Cette thèse étudie l’opposition du Parti communiste italien (PCI) et du Parti communiste français (PCF) au bloc atlantique, du début de la guerre froide jusqu’à l’admission de la République fédérale d'Allemagne (RFA) dans l'OTAN. L'approche choisie est d'intégrer les sphères « nationale » et « internationale », pour éviter de limiter l’analyse seulement aux logiques d’opposition de la Guerre froide. La compréhension des stratégies d’opposition de deux partis au bloc atlantique est primordiale, vu que, le PCF et le PCI sont, à l’époque, les deux plus grands partis communistes de l’Europe occidentale, et favorables aux constitutions française et italienne de l’après Deuxième Guerre mondiale. En tenant compte de l’interaction entre enjeux nationaux et pressions internationales, la thèse dresse un portrait de l’évolution des PCF/PCI dans leur opposition au bloc atlantique, en mettant en relief les similitudes et les différences. En s’appuyant sur plusieurs sources primaires, telles que les documents officiels des deux partis et les documents diplomatiques et ministériels italiens, français, russes et américains, elle explique l’évolution de deux partis. Si les conditions de départ, avec l’éviction des gouvernements nationaux des deux partis et la pression accrue des États-Unis et de l’Union soviétique, sont similaires, l’élaboration à long terme des stratégies est différente. En termes généraux, le PCF se caractérise par une stratégie plus « dogmatique », par rapport au bloc atlantique. Par conséquent, la tendance des communistes français sera celle d’une opposition plus attentive à la situation internationale qu’aux enjeux nationaux, avec une inversion de cette tendance qui arrive seulement à la moitié des années 1950, avec la campagne contre la CED. De leur côté, les communistes italiens sont capables, depuis le début et nonobstant les pressions internationales, d’élaborer une opposition plus équilibrée entre enjeux nationaux et situation internationale. Il en résulte que la stratégie du PCI sera plus efficace car, à plusieurs reprises, elle mettra en difficulté le gouvernement italien sur le fond de son choix atlantique. / This thesis studies the opposition of the Italian Communist Party (ICP) and the French Communist Party (FCP) to the Atlantic bloc, from the beginning of the Cold War until the entry of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) into NATO. The approach chosen is to integrate the 'national' and 'international' spheres, in order to avoid framing the analysis solely in terms of Cold War opposition. The comprehension of the oppositional strategies of two parties to the Atlantic bloc is very important, as the PCF and the PCI were the two largest communist parties in Western Europe at the time, and favorable to the French and Italian constitutions after World War II. Considering the interaction between national issues and international pressures, the dissertation draws a portrait of the evolution of the CPF/CPI in their opposition to the Atlantic bloc, highlighting similarities and differences. The thesis relies on several primary sources, such as official documents of the two parties and Italian, French, Russian and American diplomatic and ministerial documents, to explain the evolution of the two parties. While the starting conditions, with the exclusion from the national governments of both parties and the increased pressure from the US and the Soviet Union were similar, the long-term development of strategies was different. In general, the PCF was more "dogmatic", in relation to the Atlantic bloc. Consequently, the tendency of the French communists was to focus more on the international situation than on national issues, with a reversal of this tendency only in the mid-1950s, during the campaign against the EDC. For their part, the Italian communists were able, from the start and notwithstanding international pressures, to develop a more balanced opposition taking into account national issues and the international situation. As a result, the PCI's strategy was more effective, as it repeatedly challenged the Italian government on its Atlantic choice.

I och med den ryska invasionen av Ukraina har Försvarsmakten identifierat behovet av en ökad pansarvärnsförmåga. Detta har lett till prov och försök av ett nytt pansarvärnsrobotsystem. Införandet av ett nytt vapensystem med nya egenskaper är en utmaning. När detta vapensystem är en pansarvärnsrobot vars förmåga inom markstridande förband har varit nedprioriterade i flera år, kan införandet ta tid. Arbetet generera underlag för att belysa de tekniska och doktrinära skillnaderna mellan Robot 58 och befintliga pansarvärnsrobotsystem som brukas i Försvarsmakten. Arbetets tillvägagångssätt var en intervjustudie där fyra individer intervjuades. Dokumentär forskning genomfördes för att komplettera och utvidga den data som samlats in från intervjuerna. De fyra olika pansarvärnsrobotsystemen egenskaper och prestanda analyserades genom en SWOT-analys. Analysen belystes ur Försvarsmaktens grundläggande förmågor, specifikt rörlighet och verkan. Resultatet av analysen visar att även fast systemen är ämnade för samma syfte, är Robot 58 väsentligt mer utvecklad och påvisar varför den tillhör generation fyra till skillnad från de andra robotsystemen. Robot 58 nya egenskaper, däribland indirekt eldgivning, kommer vapensystemet att bidra starkt till den tredimensionella striden för infanteriförbanden och utgöra ett stort hot mot motståndarens mekaniserade förmåga. Det som krävs är att chefer på lägre förbandsnivåer övar med förmågorna Robot 58 har att erbjuda. / Due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Swedish Armed Forces have identified the need for an increased anti-tank capability. This has led to the test and trial of a new anti-tank missile. The introduction of a new weapon system with new characteristics can be a challenge. When this weapon system is an anti-tank missile which capabilities in ground combat units have been down prioritized for several years, the implementation can take time. The purpose of this paper was to generate data to highlight the technical and doctrinal differences between rbs 58 and existing anti-tank missiles used by the Swedish Armed Forces. The approach of the work was an interview study where four individuals were interviewed. Documentary research was conducted to complement the data collected from the interviews. The characteristics and performance of the four different anti-tank missile systems were analyzed with a SWOT analysis. The analysis was highlighted from the perspective of the Swedish Armed Forces' basic operational capabilities, specifically mobility and effectiveness. The result of the analysis showed that even though the systems are intended for the same purpose, rbs 58 is significantly more developed and demonstrates why it is considered to belong as a generation four missile unlike the other anti-tank missile. Rbs 58 new characteristics, including indirect fire mode, will greatly contribute to the three-dimensional battle for infantry units and pose a major threat to the opponent's mechanized units. The requirement is that officers at lower unit levels practice with the capabilities rbs 58 has to offer.

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<p>Савремени концепти међународног кривичног права одавно су напустили правне оквире, начела и традицију очувања светског мира, јер се међународно право више не примењује, оно се тумачи и то на онај начин који одговара политичким струјама у међународним односима.<br />На који начин је дошло до вулгаризације међународног кривичног права и у којој мери је оно изражено најприближније говоре случајеви покренути пред међународним кривичним судовима. Анализом рада међународних кривичних судова у смислу: конституисања суда, дефинисања материјалних и процесних норми, извођењу доказа, изменом и допуном Правилника о поступку и доказима, истицању одређених кривичних дела, различитим стандардима и начину вредновања наступелих последица, националниј припадности субјеката у поступку... могу се препознати многи проблеми који су дискредитовали постојање начелних питања истине, објективности и правичности. У овим начелима налазе се потенцијална решења ефикасности међународних кривичних судова, али стиче се утисак да би решењем ових проблема правда била достижна и за оне који су проузроковали низ озбиљних сукоба у свету. Сходно томе, потребно је запитати се да ли међународна заједница уопште жели да постоји институција као што је Међународни кривични суд?<br />Међународни кривични судови, до сада су више личили на институције које су биле подређене медијским кампањама усмереним против унапред етикетираних држава и носиоца њихове суверене власти, што се у великом броју случајева показало као идеалан параван за покретање агресивних ратова. Ако је Међународни кривични суд надлежан, између осталог, и за дела агресије, због чега целокупна међународна заједница ћути и ништа не предузима по питању окупације аутономне покрајне Косова и Метохије и&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; не супротстави се рушилачким идеологијама припајања суседним државама. Зар то не представља рушилачки фактор безбедности и мира у региону? Већина држава у свету, а посебно у Европи, има сличних проблема који су мање или више транспарентни, али уколико се настави садашњим путем слична судбина могла би и њих да задеси.<br />Да би међународни кривични судови били у могућности да обављају функцију због које су основани њихова надлежност треба да искqучи сваки вид економске и политичке зависности. Своју надлежност судови треба да заснивају на правилима бона фидес којима би као Судови региона своју правну снагу црпили из кодификованог међународног кривичног права и постулата обичајних правних правила. Такве судове је могуће успоставити, под условом да се постојећи политизовани бирократски систем судија и тужилаца у међународним кривичним судовима замени новим регионалним решењима и концепцијама независних механизама контроле.</p> / <p>Savremeni koncepti međunarodnog krivičnog prava odavno su napustili pravne okvire, načela i tradiciju očuvanja svetskog mira, jer se međunarodno pravo više ne primenjuje, ono se tumači i to na onaj način koji odgovara političkim strujama u međunarodnim odnosima.<br />Na koji način je došlo do vulgarizacije međunarodnog krivičnog prava i u kojoj meri je ono izraženo najpribližnije govore slučajevi pokrenuti pred međunarodnim krivičnim sudovima. Analizom rada međunarodnih krivičnih sudova u smislu: konstituisanja suda, definisanja materijalnih i procesnih normi, izvođenju dokaza, izmenom i dopunom Pravilnika o postupku i dokazima, isticanju određenih krivičnih dela, različitim standardima i načinu vrednovanja nastupelih posledica, nacionalnij pripadnosti subjekata u postupku... mogu se prepoznati mnogi problemi koji su diskreditovali postojanje načelnih pitanja istine, objektivnosti i pravičnosti. U ovim načelima nalaze se potencijalna rešenja efikasnosti međunarodnih krivičnih sudova, ali stiče se utisak da bi rešenjem ovih problema pravda bila dostižna i za one koji su prouzrokovali niz ozbiljnih sukoba u svetu. Shodno tome, potrebno je zapitati se da li međunarodna zajednica uopšte želi da postoji institucija kao što je Međunarodni krivični sud?<br />Međunarodni krivični sudovi, do sada su više ličili na institucije koje su bile podređene medijskim kampanjama usmerenim protiv unapred etiketiranih država i nosioca njihove suverene vlasti, što se u velikom broju slučajeva pokazalo kao idealan paravan za pokretanje agresivnih ratova. Ako je Međunarodni krivični sud nadležan, između ostalog, i za dela agresije, zbog čega celokupna međunarodna zajednica ćuti i ništa ne preduzima po pitanju okupacije autonomne pokrajne Kosova i Metohije i&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ne suprotstavi se rušilačkim ideologijama pripajanja susednim državama. Zar to ne predstavlja rušilački faktor bezbednosti i mira u regionu? Većina država u svetu, a posebno u Evropi, ima sličnih problema koji su manje ili više transparentni, ali ukoliko se nastavi sadašnjim putem slična sudbina mogla bi i njih da zadesi.<br />Da bi međunarodni krivični sudovi bili u mogućnosti da obavljaju funkciju zbog koje su osnovani njihova nadležnost treba da iskquči svaki vid ekonomske i političke zavisnosti. Svoju nadležnost sudovi treba da zasnivaju na pravilima bona fides kojima bi kao Sudovi regiona svoju pravnu snagu crpili iz kodifikovanog međunarodnog krivičnog prava i postulata običajnih pravnih pravila. Takve sudove je moguće uspostaviti, pod uslovom da se postojeći politizovani birokratski sistem sudija i tužilaca u međunarodnim krivičnim sudovima zameni novim regionalnim rešenjima i koncepcijama nezavisnih mehanizama kontrole.</p> / <p>Modern concepts of international criminal law have long since left the legal frameworks, principles and tradition of preserving world peace, because international law is no longer applicable, it is interpreted in a way that is consistent with political currents in international relations.<br />How has the vulgarisation of international criminal law come about and to what extent is it most closely illustrated by cases brought before international criminal courts. By analyzing the work of international criminal courts in terms of: constituting a court, defining substantive and procedural norms, presenting evidence, amending the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, highlighting certain criminal offenses, different standards and the way of evaluating the consequences, the national affiliation of the subjects in the proceedings ... many problems can be identified that have discredited the existence of fundamental questions of truth, objectivity and fairness. These principles provide potential solutions to the effectiveness of international criminal courts, but the impression is that by resolving these problems, justice would be attainable for those who have caused a number of serious conflicts in the world. Accordingly, one has to wonder if the international community wants an institution such as the International Criminal Court at all?<br />International criminal courts have so far been more like institutions subordinate to media campaigns against pre-labeled states and holders of their sovereign power, which in many cases proved to be an ideal front for launching aggressive wars. If the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over, among other things, acts of aggression, for which reason the entire international community is silent and does nothing about the occupation of the autonomous provincial Kosovo and Metohija and does not oppose the destructive ideologies of annexation to neighboring countries. Doesn&#39;t that represent the destructive factor of security and peace in the region? Most countries in the world, and especially in Europe, have similar problems that are more or less transparent, but if they continue along the same path, a similar fate could befall them.<br />In order for international criminal courts to be able to perform the function for which they were founded, their jurisdiction should exclude any form of economic and political dependence. Courts should base their jurisdiction on bona fides rules which, as the Courts of the Region, derive their legal power from codified international criminal law and the common law rules. Such courts can be established, provided that the existing politicized bureaucratic system of judges and prosecutors in international criminal courts is replaced by new regional solutions and concepts of independent control mechanisms.</p>

Denna kvalitativa studie syftar till att undersöka hur anställda inom Nato upplever att maktdistans påverkar beslutsfattandet. För att svara på min frågeställning har jag använt mig av en kvalitativ metod med inkäter, där sex deltagare från fyra olika länder svarade. Resultatet analyserades med en tematisk analys där fem teman framträdde, beslutsfattande, hierarki, kultur, maktdistans och språk. Resultatet är att maktdistans i viss utsträckning påverkar beslutsfattande inom Nato beroende på vilket land som representanterna kommer ifrån. Länders indirekta makt varierar beroende på storlek, befolkningsmängd och hur länge de varit medlemmar av Nato. Studien visar på att maktdistans existerar och påverkar beslut i viss utsträckning men att frågan är komplex då de tillfrågade inte alltid vet vad begreppet maktdistans är även om svaren tyder på det. Sammanfattningsvis påverkas maktdistans av hur länge ett land varit medlemmar i alliansen, hur många personer med hög grad landet har i alliansen och hur bra dessa personer är på språk, att tolka orden i rum och tid och vikta orden rätt. Kunskap i engelska och förhandlingsvana har här betydelse. / This qualitative study aims to investigate how NATO employees experience the impact of power distance on decision-making. To answer that question, I have relied on a qualitative method consisting of a hybrid of questionnaires and interviews that were sent out. Six participants from four countries participated. When the results were examined through thematic analysis, five different themes emerged: decision-making, hierarchy, culture, power distance and language. The results indicate that power distance does affect decision-making within NATO to some extent; depending on which country the representatives come from. The indirect power wielded by the member states varies according to their respective geographical size, the size of their population and their annuity as a member of NATO. The study shows that power distance exists and to some extent affects decision-making within the organization. It also shows that the issue is complex, as not all participants are aware of the concept of power distance, although their responses indicate that they are aware of its existence within the organization. In conclusion, power distance is influenced by how long the nation has been a member of the Alliance, how many high-ranking people the nation has in the various offices of the Alliance, and how well these representatives are able to master language skills, to interpret what is said in a spatial and temporal context, and to weight words accurately; here English and negotiation skills are of great importance.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / This thesis analyzes adverse demographic trends in the European Union, including sub-replacement birthrates and increasing median ages. It investigates the implications of these trends for the EU's prospects for becoming a stronger and more influential actor in international affairs. Pressures arising from population trends in and near the EU could ultimately affect national and EU cohesion, governmental effectiveness, and social stability. Absent remedial measures, social programs in some EU countries will be unsustainable due to the mounting financial burden of pensions and health care for growing elderly populations. Such financial obligations hinder funding other national programs, including modernized military capabilities. Nationalism and national identity are at issue in immigrant integration and assimilation efforts. The role of population trends with regard to the growing threat of radical Islamic fundamentalism is explored. The thesis concludes with policy recommendations that might be considered to avert the looming economic, social, and security crises that may result from these demographic trends. In short, the security and financial consequences foreshadowed by the current demographic trends of an aging, economically weaker, and socially conflicted European Union could present dramatic implications for the vital national interests of the United States. / Lieutenant, United States Navy

La période de l’après-guerre posa d’importants défis commerciaux à l’économie canadienne. Les années entre 1945 et 1950 furent effectivement marquées par la rupture de son système commercial traditionnel et la recherche d’une stratégie alternative. Le pays dut composer avec un déficit commercial croissant à l’égard des États-Unis, ainsi qu’une chute de ses exportations à destination du Royaume-Uni, ruiné par les années de guerre. Ce déséquilibre commercial qui menaçait d’épuiser les réserves canadiennes de dollars américains reflétait l’écart entre les capacités productives des deux rives de l’Atlantique. Le programme de reconstruction des économies européennes, ou plan Marshall, fut accueilli avec enthousiasme à Ottawa puisqu’il devait non seulement rétablir les marchés du Vieux Continent, mais également faciliter la mise en place d’un réseau multilatéral d’échanges et la libéralisation du commerce international. Les tensions de la guerre froide limitèrent toutefois l’ouverture de ces marchés aux marchandises canadiennes, puisque l’endiguement du communisme commanda une consolidation européenne qui privilégia le démantèlement des entraves aux échanges intra-européens, aux dépens du commerce transatlantique. Les préoccupations de Washington en matière de sécurité collective devaient néanmoins laisser place à une stratégie alternative pour le Canada, en poussant la coopération économique des deux pays, dans le but d’optimiser une production de défense destinée aux pays membres de l’OTAN, dont la demande était soutenue par l’aide Marshall. L’incorporation du Canada dans ce dispositif de défense élargie à la communauté atlantique permit ainsi d’assurer un accès privilégié à ses marchandises sur le marché américain, et par conséquent de progresser vers l’équilibre commercial. / The postwar years brought many challenges to the Canadian economy in terms of trade policies. Indeed, in the years between 1945 and 1950, Canada experienced growing trade imbalances as imports from the United States market reached new peaks and exports to the United Kingdom decreased dramatically due to financial exhaustion caused by the war. These developments soon raised concerns as the country was faced with the prospect of foreign reserves depletion, a situation mainly caused by the productivity gap existing between the economies of the two sides of the Atlantic. The American sponsored European Recovery Program or Marshall Plan was met with enthusiasm in Ottawa as it intended to restore economic viability of the European markets as well as to establish a multilateral trade system based on non-discriminatory trade practices. The international tensions of the nascent Cold War were to limit these achievements as the need for a strong Europe dictated the elimination of restrictive trade practices between European commercial partners without giving equal treatment to transatlantic trade relations. However, the conflictual Cold War context was to offer an alternative strategy to the Canadian’s quest for dollars, for Washington’s collective security concerns paved the way to closer economic cooperation and privileged access to Canadian exports of strategic materials and other defence related commodities in the American market. The Marshall Plan was a key element of the procurement mechanism of the NATO country whose demand alleviated the pressure on Canadian foreign reserves through greater exports to the United Stated.

La seconde crise de Berlin (1958-1961) est un évènement majeur de la guerre froide. L'hypothèse de notre recherche remet en question le rôle du Canada et les perceptions négatives de l'Occident envers l'URSS durant cette crise. La recherche se divise en trois volets : premièrement, une revue de l'historiographie de la politique canadienne; deuxièmement, une présentation de la chronologie des évènements de la crise de Berlin, l'importance de la diplomatie multilatérale canadienne et la politique nucléaire de Diefenbaker; enfin, un examen de la politique étrangère soviétique. À partir de sources primaires et d'un bilan historiographique,il fut démontré que, durant la crise de Berlin, le Canada a réussi à influencer l'OTAN et à ménager les gouvernements américains et soviétiques. Quant à l'URSS, contrairement à l'image négative que l'Occident en avait, celle-ci a manifesté durant cette crise des intentions pacifiques envers l'Occident, contredisant les interprétations orthodoxes de la guerre froide. / The second Berlin crisis(1958-1961)is a major event of the Cold War. The hypothesis of our research revises the role of Canada and the negative perception of the occidental countries toward USSR during this crisis. This study is divided in three parts : firstly, a historiographical review of the canadian policy toward NATO; secondly, a presentation of the events in regard to the implication of the canadian governement during the Berlin crisis, the importance of the the multilateral canadian diplomacy and the nuclear policy during the Diefenbaker's governement; at last, an examination of the soviet foreign policy. With the help of canadian primary sources, it will be demonstrated firstly that : while the tensions are to their peaks, Canada succeeded to influence NATO and american policy and tried to spare both soviet and american governements. Secondly, soviet and east-german archives showed that the soviet governement manifested during this crisis his pacific intentions, contradicting the most often supported orthodox interpretation of the Cold War.