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101	Law in 3-Dimensions 2013 March 1900 (has links) This project, overall, involves a theory of law as dimensions. Throughout the history of the study of law, many different theoretical paradigms have emerged proffering different and competing ways to answer the question ‘what is law’? Traditionally, many of these paradigms have been at irreconcilable odds with one another. Notwithstanding this seeming reality, the goal of this project was to attempt to take three of the leading paradigms in legal theory and provide a way to explain how each might fit into a single coherent theory of law. I set out to accomplish this by drawing on the field of theoretical physics and that field’s use of spatial dimensions in explaining various physical phenomena. By engaging in a dimensional analysis of law, I found that I was able to place each paradigm within its own dimension with that dimension being defined by a specific element of time, and in doing so much of the conflict between the paradigms came to be ameliorated. The project has been divided into two main parts. PART I discusses the fundamentals of legal theory (Chapter 1) and the fundamentals of dimensions (Chapter 2). These fundamentals provide a foundation for a dimensional analysis of law which takes place throughout PART II. In Chapter 3, I argue that the three fundamental theses of Positivism coalesce with the 1st-dimension of law, which is defined as law as it exists at any one point in time. From there, I argue in Chapter 4 that the 2nd-dimension of law, being law as it exists between two points in time (i.e. when cases are adjudicated), is characterized by Pragmatism. I then turn, in Chapter 5, to argue that the 3rd-dimension of law, being law as it exists from the very first point in legal time to the ever changing present day, coalesces with the fundamental theses of Naturalism. Ultimately then, I argue that a theory of law as dimensions, through the vantage points of the specific elements of time, provides a more complete account of the nature of law. Legal Theory Jurisprudence Philosophy of Law Legal Positivism Positive Law Natural Law Pragmatism Inclusive Positivism Exclusive Positivism Interpretation Hart Dworkin Posner Finnis Fuller Gardner Shapiro Hume Elements of Time Dimensions Constitutional Law Morality Morals Separation Legal Reasoning Lawyers Law Necessary Connection Multiple Right Answer Best Choice Principle Practicality Judicial Adjudication Point in Time Audacity of Morality Law's True Ambition What is Law? Theoretical Physics Double Bind Multiple Bind First-Order Considerations Second-Order Considerations Penumbra Purity General Goal Incommensurable Legal System Wicked Legal System.
102	台指選擇權之市場指標實證分析吳建民, Wu,Jian-Min Unknown Date (has links) 本研究有系統地收集了2003年8月12日到2005年9月30日止共495個交易日的台指期貨、選擇權市場裡P/C量、P/C倉、隱含波動率(AIV)、不同天數的歷史波動率等收盤資料，進行這些因素與行情走勢間的關係，以及因素彼此的互動性。結果證實分析台指選擇權指標是需要區分金融重大衝擊前後期間，以及區分漲勢、跌勢、盤整的各期間，各期間的選擇權指標均會有不同意涵。本論文證實使用結構轉換的Chow-ARMA(2,1)模型可能比較符合模擬指數實況，且GARCH(1,1) 模型也很適合描述台期指貨波動度預測力。在選擇權指標方面：P/C量與AIV與台指期貨呈現負相關，P/C倉與台指期貨正相關。其中以P/C倉對指數漲跌的影響程度最大、P/C量的影響程度次之、AIV影響程度最小。若把隱含波動率區分成買權與賣權之各個波動率更有效地預測行情走勢，在大跌期間的買賣權隱含波動率更能表現出優越的預測能力，其中前兩期的賣權隱含波動率(PIV)更是效率性指標，實證結果使用20天的歷史波動率比較能貼近選擇權市場的變化，跟過去教科書慣用的90天不同。若比較歷史波動率與隱含波動率間的關係，結論是當「大跌期」歷史波動率大於買權隱含波動率(CIV)時，買權是會被低估的，其他的各種假設條件均不成立。理由有二：一是市場效率性決定了是否可使用隱含波動率與歷史波動率之間的高低關係。二是「大跌時期」相對於「大漲時期」的市場資訊被反應的更敏銳，而在「大跌時期」的賣權價格反應比買權價格反應更快速敏銳。本研究推論的Chow-ARMA(2,1) 台指期貨模型、GARCH(1,1) 波動率模型、P/C量-P/C倉-AIV的多變數模型、FMA20/XIV模型等等在研判指數變化上具有參考價值，進一步均可以做為選擇權操作策略參考依據之一。選擇權歷史波動率隱含波動率 Chow結構轉變選擇權風險係數移動平均線自我相關單根檢定時間序列金融衝擊未平倉量隱含波動率指數 Option Historical Volatility Implied Volatility ARMA(p,q) GARCH Option Greeks Moving Average Stationary ADF(Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test) RMSE P/C Ratio Time Series
103	A Pragmatic Standard of Legal Validity Tyler, John 2012 May 1900 (has links) American jurisprudence currently applies two incompatible validity standards to determine which laws are enforceable. The natural law tradition evaluates validity by an uncertain standard of divine law, and its methodology relies on contradictory views of human reason. Legal positivism, on the other hand, relies on a methodology that commits the analytic fallacy, separates law from its application, and produces an incomplete model of law. These incompatible standards have created a schism in American jurisprudence that impairs the delivery of justice. This dissertation therefore formulates a new standard for legal validity. This new standard rejects the uncertainties and inconsistencies inherent in natural law theory. It also rejects the narrow linguistic methodology of legal positivism. In their stead, this dissertation adopts a pragmatic methodology that develops a standard for legal validity based on actual legal experience. This approach focuses on the operations of law and its effects upon ongoing human activities, and it evaluates legal principles by applying the experimental method to the social consequences they produce. Because legal history provides a long record of past experimentation with legal principles, legal history is an essential feature of this method. This new validity standard contains three principles. The principle of reason requires legal systems to respect every subject as a rational creature with a free will. The principle of reason also requires procedural due process to protect against the punishment of the innocent and the tyranny of the majority. Legal systems that respect their subjects' status as rational creatures with free wills permit their subjects to orient their own behavior. The principle of reason therefore requires substantive due process to ensure that laws provide dependable guideposts to individuals in orienting their behavior. The principle of consent recognizes that the legitimacy of law derives from the consent of those subject to its power. Common law custom, the doctrine of stare decisis, and legislation sanctioned by the subjects' legitimate representatives all evidence consent. The principle of autonomy establishes the authority of law. Laws must wield supremacy over political rulers, and political rulers must be subject to the same laws as other citizens. Political rulers may not arbitrarily alter the law to accord to their will. Legal history demonstrates that, in the absence of a validity standard based on these principles, legal systems will not treat their subjects as ends in themselves. They will inevitably treat their subjects as mere means to other ends. Once laws do this, men have no rest from evil. natural law theory legal positivism HLA Hart William Blackstone John Locke Jeremy Bentham John Austin Galileo Socrates Trotsky Athens Soviet law Stuart dynasty John Dewey Dewey Commission Sidney Hook Congregation of the Holy Office Galileo Affair trial of Socrates Moscow Trials trial of Galileo heresy trial of Trotsky reason autonomy consent philosophy of law pragmatism Kant Inquisition ostracism Anaxagoras Protagoras Alcibiades Arginusae Pericles Peloponnesian War Solon Ephialtes Apology Plato Herodotus Xenophon Plutarch Roscoe Pound common law Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. The Common Law The Path of the Law Learned Hand Christopher Columbus Langdell Ronald Dworkin Lon Fuller Lenin Stalin King Rex Sergei Kirov Permanent Revolution Socialism in One Country Great Terror Dekulakization Holomodor Terror Famine Italian positivist school Harold J. Berman Gustav Radbruch Ramon Mercader Trotsky assassination Marteman Ryutin Old Bolsheviks Genrikh Yagoda Pope Urban VIII Walter Duranty Harold Denny New York Times Joseph E. Davies Mission to Moscow New Republic John F. Finerty Lev Sedov Military Collegium Vasili Ulrikh Gaspare Borgia Cardinal Robert Bellarmine Pericles Father Commissary Michelangelo Segizzi Cardinal Francesco Barberini Cardinal Maffeo Barberini Siderius Nuncius Starry Messenger Accademia dei Lincei Letters on Sunspots Friar Tommaso Caccini Niccolo Lorini Commentaries on the Laws of England Second Treatise on Civil Government Henry de Bracton Sir Edward Coke Sir John Fortescue Matthew Hale Ranulf de Glanvil James I Charles I James II Charles II ship money forest fines distraint of knighthood impositions dispensing power royal prerogative Duke of Buckingham Oliver Cromwell Bishops Wars William Prynne Great Migration Declaration of Indulgence Settlement Act Test Act Protectorate Clarendon Code Quaker Act William and Mary English Civil War Puritan Revolution Glorious Revolution Thirty Years' War Earl of Shaftesbuty William Laud Historiomatrix Long Parliament Rump Parliament Barebones Parliament sociological jurisprudence Red Terror war communism New Economic Policy 1926 Criminal Code Kirov Amendments judicial discretion semantic sting The Concept of Law Fragments on Government The Province of Jurisprudence Determined A Fragment on Government Anarchical Fallacies primary rules secondary rules rule of recognition legal validity internal point of view external point of view law as prediction the bad man perspective on law life of the law page of history Basilikon Doron Trew Law of Free Monarchies

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