A fundamentação e a correção de decisões jurídicas na aplicação do direito de igualdade geral exigem o cumprimento das regras e formas do discurso jurídico fundado em bases pragmático-universais. As viradas lingüística e pragmática, por obra de Frege, Wittgenstein e Peirce, fundaram os alicerces de uma teoria dos atos de fala, de Austin e Searle, de uma teoria da argumentação, de Toulmin, e de uma teoria comunicativa e discursiva da verdade e correção, em Habermas. A ética procedimentalista e cognitivista habermasiana reconstrói o princípio da universabilidade em trajes discursivos. Alexy enuncia um conceito não-positivista e inclusivo da moral fundamentado na pretensão de correção jurídica e argúi a tese do discurso jurídico como caso especial do discurso prático geral. Uma decisão jurídica correta deve ser justificada com base nas regras e formas da justificação interna e externa do discurso. A fundamentação das decisões por meio de argumentos de princípios coloca a exigência da aplicação do preceito da proporcionalidade. As dogmáticas e jurisprudências alemã e brasileira, na aplicação do direito de igualdade geral, utilizam inicialmente uma fórmula da proibição da arbitrariedade ou correlação lógica, da qual resulta uma vinculação fraca do legislador, e passam a adotar uma fórmula baseada na proporcionalidade, com uma vinculação severa do legislador, especialmente quando há tratamento desigual de indivíduos com características especiais elencadas na Constituição. A racionalidade de uma decisão que se utiliza da estrutura da proporcionalidade depende da justificação externa de cada uma das premissas usadas na justificação interna. Há uma relação necessária entre discurso jurídico, proporcionalidade e dogmáticas dos direitos fundamentais. / The justification and correction of legal decisions in the application of general equality principle demands the fullfilment of rules and forms of legal discourse founded on a universal-pragmatic basis. The linguistic and pragmatic turn, by Frege, Wittgenstein, and Peirce, established the foundations of a theory of speech acts, by Austin and Searle, of a theory of reasoning, by Toulmin, and a communicative and discoursive theory on truth and correctness in Habermas. The habermasian proceduralism and cognitivism ethics reconstructs the principle of universability in discoursive ways. Alexy states a non-positivistic and moral inclusive concept of law grounded in the claim to legal correction and argues that the legal discourse must be understood as a special case of general practical discourse. A correct legal decision must be justified on the rules and forms of internal and external justification of discourse. The justification for the decisions by means of arguments of principle sets the demand of applying the partial requirements of proportionality. German and Brazilian legal theory and jurisprudence, in applying the right to general equality, apply initially a formula of prohibition of arbitrary and correlational logic, where there is a weak attachment of the legislature, and start adopting a formula based on proportionality, where there is severe attachment of the legislature, especially in the case of discrimination against individuals with special features listed in the Constitution. The rationality of a decision which uses the structure of proportionality depends on the external justification of each of the premises used in the internal justification. There is a necessary link between proportionality, legal discourse and fundamental rights legal theory.

A fundamentação e a correção de decisões jurídicas na aplicação do direito de igualdade geral exigem o cumprimento das regras e formas do discurso jurídico fundado em bases pragmático-universais. As viradas lingüística e pragmática, por obra de Frege, Wittgenstein e Peirce, fundaram os alicerces de uma teoria dos atos de fala, de Austin e Searle, de uma teoria da argumentação, de Toulmin, e de uma teoria comunicativa e discursiva da verdade e correção, em Habermas. A ética procedimentalista e cognitivista habermasiana reconstrói o princípio da universabilidade em trajes discursivos. Alexy enuncia um conceito não-positivista e inclusivo da moral fundamentado na pretensão de correção jurídica e argúi a tese do discurso jurídico como caso especial do discurso prático geral. Uma decisão jurídica correta deve ser justificada com base nas regras e formas da justificação interna e externa do discurso. A fundamentação das decisões por meio de argumentos de princípios coloca a exigência da aplicação do preceito da proporcionalidade. As dogmáticas e jurisprudências alemã e brasileira, na aplicação do direito de igualdade geral, utilizam inicialmente uma fórmula da proibição da arbitrariedade ou correlação lógica, da qual resulta uma vinculação fraca do legislador, e passam a adotar uma fórmula baseada na proporcionalidade, com uma vinculação severa do legislador, especialmente quando há tratamento desigual de indivíduos com características especiais elencadas na Constituição. A racionalidade de uma decisão que se utiliza da estrutura da proporcionalidade depende da justificação externa de cada uma das premissas usadas na justificação interna. Há uma relação necessária entre discurso jurídico, proporcionalidade e dogmáticas dos direitos fundamentais. / The justification and correction of legal decisions in the application of general equality principle demands the fullfilment of rules and forms of legal discourse founded on a universal-pragmatic basis. The linguistic and pragmatic turn, by Frege, Wittgenstein, and Peirce, established the foundations of a theory of speech acts, by Austin and Searle, of a theory of reasoning, by Toulmin, and a communicative and discoursive theory on truth and correctness in Habermas. The habermasian proceduralism and cognitivism ethics reconstructs the principle of universability in discoursive ways. Alexy states a non-positivistic and moral inclusive concept of law grounded in the claim to legal correction and argues that the legal discourse must be understood as a special case of general practical discourse. A correct legal decision must be justified on the rules and forms of internal and external justification of discourse. The justification for the decisions by means of arguments of principle sets the demand of applying the partial requirements of proportionality. German and Brazilian legal theory and jurisprudence, in applying the right to general equality, apply initially a formula of prohibition of arbitrary and correlational logic, where there is a weak attachment of the legislature, and start adopting a formula based on proportionality, where there is severe attachment of the legislature, especially in the case of discrimination against individuals with special features listed in the Constitution. The rationality of a decision which uses the structure of proportionality depends on the external justification of each of the premises used in the internal justification. There is a necessary link between proportionality, legal discourse and fundamental rights legal theory.

A fundamentação e a correção de decisões jurídicas na aplicação do direito de igualdade geral exigem o cumprimento das regras e formas do discurso jurídico fundado em bases pragmático-universais. As viradas lingüística e pragmática, por obra de Frege, Wittgenstein e Peirce, fundaram os alicerces de uma teoria dos atos de fala, de Austin e Searle, de uma teoria da argumentação, de Toulmin, e de uma teoria comunicativa e discursiva da verdade e correção, em Habermas. A ética procedimentalista e cognitivista habermasiana reconstrói o princípio da universabilidade em trajes discursivos. Alexy enuncia um conceito não-positivista e inclusivo da moral fundamentado na pretensão de correção jurídica e argúi a tese do discurso jurídico como caso especial do discurso prático geral. Uma decisão jurídica correta deve ser justificada com base nas regras e formas da justificação interna e externa do discurso. A fundamentação das decisões por meio de argumentos de princípios coloca a exigência da aplicação do preceito da proporcionalidade. As dogmáticas e jurisprudências alemã e brasileira, na aplicação do direito de igualdade geral, utilizam inicialmente uma fórmula da proibição da arbitrariedade ou correlação lógica, da qual resulta uma vinculação fraca do legislador, e passam a adotar uma fórmula baseada na proporcionalidade, com uma vinculação severa do legislador, especialmente quando há tratamento desigual de indivíduos com características especiais elencadas na Constituição. A racionalidade de uma decisão que se utiliza da estrutura da proporcionalidade depende da justificação externa de cada uma das premissas usadas na justificação interna. Há uma relação necessária entre discurso jurídico, proporcionalidade e dogmáticas dos direitos fundamentais. / The justification and correction of legal decisions in the application of general equality principle demands the fullfilment of rules and forms of legal discourse founded on a universal-pragmatic basis. The linguistic and pragmatic turn, by Frege, Wittgenstein, and Peirce, established the foundations of a theory of speech acts, by Austin and Searle, of a theory of reasoning, by Toulmin, and a communicative and discoursive theory on truth and correctness in Habermas. The habermasian proceduralism and cognitivism ethics reconstructs the principle of universability in discoursive ways. Alexy states a non-positivistic and moral inclusive concept of law grounded in the claim to legal correction and argues that the legal discourse must be understood as a special case of general practical discourse. A correct legal decision must be justified on the rules and forms of internal and external justification of discourse. The justification for the decisions by means of arguments of principle sets the demand of applying the partial requirements of proportionality. German and Brazilian legal theory and jurisprudence, in applying the right to general equality, apply initially a formula of prohibition of arbitrary and correlational logic, where there is a weak attachment of the legislature, and start adopting a formula based on proportionality, where there is severe attachment of the legislature, especially in the case of discrimination against individuals with special features listed in the Constitution. The rationality of a decision which uses the structure of proportionality depends on the external justification of each of the premises used in the internal justification. There is a necessary link between proportionality, legal discourse and fundamental rights legal theory.

The aim of this thesis is to visualize and explain how people’s economic and social relations were connected in the parish of Sundborn, in the south east of Dalarna, in the period 1820-1849. The study is based on records of claims and debts in inventories and parish registers, which enable reconstruction of the private local credit market. The study shows that the majority in the economic network lived in Sundborn, and that while few people had formal loans at the institutional credit market, many had loans by trust at the private local credit market. Also, while few people were lenders, almost everyone was a borrower. The most common credit relationship was between people who lived near one another, and people who lived near one another or were related received a higher average credit. The private local credit market consisted primarily of men. These results have been interpreted with the use of social network theory, it being shown that people depended on their social network to obtain the necessary credit. In creating an economic network graph, I show that households in the parish of Sundborn were interconnected by debt relations. By using this method, it is possible to identify significant persons and potential parish bankers. Through combining the network graph with a landscape map, I show connections between the settlement, the assets, economic relations, centrality and the long valley of Sundborn river. The study opens up possibilities for further development of the same method to visualize historic data and relate it to the landscape, with a view to generating new related questions and spatial analyses.

The Faith Movement is a religious mosaic since it is a multi-layered phenomenon which is coloured by several themes. These themes represent several areas of emphasis like: Blessing and Blessings, Power to declare, Prophetic anointing, connecting with the anointing, dominion, success and increase, sowing the seeds, as well as other ideas which are still evolving. The Word of Faith teachers have a very unique way of reading the Bible. They usually approach the text without consideration of its historical and cultural context. When they approach the biblical text they usually assign to it an independent existence cut off from its natural context. This in turn results in the reinterpretation of all the major doctrines of the Christian faith. Both God and human beings belong to the same class of “divine beings.” God and human beings it is believed operate under the rule of faith. It is argued that whatever God created, God did so by speaking words of faith (see Genesis 1:1-3). It is therefore argued that human beings similarly can create their own reality and destiny by speaking words of faith.Christology and Pneumatology of the Faith Movement assume a rather narrow outlook. It is believed that Jesus Christ died so that in addition to the forgiveness of sins He provided for all spiritual and material needs of the people. Therefore, no Christian should be poor or sick. The Holy Spirit on the other hand, is the anointing that enables believers to make it in life. It must be pointed out that even though the Word of Faith ideas were exported to Africa mainly from the United States of America it has found a home in Africa. The concepts of blessings and curses have a corollary in African Religious Traditional thought. The role that Word of Faith preachers play is similar to the roles played by several religious experts in African Religious Thought. Ultimately, the Faith Movement is not based on sound theological and philosophical ground. It is based on unique reading of the Bible which is more esoteric than theological. More Gnostic than Christian. / Philosophy & Systematic Theology / D. Th. (Systematic Theology)

所有權結構、支付制度與競爭係影響醫院績效之關鍵因子，本研究援用相關文獻之發現，推論出三項因素對醫院績效之關係，並以我國獨特之總額預算制度為研究對象，蒐集、串連與合併不同來源之資料，實證檢視衝量競爭與所有權結構對醫院營運績效與醫療品質之聯合效果。 台灣於民國91年7月實施醫院總額預算制度後，浮動點值制度之設計為醫院間引入了衝量競爭(即虛假價格競爭)，而結算後之點值則係反映出醫院間衝量競爭後之結果，醫院除了需面對支付點值所致之財務衝擊外，尚須面對自全民健保實行後，備受醫院詬病之核減制度之衝擊，因此，本文首先嘗試估算醫院受到核減與支付點值所致之財務衝擊程度。無論是國外或國內之研究，對於不同所有權結構醫院之績效表現是否有差異性，一直無法獲得一致性之結論，除了納入營運效率之績效指標外，本研究亦採用疾病別與醫院層級別之醫療品質指標來檢視不同所有權結構醫院之績效表現。更以考量核減與支付點值所致之財務衝擊程度，取代目前文獻僅以總額前、後之二元變數，評估財務衝擊程度對營運效率、醫療品質與財務績效之影響。最後，則是檢視總額預算制度下，醫院受到之財務衝擊度是否會縮小不同所有權結構醫院之營運效率與醫療品質表現之差距。 實證研究發現，不同所有權結構醫院之營運效率並未有顯著差異，但不同所有權結構醫院在某些疾病別品質指標(子宮肌瘤切除手術之住院超過7日機率與再入院率)與醫院層級品質指標(院內感染率與淨死亡率)表現上則有差異性；且公立或非營利醫院受到核減與支付點值之財務衝擊高於私立醫院，因此不同所有權結構醫院之行為與績效存有某些差異性。台灣的醫院在總額預算制度下，若受到之財務衝擊程度愈大，其營運效率會變差、醫療品質也受到負面之影響、財團法人醫院之醫務利益率與稅後淨利率也會降低，但現金流量比則會增加，故財務衝擊愈大，醫院之績效愈低。若同時考量財務衝擊度對不同所有權結構醫院之營運效率與醫療品質之聯合效果後，可發現財務衝擊雖然不會縮小公立(或非營利)醫院與私立醫院營運效率之差距，卻縮小公立(或非營利)醫院與私立醫院醫療品質之差距，故以台灣資料可部分支持「不同所有權結構醫院績效差距縮小之因素係競爭力量之崛起」之論點。 / Hospital ownership, payment system and competition are all key drivers to influence hospital performance. This research infer and depict the association of these three drivers from the related literature and empirically examined the effects of fictitious price competition due to the floating point-value system and ownership on hospital operational performance and quality of care by combing and merging different sources of data. Deduction rate of claim and the floating point-value system are the two controversial debates to the payment system. I attempt to estimate hospital financial pressures as precipitated by deduction rate of claim and floating point-value system. To investigate whether for-profit, not-for-profit, and government hospitals differ in operating performance and quality of care, five diagnose-level and two hospital-level quality indicators are selected. Different from prior research, the financial pressure is captured by hospital data instead of a binary variable (pre and post global budget) and I examine the effect of financial pressure on hospital operational efficiency, quality of care and financial performance. Finally, we test whether differences in operational efficiency and quality care among hospitals with different ownership forms will mitigate or narrow, as hospital financial pressure increases. The results show that for-profit, not-for-profit and government hospitals are far more alike than different in operational efficiency, but ownership affects not only the rate of readmission and the rate of the length of stay larger than 7 days of uterine myomectomy, but also the hospital-level quality indicators: the rate of nosocomial infection and hospital mortality rate. I also find higher financial pressure incurred at government or not-for-profit hospitals than for-profits hospitals. Given my findings, we conclude that hospital ownership status affect performance in terms of quality of care and financial pressure from rate of deduction and float point-value system. The study shows that financial pressure adversely affects operational efficiency and quality of care. As not-for proprietary hospital financial pressure increases, the profit margin and net profit ratio will decrease, but the cash flow ratio will increase. Nonetheless, deduction rate of claim and global budget has a negative impact on hospital performance. This research further considers the joint effect of financial pressure on difference between quality of care and efficiency of for-profit hospitals and the other two types. My results indicate that hospital financial pressure mitigates the difference of quality of care between for-profit hospital and not-for profit (or government) hospitals, but does not narrow the difference in quality of care between for-profit hospital and not-for profit (or government) hospitals. This finding partly supports that increased competition should force not-for-profit (or governmental) hospitals to be increasingly similar to their for-profit counterparts.

Sous l'effet de l'utilisation répétée de la notion de propriété des créances par le législateur et par les juridictions, l'urgence de l'élaboration d'une théorie de la propriété des créances apparaît. Or ce sujet suscite encore controverses, réserves, interrogations et incertitudes. L'alliance de la propriété et des créances apparaît souvent comme une hérésie. En effet, la notion de propriété des créances est généralement condamnée, non seulement parce que la propriété des biens corporels est considérée comme la seule propriété authentique, mais aussi parce qu'elle semble s'intégrer difficilement dans la distinction traditionnelle des droits réels et des droits personnels. Pourtant n'est-il pas logique de se poser la question de savoir si cet usage réitéré de l'expression « propriété des créances » ne constitue qu'un dérapage linguistique sans portée réelle, ou s'il s'agit de l'expression d'une réalité qui se serait manifestée par le vecteur du langage ? La condamnation doctr inale de la propriété des créances ne repose-t-elle pas sur des présupposés théoriques ? Le principal enjeu de cette thèse consiste à se prononcer sur la possibilité théorique de la notion de propriété des créances. Peut-on juridiquement employer le terme propriété, dans son sens technique, pour désigner la relation qui unit le créancier à sa créance, ou bien s'il faut s'en tenir à la notion de titularité ? Au vrai, cette question de l'existence du concept de propriété des créances est primordiale car elle est aussi préjudicielle à celle de la protection de la créance par le biais du droit de propriété. Une fois l'adaptation du droit de propriété aux créances réalisée, ces biens incorporels n'auront effectivement plus qu'à se glisser dans le moule de la propriété et qu'à se nourrir de l'intérêt fondamental de cette notion, le bénéfice de sa protection assurément très efficace. Au fil de ces travaux, l'on découvre néanmoins que seul l'assouplissement de la rigueur de la défin ition classique de la propriété concilié à l'affermissement de celle des créances rend possible la compatibilité des deux notions. / Under the effect of repeated use of the concept of ownership of receivables by the legislature and the courts, the urgency of developing a theory of property claims appears. This subject still arouses controversy, reservations, questions and uncertainties. The combination of property and debt is often seen as a heresy. Indeed, the notion of ownership of the claims is generally condemned, not only because the ownership of tangible property is considered the only real property, but also because it seems to fit easily into the traditional distinction between real rights and personal rights. Yet is it not logical to ask whether the repeated use of the phrase "property claims" only a linguistic slippage without real significance, or whether the expression a reality which would have emerged by the vector of language? The doctrinal condemnation of property claims is not she pa on theoretical assumptions? The main goal of this thesis is to decide on the theoretical possibility of the concept of property claims. Can we legally use the term ownership in its technical sense, to designate the relation between the creditor's claim, or whether to stick to the notion of authorship? In truth, this question of the existence of the concept of ownership of receivables is important because it is also referred to the protection of the debt through property rights. Once the adjustment of property rights claims made, these intangible assets will effectively more than slipping into the mold of the property and that feed on the fundamental interest of this notion, the benefit of its certainly very effective protection. Throughout this work, however, one discovers that only the relaxation of the rigor of the classical definition of property reconciled to the consolidation of claims that makes possible the compatibility of both concepts.

L’arbitrage public international est demeuré un domaine exclusif aux États souverains jusqu’à la fin des années 50, alors que sont apparus les traités bilatéraux relatifs aux investissements (TBI). La principale caractéristique de ces TBI est sans conteste le recours direct de l’investisseur étranger en arbitrage international contre des États récalcitrants, une alternative aux tribunaux locaux souvent inefficaces. Plus récemment, en 1998, l’organe d’appel de l’OMC est allé jusqu’à accepter l’opinion d’amicus curiae dans un différend opposant des États et aujourd’hui, l’admission de ce type d’opinion est expressément prévue dans plusieurs TBI de nouvelle génération. Mais si l’investisseur bénéficie d’un recours devant une instance arbitrale neutre, il en va tout autrement pour la population locale qui se trouve souvent lésée par la présence, sur son territoire, d’investisseurs étrangers. Le droit de présenter une opinion ne peut remplacer le droit de faire valoir une réclamation. Se pose donc la question : est-ce que, dans le contexte actuel du droit de l’investissement international, des tiers (par rapport aux parties signataires de TBI et par rapport aux parties au différend) peuvent prétendre à une voie de recours direct en arbitrage international? Nous sommes d’avis qu’une telle voie de recours est actuellement possible et que le contexte de l’arbitrage relatif à l’investissement constitue un terrain fertile pour la mise en place de ce droit, étant donné la place déjà faite aux investisseurs. Nous verrons que les principales objections à l’admission de tiers à l’arbitrage international peuvent être rejetées. L’objection de l’absence du consentement des parties intéressées tombe quand on constate les nombreux cas d’arbitrage international où la portée du consentement a été étendue pour inclure des non-parties ou encore pour soumettre à l’arbitrage des matières non envisagées au départ. Par ailleurs, l’absence de qualité pour agir en droit international est un problème théorique, car les investisseurs y ont déjà accès malgré l’absence de cette qualité. Reste donc à déterminer quelle pourrait être la base d’un recours en droit substantiel international pour qu’un tiers puisse faire valoir une réclamation. Nous verrons qu’il existe des instruments juridiques et des principes internationaux dont la contravention pourrait très bien engager la responsabilité de l’État ou de l’investisseur fautif, tout comme il est possible de bien circonscrire les critères d’admissibilité des tiers à la procédure d’arbitrage international. / International arbitration has remained an exclusive domain sovereign states until, in the late 50s, came the first bilateral investment treaties (BITs). The main feature of these BITs is undoubtedly the right, granted to investors, to direct international arbitration against recalcitrant States, an alternative to often ineffective local justice. More recently, in 1998, the appellate body of the WTO went to accept the opinion of an independent amicus curiae in a dispute between State members. Today, the admission of such opinions is clearly provided for in several recent BITs. But if investors benefit from a right of action before a neutral international arbitration body, the situation is quite different for the local population, who is often affected by the presence of foreign investors on its territory. The right to submit an opinion cannot replace the right to legal action. This therefore raises one question: in the current context of international investment law, is it possible for third parties (non signatories of BITs and not parties to the dispute) are entitled to a remedy direct international arbitration? We are of the opinion that the answer to this question is: yes. And the context of investment arbitration, because of the right to direct arbitration against States already granted to investors, constitutes a fertile ground for the implementation of this right of action in favour of third parties. The objection based on the absence of the parties’ consent to such right of action has been set aside in many international arbitration cases where the scope of consent has been extended to include non-parties or to submit to arbitration matters not contemplated at first. Also, the objection based on the absence of legal standing of third parties in International Law proves to be theoretical as foreign investors already have access to international justice despite the lack of this quality. There remains to determine what substantial International Law will constitute a valid legal basis for a third party claim. We will see that there exists legal instruments and international principles and that their violation by States or investors may result in the obligation to compensate the prejudice suffered, as well as it is possible to clearly define and indentify who the third parties could be.

70 Abstract This diploma thesis is focused mainly on the judgment by acknowledgement and judgment by default which are institutes of the civil procedural law, which purpose is mainly to increase the efficiency of the legal proceedings. The aim of the thesis is to offer a complete overview of the current legal legislation and its practical usage. At the same time this thesis attempts to cope with problems, which the current legislation suffers with, and offers convenient conceptual solutions. This piece of work is divided into five chapters. The first chapter generally concerns the judgment by acknowledgement and clarifies the conditions in details that are essential to meet for its issuance. It concurrently distinguishes the judgment issued on the basis of actual acknowledgement by defendant and a judgment issued on the basis of legal fiction of acknowledgement of claim. The second chapter is dedicated to the institute of judgment by default. In the first subchapter the individual preconditions for the judgment by default issuing are being discussed in details, whether the formal or the material ones. This subchapter is divided according to these individual preconditions. The second subchapter deals closely with the defence of the defendant consisting in the proposal of cancellation of the judgment by...

Les divisions de la créance ne renvoient qu’aux hypothèses de l’article 1309 du code civil : la division de la créance constituée au profit de plusieurs créanciers et la division de la créance dévolue à une pluralité d’héritiers. Pourtant, le procédé ne doit pas être réduit à ces deux occurrences. Peuvent être identifiées non seulement d’autres divisions de l’objet de la créance, mais également des divisions d’une autre forme, qui consisteraient en une répartition des prérogatives du droit de créance. Suivant un classement des divisions de la créance – division de l’objet de la créance, division des prérogatives du droit de créance –, il faut identifier les mécanismes qui y correspondent et, le cas échéant, établir des rapprochements susceptibles de compléter leur régime. S’agissant des divisions de l’objet de la créance, le modèle de l’article 1309 du Code civil consiste dans l’attribution, par un effet légal, à chacun des créanciers ou des héritiers du créancier d’un droit complet sur une fraction de l’objet de la créance. Au-delà, le modèle peut être reproduit par l’effet de la volonté grâce à des mécanismes – comme la cession partielle de créance – qui permettent de transmettre, par l’effet de la volonté, un droit sur une fraction de l’objet de la créance. S’agissant des divisions des prérogatives de la créance, le modèle réside dans le démembrement du droit de propriété. D’abord, ce modèle s’applique à la créance pour en diviser les prérogatives – avec l’usufruit de la créance ou un droit réel sui generis. Ensuite, se pose la question de l’imitation du modèle, c’est-à-dire de la possibilité de diviser directement les prérogatives du droit de créance. / The divisions of the credit-claim refer only to the hypotheses of article 1309 of the French Civil Code : the division of the credit-claim to the benefit of multiple creditors and the division of the credit-claim transferred to multiple heirs. However this process must not be limited to these two occurrences. Firstly, it is possible to identify other ways to divide the credit-claim’s subject matter. Secondly, the division of a credit-claim may consist in distributing the prerogatives resulting from the credit-claim. Following a typology of the divisions of the credit-claim – divisions of the subject matter of the credit-claim, division of the prerogatives resulting from the credit-claim -, it is necessary to identify the corresponding notions and, where appropriate, to suggest how their regimes can be perfected accordingly.As far as the divisions of the credit-claim’s subject matter are concerned, the way they are modelled on article 1309 of the Civil Code consists in conferring, through an effect of the legislation, to each creditor or to each creditor’s heir a full right on a fraction of the credit-claim’s subject matter. This initial model can be expanded, as it can be replicate through the effects of will, thanks to notions such as the partial assignment of the credit-claim which enable the transfer, through the effects of individual will, of right on a fraction of the credit-claim’s subject matter.As for the divisions of the prerogatives attached to the credit-claim, the archetypal reference is the dismemberment of ownership. Firstly, this archetype applies to the credit-claim in order to divide its prerogatives – with the usufruct of the credit-claim or a sui generis real right. Secondly, the question is whether it is possible to replicate the model, ie whether it is possible to divide directly the prerogatives of the credit-claim.