Si le rapport entre Derrida et Bergson n’a pas fait l’objet de nombreuses études, les commentaires existants témoignent à peu près tous d’une vision commune : entre les deux philosophes, les divergences peuvent être atténuées, voire dissoutes, par la considération de convergences plus fondamentales. Les pages qui suivent seront l’occasion pour nous de faire contrepoids à cette vulgate interprétative. Sans nier l’existence de points de contact entre Derrida et Bergson, nous voudrions en effet montrer qu’un important désaccord subsiste entre eux au sujet de la possibilité de l’intuition. Alors que Derrida met en cause les doctrines intuitionnistes, Bergson érige l’intuition en méthode philosophique. Le présent mémoire prendra pour fil conducteur les motifs de cette discorde. Réduit à sa plus simple expression, l’objectif que nous y poursuivrons sera de montrer que les pensées bergsonienne et derridienne, lorsque mises en dialogue, révèlent un désaccord partiel qui permet de réfléchir de façon féconde sur la possibilité de l’intuition. Pour être plus exact, nous caresserons ici une triple ambition : i/ cerner étroitement l’objet du litige entre Derrida et Bergson, trop peu souligné par les commentateurs, et dont nous montrons qu’il s’articule à une entente partielle ; ii/ tirer au clair les diverses raisons qui amènent l’un à s’en prendre à l’intuition, l’autre à embrasser la méthode intuitive ; iii/ établir que certains arguments de Bergson, bien qu’ils connaissent un regain d’intérêt depuis quelques années, paraissent lacunaires lorsqu’on les confronte à différentes objections. / Although studies of the relation between Derrida and Bergson are few and far between, they nearly all share a common vision: that of attenuating – or even altogether eliminating – the divisions between the two philosophers’ thought, by considering their more fundamental convergences. The following pages will allow us to counterbalance this common interpretation. Without denying the points that Derrida and Bergson do have in common, we will show an important divergence in opinion between the two on the idea that intuition is possible and founded. While Derrida lays doubt on intuitionist doctrine, Bergson establishes intuition as a philosophical method. This thesis examines the motives behind this divergence. Put simply, a comparison of Derridian and Bergsonian thought reveals a partial disagreement that enables fruitful reflection about whether or not intuition is possible. More precisely, we pursue three objectives here: i/ to clearly identify the scope of the disagreement between Derrida and Bergson, often overlooked by previous commentaries, showing that it includes a partial agreement; ii/ to clarify the diverse reasons leading Derrida to deny the very existence of intuition while Bergson embraces intuition as a philosophical method; and iii/ to show that certain Bergsonian arguments, although enjoying a resurge in interest in recent years, appear unable to stand up to several different objections.

Le temps et la mémoire chez la personne " cérébro-lésée " Le temps et la mémoire participent au fondement de notre humanité. Les personnes atteintes de pathologies neurologiques interrogent de façon particulière les liens que les hommes tissent avec leur temporalité et leur mémoire. Au cours de ce travail, nous avons tenté de dégager ce qui était spécifique du temps vécu et de l'atteinte mémorielle dans la clinique neurologique. Temps disloqué des patients " déments ", temps déchiré des patients atteints d'un accident vasculaire, ces deux modalités temporelles seront étudiées sous l'angle de l'éprouvé temporel. Nous avons également tenté de réfléchir autour des questions de la durée et du changement. Que devient l'identité de ces personnes touchées au coeur de leur être ? En précisant ce qui anime le rapport dialectique qui s'articule entre le temps et la mémoire, et qui est l'oeuvre de l'esprit, nous évoquons ce qui atteste de la continuité de la vie psychique, au-delà de l'apparaître et des potentialités " rationnelles ". L'accompagnement de ces patients requiert une présence, un don du temps

El estudio de la obra de un filósofo como el uruguayo Carlos Vaz Ferreira, en apariencia tan alejado de la tradición filosófica española, podría parecer extraño de no darse en él las condiciones de afinidad intelectual y comunidad de intereses que revela el estudio de dicha obra, una profunda simpatía mutua entre lo español y lo americano de la cual es en parte fruto el presente trabajo.La obra del filósofo uruguayo, una vez comenzada a estudiar desde esta perspectiva de los intereses comunes, ofrecía una interesante dimensión en tanto que filosofía crítica de la ciencia y, más adelante, con el descubrimiento de su "Lógica Viva" como el gozne donde hacer girar toda su reserva teórica a toda producción intelectual, esa filosofía de la ciencia se ofrecía como una de las alternativas más sólidas al racionalismo científico, mostrando con cuánta originalidad el autor se independizaba del lenguaje, estableciendo una separación casi estanca entre lenguaje y pensamiento de un lado, y realidad de otro.De este modo, el principio crítico defendido por Carlos Vaz Ferreira que separa y aísla el discurso racional (decir y pensar) de la realidad (ser) replanteaba un problema ontológico ya clásico en la filosofía, pero reconociendo en el hombre una limitación de sus capacidades racionales que le obligaba a postular un principio de humildad y de ignorancia consciente que no siempre se hallaba presente en el racionalismo científico.La obra de Carlos Vaz Ferreira se sitúa en el primer capítulo dentro de la reacción a las corrientes estrechamente positivistas que desde fines del siglo XIX intentaron terminar con toda manifestación especulativa del espíritu, destacándose H. Bergson y V. James junto con M. de Unamuno y Vaz Ferreira, quien coloca a Fr. Nietzsche en la base filosófica de los dos primeros autores. Respecto de H. Bergson, Vaz Ferreira reconoce haber heredado de él su espíritu independiente con el que abordar los problemas filosóficos, siendo provechoso observar los puntos en los que el filósofo francés rechaza la versión mecanicista de la vida y del espíritu. En cuanto a V. James, Vaz Ferreira se reconoce deudor de la interpretación fluida de la conciencia y del lenguaje frente a la realidad, repitiendo su concepto de la "corriente de pensamiento" pero rechazando la interpretación utilitarista del pragmatismo al poner en duda la validez de un principio que sólo considera útil cuanto tiene éxito a corto plazo. La simpatía y la admiración que por el filósofo uruguayo sintió nuestro M. de Unamuno se refleja en multitud de testimonios y radica en la independencia de criterio y en la originalidad con la que Vaz Ferreira encaraba sus propios problemas filosóficos. Por su parte, la obra de Fr. Nietzsche parecía ofrecer elementos suficientes como para que sus ideas más originales sirvieran de revulsivo del mecanicismo y de la ciencia establecida, actuando como un auténtico fermento filosófico que replanteara de nuevo el lugar que debía ocupar esa ciencia dentro del ámbito general del conocimiento.El segundo capítulo está destinado a establecer el lugar de la filosofía de Carlos Vaz Ferreira dentro de las distintas escuelas filosóficas, defendiéndose ante todo de la acusación de ecléctico por una filosofía como la suya que se nutre del pensamiento ajeno, pero que al pensar directamente los problemas no acepta las soluciones ya dadas. Por otro lado, la reflexión constantemente crítica que propugna el filósofo uruguayo le hace aparecer como escéptico y, recogiendo en parte esa acusación, muestra que la reserva crítica ante la acción y el análisis detenido de sus posibilidades proporciona un criterio excelente para el comportamiento social.Se hacía preciso determinar en el capítulo tercero la aportación más genuinamente metafísica de nuestro autor: su solución a los problemas de la libertad y del determinismo. Partiendo de la separación de los problemas, Vaz Ferreira establece que tan sólo los seres son sujetos de quienes pueda predicarse la libertad o la falta de libertad, mientras que de los actos (humanos), hechos o fenómenos (naturales) tan sólo puede predicarse el determinismo o el indeterminismo. De este modo, podría concluirse que el hombre es libre mientras que sus actos son determinados.El análisis metodológico constante propuesto por Vaz Ferreira sólo podía entenderse dentro de una concepción viva de la lógica, como actividad siempre en ejercicio que a lo largo del capítulo cuarto se ejercita sobre el concepto de Ciencia, destacándose el intento de trascendentalizar el principio de incertidumbre de Heisenberg o la dualidad onda corpúsculo para establecer una ontología de la contradicción que arruinara la lógica aristotélica, intento fallido que ponía de manifiesto la necesidad que tenían los científicos de una buena lógica y de una filosofía legítima.En el capítulo quinto se estudia la relación entre ciencia y filosofía, comenzando por señalar que es falsa su mutua oposición. Con fina penetración observa Vaz Ferreira el fondo filosófico de toda ciencia al preguntarse por sus fundamentos y establece el origen y el fundamento único de toda ciencia en la filosofía. Esta unidad en el saber le permite a Vaz Ferreira invalidar el postulado positivista por el cual se intenta instituir una ciencia basada en sus propios principios racionales, claros y definidos, donde ya no tenga lugar la metafísica.Para finalizar, en el capítulo sexto se indica cómo la ignorancia consciente de serlo supone la coronación de una evolución cognoscitiva que en Vaz Ferreira comienza por suscitar los problemas por medio de una enseñanza fermental que se constituye en filosofía al pensar y al sentir en toda la amplitud posible los problemas filosóficos, vacilando en sus soluciones.Ignorar supone, por consiguiente, una previa aclaración racional que no deja de lado cuanto queda por resolver, revelando con ello la dimensión infinita de cuanto resulta ser trascendente al hombre. / The study of the work of the Uruguayan philosopher Carlos Vaz Ferreira (1872-1958) from the perspective of the philosophy of the science, acquires an special interest because of his critical postulates on the Science and the additional criticism to the Positivism that tries to be established on her basis.Immersed in the anti-positivistic currents of the early century, the work of Carlos Vaz Ferreira reveals the human resistance -attested by H. Bergson as well as W. James- to be shut in a narrow rationalism. In the same way, M. de Unamuno is another of the few authors that constitute the basis of his philosophy, below which Vaz Ferreira places furthermore work of Fr. Nietzsche as a fermentative germ.From the point of view of his living logic, Vaz Ferreira analyzes and invalidates some fallacies as the transcendentalization -which attempts in every moment to identify language and thought-, distancing the ontological plane ("being") from the reasoning plane ("to say" and "to think") in order to recognize the limits or our rational capacities.The work of Carlos Vaz Ferreira is then articulated within a wise rationalism where the conscious ignorance shows at any time the greatness of an absolute reality that the man is never capable to comprehend.

Submitted by Glauber Assunção Moreira (glauber.a.moreira@gmail.com) on 2018-08-27T18:14:45Z No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertação completa.pdf: 1783919 bytes, checksum: dbafef09d3d0ba966007c47d9b66d847 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marly Santos (marly@ufba.br) on 2018-08-27T21:55:05Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertação completa.pdf: 1783919 bytes, checksum: dbafef09d3d0ba966007c47d9b66d847 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-27T21:55:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertação completa.pdf: 1783919 bytes, checksum: dbafef09d3d0ba966007c47d9b66d847 (MD5) / O riso tem sido motivo de reflexão de diversos teóricos e filósofos. Contudo, no campo das artes cênicas, são raros os trabalhos que abordem o ofício do ator na cena cômica sem restringirem-se a formas, gêneros ou estéticas específicas. Diante disso, esta pesquisa busca investigar possibilidades de construção ou potencialização dos efeitos risíveis no trabalho do ator dentro de uma cena cômica através dos gestos. Para isso, são tomados como referencial teórico os pensamentos do filósofo francês Henri Bergson a respeito do riso. A partir dos estudos do pensador e de sua teoria do mecânico colado no vivo, traçam-se paralelos com as reflexões de encenadores como Stanislavski, Burnier e Dario Fo, encontrando neles aproximações com a prática teatral. A partir daí, observa-se no gesto do ator a possibilidade da utilização das reflexões bergsonianas na cena cômica. Do ponto de vista metodológico, são analisadas duas oficinas realizadas com os atores-alunos dos cursos de graduação em Interpretação da Universidade Federal da Bahia (UFBA) e de Licenciatura em Teatro do Instituto Federal de Educação, Ciência e Tecnologia (IFCE). Estas incursões práticas foram estruturadas a partir de exercícios criados pelas relações entre as ideias de Bergson e a prática teatral. Por meio delas, analisam-se as implicações que a utilização do gesto trouxe à prática destes atores-alunos nas oficinas e suas possíveis contribuições para a cena cômica. / For a long time, laugh has been the subject of reflection for many theorists and philosophers. However, on the performing arts, there are few studies about the actor in the comic scene without restricting itself to forms, genders or specific esthetics. Thus, this research investigates possibilities of building or potentiation of the laughable effects in the actor’s work into a comic scene. For this reason, takes as reference the French philosopher Henri Bergson’s thoughts about laugh. Based on this studies and his theory of mechanical pasted in live, draws parallels with the reflections of directors as Stanislavski, Burnier e Dario Fo, finding it approaches to the theatrical practice. Thereafter, observes the gesture of the actos as a possibility of using the Bergson’s reflections in comic scene. From the methodological view, analyzes two workshops with actors-students of undergraduate courses in Interpreting of Universidade Federal da Bahia (UFBA) and the pedagogy of theater of Instituto Federal de Educação, Ciência e Tecnologia (IFCE). These practices were structured from exercises created by the relationships between Bergson’s ideas and theater practical. Through them, analyzes the implications that gesture bring to the practical of these actors-students in the workshops and their possible contributions to the comic scene.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:12:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2423.pdf: 1121078 bytes, checksum: 18675696894a0625dd4f9b5d009786b8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-08-27 / Although both the Bergsonian philosophy and the Freudian metapsychology have been not properly considered, in the last decades, regarding an ample debate about the nature of the mind, it is about two recent speeches that might contribute significantly to the new theoretical-practical outlines in the contemporary philosophy and sciences that examine the mind. Both thoughts show the unconscious as something without what the psychic events could not be understood entirely, which demands total attention of any future scientific paradigm that intends to establish itself over the psychic phenomena. The key to this enterprise we find in the concept of Action, openly in Bergson, but also clearly in Freud who never withheld himself to understand the human in their constant relationship to the world around. It is not about the fusion of two speeches in the name of a new psychoanalysis , which inevitably might cause several epistemologic problems, but, chiefly, about the possibility to verify how much we can learn with the thesis about the mind that emerge from the both theories. / Embora tanto a filosofia bergsoniana como a metapsicologia freudiana não tenham sido, nas últimas décadas, devidamente consideradas no que diz respeito a um debate mais amplo sobre a natureza do mental, trata-se de dois discursos atuais que, significativamente, podem contribuir para os novos delineamentos teórico-práticos que se configuram na filosofia e nas ciências contemporâneas que versam sobre o psíquico. Ambos os pensamentos mostram o inconsciente como algo sem o qual não se poderiam entender os eventos psicológicos em sua plenitude, o que demandaria total atenção de qualquer paradigma científico futuro que pretenda se estabelecer acerca dos fenômenos psíquicos. A chave para tal empreendimento encontramos no conceito de Ação, declaradamente em Bergson, mas também claramente em Freud, que jamais se absteve de compreender o humano na sua constante relação com o mundo ao redor. Não se trata de fundir os dois discursos em nome de uma "nova psicanálise" - o que inevitavelmente acarretaria problemas epistemológicos diversos - mas de, sobretudo, verificar o quanto ainda podemos aprender com as teses sobre o psíquico que emanam de suas teorias.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:13:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2606.pdf: 930592 bytes, checksum: f4756c2d671b859733477486438959b2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-03-06 / The research is an investigation about the phenomenon of the Laugh, from the studies of Henri Bergson and Sigmund Freud up to today's research on neuroscience, gelotology and several other studies on human behaviour. In order to better understand the Laugh, an accurate evaluation of the book " Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic", by Henri Bergson is made as an attempt to better understand the main considerations set by the author, in his interpretation of this phenomenon as a Social Gesture and all the implications originated by such fact. In the second chapter of this study, Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious , by Sigmund Freud, are closely analyzed in details, comparing Freud s and Bergson s approaches and analyzing the mechanisms proposed by Freud concerning the way the Joke works, pointing out the reasons why they would be told to others. The reading and analysis of this book are directed specifically to the study of the Laugh, not approaching any other aspect, relevant to the reading of Freud s work as a whole, which however, would deviate the focus of this work. All the efforts were dedicated to the comprehension of the jokes mechanisms studied by Freud as well as ways to obtain pleasure through them. At the end updated research is verified, such as the one from Richard Wiseman s Laugh Laboratory, that accomplished a worldwide research selecting which would be considered the funniest jokes by people. Also as an object of study there is the role of the mirror-neurones, an important finding that allows a clearer vision about primates and human s social behaviors. The possibility of the laughter to be a behaviour similar to the grooming of the primates is also raised, since both would be related to the exchange of pleasure among individuals viewing the benefit of the group. Following this line, a study is presented defining the laughter as a specific characteristic of the male gender, who would use this feature as an approach aiming at attracting a mate. There isn't a conclusive result, there is not a final word about the laughter because it is clear that in many circumstances the term ranges similar phenomena, which are not exactly the same. In the same way that there is multiple laughter, there are multiple areas that study the distinct variations of the Laugh. / A pesquisa é uma investigação sobre o fenômeno do Riso, partindo dos estudos de Henri Bergson e Sigmund Freud até as pesquisas atuais da neurociência, da gelotologia e dos variados estudos sobre o comportamento humano. Para compreender melhor o Riso, é feita uma avaliação detalhada do livro O Riso , de Henri Bergson, buscando compreender as considerações fundamentais estabelecidas pelo autor, na sua interpretação deste fenômeno como um Gesto Social e todas as implicações que derivam deste fato. No segundo capítulo deste estudo é analisado com detalhes O Chiste e sua relação com o Inconsciente , de Sigmund Freud, comparando as abordagens de Freud e Bergson e analisando os mecanismos propostos por Freud para o funcionamento do chiste e quais as razões pelas quais eles seriam contados. A leitura e análise deste livro são dirigidas especificamente ao estudo do Riso, deixando de abordar outros aspectos, importantes para a leitura da obra de Freud como um todo, mas que desviariam o foco deste trabalho. Todo o esforço foi dedicado à compreensão dos mecanismos do chiste estudados por Freud e das formas de obtenção de prazer através deles. Ao final, pesquisas atuais são estudadas, como as do Laboratório do Riso de Richard Wiseman, que realizou uma pesquisa mundial sobre quais seriam as piadas consideradas mais engraçadas pelas pessoas. Investiga-se também o papel dos neurônios-espelho, importante descoberta que permite uma visão mais clara sobre comportamentos sociais de humanos e primatas. A possibilidade de o riso ser um comportamento semelhante ao grooming dos primatas também é levantada, já que ambas seriam trocas de prazer entre indivíduos visando um benefício dentro do grupo. Nesta linha, é apresentado um estudo que define o riso como uma característica específica do gênero masculino, que usaria o recurso para aproximação da fêmea visando acasalamento. Não há um resultado conclusivo, não há uma palavra final sobre o Riso, pois se torna claro que em muitas circunstâncias o termo abarca fenômenos semelhantes, mas não exatamente iguais. Da mesma maneira que existem múltiplos risos, também existem múltiplas áreas que estudam as distintas variações do Riso.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:13:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 6132.pdf: 851637 bytes, checksum: 6881ffcd8203c0ce0d1033adc3eed7be (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-08-29 / Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos / This work is aimed at investigating the inner life in Bergson s first book, Time and Free Will An essay on the immediate data of consciousness (1889). We try to analyze especially the notions of duration and space in light of what we call the divided self , i.e., the division established by Bergson between the superficial self related to space, social life and language and the deap-seated self which concerns the pure duration of consciousness, the continuous multiplicity of interpenetration of psychological states and creating and unpredictability that constitutes each free act. At the end, and already in possession of the conclusions on the Essay, we will discuss the bergsonian intuitive method and its relationship with the divided self. / Este trabalho tem por intuito investigar a vida interior no primeiro livro de Bergson, Ensaio sobre os dados imediatos da consciência, de 1889. Trataremos de analisar sobretudo as noções de duração e espaço à luz daquilo que chamamos o eu dividido , isto é, a divisão estabelecida por Bergson entre o eu superficial relacionado ao espaço, à vida social e à linguagem e o eu profundo o qual diz respeito à duração pura da consciência, à multiplicidade contínua de interpenetração dos estados psicológicos e da criação e imprevisibilidade constituintes de cada ato livre. Ao final, e já de posse das conclusões acerca do Ensaio, discorreremos sobre o método intuitivo bergsoniano e sua relação com o eu dividido.

Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T18:26:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Luiz Ricardo Rech.pdf: 493792 bytes, checksum: c8aa8f16e2f49811843138b411d84831 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-11-29 / This research investigates one of the celebrated concepts through which Henri Bergson was known: the vital impulse. As in all the author's thought, this idea provides direct relationships with all his philosophy, which is why it is necessary one approach to the notion of metaphysical employed by the philosopher. In fact, it is a metaphysical approach to the problem of evolution that Bergson is proposing in Creative Evolution. The dialogue established with the biology of his time serves as the backdrop for the exhibition of what Bergson calls the limits of scientific method. In addition to this dialogue, it is important to comprehend, too, as the concept emerges, which is its internal coordination in the philosophy of the author and what the implications later in their thinking. / A presente pesquisa busca investigar um dos célebres conceitos pelos quais Henri Bergson ficou conhecido: o elã vital. Como em todo o pensamento do autor, essa ideia estabelece relações diretas com toda a sua filosofia, razão pela qual se faz necessária uma abordagem da própria noção de metafísica empregada pelo filósofo. De fato, é uma abordagem metafísica sobre o problema da evolução das espécies que Bergson está propondo em A evolução criadora. O diálogo estabelecido com a biologia de sua época serve de pano de fundo para a exposição do que Bergson chama de limites do método científico. Para além desse diálogo, é importante compreender, também, como surge o conceito, qual é a sua articulação interna na filosofia do autor e quais as implicações posteriores em seu pensamento.

My dissertation argues that the writings of Virginia Woolf and D. H. Lawrence are animated by a shared belief that the way human beings experience and understand their worlds needs to be radically transformed. Their works expose how human experience is canalized by habits reinforced through education and custom, and they explore the ways people might overcome these limitations to expand the receptive possibilities of their experience, illustrating more fruitful ways their readers might engage their worlds. Their novels offer a radical recasting of the human subject and its situation in the environment, one that valorizes a turn away from the fixity of conceptual certainty and an embrace of experiences that trouble clean distinctions between the human being and its world. Reading through the lens of radical empiricism, this project makes the case that Woolf and Lawrence are together engaging in a similar project: they are working from a shared interest in intensive explorations of the seemingly ineffable qualities in concrete human experience and in bringing those accounts into language to suggest the relational constitution of the human being with other people and the environment. They are working experimentally to discern the extent to which the human being can know first-hand its place in the extensive world. In doing so, the authors come to understand such a human being differently, as simultaneously discrete and non-discrete. By examining the methodological and philosophical intersections of these two authors, this project serves as a first step in suggesting a radical empirical British modernism. Woolf’s and Lawrence’s approaches to experience have philosophical implications that become more apparent when read in conjunction with William James’s philosophy of radical empiricism and the related philosophies of Henri Bergson and A. N. Whitehead. While “radical empiricist” is not a common moniker for these philosophers, my project makes the case for the consideration of several of their works as reflective of a line of confluent thought that illuminates the concerns of some modernist literature with developing a new understanding of the human situation through an inclusive attention to lived experience. The project is organized into four chapters. In the first chapter, I establish the radical empirical philosophical situation of Woolf’s and Lawrence’s writing, revealing in their novels how the dispositions of the characters facilitate different worlds, and elaborating the attentive approaches that they valorize through their novels. In the second chapter, I explore their critiques of abstraction, elaborating their concern with fixed abstract forms while countering readings of their work as anti-intellectual or apophatically mystical. In the third chapter, I examine how in and through their novels they engage the difficulty of articulating preconceptual experience, and I explore how they productively use ambiguity towards this end. In the fourth and final chapter, I examine the relational situation of the human individual that their novels disclose and the sort of self-understanding that they champion through their work.

This diploma thesis observes the topic of life in early Bergson. It is divided into three parts. The first chapter is concentrated on Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. In this chapter we can become acquainted with the distinction between duration and space. This distinction is the basic of Bergson philosophy. We can also see the distinction between the deeper self and the surface self, which is based on the first distinction. The second chapter Matter and Memory shows how the foregoing distinctions are connected through the Bergson's theory of memory. In the last charter, named Creative Evolution, we deal with the metaphysic concept of life by Bergson, which has always been connected with duration and freedom