This study investigates the subject of Muslims’ citizenship in contemporary Western European societies from the viewpoint of John Rawls’s political liberalism, in particular in light of the ‘idea of public reason’ [see John Rawls, Political Liberalism, expanded edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005) and the 1997 essay “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” originally published in University of Chicago Law Review 64 (1997), 765-807 and now included in Political Liberalism, expanded edition, 440-490]. By its very nature, political liberalism does not prescribe a single model for being Muslim in contemporary Europe. Thus, one may wonder if it is too vague as a point of departure for the analysis. On the other hand, however, here I argue that political liberalism specifies a peculiar evaluative framework that allows citizens to answer questions such as “What is politically at stake when citizens of Muslim faith are publicly presented as permanent aliens in contemporary European societies?”, “On what grounds is such exclusion based?”, and “What requirements can European citizens be reasonably expected to meet?” in a distinctively political way and, ideally, to solve the political and social problems from which those questions spring. In this research, I claim that public reason provides a common discursive platform that establishes the ground for a public political identity and for shared standards for social and political criticism. Together, these two elements solve the two dimensions of the problem of ‘stability for the right reasons’ (in Rawls’s terms) in contemporary European societies, because they secure both the political inclusion of Muslims on an equal footing as citizens and civic assurance that they will remain committed to fair terms of social cooperation. A joint solution of these two apparently conflicting demands of stability for the right reasons (i.e. inclusion and mutual assurance) requires an effort in political reconciliation. After having compared public reason citizenship with two prominent normative alternatives, I will conclude that the former is an adequate ideal conception of citizenship for European societies. Finally, I will apply the justificatory evaluative methodological framework (whose requirements I will specify starting from the idea of public reason itself) to a conception of citizenship elaborated by one of the most renowned Muslim public intellectuals in Europe: Tariq Ramadan. (I justify the choice of this author in sections 2.3 and 6.1). Such an evaluation sheds light on one of the main insights of this research, that is, the idea that public reason makes a decompression of the public space possible: it frees the public space from those forces that would prevent citizens from the possibility of exercising effectively their two moral powers (once more in Rawls’s words, the ‘capacity for a sense of justice and for a conception of the good’) as free equals. In this sense, public reason tries to reconcile ideal political consensus and the fact of reasonable pluralism on a public political ground. I believe that this is the deepest meaning of what Rawls calls ‘reconciliation through public reason’: its aspiration is to reabsorb reasonable pluralism politically without annihilating it.This research is structured in three parts: the first is methodological, the second is reconstructive, and the third is evaluative. Each part is composed of two chapters.In chapter one (“General Framework”), I begin from some empirical observations about the role of perceptions and identities in relation to the issue of Muslims’ citizenship in contemporary Europe. I claim that from this point of view Islam seems to “make problem” in a very specific sense. This does not mean that Islam is a problem, but that Islam is frequently publicly presented and perceived as a problem. This is the background problem from which my work starts. Thus, I explore some dimensions of such a problem (see 1.1). Subsequently, I provide a more specific formulation of the research problem and questions and of the aims of this study. Then, the main research question (Q) is stated in these terms: Which ideal conception of citizenship should provide the common normative perspective in contemporary Western European societies, which are characterised by both demands of inclusion of Muslims and the need for solving a ‘problem of mutual assurance’ [on which, see in particular Paul Weithman, Why Political Liberalism? On John Rawls’s Political Turn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010)] concerning citizens’ commitment to shared terms of social cooperation, so that those societies can be stable for the right reasons? In order to answer this question, I also specify three sub-questions that I call respectively Q1, Q2, and Q3 (see 1.2).In chapter two (“Toward a Justificatory Evaluative Political Theory”), I firstly try to frame the problem of public justification within Rawls’s political liberalism (see 2.1). I then consider a specific approach to the question of Muslim citizenship in liberal democracies which can be adopted from a Rawlsian perspective: namely, reasoning from conjecture (see 2.2). Finally, I explain my own approach (which I call justificatory evaluative political theory) by means of comparison with the method of reasoning from conjecture (see 2.3). In presenting the evaluative framework specified from a political liberal standpoint, I point out three political liberal evaluative requirements: the reciprocity requirement (RR), the consistency requirement (CR), and the civility requirement (CiR).Chapter three (“What is Public Reason?”) deals with the history of the notion of public reason from Kant to Rawls and its enunciation within Rawls’s work (see 3.1 and 3.2 respectively). In doing so, I also identify three specifications for the three political liberal evaluative requirements considered in the second chapter. Furthermore, in chapter three I also unpack CR in three different dimensions (PR1, PR2, and PR3).Chapter four (“Public Reason and Religion. Reinterpreting the Duty of Civility”) completes the reconstructive stage by analysing Rawls’s ‘wide view’ of public reason and two major lines of objection to it (see 4.1). After having discussed such criticisms, I then introduce my own interpretation of the ‘proviso,’ which is structured around a two-level (or bifurcate) model of the ‘duty of civility’ (see 4.2).Chapter five (“Reconciliation through Public Reason: Justificatory Evaluative Political Theory between Modelling and Application”) bridges the second and the third part, that is, the reconstructive and the evaluative stage respectively. In the first section of the chapter, I summarise the political liberal evaluative requirements developed in the second part. In doing this, my purpose is to present my justificatory evaluative model of public reason citizenship (see 5.1). In the second section, I firstly argue that a conception of citizenship grounded in public reason is not only possible in existing European societies, but also preferable if compared with alternative conceptions (I consider liberal multiculturalism and Cécile Laborde’s critical republicanism [Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)]) with reference to the problem under scrutiny in this research. In conclusion, I show that public reason citizenship is able to solve the theoretical problem and the main research question mentioned above: Which ideal conception of citizenship should provide the common normative perspective in contemporary Western European societies, which are characterised by both demands of inclusion of Muslims and the need for solving a problem of mutual assurance concerning citizens’ commitment to shared terms of social cooperation, so that those societies can be stable for the right reasons? In the final part of chapter five, I try to demonstrate that public reason citizenship can both include Muslim citizens and solve the assurance problem because it provides both shared standards for political criticism and a common political identity on the basis of which citizens politically recognise one another as free equals. If my argument succeeds, then public reason citizenship not only could but also should be adopted as the ideal conception of citizenship in European societies (see 5.2).In the sixth chapter (“Tariq Ramadan’s European Muslims and Public Reason”) I apply the evaluative framework based on public reason to the conception of citizenship for Muslims in Europe developed by Tariq Ramadan. (According to a principle introduced in chapter two which I call the “plausibility principle” PP, I argue that Ramadan’s theory of citizenship can be plausibly presented as a “European Muslim” approach to the issue of citizenship, see 6.1). The purpose of such an evaluative work is twofold. Firstly, it aims at examining whether and how the idea of public reason accounts for a version of European citizenship for Muslims coming from Muslims themselves. Secondly, it aims at disclosing whether what such a Muslim conception of citizenship in Europe says about the two dimensions of ‘stability for the right reasons’ of the system of social cooperation (namely, inclusion and ‘mutual assurance’) is consistent with the provisions of public reason citizenship (see 6.2-6.5). / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / N.B. 1) Le lieu de défense de la thèse en cotutelle est ROME (Luiss Guido Carli)2) L'affiliation du co-promoteur de la thèse en cotutelle (Sebastiano Maffettone) est: LUISS Guido Carli / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Phénoménologie de l'espace politique est une étude à la fois généalogique et phénoménologique d'un sujet auquel la philosophie ne se confronte que rarement, à savoir l'espace politique. Les principaux acteurs en sont Maurice Merleau-Ponty et Jan Patočka. Il s'agit donc d'une thèse de philosophie contemporaine, pour ce qui concerne les auteurs étudiés, tandis que l'objet de notre recherche est politique - comme en témoigne le fait que même l'expression «espace politique» n'est pas utilisée dans le domaine philosophique. Puisque notre objectif est de conduire une recherche à la fois politique et phénoménologique sur l'espace politique, il sera essentiel de l'aborder simultanément de ces deux points de vue. Il s'agira en effet de tracer une généalogie de l'espace politique, précédée par une étude phénoménologique du concept d'espace et de celle de mouvement. Nous en tirerons l'idée centrale de la partie plus proprement politique, à savoir l'opposition, dans la pensée politique moderne, entre apparition et représentation, ou en d'autres termes, entre immédiateté et médiation, que l'on peut trouver respectivement chez Machiavel et Hobbes et chez les auteurs qui, au XXe siècle, ont étudié leurs œuvres, notamment Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jan Patočka et Carl Schmitt. C'est à partir de ces concepts d'apparition et de représentation, et de leur opposition, que nous allons développer une analyse à la fois phénoménologique et politologique de l'espace politique. / Phenomenology of Political Space is an attempt to provide both a genealogical and a phenomenological account of a subject that philosophy rarely confronts, namely political space. Our analysis thus encompasses all the dimensions of political space - political, historical, geographical, and juridical - without dismissing any of them. It aims at showing the intrinsic connection between phenomenology and modern and contemporary political thought. It does so by identifying the two opposing models of political space, respectively shaped by Machiavelli and Hobbes, which we claim correspond to two opposing systems of visibility: a logic of appearance versus a logic of representation. It then moves to the contemporary phenomenological approach and gives both a phenomenology of movement and a phenomenology of political space. The central idea is the opposition, in modern and contemporary political thought, between appearance and representation, or in other words, between immediacy and mediation, as the terms are used respectively by Machiavelli and Hobbes, as well as by other authors who, in the twentieth century, studied their works (Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jan Patočka, Carl Schmitt). Our current research focuses on both their conceptions of movement, desire and fear; and on their interpretation of political space.

Ce mémoire propose une défense de la pertinence de l’éco-anarchisme. Cette défense se fera à travers une analyse critique des arguments adressés à l’éco-anarchisme, ainsi que ses deux branches principales : le biorégionalisme et l’écologie sociale. Pour mener à bien ce projet, il sera nécessaire d’offrir un portrait détaillé des théories dont j’analyserai également les critiques. Ce mémoire commence par une présentation de l’éco-anarchisme, du biorégionalisme et de l’écologie sociale. Puis, il passe en revue les différentes critiques qui ont été émises sur ces théories. Cette analyse critique sert de base à la présentation d’un ensemble de recommandations, qui auront comme objectifs de pallier les failles mises en lumière par certaines critiques. Ces recommandations tourneront autour de trois objectifs principaux : soulever l’importance de confédérer les communautés ; soulever l’importance de créer des ponts entre l’éco-anarchisme et l’éco-féminisme et l’éthique du Care ; abandonner la branche du biorégionalisme. / This master thesis offers a defense of the relevance of eco-anarchism. This defense will be done through a critical analysis of the arguments made against eco-anarchism, as well as its two main strands: bioregionalism and social ecology. To carry out this project, it will be necessary to offer a detailed portrait of the theories from which we will analyse the critics. Therefore, the beginning of this thesis will be a presentation of eco-anarchism, bioregionalism and social ecology. Then, it will be necessary to establish a review of the various criticisms that have been made of these theories. Ultimately, this critical analysis will serve as the basis for the presentation of a myriad of recommendations, which will have the objective of remedying the flaws highlighted by certain criticisms. These recommendations will revolve around three main ones: highlight the importance of confederating communities; highlight the importance of building bridges between eco-anarchism and eco-feminism and the ethics of care; abandon the strand of bioregionalism.

[pt] A questão da servidão permeia toda a filosofia de Espinosa. Seja no campo ético, seja no político, a servidão é um problema quando se trata da experimentação da liberdade política, sendo necessário, portanto, compreender suas causas e seus efeitos práticos. Na experiência política, a tirania se torna o principal efeito prático da servidão e sua constituição reside nas mãos da multidão. É por isso que Espinosa afirma que não adianta derrubar o tirano se não eliminar as causas da tirania, ou seja, investigar, na multidão, os motivos pelos quais um regime tirânico chega ao exercício do poder político. Começaremos este trabalho com uma análise da servidão no plano da Ética: a reflexão perpassa pela noção do conatus e pela lógica dos afetos que rege as relações sociopolíticas. A dinâmica afetiva é fundamental para compreender não só as causas da servidão, mas todas as relações entre os corpos. A noção de servidão está relacionada com a ideia do preconceito finalista que, no campo político, se transforma em superstição. Por fim, como a servidão, ainda que individual, só pode ser pensada com a instituição da política, é necessário analisar o conceito de multidão. É, para Espinosa, o sujeito político que não segue ordem racional, mas sim, é pensada através da dinâmica afetiva. A partir desse conceito, a figura do vulgus possui papel fundamental para o entendimento do tema proposto, assim como a compreensão da obediência política e as diferenças entre a obediência servil do escravo e a obediência livre do cidadão. A resistência à servidão é expressão do conatus e necessária, assim como a obediência, para a constituição de um campo político mais democrático e de um temperamento menos servil da multidão. / [fr] Le sujet de la servitude marque toute la philosophie de Spinoza. Que ce soitau domaine éthique ou politique, la servitude est un problème lorsqu il s agitd expérimenter la liberté politique, et il est donc nécessaire d en comprendre ses causes et ses effets pratiques. Dans l expérience politique, la tyrannie devient le principal effet pratique de la servitude et sa constitution demeure aux mains de lamultitude. C est pour ça que Spinoza affirme qu il est inutile d abattre le tyran sion n élimine pas les causes de la tyrannie, c est-à-dire, il faut enquêter sur lamultitude les raisons pour lesquelles le régime tyrannique parvient à l exercice dela puissance politique. D abord, on analyse la servitude sous les thermes del Éthique: la réflexion passe par la notion de conatus et par la logique des affections qui régit les relations sociopolitiques. La dynamique affective est fondamentale pour comprendre non seulement les causes de la servitude, mais toutes les relationsentre les corps. Le concept de servitude est lié à l idée du préjugé finaliste qui, dansle domaine politique, devient superstition. Enfin, comme la servitude, elle-même individuelle, ne peut être pensée qu avec l institution de la politique, il est nécessaire donc analyser la notion de multitude. Pour Spinoza, c est le sujet politique que ne suit pas l ordre rational, toutefois celui qui est pensé à travers dela dynamique affective. En s appuyant sur ce concept, la figure du vulgus a un rôle fondamental pour la compréhension du thème, ainsi que l entendement del obéissance politique et les différences entre l obéissance servile de l esclave etcelle libre du citoyen. La résistance à la servitude est l expression du conatus et nécessaire, ainsi que l obéissance, pour la constitution d un domaine politique plus démocratique et d un caractère moins servile de la multitude.

L'objet de cette thèse est de construire une analyse critique de l'approche économique « conventionnelle » des inégalités entre les sexes. L'existence de « barrières discriminatoires » entre hommes et femmes sur le marché du travail conduit à critiquer la mesure de la discrimination salariale « pure ». <br />Nous soutenons qu'il n'est pas possible de donner une définition non ambiguë de la discrimination sur le marché du travail sans rentrer dans des questions de philosophie politique de la justice. Chaque philosophie politique implique une conception différente de la discrimination et impose des contraintes sur la méthodologie empirique de mesure des inégalités. Une conception pluraliste de la discrimination conduit ainsi à critiquer la conception consensuelle de l'égalité des chances, la théorie marginale de la juste distribution ainsi que la « bonne » pratique de mesure de la discrimination. <br />Nous présentons d'abord une grille d'analyse pluraliste de la discrimination entre les sexes articulant philosophies politiques de la justice sexuée, théories économiques de la discrimination, et méthodologies statistiques de mesure de l'inégalité de traitement sur le marché du travail. Nous proposons ensuite des mesures économétriques des barrières discriminatoires à l'accès à l'emploi, au temps plein et aux responsabilités hiérarchiques. Ces mesures nous permettent enfin de revenir sur l'identification et l'évaluation de la ségrégation verticale, de la discrimination salariale, et de la discrimination positive dans les politiques de l'emploi.

The thesis is related to transnational social movements’ production of knowledge. Particularly, the research investigates the developed norms and pathways of a Palestinian-transnational movement (the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement- The BDS movement) during its formation period. The thesis reviews major social movement theories (i.e. Sidney Tarrow and Margeret Sikkink). While benefiting from major aspects of these theories, the thesis discovers that the researched movement suggests major deviations from these theories. Hence, the thesis mobilizes other literature, particularly of Pierre Bourdieu, to better account for cultural and social dimensions. This choice is enforced by the presence of academics that form a pillar in the movement. Yet, the thesis mobilizes together diverse dimensions from social movement literature, sociology and history (i.e. the historical trajectory of individual and collective actors), and with a constant check with the case itself. The methodological choice of the research goes back and forth between theories and the case (abductive methodology). Two chapters of the thesis are dedicated to the agency of the Palestinian actors in addition to interactions inside the field of power in Palestine. Another two chapters discuss transnational relations with a focus on European actors. Specific cases are chosen from interactions with Belgian and British actors. Moreover, interactions in three transnational fora are discussed.The research concludes that this transnational movement infuses diverse norms from different experiences and regions while adhering to universal norms such as comprehensive human rights. Moreover, the movement follows diverse pathways that include a Palestinian emergence, a Global Southern path and through the North. And these pathways enforce the adherence of the movement to specific norms. Such findings diverge from “Euro-centric” approaches in discussed social movements’ literature in the thesis. The research finally discusses other literature more relevant to the case (i.e. by Amitav Acharya), which argues that local actors try to protect their norms from abuse by central forces, and they do not only import norms but also diffuse new norms. The thesis ends up with questions for further research on the patterns of norms diffusion. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Cette étude explore dans une perspective comparative la présentation historique et l’interprétation philosophique de la décadence de la res publica chez Salluste et Tite Live. Dans la première partie, il est montré que Salluste et Tite-Live sont les premiers auteurs à avoir choisi comme thème central de leur récit le progrès et la décadence d’une cité. À travers un examen précis des étapes de la décadence chez les deux auteurs, nous remarquons que Tite-Live apporte constamment des corrections à la théorie de Salluste. Le schéma d’aucun des deux historiens ne se conforme à une vision cyclique ou linéaire du temps. La représentation biologique de la cité montre aussi que les hommes sont les seuls responsables pour la maladie de la décadence. Or, la reprise du progrès, selon une conception cyclique et la guérison du corps de l’État sont évoquées comme perspectives seulement par Tite-Live. La deuxième partie est consacrée aux causes de la maladie de la décadence, et la troisième à la guérison de la res publica. Trois facteurs sont examinés en détail : les facteurs « divins », le metus hostilis et la nature humaine. Tite-Live renverse l’analyse de plus en plus pessimiste de Salluste, et réintroduit l’homme en tant que facteur principal de l’histoire et comme responsable de la décadence. Dans la troisième partie, leur vision différente de l’avenir de Rome est mise en lumière, à travers l’étude de la position politique et de la fonction exemplaire de l’œuvre des deux historiens. Il en ressort que Tite-Live adopte les catégories sallustéennes d’analyse, mais conçoit sa propre présentation et interprétation de la décadence en réponse à son devancier, dont il renverse les théories. / This study explores in a comparative perspective the historical presentation and the philosophical interpretation of the decadence of the res publica in Sallust and Livy. In the first part, it is shown that Sallust and Livy are the first authors who have chosen the progress and decline of a State as the central theme of their works. Through a precise examination of the stages of decadence in both writers, we observe that Livy constantly proposes corrections to Sallust’s theory. Neither author’s pattern conforms to a cyclical or a linear vision of time. The organicist representation of the body politic also shows that men are solely responsible for the disease of decadence in both authors. However, the resumption of progress according to a cyclical conception and the healing of the body of the State are considered as potential prospects only by Livy. The second part is devoted to the causes of the disease of decadence, and the third one to the healing of the res publica. Three factors are discussed in detail: the "divine" factors, the metus hostilis and the human nature. Livy reverses the increasingly pessimistic analysis of Sallust, and reintroduces man as the most important factor in history and as responsible for the decadence. In the third part, their different view of the future of Rome is brought into focus, through the study of the political position and the exemplary function of the two historians’ works. It is concluded that Livy adopts Sallustian categories of analysis, but he conceives his own presentation and interpretation of the decadence in response to his predecessor, whose theories he challenges.

L’œuvre de Tite-Live propose une histoire de la Res publica romaine depuis sa naissance jusqu’au tournant du premier siècle av. J.-C. où, selon les termes de l’auteur, « l’État se détruit sous l’effet de ses propres forces ». Au sortir d’une période de guerres civiles qui bouleversa en profondeur les repères politiques et sociaux, il s’agit pour l’historien de redéfinir l’identité politique de Rome en puisant dans les grands exemples du passé, à une époque où Auguste, en ramenant la paix, propose aussi, avec le Principat, un nouveau modèle d’exercice du pouvoir. Cette étude propose de relire l’Ab Vrbe condita comme une réflexion sur le pouvoir, un « discours », à une époque de profondes mutations. Retraçant le passé de la ville, l’historien exprime une pensée politique cohérente à travers ses commentaires, ses choix narratifs, et les discours qu’il attribue à différents personnages historiques. Celle-ci est le plus souvent proche de celle de Cicéron qui, du De Republica au De Officiis, offrait un cadre philosophique à la réflexion sur les institutions et les devoirs de l’homme d’État. Mais Tite-Live se la réapproprie en l’enrichissant des préoccupations politiques de son époque. Son récit de l’histoire de Rome s’inscrit principalement dans une défense de la libertas du peuple romain menacée par l’émergence d’un pouvoir personnel. Dans chaque situation, l’historien insiste sur les rapports complexes du dirigeant avec les institutions de la cité et le peuple de Rome. Par la mise en relation des exempla et des discours, Tite-Live propose un modèle de gouvernement unifié et cohérent fondé sur les vertus des dirigeants du passé et les valeurs collectives du peuple romain. / Livy’s body of work presents a history of the Roman Res publica from its beginnings to the turn of the first century. Civil wars had then deeply shaken the political and socials benchmarks and, while Augustus, after bringing peace back, was trying to impose a new political model with the Principate, it was the historian’s role to redefine Rome’s political identity through the use of well-known examples from the past. Livy’s From the Founding of the City may thus be read as a discourse about Roman power in a period of deep political change. The historian, as he tells the story of the city’s past, makes comments, narrative choices, and inserts into the historical figures’ speeches general remarks which help in many ways to grasp his political thinking. Most of the time, this thoughts are close to what can be read in Cicero’s political treatises. Cicero’s De Republica and De Officiis actually offered a philosophical frame of reference to political thinking, concerning the state institutions and the duties of state leaders. However, Livy develops his own theory and adds to Cicero’s political thought considerations on issues specific to his own time. Livy mainly defends the libertas of the Roman people against the emergence of personal power. In each and every situation, Livy sheds light on the complex relationships between the leaders and the state institutions and between the leaders and the Roman people. Linking exempla and speeches, Livy suggests a stable and coherent leadership model based upon the virtues of past political leaders and the collective principles of the Roman people.

L'objet de cette thèse doctorale est la réponse poïétique et institutionnaliste offerte par Castoriadis au problème de la constitution d'une universalité pratique dans un contexte post-métaphysique. La thèse s'ouvre sur une définition de la philosophie politique comme projet d'objectivation institutionnelle de la raison et sur l'exposition du problème, pour cette discipline, engendré par la critique de la métaphysique et l'émergence d'une conception procédurale de la raison lors de la modernité. La thèse est ensuite divisée en deux parties. La première porte sur la philosophie de Castoriadis, c'est-à-dire sur sa critique de la pensée métaphysique, son ontologie et sa théorie de la connaissance. Nous y défendons la thèse interprétative que sa philosophie est un « pluralisme ontopoïétique constructiviste ». La seconde porte sur sa conception de la raison pratique, que nous interprétons comme « institutionnalisme post-métaphysique ». Nous concluons en explicitant les nouvelles médiations établies par Castoriadis entre philosophie et politique, sa conception de l'universalité pratique, et, par conséquent, la place qu'il occupe dans le temps long de l'histoire de la philosophie politique. Une perspective comparative a été privilégiée tout au long de notre argumentaire. Nous apprécions la singularité castoriadienne en la comparant avec des philosophies ayant partagé des problèmes communs et certains horizons thétiques, notamment l'héritage hégéliano-marxien et les philosophies de la différence. / The purpose of this doctoral thesis is to expose Castoriadis’ poïetical and institutional answer to the following question: how can we constitute a practical universality in a postmetaphysical context. Starting with a definition of political philosophy as the progressive and institutional objectification of reason, I first show how the modern radical critic of metaphysical thoughts and the modern emergence of a procedural conception of reason were both problematic for political philosophy. The thesis is then divided into two parts. The first part is devoted to Castoriadis’ philosophy and presents his own critics of metaphysical thinking, his ontology and his theory of knowledge. I then follow the interpretative thesis according to which Castoriadis’ philosophy can be characterized as an ''ontopoïetical pluralistic constructivism'' The second part is about his conception of practical reason, which I interpret as a “postmetaphysical institutionalism”. I conclude by showing that Castoriadis offers not only new mediations between politics and philosophy but also an original conception of practical universality in the history of political philosophy. Using a comparative method, I put forward Castoriadis’ thoughts through a comparison with other philosophies that share common problems and thesis, e.g. the Hegelian-Marxian tradition and the philosophies of difference.

The Method and its Disappearance: Analysis between philosophies of social contract and classical sociologies. A Study in Epistemology Jan Maršálek Université de Franche-Comté/Charles University in Prague Supervisors: prof. Frédéric Brahami, prof. Miloslav Petrusek (†), dr. Jan Balon. Résumé: In a doubly disloyal continuity with regard to the French epistemological tradition, largely preoccupied with the formation of scientific concepts, the present work addresses the phenomenon of disappearance of 'analytical' method. Nevertheless, the present work does not constitute an historical investigation: its very goal is to show (within the works of T. Hobbes, J.-J. Rousseau, H. Spencer and E. Durkheim) the variation of the epistemological status of the analysis, and thus to set up the concept of an 'epistemological event'. Examining the disappearance of the analysis requires its identification in the theoretical work whereby its leverage remains unacknowledged. Thus, having the status of a method in the philosophies of the social contract of Hobbes and Rousseau, the analysis 'continues' to structure, in a tacit way, the work of Spencer and Durkheim, both of them founders of scientific sociology. Is it possible to claim that, in the 19th century, the analysis manifests itself in the sociology's common recourse to...