esquecimento e considerada a tutela da vida privada em seu viés atual, de controle sobre a circulação de informações relativas aos indivíduos, entende-se não apenas possível como também fundamental a plena tutela do direito tratado na tese. Dada a magnitude do papel atualmente desempenhado pela Internet na comunicação social, defende-se, entre outras possibilidades de aplicação do direito ao esquecimento, o direito de o indivíduo requerer a exclusão de resultados das listas de links apresentadas após uma pesquisa, em provedores de busca, utilizando-se determinadas palavras ou expressões, ainda que tal exclusão não atinja também a fonte onde a informação foi originalmente divulgada. Ademais, o exame da legislação correlata ao tema, a análise de projetos de lei sobre a matéria, bem como a pesquisa da recente jurisprudência brasileira na aplicação do direito ao esquecimento foram métodos utilizados para se chegar à sugestão de critérios que possam ser adotados na ponderação entre os interesses eventualmente conflitantes à liberdade de expressão e à tutela dos direitos da personalidade. Em síntese, informações desatualizadas e irrelevantes sob a perspectiva do interesse público, cuja disseminação possa causar comprovados e injustos danos aos direitos da personalidade, não devem ser irrestritamente divulgadas, sob pena de configuração de notória violação à dignidade humana e, acrescente-se, sem que esta defendida limitação informativa possa ser considerada como prática análoga à tão condenável censura. / [en] This thesis intends to contribute for a better understanding and application of the so-called right to be forgotten in the contemporary society, notably characterized by the intense circulation of information made possible by the ongoing technological progress. In order to develop the study, it was necessary to weave critical considerations to the term used in Brazil to identify the right under review, conceptualize it as a way to restrict the unlimited disclosure of past individual information lacking public interest, as well as define its legal configuration of fundamental right of the personality resulting from the general clause of human dignity protection. From the recognition of clear limits for the application of the right to be forgotten and considering the protection of the private life in its current bias of control over the circulation of information regarding individuals, it is noticeable that it is not only possible but also fundamental to provide for the full protection of the right addressed in the thesis. Due to the magnitude of the role that is currently performed by the Internet in social communication, the right of an individual to require the exclusion of results from the lists of links presented after a search in search providers using certain words or terms, even if such exclusion fails to also reach the source where the information was originally disclosed, is defended, among other possibilities to apply the right to be forgotten. In addition to that, the analysis of the legislation related to the subject, the assessment of draft bills on the subject, as well as the survey of the recent Brazilian jurisprudence in the application of the right to be forgotten were methods used to get to the suggestion of criteria that may be adopted when pondering the possibly conflicting interests with freedom of expression and protection of personality rights. In short, outdated and irrelevant information under the perspective of public interest, whose dissemination may cause proven and unfair damages to the rights of personality, shall not beunrestrictedly disclosed, under the penalty of configuring notorious violation to human dignity and, moreover, not allowing that defended informative limitation to be considered a practice that is similar to the so condemnable censorship.

The Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 is a old order piece of legislation, but gives full recognition to the right to freedom of assembly and expression. These rights are entrenched in sections 16 and 17 of the Bill of Rights and enjoy a generous interpretation. Section 5 of the Act creates limitations on these rights, as the responsible officer of a local authority is allowed to prohibit a gathering when he has reasonable grounds to believe that the police will not be able to prevent traffic disruption, injury or substantial damage to property. Given the fact that this limitation serves to protect a compelling state interest, it constitutes a reasonable and justifiable limitation in terms of section section 36 of the Bill of Rights. / Law / LL.M.

Canada’s experience in the war against terrorism goes back to the seventies, and continues to develop nowadays, with the last direct terrorist activity in 2017. The Canadian Government reacted to these terrorist attacks by enacting a number of statutes that reflect a changing international paradigm in relation to the fight against terrorism. Fundamental rights and liberties such as the freedom of expression, the right to private life and to personal freedom have been curtailed by these legislative measures. The practical consequences of these measures are analyzed via a comparative examination of the Inter-American System of Human Rights. In general terms, the war against terrorism produces significant impacts over the human rights. / La experiencia de Canadá en la lucha contra el terrorismo se remonta a inicios de la década de los setenta y se desarrolla hasta la época actual (los acontecimientos más recientes han tenido lugar en el año 2017). Las medidas legislativas fueron la vía adoptada por parte de Canadá para contrarrestar los ataques y reflejar el cambio de paradigma político en la esfera internacional con relación al fenómeno del terrorismo. Derechos fundamentales como el derecho a la libre expresión, a la vida privada y a la libertad personal se encuentran particularmente afectados por estas medidas. Un análisis comparativo del sistema canadiense y el sistema interamericano permite identificar las consecuencias de estas medidas. En términos más amplios, la lucha contra el terrorismo genera impactos significativos sobre los derechos humanos en general.

La démocratie représentative reste un régime essentiellement représentatif qui a été conçu précisément pour exclure la participation directe de l’universalité des citoyens à la prise de décisions politiques. L’introduction d’instruments de la participation directe, en forme de l’e-démocratie, crée un conflit au sein de ce régime, conflit qui ne sera résolu que par un aménagement de la notion de démocratie représentative, voire sa substitution par une autre notion, ayant vocation à concilier les exigences de la participation et de la représentation. Cette thèse se propose de réfléchir à un modèle de régime politique-type susceptible de permettre l'intégration de l'e-démocratie.Une telle intégration met en lumière l’interdépendance entre la démocratie et les droits fondamentaux qui sont menacés de manière inédite à l’ère numérique. La possibilité d’introduire l’e-démocratie est donc conditionnée à la protection renforcée des droits essentiels : la liberté d’expression, le droit au respect de la vie privée, ainsi qu’à la reconnaissance de nouveaux droits fondés sur l’autodétermination personnelle. L’introduction de l’e-démocratie peut également remettre en cause certains concepts bien établis, tels que le principe majoritaire, ou exiger leur reconsidération, comme dans le cas de la bonne gouvernance. / Representative democracy remains essentially a representative government that was created precisely to avoid all the citizens to participate directly in political decision-making. Implementation of direct participation’s instruments in form of e-democracy creates a conflict within this government, a conflict which can be solved only by a renewal of representative democracy concept, even its substitution by another idea committed to reconciling representation and participation. This thesis aims a reflection on a concept of government capable of integrating e-democracy.Such an integration highlights the interdependent character of the link between democracy and human rights that are exposed to totally new threats in the digital era. The possibility to introduce e-democracy is conditional upon the reinforced protection of such essential rights and freedoms: as freedom of expression and right to respect for private and family life in the digital environment, as well as recognition of new rights based on personal self-determination. Implementation of e-democracy can also challenge well-established concepts such as majority principle or require their reconsideration, as in the case of good governance.

Identifiés comme acteurs politiques, économiques, sociaux ou encore culturels ayant un rôle et une responsabilité fondamentale dans un monde caractérisé par une mondialisation technologique galopante, les médias semblent évidemment soumis au droit de la concurrence. Pourtant, cette évidence n’en constitue pas une lorsque l’on analyse profondément la question. Les médias sont-ils vraiment soumis au droit de la concurrence ? Parallèlement est-il possible de dire qu’on se dirige résolument vers un droit de la concurrence propre aux médias ? Les relations entre les médias et le droit de la concurrence ont connus plusieurs épisodes en Mauritanie. Tout d’abord, l’épisode initiale au fil duquel le rapport entre les médias et le droit de la concurrence fut fade et monotone puisque l’Etat monopolisait tous les médias. Ensuite, au cours du deuxième épisode, il y a eu une ouverture partielle et partiale des médias à la concurrence et ainsi au droit de la concurrence. Enfin, le troisième et dernier épisode est celui inauguré par l’abolition totale du monopole. Dés lors, ce travail consiste à montrer et démontrer la soumission des médias au droit de la concurrence. / Identified as a political, social, cultural or economical actor, having an esential role in the world characterized by soaring globalisation, which is in a staggering peak, media seems to be naturally submitted to the competition law. However, when the question is analysed in a precised and refined way, this obviousness is not right anymore. Are the media really submited to the competition law ? At the same time is it possible to talk about the competition law specific to medias ? Relations between media and the competition law have been faced of several incidents in Mauritania. First of all, during the first incident, the relation between two institutions, it means media and the competition law were bland and dull because of State’s monopolization of all media’s means. Then, there was a partial opening of media to competition. Eventually, the recording of media by the competition law happened during the last incident. This work consists in demonstration of media’s submission to the competition law even though the mediatic product keeps being specific.

1.\ / Doctorat en droit / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Le dernier tiers du XIXème siècle ne constitue pas un moment pamphlétaire parmi d’autres. Non seulement il survient dans une période de démocratisation inédite qui confère au fait pamphlétaire un statut nouveau en lui permettant d’investir l’espace public officiel, mais il est aussi marqué par l’invention de la figure du pamphlétaire et l’émergence de personnalités reconnues comme telles et accédant parfois à une visibilité de premier plan. En dépit de leurs différences de cultures politiques, ces personnalités contribuent à organiser tout un jeu et tout un monde du pamphlet au croisement de la littérature, du journalisme et de la politique. A travers leur violent répertoire discursif, elles contestent l’ordre politique en cours d’édification et le procès de civilisation des mœurs politiques.Partant de l’hypothèse que ces pamphlétaires ont pu être des médiateurs importants du politique, notre recherche a pour objet d’interroger leur contribution aux processus de politisation. Elle entend examiner, dans une perspective socio-historique, dans quelle mesure ils ont pu représenter, dans cette période d’enracinement de la République et de stabilisation de la démocratie, un cheminement de la politique hors des sentiers battus, en favorisant une forme symbolique de participation non conventionnelle au jeu politique et en incarnant une forme transitoire de la rationalisation des passions politiques, entre l’émeute révolutionnaire et la patience démocratique. / The last third of the 19th century was not just any pamphleteering time amongst others. It occurred in a formerly unheard-of period of democratization, which conferred the pamphleteering reality a new status, thus enabling it to carve its way into the official public space. Besides, it was also marked by the invention of the pamphleteer's figure and the emergence of personalities acknowledged as such, some of whom boasting first rate visibility. For all their differing political cultures, these figures helped organize a whole set and world of the pamphlet, at the intersection of literature, journalism and politics. Through their violent discursive repertoire, these pamphleteers question the political order that was then being elaborated, as well as the then on-going process of civilization of political mores.Our research thus aims to examine pamphleteers' contribution to the process of politicization, on the assumption that these could be said to have acted as important mediators of politics. Our work is intended to grasp, within a socio-historical perspective, to what extent – during that period when the Republic was getting increasingly entrenched and democracy more stable – pamphleteers might be said to have represented an evolution of politics off the beaten path, thus favoring a symbolic form of unconventional participation in politics and ultimately embodying a transitional form of rationalization as regards political passions, hovering between revolutionary riots and democratic patience.