Le renouveau du constitutionnalisme amorcé dans les années 1990 en Afrique subsaharienne francophone et la menace sécuritaire grandissante à travers le monde réorientent la problématique des rapports qu’entretient la liberté d’opinion avec l’ordre public sécuritaire. La reconnaissance constitutionnelle de la liberté d’opinion exige que l’exercice de cette liberté se fasse dans le respect de l’ordre public matériel, avec au coeur de cet ordre juridicisé, la sécurité des personnes, des biens et du territoire national par extension. Cette reconnaissance impose de s’interroger sur la conciliation de la liberté d’opinion avec l’ordre public sécuritaire en Afrique subsaharienne francophone (Bénin- Côte d’Ivoire-Sénégal) à la lumière de l’expérience des grandes démocraties contemporaines (Allemagne-France). Dans la présente recherche, l’exigence de conciliation s’appuie sur des fondements constitutionnels et son respect doit être assuré par un ensemble de garanties juridiques. Cependant, la conciliation trouve ses limites dans les contingences politiques, économiques et sociales propres aux États de l’Afrique subsaharienne francophone. En effet, dans des pays où l’État de droit est en gestation,la conciliation de deux normes de valeur constitutionnelle est incertaine, surtout lorsque l’une d’entre elle, la liberté d’opinion, peut être mise en oeuvre contre le pouvoir politique tandis que l’autre, l’ordre public sécuritaire, peut lui servir de prétexte pour limiter l’exercice de cette liberté. La réflexion invite in fine à repenser la conciliation de la liberté d’opinion avec l’ordre public sécuritaire comme un nouveau principe constitutionnel en Afrique subsaharienne francophone. / The renewal of constitutionalism, initiated in the 1990’s in francophone sub-Saharan Africa,and the worldwide growing security threat reorient the issue of the relationships between freedom of opinion and public security order. The constitutional recognition of freedom of opinion requires that the exercise of this freedom be done according to substantive public policy, with, at the heart of this legalised policy, the safety of people, property and, by extension, national territory. This recognition demands that we question the conciliation of freedom of opinion with public security order in francophone sub-Saharan Africa (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal) in the light of the experience of great contemporary democracies (Germany, France). In this research, constitutional grounds support the conciliation requirement and its respect must be ensured by legal guarantees. However, conciliation finds its limits in the political, economic and social contingencies specific to the francophone sub-Saharan States of Africa. Indeed, in these countries where the rule of law is building up, the conciliation of two constitutional standards is uncertain, especially when one of them, freedom of opinion, can threaten political power whereas the other one, public security order, can become an excuse to limit the exercise of this freedom. The essay invites in fine to reconsider the conciliation of freedom of opinion with public security order as a new constitutional principle in francophone sub-Saharan Africa.

L’effet horizontal implique l’application de la Convention EDH dans les relations interindividuelles. Justifiée par la théorie des obligations positives, cette construction jurisprudentielle permet la mise en jeu de la responsabilité internationale de l’État lorsque celui-ci ne prend pas les mesures nécessaires pour prévenir et réprimer les violations de la Convention commises par les personnes privées. La reconnaissance de l’effet horizontal par le juge européen a pour conséquence la prolifération des obligations substantielles et procédurales de l’État. La transposition de celles-ci dans l’ordre juridique interne astreint les autorités publiques, y compris les tribunaux, à intervenir dans les rapports privés. Nécessaire à l’effectivité des droits de l’homme, la diffusion de l’effet horizontal a pour contrepartie l’accroissement de l’intervention étatique dans la sphère privée et l’apparition des devoirs individuels fondés sur le respect des droits et libertés d’autrui. La Cour EDH, pionnière de l’ « horizontalisation », refuse d’en élaborer une théorie générale. Le défi est dès lors de délimiter l’extension des droits de l’homme aux relations interindividuelles afin que celle-ci ne devienne pas un facteur d’affaiblissement de la protection verticale des droits de l’homme. / The horizontal effect involves the application of the ECHR in interindividual relationships. Justified by the theory of positive obligations, this jurisprudential construction allows to establish the international responsibility of the State when it fails to take necessary measures to prevent and suppress violations of the Convention committed by private persons. Recognition of the horizontal effect by the European judge results in the proliferation of substantive and procedural obligations of the State. Transposing them into domestic law compels public authorities, including courts, to interfere in private relations. Necessary for the effectiveness of human rights, the diffusion of the horizontal effect generates, in return, an extension of State intervention in the private sphere and the emergence of individual duties based on the respect of the rights and freedoms of others. The European Court of Human Rights, pioneer of the « horizontalization », refuses to develop a general theory. The challenge is therefore to delimit the extension of human rights to relations between individuals so that it does not become a factor of weakening of the vertical protection of human rights.

Délimitée par référence à la jurisprudence de la Cour Européenne des droits de l’homme, le champ pénal de l’Union européenne se révèle plus conséquent que ce que l’apposition du qualificatif « pénal », en droit de l’Union, ne le laisse penser. Envisager dans sa globalité, à l’aune des caractéristiques d’un système juridique et des modèles pénaux existant, les éléments du champ pénal de l’Union européenne peuvent alors s’agencer comme les pièces d'un puzzle qui prend progressivement forme et dont l'image générale se dessine peu à peu. Le champ pénal de l’Union européenne n’est plus qu’une compilation de normes. Il constitue désormais un système juridique : un ensemble d'éléments en interaction, évoluant dans un environnement déterminé, structuré en fonction des finalités qu’il est destiné à satisfaire, agissant sur son environnement et se transformant avec le temps sans perdre son identité. Son idéologie pénale à dominante répressive n’a rien de particulièrement original ; sa physionomie, en tant que système pénal, en revanche, reproduit l'atypisme proprement unioniste / Defined by the Europe court of human rights (ECHR), the EU extend its scope of action beyond the definition of « penal » as found in the EU law. Seen as a whole, taken the characteristics and models of already existing law systems, the different elements of the EU law scope can be put together like a jigsaw puzzle, revealing pieces after pieces the general picture. The penal scope of the EU isn’t just about regulations anymore. It acts as a legal system - a set of elements interacting with one another, evolving in set environment, structured to meet set up goals, taking action on its environment and evolving with time without losing its identity/nature. Its penal ideology and restrictive tendencies are not innovative, but its structure, on the other hand, replicate the atypical trait of the EU

Le trafic d’armes à feu au sein de l’Union européenne est une menace préoccupante contre l’espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice poussant l’Union et ses États membres à réagir afin de renforcer leur cadre juridique. Néanmoins, il est difficile d’apporter aux problématiques posées par le trafic d’armes à feu une solution légale du fait de ses caractéristiques et sa transversalité. Les stocks d’armes à feu se trouvant aux frontières de l’Union européenne sont détournés afin d’être introduit dans l’espace sans frontières par de multiples acteurs aux intérêts et motivations diverses. Ces traits de caractères rendent difficile la mise en place d’un cadre juridique harmonisé dans des domaines restant sous le joug de la souveraineté nationale. Ces difficultés ont entrainé le développement d’un cadre juridique imparfait et limité créant des failles juridiques dont les trafiquants profitent. Néanmoins, les solutions existent et sont pour certaines déjà présentes dans le cadre normatif de l’Union européenne. Cependant, l’évolution du trafic d’armes à feu et de ses acteurs conduit également à envisager le développement de nouveaux mécanismes et de nouveaux pans du droit / Firearms trafficking within the European Union is a worrying threat to the area of freedom, security and justice, prompting the Union and its Member States to react in order to strengthen their legal framework. Nevertheless, the issue of firearms is complex to legislate because of its characteristics and its cross-cutting nature. Firearm stocks at the borders of the European Union are diverted in order to be introduced into the border-free area by multiple actors with diverse interests and motivations. These characteristics make it difficult to establish a harmonised legal framework in areas that remain under the yoke of national sovereignty. These difficulties have led to the development of an imperfect and limited legal framework creating legal loopholes from which traffickers benefit. Nevertheless, solutions exist and some of them are already present in the European Union's normative framework. However, the evolution of firearms trafficking and its actors also leads us to consider the development of new mechanisms and new areas of the law

No description available.

In October 2010, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union adopted Directive 2010/64/EU on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings. For the first time in the history of the EU, an official regulation of interpretation and translation services in criminal proceedings in all EU countries seemed within reach. The Directive inspired high hopes because it explicitly addressed – likewise a first in EU history – the quality of translation services. These hopes were soon deflated, however, as it became clear that not all of the requirements would be sufficiently implemented. This thesis analyses the Directive’s implementation, ten years after its adoption, in Germany, Poland, and Spain, pursuing the question of whether and to what extent the original objectives were achieved through changes to the relevant national legislation in each country and examining the practical application of such changes through judicial decisions made between 2013 and 2019. Particular attention is paid to the comparative analysis, which draws on a rich array of interdisciplinary sources. The requirements of the Directive, summarized by the author in ten key points, serve as parameters for classifying the countries’ actions as “full”, “unclear”, or “insufficient” implementations of said requirements. This reveals the improvements that have been made and the contradictions and systemic problems that remain. It is determined that the latter are primarily related to interpretation services and that the greatest shortcomings in all three countries relate to quality – the actual centrepiece of the Directive. The analysis of the practical application of relevant national laws illuminates early tendencies in the judicial interpretation of the Directive. Illustrative judicial decisions from the European level (CJEU, ECHR) and from Germany, Poland, and Spain suggest that a rather restrictive interpretation is taking root. / Im Oktober 2010 verabschiedeten das Europäische Parlament und der Europäische Rat die Richtlinie 2010/64/EU über das Recht auf Dolmetschleistungen und Übersetzungen in Strafverfahren. Sie regulierte zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte der EU das Dolmetschen und Übersetzen in Strafverfahren auf der EU Ebene, und bezog sich – auch das war ein Novum – explizit auf die Qualität von Translationsleistungen. Sie weckte große Hoffnungen, die jedoch bald gedämpft wurden, als sich zeigte, dass nicht alle Forderungen zureichend umgesetzt werden würden. Vorliegende Arbeit analysiert zehn Jahre nach der Verabschiedung dieser Richtlinie ihre Umsetzung in Deutschland, Polen und Spanien ausgehend von der Frage, ob und in welchem Umfang die ursprünglichen Zielsetzungen durch Änderungen der jeweils einschlägigen nationalen Gesetzgebung erreicht wurden und prüft auch die praktische Anwendung durch Gerichtsentscheide zwischen 2013 und 2019. Ein besonderes Augenmerk liegt auf dem Vergleich, für den breit gefächerte, interdisziplinäre Quellen herangezogen werden. Die von der Verfasserin in zehn Punkten zusammengefassten Forderungen der Richtlinie dienen dabei als Parameter für die Einordnung in vollständig, unklar und unzureichend umgesetzte Forderungen. So wird aufgezeigt, welche Verbesserungen vorgenommen wurden, und welche Widersprüche und systemischen Probleme weiterhin zu beobachten sind. Es wird herausgestellt, dass Letztere vor allem das Dolmetschen betreffen und dass die größten Missstände in allen drei Ländern in puncto Qualität herrschen: dem eigentlichen Herzstück der Richtlinie. Bei der Analyse der praktischen Anwendung der Gesetzgebung werden Tendenzen der ersten Jahre der Auslegung der Richtlinie aufgezeigt. Exemplarische Gerichtsentscheide auf der europäischen Ebene (EuGH, EGMR) und aus Deutschland, Polen und Spanien zeigen auf, dass sich eine restriktivere Auslegung zu etablieren scheint.

Competition and data protection law are two powerful regimes simultaneously shaping the use of digital information, which has given rise to new interactions between these areas of law. While most views on this intersection emphasize that competition and data protection law must work together, nascent developments indicate that these legal regimes may sometimes conflict.  In the first place, firms faced with antitrust allegations are to an increasing extent invoking the need to protect the privacy of their users to justify their impugned conduct. Here, the conduct could either be prohibited by competition law despite of data protection or justified under competition law because of data protection. In the EU, no such justification attempt has reached court-stage, and it remains unclear how an enforcer ought to deal with such a claim. In the second place, competition law can mandate a firm to provide access to commercially valuable personal data to its rivals under a competition law remedy. Where that is the case, the question arising in this connection is whether an enforcer can and should design the remedy in a way that aligns with data protection law. If so, the issue remains of how that ought to be done. The task of the thesis has been to explore these issues, legally, economically, and coherently.  The thesis has rendered four main conclusions. First, data protection has a justified role in EU competition law in two ways. On the one hand, enhanced data protection can increase the quality of a service and may thus be factored in the competitive analysis as a dimension of quality. On the other, data protection as a human right must be guaranteed in the application of competition law. Second, these perspectives can be squared with the criteria for justifying competition breaches, in that data protection can be invoked to exculpate a firm from antitrust allegations. Third, in that context, the human rights dimension of data protection may entail that the enforcer must consider data protection even if it is not invoked. However, allowing data protection interests to override competition law in this manner is relatively inefficient as it may lead to less innovation, higher costs, and lower revenues. Fourth, the profound importance of data protection in the EU necessarily means that enforcers should accommodate data protection interests in designing competition law remedies which mandate access to personal data. This may be done in several ways, including requirements to anonymize data before providing access, or to oblige the firm to be compliant with data protection law in the process of providing access. The analysis largely confirms that anonymization is the preferable option.

La protection des données personnelles sensibles consistait, jusqu'au RGPD, en un contrôle préalable réalisé par une autorité indépendante, malgré l’obstacle posé à la libre circulation. Cette protection renforcée est aujourd'hui remplacée par l’obligation du responsable de traitement d’élaborer une étude d’impact. Une telle mutation implique un risque de pré-légitimation des traitements et peut être favorable au responsable de traitement. Or, est-elle conforme au droit fondamental à la protection des données personnelles ? La thèse interroge le contenu de ce droit et la validité du RGPD. À partir d'une étude comparative allant des années 1970 à nos jours, entre quatre pays et l’Union européenne, les données personnelles sensibles sont choisies comme moyen d'analyse en raison de la protection particulière dont elles font l’objet. Il est démontré qu’en termes juridiques, la conception préventive fait partie de l’histoire de la protection européenne des données et peut donner un sens à la protection et à son seul bénéficiaire, l’individu.Un tel sens serait d’ailleurs conforme aux Constitutions nationales qui garantissent aussi l’individu malgré leurs variations. Cependant, cette conception n’est pas forcement compatible avec l’art. 8 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’UE. La thèse explique que cette disposition contient la garantie d’une conciliation (entre les libertés de l’UE et celles des individus) qui peut impliquer une réduction de la protection de ces dernières. Or, il revient à la CJUE, désormais seule compétente pour son interprétation, de dégager le contenu essentiel de ce droit ; objectif auquel la thèse pourrait contribuer. / Before the GDPR, protection of sensitive personal data consisted of a prior check by an independent authority despite limiting their free movement. This has been replaced by the obligation of the controller to prepare a privacy impact assessment. With this modification, one can assume a risk of pre-legitimization of data processing, putting the controller at an advantage. Is that compatible with the fundamental right to the protectionof personal data ? This thesis questions the content of this right and the validity of the GDPR. It is based on a comparative study from 1970s until present day between four European countries and the European Union, in which sensitive data are chosen as a meanto the analysis due to their particular protection. Research shows that in legal termsthe preventive conception is a part of the history of protection in the European Union. By limiting freedom of processing it gives meaning to protection and its only subject,the individual. Such an interpretation is compatible with National Constitutions despite their variations. However, the preventive conception of data protection is not so easily compatible with article 8 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. The thesis puts forward that this article contains the safeguard of a balancing, between EU liberties and individuals’ freedoms, which implicates reduced protection. It is up to the European Court of Justice to identify the essence of this right, an aim to which this thesis could contribute.

This research is an enquiry to find an electoral formula that conforms to Canadian constitutional values. Three core values that are pertinent to the issue of electoral systems are identified: democracy, diversity, and efficiency. Each of these core values is divided into different aspects. These aspects will form the backbone of the evaluation of different electoral systems in this work. I will begin with an evaluation of the plurality model of elections, which is currently used in Canada. I will demonstrate that many of the attributes of the current system are not in tune with Canadian constitutional values, in particular with the progressive interpretation that the Supreme Court of Canada has given to the right to vote as enshrined in Section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Although the interpretation of the right to vote will be the main thrust of the constitutional scrutiny in this work, attention will also be given to other pertinent rights such as equality rights, minority rights, and the freedom of expression. Next, I will examine provincial electoral reform initiatives that were initiated in five Canadian provinces. All of these initiatives - three of which were put to referenda and eventually defeated - proposed adopting a variant of proportional representation. Accordingly, I will evaluate proportional systems according to the intended values. I will conclude that these systems have problems of their own and they also cannot strike a fine balance between competing values. In the final stage, I will make a new proposal for elections to the Canadian Parliament. First, I will demonstrate that majority systems are better candidates to attain the envisioned values. Then I will introduce a new variant of the majority model, which I call a majority-preferential two-round variant. I will demonstrate that this new variant will outperform the other variants in the attainment of values if adopted for elections to the House of Commons. Finally, I will argue that the combination of a House of Commons elected through the majority-preferential formula and a proportionally elected Senate will result in a more balanced approach to the relevant constitutional values.

This study makes the assumption that community participation in the governance of mineral resources is a requirement of sustainable development and that through a fundamental rights-based approach, it can be made effective. The concern is that an affected community should not only be involved in the decision-making process, but its view must also influence the outcome in respect of whether or not a mineral project should take place and how it should address development issues at local level. It is assumed that this legal approach will improve mineral governance by bringing more transparency and accountability. In many African resource-rich countries, community participation has until now been practiced with more of a soft approach, with the consequence that it has been unable to eradicate the opacity existing in the management of revenues generated by mineral exploitation and also deal efficiently with the recurrence of fundamental rights violations in the mineral sector. Obviously, the success of the fundamental rights based-approach is not absolutely guaranteed because there are preconditions that must be fulfilled. The synergy between community participation and some relevant concepts like democracy, decentarlisation, accountability, (good) governance and sustainable development must be well balanced for the participation process to bring positive outcomes. Also, because the fundamental rights based-approach is conceived here within the framework of the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights, its normative and institutional components, despite the potential to make participation effective and successful, require that some critical challenges be addressed in practice. The study ends with the conclusion that the fundamental rights based-approach is appropriate to make community participation effective in the mineral-led development process taking place at local level, provided that its implementation is kept reasonable. / Constitutional, International & Indigenous Law / D.Law