Fokus för avhandlingen, Att uttrycka det mänskliga: narrativ etik i Nuruddin Farah’s trilogier, är de nio romaner publicerade mellan 1979 och 2011 som tillsammans utgör Nuruddin Farah’s tre trilogier: ”Variations on the Theme of an African Dictatorship,” bestående av Sweet and Sour Milk (1979), Sardines (1981), Close Sesame (1983); “Blood in the Sun,” bestående av Maps (1986), Gifts (1993), Secrets (1998); samt “Past Imperfect,” bestående av Links (2003), Knots (2007), Crossbones (2011). Tematiska och stilistiska skillnader till trots så är dessa trilogier och romaner märkbart sammanhängande i sitt fokus. De är inte bara tydligt förankrade i en somalisk verklighet som spänner över mer än tre decennier – en resa som inbegriper landets skifte från kommunisitstyre, via diktatur, till inbördeskrig, och 2010-talets version med islamistiskt styre och pirater som härjar kustregionen – men dessa romaner pekar genomgående bortom sin tydliga socio-politiska kontext mot djupt etiska, tid- och rumsoberoende frågeställningar: Hur förhåller sig individen till kollektivet? Vilket etiskt ansvar har jaget för den andre? Vad utgör grunden för människans gemensamma varande? Hur bevara sin mänsklighet under omänskliga levnadsförhållanden? Hur göra motstånd i en diktatur utan att bli en del i det maskineri av våld och tyranni man söker bekämpa? Trots det tydligt etiska anslaget så har dessa trilogier nästan uteslutande lästs utifrån sina politiska implikationer. Utan att undervärdera decennier av rikt och varierande kritiskt mottagande så har denna tendens till politiska läsningar ofta genererat förvånansvärt entydiga läsningar av verk kända för sin mångtydighet och komplexitet. Avhandlingen avser därför att påvisa djupet och bredden i Farah’s gestaltningar genom att tydligt belysa hur det etiska gestaltar sig på flera nivåer – tematiskt, berättartekniskt, i mötet mellan läsare och text, samt i föreställningar om författarens moraliska ansvar. Därutöver diskuteras även de etiska dimensionerna av litteraturkritik: vad innebär en etiskt hållen läsemetodik? Arbetets unika bidrag kan formuleras i fyra steg. För det första utgör avhandlingen det ända kända arbete – utöver Fiona F. Moola’s Reading Nuruddin Farah: The Individual, the Novel, and the Idea of Home (2014) – som inbegriper Farah’s alla trilogier, vilket möjliggör mer långtgående och genomgripande analyser än vad som hittills publicerats. Avhandlingens fokus på den senaste trilogin fyller dessutom en viktig lucka i det kritiska mottagandet av Farah’s romaner eftersom väldigt lite publicerats utöver recensioner. Förutom nya läsningar av Farah så utgör min emfas på det etiska i Farah’s etisk-politiska skrivande ett viktigt bidrag till det vidare fält av (afrikansk) (postkolonial) litteraturkritik där man ofta betonat det politiska över det etiska, snarare än att läst dessa två som oskiljaktiga entiteter. Trots att anledningarna till politiska läsningar av Farah’s trilogier kan härledas såväl till verkens starkt politiska nerv som författarens egna uttalanden i intervjuer och artiklar, så pekar privilegieringen av det politiska framför det etiska på en mer generell tendens inom postkolonial kritik att inrymma det etiska under det politiska. Trots att kopplingen mellan fiktion, politik och författaransvar inte kan avfärdas, hävdar jag i denna avhandling att ett ensidigt politisk angreppssätt hotar att såväl underskatta komplexiteten i romanernas gestaltningar, som att reducera konceptuellt vad författare som Farah faktiskt åstadkommer. För det andra så vidgar avhandlingen befintlig forskning kring det etiska i Farah’s romaner genom att inte endast fokusera på tematik och berättartekniska grepp, men också diskutera läsandet och skrivandet – det som i avhandlingen beskrivs som fyra sammanlänkande ”ethical moments of the told, the telling, the act of writing, the act of reading.” Utan att undervärdera tidgare kritiska läsningar så tycks många diskussioner kring Farah’s trilogier fokusera författarens centralitet på ett vis som emellanåt tar fokus från i övrigt tankeväckande läsningar av tematik och narrativa strategier. Min högst textcentrerade utgångspunkt visar som kontrast att läsningen av Farah’s trilogier genererar spörsmål som kräver ett mer holistiskt perspektiv, inte minst tydliga diskussioner kring den etiska dialog som uppstår i mötet mellan läsare och text. Förutom att bidra till befintlig forskning på Farah’s författarskap, så bidrar avhandlingens holistiska inställning till narrativ etik med fem sammanlänkade perspektiv till det vidare fältet av etisk litteraturkritik. Dels beror detta på det faktum att en sådan modell förutsätter användandet av multipla tolkningsmodeller; i mitt fall kontinental filosofi, postkolonial teori, samt narratologiska teorier kring läsande och mottagande. Denna interdisciplinära modell för narrativ etik är dock inte begränsad till min specifika sammansättning utan kan fungera som modell även för andra litteraturforskare, med alternativa kombinationer av tänkare och teoretiker. Till sist; trots att det inte varit ett uttalat mål från projektets början så har arbetet med det etiska i Farah’s trilogier generarat många funderingar kring den egna läsningen som efterhand lett till formulering av nya narratologiska perspektiv. Här utgör mötet mellan text och läsare en central del i avhandlingen. Genom att betona de etiska elementen i mötet mellan text och läsare närmar jag mig spörsmål som i förlängningen kan ses som byggstenar i en mera etiskt hållen läsemetodik. I stället för att tolka ”störande” element som exempel på estetiska brister, alternativt brister i författarens moraliska ansvarstagande (!) så menar jag att de aspekter som irriterar läsaren, försvårar eller rent av omöjliggör förståelse mycket väl kan vara de ting i texten som tvingar läsaren till en mera engagerad och därmed etiskt mer välgrundad läsning. Att läsa textens ”krux” i termer av ”ethical resource” utgör ett viktigt bidrag till såväl litteratur-filosofisk som narratologisk litteraturforskning, eftersom man ofta hamnat i endera värderande samtal kring ”god litteratur” eller i resonemang kring vilka narrativa element/strategier som väcker läsarens engagemang, empati, etc – och vilka som inte gör det. / This study explores the multiple ethical dimensions of the nine novels published between 1979 and 2011 that together constitute Nuruddin Farah’s three trilogies Variations on the Theme of an African Dictatorship, including Sweet and Sour Milk (1979), Sardines (1981), and Close Sesame (1983); Blood in the Sun, including Maps (1986), Gifts (1993), and Secrets (1998); and Past Imperfect, including Links (2003), Knots (2007), and Crossbones (2011). For all that separate these trilogies and novels thematically and stylistically, they are remarkably consistent in their enquiry. While firmly rooted in the geo-political particulars of Somalia, these novels stage human experience in ways that cut across time and place, inviting the reader to ponder a plethora of questions of profoundly ethical import: How can one remain human in the face of extreme adversities? How can one resist oppression in all its forms without becoming a perpetrator of that which one seeks to resist? What role may violence or non-violence have in seeking to see justice done? How far does responsibility for the other reach? How may dehumanizing forces be resisted in ways that preserve and even restore human dignity? By privileging the ethical in Farah’s ethico-political writing, the study draws attention to voices and perspectives that have gone unnoticed in previous readings, where political perspectives have dominated. Not only does a sustained analytical focus on how human dignity is valued, protected, preserved and even restored call for re-assessments of concepts such as ‘freedom,’ ‘resistance,’ and ‘moral responsibility.’ but the thesis’ highly text-centered approach has in the process of writing proved that Farah’s trilogies generate questions that demand a fuller exploration than what has hitherto been possible with a more limited emphasis on themes and narrative strategies. The use of a model in which five ‘ethical moments’ are explored thus allows for more extensive conclusions to be drawn, both regarding the ethics emerging in the trilogies themselves (‘ethics of the told,’ ‘ethics of telling’ and ‘ethics of writing’), in reading practices and critical reception (‘ethics of reading’), and my own research practice (‘ethics of method’). Ultimately, the study’s explorations of themes, narrative strategies, author’s responsibilities and critical response elucidate how Farah’s trilogies escape any narrow definition of what (African) (postcolonial) literature is or should be. By privileging the ethical trajectory – without losing sight of the strong political impetus of Farah’s writing – significant stories and perspectives surface that are no less political in their outlook than more conventional readings of “resistance writing.” By drawing on continental philosophy (Lévinas, Cavarero and Butler), narrative theory and postcolonial studies, this study brings fresh perspectives to bear on both familiar and less well-known material, while also contributing to new methodological frameworks within narrative ethics and new theoretical perspectives within narrative theory, not least as reflected in the final chapter’s discussion of imaginative challenges.

Le thème de ce mémoire de Maîtrise en droit est « La dignité humaine: limite à la brevetabilité du corps humain». Dans ce travail, nous avons tenté d'apporter une contribution à un débat des plus importants de ce début du 21 e siècle. Deux parties composent ce mémoire. La première partie vise à présenter la thématique de la brevetabilité du corps humain. Elle fait l'analyse non seulement des normes juridiques interdisant la brevetabilité du corps humain, mais aussi elle se penche sur le corps humain comme source d'inventions brevetables. Dans la première sous-section, notre analyse porte sur l'étude des documents normatifs d'intérêt international, régional et national. Le modèle et les normes de la Communauté européenne ont largement retenu notre attention alors que le cas des États-Unis, du Canada et surtout de la France nous servait de guide de réflexion pour mieux comprendre l'état du droit au Canada. Par une argumentation serrée nous avons conclu cette partie en affirmant que le corps humain n'est pas brevetable. La prohibition de la brevetabilité du corps humain s'impose comme universelle. La dignité humaine a constitué un élément déterminant de cette prohibition. Ce qui nous a permis, dans la deuxième sous-section de considérer le brevetage de l'ADN. Après avoir présenté les trois critères juridiques de la brevetabilité, à savoir la nouveauté, l'utilité et l'inventivité, nous avons appliqué ces critères à l'ADN. Il s'est avéré que c'est à bon droit que la plupart des pays accordent le brevet sur l'ADN. Mais cet état de droit pose des problèmes sur le plan des valeurs éthiques. Il a notamment comme conséquence de relativiser la dignité humaine. Ces dernières considérations éthiques nous ont conduits à étendre à l'ADN les critères juridiques de la brevetabilité vus dans la première partie. Pour nous prononcer adéquatement sur ce sujet combien délicat, il a fallu considérer la question de la brevetabilité de l'ADN chez les vivants, depuis l'affaire Chakrabarty en 1980, aux États-Unis, en passant par la Directive européenne de 1998, l'affaire Harvard College au Canada jusqu'à Myriad Genetics Inc. En droit, la brevetabilité de l'ADN ne fait plus de doute. Mais elle continue de soulever des « gènes» sur le plan éthique. L'inquiétude que suscite la pente glissante nous a amenés, dans la deuxième partie, à nous pencher sur la brevetabilité dans son rapport avec la dignité humaine. La première sous-section se voulait une analyse permettant de montrer que la dignité humaine est une valeur absolue et inconditionnelle. Si nous considérons cette valeur comme absolue, il devient impossible de breveter le corps humain dans son ensemble. Par contre, en brevetant l'ADN humain, nos institutions se trouvent à relativiser la dignité humaine. C'est ce que la deuxième sous-section tendait à montrer. Soulignons que cette deuxième sous-section a été conçue également comme une conclusion. Elle s'articule autour notamment de la dignité humaine comme principe de précaution. / "Patentability of the Human Body and of DNA through a comparative, ethical and legal study" is at the heart of a crucial debate of our time regarding the effect of biotechnology on human nature. Hereby, we have attempted to bring a contribution to the debate. In the first part of our work, we developed the concept and the legal criterion of patentability. We then presented a comparative study based on normative documents from international, regional and national sources. Based on the norms defined by the European community, as well as documents from the US, Canada and France, it is clear that the human body is not patentable. In fact, this prohibition appears to be widely recognized. At the core of such a prohibition lies the concept of human dignity, a concept that we proceed to analyze both legally and ethically. It follows that the idea of patenting a human body violates human dignity as well as the integrity and freedom of the person. However, the same cannot be said about the patentability of the DNA. By applying the legal .criteria prevalent to patentability of "human parts," as they appear in Sections 1 and 4 of our thesis, and after considering the debate raised by Chakrabarty in the US, the European Directive of 1998, the Harvard College case in Canada and that of Myriad Genetics, one sees that patentability of the DNA is accepted legally in spite of its ambivalent statutes and the ethical issues. There is no conclusion as this matter is an ongoing subject of public and individual concern. To avoid sliding down a road leading to the patentability of the human body as a whole, one searches for safeguards, such as the "plastic" concept of human dignity.

The aim of my diploma thesis is a comprehensive comparison of sexual offenses legislation in Polish and Czech law. This diploma thesis consists of 11 main chapters. First chapter deals with the general concept of crimes against human dignity in sexual matters in the Czech Republic, second chapter deals with the concept of crimes against sexual freedom and morality in Poland. Third chapter analyzes aspects of Czech criminal law closely related to the sexual offenses, fourth chapter deals with the same in Polish law. The following chapter is a brief comparison of selected aspects of the Czech and Polish law. Chapter Six focuses primarily on the crime of rape and its comparison in Polish and Czech law, when both legal systems for a various socially dangerous behavior use different systematics, whether in the context of the crime of rape, or as a separate offense - sexual coercion in the Czech Republic, sexual abuse clueless or deranged person or abuse addiction and critical situation in Poland. Seventh chapter is devoted to the problem of adult prostitution and offenses associated therewith, including human trafficking. Chapter eight analyzes the very phenomenon of pornography and offenses related to pornography, this chapter also deals with child pornography, including grooming and mentions...

Comment la liberté de communication audiovisuelle peut-elle prétendre à une forme de reconnaissance constitutionnelle dans la mesure où elle semble fragile – l’exercice de la liberté dépend d’un procédé technique – et bientôt dépassée – l’attention doit être portée sur les nouveaux médias ? La liberté de communication audiovisuelle tire sa force constitutionnelle, d’une part, de son rattachement à l’article 11 de la Déclaration de 1789 et, d’autre part, du principe de pluralisme des courants de pensée et d’opinion qui impose de prendre en considération la liberté du public. Les conséquences de ce rattachement constitutionnel ont conduit le législateur à faire le choix d’une autorité administrative indépendante à qui il revient de développer les outils de la régulation pour donner à la liberté sa pleine effectivité. L’approche constitutionnelle va permettre d’incorporer dans le champ de la communication audiovisuelle une partie des nouveaux acteurs de la convergence technologique. La liberté constitutionnelle de communication audiovisuelle doit également être conciliée avec d’autres libertés et droits fondamentaux. C’est ainsi qu’au nom du pluralisme les libertés économiques vont être réduites, notamment sous l’effet de la législation anticoncentration et des formes modernes d’intervention du régulateur qui intègre aux préoccupations du droit de la concurrence l’intérêt du public. Par ailleurs, dans la mesure où elle renvoie à l’expérience collective et au consensus social, la communication audiovisuelle est portée par certaines exigences traduites en droit constitutionnel. La liberté d’autrui et l’exigence première de dignité de la personne humaine doivent s’imposer. / How can the broadcast freedom claim constitutional principle in so far as it seems fragile – the exercise of this freedom depends on a technical process – and soon outdated – the attention must be focused on the new medias? The freedom of broadcasting activities pulls its constitutional strength, on one hand, of its link connection with article 11 of the Declaration of human rights of 1789 and, on the other hand, the principle of pluralism which imposes to consider the freedom of the audience. The consequences of this constitutional links led the legislator to choose an independent authority to develop the tools of regulation in order to give the freedom effectiveness. The constitutional approach allows to bring new actors of the technological convergence into the scope of broadcasting activities. The constitutional freedom of broadcasting must also be balanced with other rights and freedoms. This is how, in the name of pluralism, the economic freedoms are going to be reduced, in particular under anti trust law and modern forms of regulation which integrate public interest into the competition law. Besides, as far as it deals with the collective experience and social consensus, the broadcasting activities are influenced by certain requirements translated into constitutional main principles. The freedom of others and the first key principle of human dignity should prevail.

Ancrée d’abord dans la charité, se métamorphosant dans la philanthropie libérale, dans la fraternité révolutionnaire, puis dans la solidarité républicaine, la fondamentalisation de l’accès aux soins des pauvres a finalement trouvé refuge dans les droits de l’Homme. Depuis la loi d’orientation relative à la lutte contre les exclusions du 29 juillet 1998, elle se traduit ainsi en France par l’affirmation d’un droit fondamental à la protection de la santé. Cette mutation est loin d’être anodine. L’action des pouvoirs publics et la responsabilité de la société dans la lutte contre l’exclusion sociale en santé s’en trouvent déportées du terrain économique et caritatif vers le terrain juridique. L’accès aux soins des pauvres ne relève plus seulement d’un devoir moral, mais aussi d’une obligation juridique en vertu du droit international des droits de l’Homme et des exigences constitutionnelles françaises. Mais quel est donc le contenu de cette obligation juridique ? Quelles sont la nature et la portée réelle de la notion juridique de droit fondamental à la protection de la santé, et de son emploi en lieu et place de celle de pauvreté ? Comment peut-elle s’inscrire dans un processus dynamique et pragmatique d’universalisation de l’accès aux soins ?C’est ainsi à une étude critique de la juridicisation contemporaine de l’accès aux soins des pauvres que la recherche s’attelle. Certes, la fondamentalisation de l’accès aux soins des pauvres se déploie désormais sur la base d’un droit fondamental à la protection de la santé. Mais le choix des moyens et des voies de réalisation de ce dernier ne fait pas consensus, et les juges hésitent toujours à sanctionner et contrôler pleinement le respect de son application. L’universalité de sa proclamation ne s’est pas encore muée en universalité de sa concrétisation. L’émergence d’un droit fondamental pour garantir l’accès aux soins des pauvres n’est en effet pas sans poser de difficultés. Ces dernières qui s’expriment de façon de plus en plus criante aujourd’hui tiennent à la tension irréductible entre son horizon d’universalité et sa pratique discriminatoire et ségrégative, mais aussi à son interactivité avec les autres droits jugés fondamentaux dans un monde où la santé est devenue un marché globalisé et la solidarité peut être assimilée à un délit.Malgré son inscription au sommet de la hiérarchie des normes, le droit à la santé reste en effet l’un des plus inégalement appliqués. S’il induit un principe d’égal accès aux soins, sa mise en œuvre catégorielle et différenciée pour les plus démunis entre en tension avec l’universalisme des droits de l’Homme. Aussi, l’effectivité des droits créances aux soins dépend fortement des finances publiques et donc des volontés politiques. Elle pose la question des devoirs de solidarité à imposer aux citoyens. Or, l’importance politique prise par l’économie dans le monde actuel vient particulièrement entraver les développements juridiques de la solidarité dans l’accès aux soins, en réduisant le rôle et les capacités de l’État providence. S’institue progressivement une forme de précarité sociale généralisée qui compromet l’accès aux soins de nombreuses personnes. En réintégrant les droits de l’Homme dans le débat, les nouvelles politiques de lutte contre la pauvreté tendent cependant à redonner sens au projet humaniste. L’éthique politique moderne en particulier, et la notion qui la traverse aujourd’hui, l’inclusion sociale, influencent les réflexions doctrinales, et avec elles les représentations du droit comme outils de la justice distributive. Désormais, les juristes se préoccupent des notions d’effectivité, de justiciabilité et d’exigibilité des droits sociaux aux soins. De nouvelles réponses sociales et juridiques émergent afin de donner aux personnes précaires et pauvres les capacités d’exercer pleinement leur droit fondamental à la protection de la santé. / Be in motivated by group or individual interest, the desire to help the poor appears as a constant around the world and throughout history. Originally anchored in charity, then reincarnated in liberal philanthropy, in the fraternity of the revolution, and in republican solidarity, the fundamentality of healthcare access for the poor finally found its home in Human Rights. Since the Framework Act on Measures to Combat Exclusion of 29 July 1998, the protection of health has been considered a fundamental right in France.This new incarnation is far from anodine. Government action and social responsibility in the fight against social exclusion in healthcare, have moved from an economic and charitable framework to a legal one. Healthcare access for the poor is no longer considered as just a moral duty, but also a legal obligation enshrined in international Human Rights law and the French Constitution. But what is the real content of this legal obligation? What is the nature and real application of the legal notion of a fundamental right to the protection of health, and how is this used to reduce poverty? How can we take poverty into account in the dynamic and pragmatic process of the universalisation of access to healthcare.This research thus attempts a critical study of contemporary legislation on healthcare access for the poor. Certainly, the fundamentality of healthcare access for the poor follows naturally from the fundamental right to the protection of health. But there is no consensus on the manner and means of its implementation, and the judiciary has hesitated to fully sanction and control its application. The universality of the proclamation has not yet been translated into universality of its realization. The emergence of a fundamental right guaranteeing access to healthcare for the poor is not without its difficulties. These difficulties, today more visible than ever, arise from the irreducible tension between the theoretical universality of this right and its discriminatory and segregative practice. Challenges also arise from the interaction of this and other rights considered fundamental in a world where health has become a globalized market and solidarity perhaps akin to a crime.Despite its place at the summit of the hierarchy of norms, the right to health remains one of the most unequally applied. If it demands a principle of equal access to healthcare, its discriminatory and segregational implementation among the poorest is at odds with the universalism of Human Rights. Moreover, the ability to claim the right to healthcare is highly dependent on public finances and political will. It requires that a duty of solidarity be imposed on citizens. However, the political importance given to the economy in the world today impedes on the legal development of solidarity in healthcare access, reducing the role and capacity of the welfare state. A generalized form of social precariousness is gradually being established, compromising access to healthcare for many people. By reintroducing Human Rights to the debate, new policies in the fight against poverty are beginning to bring meaning back to this humanist project. Modern political ethics in particular, and the current drive for social inclusion, are influencing doctrinal reflections, and with them the perception of the law as a tool for redistributive justice. Thus, lawyers now consider the notions of effectiveness, justiciability and accountability when addressing social rights to healthcare. New social and legal responses are emerging to empower people living in poverty or insecurity to fully exercise their fundamental right to the protection health.

This thesis deals with the criminal aspects of sexual abuse as it is a very sensitively perceived and always current issue. It is assumed that a significant minority of children in Europe (10-20 %) is sexually abused during their childhood. It is not an insignificant number and it is necessary to react with searching for answers to questions about how best to protect the child from such abuse and how best to prevent a potential offender from abusing a child. The most effective tool in combating this serious phenomenon is considered criminal law, and therefore the aim of this paper is to analyse the topic of sexual abuse in terms of the substantive and procedural criminal law, to point out the shortcomings of current legislation and recommend possible solutions. The content of the thesis is a historical excursion, introduction to problems of sexual abuse and the definition of basic concepts ( the cognitive development and current situation , the causes and forms, the basic characteristics of victims and perpetrators , the consequences of sexual abuse and the incidence and prevalence of this phenomenon , including graphical representations), forms of prevention in the area of sexual abuse at primary, secondary and tertiary level, the issue of commercial sexual abuse of children (child prostitution ,...

After the concept of human dignity has spread into a large number of constitutions from all over the world, detailed examination of this phenomenon is steadily gaining importance. This thesis finds three autonomous approaches to human dignity in constitutional law, namely a subjective human right, the source of human rights and an objective constitutional value. Each of these approaches is based on a particular historical view on human dignity. The key argument of this thesis states that the connection of the three aforementioned legitimate approaches leads to the creation of dangerous and undesirable hybrid forms of human dignity. These forms tend to be axiomatic, preventing from the rational legal argumentation as well as from the use of the proportionality principle. The implementation of the concept of human dignity in such an axiomatic way is an argumentative foul, unfortunately so frequently made by both judiciary and doctrines. The thesis further focuses on the examination of the axiomatic human dignity phenomenon with respect to the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic decision-making specifically. Using quantitative methods, it first comes to the conclusion that the problem of axiomatic human dignity-related argumentation does not only exist in the Constitutional Court's...

[pt] O Código Civil de 2002 inovou em relação ao antecessor, incluindo em seu corpo um capítulo dedicado aos direitos da personalidade. Ocorre, porém, que a forma tipificada de tais artigos se apresenta como insuficiente para tutelar a personalidade, não só porque os dispositivos reproduzem a técnica utilizada para a normatização dos direitos patrimoniais, mas principalmente por desconsiderar a abrangência do instituto ante a crescente e inelutável necessidade de tutela da pessoa humana. Em tais condições, entende-se que o princípio da dignidade da pessoa humana tem uma função protetiva irradiadora, servindo então ao escopo constitucional de uma tutela integral, o que implica sua consideração de uma forma mais efetiva no que tange à personalidade. É nessa seara que se considera a reformulação italiana do direito da personalidade em termos de um direito à identidade pessoal, significando uma fórmula sintética para distinguir o sujeito do ponto de vista global, na multiplicidade de suas características específicas e manifestações. O desrespeito à identidade pessoal se perpetra com a atribuição - mediante qualquer forma de deturpação - de atos, pensamentos ou afirmações que a contrariem, manifestando, assim, o interesse da pessoa em ver reconhecido o próprio patrimônio ideológico-cultural, constituído pelos seus pensamentos, opiniões, crenças, comportamentos que projetam no mundo da intersubjetividade. É em torno desse direito, ainda pouco explorado e conhecido no Brasil, mas de suma importância, que versa o presente trabalho, abordando sua origem, características, objeto e limites, e a garantia de sua tutela no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro. / [en] The Civil Code in 2002 has innovated in relation to its antecessor, inserting in its body a chapter dedicated to the right to be oneself. The point is that the typified form of such Articles is insufficient to protect one`s personality not only because they reflect a technique used for the normatization of equity rights but mainly because it fails to consider the range of the institute as to the increasing and unceasing need to protect the human individual. On such conditions it is known that the principle of dignity has a protective irradiating function, in the service of a constitutional scope of integral guardianship, which implies (implicates) its consideration of individual`s personality in a more effective manner. It is in this area of study, the Italian reformulation as to individual`s right to personality is considered. It is approached in terms of a right to personal identity, or otherwise, the right to be oneself, which means the set of attributes and characteristics which allow for individualization of a person in society. The disrespect to personal identity perpetrates with the attribution - in face of many different forms of distortion - of acts, thoughts, statements which oppose to it, thus expressing the person`s interest in verifying that their own cultural- ideological asset - constituted by their thoughts, beliefs, opinions, behaviour, which they project in the intersubjective world - is acknowledged. It is about this law, not yet sufficiently taken into consideration in Brazil, although of utmost importance, that this present study is dedicated to, with the focus on its origins, characteristics, object and limits, as well as the defense of its protection in the Brazilian judicial order.

A bioética é uma ciência que surgiu no início da década de 1970 nos Estados Unidos, com objetivo de criar uma ponte entre a ciência biológica e a área dos valores. No Brasil, a bioética chega, efetivamente, em 1995, a partir da fundação da Sociedade Brasileira de Bioética e da promulgação da Resolução 196/96 do Conselho Nacional de Saúde, que regulamenta a pesquisa com seres humanos no país. A bioética possui vários modelos e dentre eles está o Personalismo Ontologicamente Fundado, criado por Elio Sgreccia. Esta linha de pensamento se funda na pessoa humana, ou seja, a pessoa deve ser o critério de avaliação frente a um dilema bioético. Toda pessoa humana é unitotalidade, dotada de uma dignidade. Ela é formada pelas dimensões física, psíquica, social, moral e espiritual. Este modelo considera que toda vida humana tem início com a fecundação e fim com a morte natural. Mas este conceito de pessoa humana não é o único no âmbito da bioética. Por isso, no presente trabalho, se pretendeu através da hermenêutica de Gadamer, identificar o conceito de pessoa humana utilizado no Brasil. Foram recolhidas 63 referências no site da Bireme através de palavras-chave identificadas na revisão da literatura. Destas referências, 50 foram lidas na íntegra e algumas categorias foram criadas para dividi-las, sendo elas: Início da vida, Final da vida, Prática da Saúde, Saúde Pública e Temas Variados. Os textos foram resumidos e interpretados com o objetivo de se identificarem aspectos relativos ao conceito de pessoa humana. Na discussão, os aspectos referentes ao Personalismo Ontologicamente Fundado foram evidenciados como contraponto de conceitos de outros modelos. E o critério utilizado no sentido de reconhecer o conceito de pessoa humana foi a experiência elementar, entendida como a experiência que cada pessoa faz, a partir de um critério de juízo, e através da correspondência com sua realidade. No Brasil, em relação ao Início da vida, os pesquisadores em sua maioria, consideram que a vida tem início em qualquer momento posterior à fecundação; diferentemente do conceito da bioética personalista que determina o início da vida na fecundação. Em relação ao final da vida, os conceitos de dividem, sendo que metade pensa na morte natural, e metade pensa que a pessoa deve ter autonomia para decidir pelo final de sua vida. Os que falam em morte natural, admitem os cuidados paliativos como saída para os doentes incuráveis se verem acolhidos em seu sofrimento, como diz também o personalismo ontologicamente fundado. Em relação à prática à saúde, a autonomia aparece predominantemente como auxiliar à prática médica, mas em alguns artigos este princípio aparece como a parte da pessoa de maior importância na relação paciente - equipe de saúde. De acordo com a bioética personalista o critério último frente à prática clínica deve ser SEMPRE a pessoa humana. Na saúde pública foram evidentes os aspectos relacionados à grupos vulneráveis e à necessidade de intervenção do Estado, tendo faltado a ênfase ao protagonismo da pessoa, da sociabilidade e da subsidiariedade. E no que tange a eugenia, os autores falaram em tolerância à ela e respeito à vontade da maioria da sociedade, enquanto a bioética personalista fala em considerar o diferente, o diverso, através do reconhecimentos de sua dignidade humana. Assim, no Brasil os conceitos relacionados à definição de pessoa humana são bastante diversos. Concluindo, é preciso fazer com que a comunidade bioética brasileira comece a considerar o conceito de pessoa do personalismo ontologicamente fundado, a partir do olhar para sua própria experiência, tendo como critério de juízo sua própria realidade. E utilizar essa experiência de pessoa nos momentos em que seja necessário decidir sobre as intervenções que se faz sobre a vida. / Bioethics is a science that emerged in the beginning of the 70s in the U.S. by aiming at creating a new connection between biologic science and values. Bioethics effectively arrived in Brazil in 1995 as of the foundation of the Sociedade Brasileira de Bioética [Brazilian Bioethics Society] and the publication of Decree 196/96 by the National Health Council, which rules over research with human beings in the country. Bioethics presents several models, wherein the Ontologically Based Personalism as created by Elio Sgreccia can be found. This train of thought is based on the human person, i.e. the person needs to be the assessment criteria before a bioethical dilemma. Every human person is a unitotality who is endowed with dignity. She is formed by physical, psychic, social, moral and spiritual dimensions. This model considers that all forms of human life begin upon conception and end with natural death. But this human person concept is not the only one within the bioethical scope. Thus, we intended to identify herein the human person concept used in Brazil through Gadamer\'s hermeneutics. 63 references from the Bireme website were collected through key-words identified in the revision of the literature. From among them, 50 were read completely and some categories were created so as to divide them, namely being: Beginning of Life, End of Life, Practicing Health, Public Health and Various Subjects. The texts were summarized and interpreted by aiming at identifying aspects concerning the human person concept. Aspects regarding the Ontologically Based Personalism were evinced as counterpoint to the concepts from other models within the discussions, and the criteria used to recognize the human person concept was the elementary experience that is understood as the one each person undergoes as of judgment criteria, as well as through the correspondence to its reality. In Brazil, most researchers consider life begins at any moment after conception when referring to the Beginning of life, as opposed to the concept of personalistic bioethics which understands the beginning of a new life happens upon conception. Regarding the end of life, the concepts are divided, whereby half of researched authors admit palliative care as an exit for terminally-ill patients for them to be soothed in their suffering, just as the Ontologically Based Personalism also suggests, and the other half thinks the person needs independence to decide the end of his life, offering hence an opening to euthanasia. In regard to practicing health, the principle of independence appears predominantly as part of the base of medical practice, whereby this principle appears in some articles as the part of the person with the biggest importance in the patienthealthcare team relation. For personalistic bioethics, the ultimate criterion before the clinical practice has to serve as the foundation for the human person. Authors who work with public healthcare themes showed evident aspects related to vulnerable groups and to the need of State intervention, wherein the emphasis on the persons leadership has been missing, in addition to sociability and subsidiarity. Concerning eugenics, authors speak of tolerance toward it and respecting the will of the majority of society, while personalistic bioethics speak of considering what is different and diverse through the acknowledgment of human dignity. Thus, the concepts related to the definition of the human person are quite diverse in Brazil. In summary, it is necessary to help the Brazilian bioethical community become acquainted with the concept of the person as resumed by the Ontologically Based Personalism, by looking at our experience and by having our own reality as judgment criteria, as well as using this experience of person when it is necessary to take decisions in regard to life.

A presente dissertação analisa o racismo no Brasil e busca investigar, sob a ótica sociológica, jurídica e justrabalhista, as contradições no conteúdo das legislações com o que ocorre de fato nas relações empregatícias, tentando elucidar formas de combater a discriminação racial como modo de afirmar os direitos fundamentais no âmbito laboral. Para tanto, inicialmente, será feita uma explanação histórico-social do processo de fixação do racismo no pensamento intelectual e suas consequências sociais pós-abolição. Consecutivamente, avaliar-se-á o racismo na Constituição da República, dando-se ênfase aos instrumentos legais e políticos complementares, implementados em nome da dignidade humana e da igualdade dos indivíduos perante a lei. Partindo destes dois aspectos (histórico-social e jurídico-legislativo), o estudo estará voltado para as ações afirmativas como meio de combate à discriminação racial no ambiente de trabalho mostrando, através de dados estatísticos, que valores e comportamentos discriminatórios ainda são presentes em nosso país, mas que a fundamentabilidade do direito ao trabalho deve prevalecer. / This dissertation examines racism in Brazil and aims to investigate, from the perspective sociological, legal and justrabalhista, the contradictions in the content of the laws with what actually occurs in employee relations, trying to elucidate ways to combat racial discrimination as a way of affirming the fundamental rights in the workplace. For that, initially, there will be a socio-historical explanation of the process of fixation of racism in intellectual thought and its social consequences after abolition. Consecutively, an assessment will be racism in the Constitution, giving emphasis to the legal instruments and complementary policy implemented in the name of human dignity and equality of individuals before the law. Based on these two aspects (historical, social, legal and legislative), the study will focus on affirmative action as a means of combating racial discrimination in the workplace by showing, through statistical data that discriminatory values and behaviors are still present in our country, but the fundamental right to work must prevail.