Rooted in philosophy of education, the overall purpose of this dissertation is to renegotiate the relationship between education, religion, and democracy by placing the religious subject at the centre of this renegotiation. While education is the main focus, the study draws its energy from the fact that tensions around religious beliefs and practices seem to touch upon the very heart of liberal democracy. The study reads the tensions religious pluralism seems to be causing in contemporary education through a post-structural approach to difference and subjectivity. The purpose is accomplished in three movements. The first aims to show why the renegotiation is needed by examining how the relationship between education, democracy, and religion is currently being addressed in cosmopolitan education and deliberative education. The second movement introduces a model of democracy, radical democracy, that sees the process of defining the subject as a political process. It is argued that this model offers possibilities for seeing religion and the religious subject as part of the struggle for democracy. The third movement aims to develop how the relationship between education, democracy, and religion might change if we bring them together in a conversation whose conditions are not ‘owned’ by any one of them. To create this conversation, Hannah Arendt, Jacques Derrida, Søren Kierkegaard, and Emmanuel Levinas are brought together around three themes – love, freedom, and dialogue – referred to as ‘windows.’ The windows offer three examples in which religious subjectivity is made manifest but they also create a shift in perspective that invites other ways of seeing the tensions between religion and democracy. The aim of the study is to discuss how education might change when religion and democracy become questions for it through the perspectives offered in the windows and what this implies for the particular religious subject.

Le principal dessein de cette recherche consiste à suggérer une nouvelle hypothèse pour rendre intelligible la fabrique des constitutions en Afrique et partant rouvrir l’instance pendante du « procès en mimétisme » dont elle a longtemps été l’objet. Tout au long de leur histoire, les pays d’Afrique subsaharienne ont été imprégnés de représentations contradictoires du politique, justifiant ainsi le caractère ambivalent des structures politiques actuelles qui d’une certaine façon porte l’empreinte de ce processus de gestation troublée. Le processus de structuration politique de ces États amorcé depuis la période coloniale s’apparente à un « roman à la chaine » dont les chapitres n’ont pas cessé de se faire et de se défaire, à plusieurs « mains », locale et occidentale, à l’épreuve de cultures différentes. L’ordre constitutionnel qui en résulte renferme des références identitaires distinctes voire antinomiques, ayant une configuration protéiforme. Ce faisant, le constitutionnalisme des pays d’Afrique subsaharienne semble s’être installé dans l’hybride à la jonction des orientations inspirées par les États « du Nord » et réinterprétées par ceux qu’on dit « du Sud ». La circulation des modèles constitutionnels ou des « cultures constitutionnelles » en Afrique subsaharienne s’accompagne ainsi d’une réappropriation contextuelle. Tout se passe alors comme si le constitutionnalisme de ces pays était pris dans un tourbillon tissé d’imaginaires imbriqués. Il en résulte une tension entre les « standards constitutionnels » occidentaux et « les localismes constitutionnels ». On est donc loin de l’espace de mimesis, ou de celui de « l’isomorphisme constitutionnel » suggéré par certains auteurs comme paradigme explicatif du constitutionnalisme en Afrique. Nous suggérons plutôt l’idée d’un « polymorphisme constitutionnel » qui résulte d’une ré-imagination constitutionnelle néanmoins inachevée. Cette étude en fera la démonstration. / The main purpose of this research is to suggest a new hypothesis to make intelligible the making of constitutions in Africa and thus reopen the pending instance of the "mimicry trial" of which it has long been the object. Throughout their history, the countries of sub-Saharan Africa have been imbued with contradictory representations of politics, thus justifying the ambivalent nature of current political structures which in a way bears the indelible imprint of this process of troubled gestation. The process of political structuring of the States of sub-Saharan Africa initiated since the colonial period is similar to a "chain novel" whose chapters have not ceased to be made and undone, with several "hands", local and Western, to the test of distinct cultures. The resulting constitutional order contains distinct and even contradictory identity references, with a protean configuration. In doing so, the constitutionalism of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa seems to have settled in the hybrid at the junction of the orientations inspired by the States "of the North" and reinterpreted by those who are said to be "of the South". The circulation of constitutional models or “constitutional cultures” in sub-Saharan Africa is therefore accompanied by a contextual reappropriation. Everything then happens as if the constitutionalism of African countries were caught in a whirlwind woven of intertwined imaginaries. The result is a tension between Western “constitutional standards” and “constitutional localisms”. We are far from the space of mimesis, or that of “constitutional isomorphism” suggested by certain authors as an explanatory paradigm of constitutionalism in Africa. Rather, we suggest the idea of a “constitutional polymorphism” that results from an unfinished constitutional re-imagining. This study will demonstrate this.

Esta tese desenvolve uma pesquisa em torno do lugar da psicanálise no pensamento filosófico e político de Cornelius Castoriadis (1922-1997), sobretudo relativa à segunda etapa de sua obra a partir de 1968. Investiga e discute em particular duas hipóteses: 1. A função paradigmática da psicanálise (teoria e prática) foi constitutiva para a formulação da concepção de sujeito e, portanto, de autonomia conceito que foi adquirindo papel progressivamente central na obra castoridiana. 2. O modelo de sujeito que emerge dessa reflexão é sui generis, distinto das filosofias da segunda metade do Século XX, e representa uma virada conceitual que remete ao futuro da filosofia. Examina ainda, ao longo do texto, o processo de articulação entre a psicanálise e as idéias-mãe de Castoriadis: imaginação radical, criação, significações imaginárias sociais, imaginário social instituinte, etc. Como conclusão, tenta elucidar algumas conseqüências dessa virada nas esferas política, histórico-social, institucional e mesmo psíquica. / The present thesis develops a research concerned with the position of psychoanalysis within the boundaries of the philosophical and political thought of Cornelius Castoriadis (1922-1975), conferring a particular emphasis on the second stage of his work initiated in 1968. The framework investigates and discusses especially two hypotheses: 1. The paradigmatic function of psychoanalysis (theory and practice) with has been constitutive viewing the formulation of the subject conception and therefore comprises the statement of autonomy -- concept that progressively acquired a central role in the castoridian body of work. 2. The model of subject - that arises stemmed by this reflection results sui generis, for it distinct from the prevailing philosophies of the second half of the twentieth century and represents a conceptual turning point that conducts to consider and regard the future of philosophy. Throughout the text there is also the inspection of the articulation process between psychoanalysis and Castoriadis mother ideas, namely: radical imagination, creation, social imaginary significations, social imaginary institutor, etc. As for conclusion, the text attempts to clarify some consequences derived from this turning point considering the context of political, sociohistorical institutional and even psychic scopes.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Sybil Safdie Douek.pdf: 1865791 bytes, checksum: ebc827ec6b5f55d21c76a00bfc6d1d0e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-06-03 / The present dissertation intends to confront Paul Ricoeur and Emmanuel Levinas philosophy, from an essential point of view: the relationship between the subject and the other, subjectivity and alterity. Question which relevance seems to be dramatic after the Two World Wars, particularly after the Shoah: which could be, subsequent to this historical experience, the meanings of words such as subject, man and ethics? Aware of the necessary and indispensable critics toward classic humanism, and willing to withdraw the subject of his central position in philosophy, since Descartes, both authors seem to rehabilitate the subject, and put again faith in him, without paying to the subject unrestricted reverence. The result is the idea of a subject that includes in itself alterity: self as another , says Ricoeur; the other in the same , says Levinas. But which is the place assigned to the other? Levinas insists in the absolute priority of the other, and proposes the deposition of the subject in behalf of the other: the subject substitutes himself to the other, it is hostage of the other, being absolutely passive in his relationship with him. Ricoeur, in his turn, defends the importance of both (oneself and other) and prefers to think in terms of reciprocity, and receptivity of the subject. These different perspectives concerning relationship between subject and other imply two conceptions of ethics: for Levinas, ethics of responsibility and election; for Ricoeur, ethics of promise, of good living together and mutuality. It implicates also two different attitudes in regard of a question not always considered as philosophical: transcendence or the Name of God. For both, God is a question which deserves attention, but Ricoeur excludes the Name of his philosophical speech, building a hermeutics of the self without the support of transcendence; while for Levinas, the problem of subjectivity goes along this the problem of transcendence. Therefore, a question is born: the presence or absence of the Name of God in their philosophy of subjectivity could have connections or correspondences with their respective religious traditions Ricoeur´s Protestantism and Levinas Judaism? Traditions never denied by both of them, although kept far from their philosophical reflections, each one in his own way / A presente tese se propõe a confrontar as filosofias de Paul Ricoeur e Emmanuel Lévinas, a partir de uma questão essencial: a relação do sujeito com a alteridade. Questão cuja relevância se coloca de modo dramático após a experiência histórica das duas Guerras Mundiais, em particular da Shoah: que sentido dar, hoje, às palavras: sujeito, homem ou ética? Conscientes da necessária e incontornável crítica ao humanismo clássico e, desejosos de retirar o sujeito da posição central que vem ocupando na filosofia, desde Descartes, ambos parecem querer reabilitar o sujeito, fazer-lhe novamente confiança, sem por isso, render-lhe irrestritas homenagens. O resultado é uma concepção de sujeito que inclui em si próprio a alteridade: si mesmo como um outro , diz Ricoeur; o outro no mesmo , diz Lévinas: mas que lugar dar a outrem? Lévinas insiste na prioridade absoluta do outro, propondo a deposição do sujeito em favor de outrem: o sujeito se substitui ao outro, é refém do outro, sendo absolutamente passivo na relação; Ricoeur, por seu lado, defende a importância dos dois pólos e prefere falar em reciprocidade da relação e em receptividade do sujeito. As diferentes perspectivas na relação sujeito-outrem implicam em duas concepções de ética: em Lévinas, ética da responsabilidade e da eleição; em Ricoeur, ética da promessa, do bem viver-junto e da mutualidade. Como também em duas atitudes diferentes, no que diz respeito a uma questão nem sempre considerada filosófica: a transcendência ou o nome de Deus. Se para ambos Deus é uma questão que merece atenção, Ricoeur O exclui de seu discurso filosófico, construindo uma hermenêutica do si que não necessita da transcendência para se sustentar; enquanto para Lévinas, o problema da subjetividade e o da transcendência caminham juntos. Nasce uma questão: a presença ou a ausência do nome de Deus nas filosofias do sujeito de Ricoeur e Lévinas poderia ter conexões ou correspondências com suas respectivas tradições religiosas - o protestantismo de Ricoeur e o judaísmo de Lévinas? Tradições que eles nunca negaram, embora as tenham mantido afastadas, cada um a seu modo, de suas reflexões filosóficas

Submitted by Edileide Reis (leyde-landy@hotmail.com) on 2013-04-29T14:09:27Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Josanne Araujo.pdf: 1095887 bytes, checksum: 79387ec157260146986713e5c23d118b (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Maria Auxiliadora Lopes(silopes@ufba.br) on 2013-06-12T18:58:02Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Josanne Araujo.pdf: 1095887 bytes, checksum: 79387ec157260146986713e5c23d118b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-06-12T18:58:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Josanne Araujo.pdf: 1095887 bytes, checksum: 79387ec157260146986713e5c23d118b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005 / Esta tese registra e analisa parte das linguagens presentes e exploradas em quatro espaços escolares tidos como comunitários uma vez que tivemos como objetivo geral analisar as linguagens presentes e exploradas nos espaços escolares-comunitários, elementos constitutivos da prática social e cotidiana, identificando comportamentos verbalizados que caracterizam: o agir heterônomo ou o agir autônomo ou ainda o agir heterônomo que evolui para o agir autônomo. Nossa intenção é chamar a atenção da comunidade e dos educadores interessados na proposta de educação-comunitária, para a compreensão de que escola-comunitária deve ser, por natureza, a escola que se preocupa em estabelecer linguagens e relações sociais que privilegiam o contato e a aproximação com a comunidade, entendendo que educar é um ato político, o conhecimento configura-se como resultado das relações que dialetizamos, e educação-comunitária deve ser a educação que privilegia as linguagens que expressam um viver/agir autônomo, dialético e comunicativo, observando e trabalhando as necessidades pedagógicoeducativas da comunidade, comprometendo-se com a construção coletiva de projetos e propostas nascidos dos interesses coletivos. Para tanto, escolhemos a metodologia descritivo-explicativa e utilizamos técnicas qualitativas e quantitativas para explorar, convenientemente, os dados oriundos da pesquisa. Investigamos 4 comunidades e procuramos ouvir os pais e responsáveis pelas crianças e adolescentes matriculados nas 4 escolas da amostra, sendo uma em cada comunidade e procuramos ouvir as gerentes administrativo-financeiras e as professoras que tinham formação em Magistério do 1º Grau. Os resultados da pesquisa apontam para duas realidades distintas: A primeira destas realidades diz respeito a duas escolas que estão distantes das comunidades a que servem, pois não procuram desenvolver linguagens e trabalhos pedagógico-educativos voltados para as necessidades das suas respectivas comunidades, tendo sido constatado que as linguagens e as relações sociais pautavam-se numa construção de viver/agir heterônomo, anti-dialógico e estratégico, caracterizado por expressões/comportamentos de negação/impedimento do reconhecimento do outro, da experiência do diálogo, da liberdade de expressão, da possibilidade de entendimento, do estabelecimento de cooperação e do respeito à identidade/diversidade cultural dos sujeitos. A segunda destas realidades diz respeito a duas outras escolas que estão em sinergia com as comunidades a que servem, procurando desenvolver linguagens e trabalhos pedagógico-educativos voltados para as necessidades das suas respectivas comunidades. Observamos que as linguagens e as relações sociais pautavam-se por uma procura constante de construir um viver/agir autônomo, dialógico e comunicativo, caracterizado por expressões/comportamentos que privilegiavam o reforço/permissão de reconhecimento do outro, da experiência do diálogo, da liberdade de expressão, da possibilidade de entendimento, do estabelecimento da cooperação e do respeito à identidade/diversidade cultural dos sujeitos. O trabalho apresenta sugestões para o cotidiano pedagógico-educativo da escola-comunitária, buscando demonstrar que é possível aos sujeitos envolvidos neste processo apoiar-se em uma comunicação que objetive e subjetive o conhecimento, colaborando para o desenvolvimento da cultura humana, orientando os alunos para a construção da autonomia, dialogando e experienciando a defesa de suas idéias, discutindo, argumentando e contra-argumentando. / Salvador

Esta tese desenvolve uma pesquisa em torno do lugar da psicanálise no pensamento filosófico e político de Cornelius Castoriadis (1922-1997), sobretudo relativa à segunda etapa de sua obra a partir de 1968. Investiga e discute em particular duas hipóteses: 1. A função paradigmática da psicanálise (teoria e prática) foi constitutiva para a formulação da concepção de sujeito e, portanto, de autonomia conceito que foi adquirindo papel progressivamente central na obra castoridiana. 2. O modelo de sujeito que emerge dessa reflexão é sui generis, distinto das filosofias da segunda metade do Século XX, e representa uma virada conceitual que remete ao futuro da filosofia. Examina ainda, ao longo do texto, o processo de articulação entre a psicanálise e as idéias-mãe de Castoriadis: imaginação radical, criação, significações imaginárias sociais, imaginário social instituinte, etc. Como conclusão, tenta elucidar algumas conseqüências dessa virada nas esferas política, histórico-social, institucional e mesmo psíquica. / The present thesis develops a research concerned with the position of psychoanalysis within the boundaries of the philosophical and political thought of Cornelius Castoriadis (1922-1975), conferring a particular emphasis on the second stage of his work initiated in 1968. The framework investigates and discusses especially two hypotheses: 1. The paradigmatic function of psychoanalysis (theory and practice) with has been constitutive viewing the formulation of the subject conception and therefore comprises the statement of autonomy -- concept that progressively acquired a central role in the castoridian body of work. 2. The model of subject - that arises stemmed by this reflection results sui generis, for it distinct from the prevailing philosophies of the second half of the twentieth century and represents a conceptual turning point that conducts to consider and regard the future of philosophy. Throughout the text there is also the inspection of the articulation process between psychoanalysis and Castoriadis mother ideas, namely: radical imagination, creation, social imaginary significations, social imaginary institutor, etc. As for conclusion, the text attempts to clarify some consequences derived from this turning point considering the context of political, sociohistorical institutional and even psychic scopes.

Ce travail a pour objet une étude théorique des formes de société politique et des contraintes de production de leur unité collective. Le questionnement qui l’anime interroge les modalités de base génératrices d’une dimension collective, par laquelle faire tenir les agents sociaux ensemble, dans un espace commun. Ces formes sont considérées à partir de l’enseignement apporté par l’œuvre de Marcel Gauchet. Les travaux de ce dernier ont approfondi les modes différenciés de structuration de l’existence collective, selon le déploiement d’un fonctionnement autonome des collectivités humaines-sociales, par extraction hors de l’hétéronomie. Autour de l’instauration et de la modification possible des configurations d’un espace humain-social, il s’agit de s’interroger spécifiquement sur les contraintes de mise en forme, inhérentes aux possibilités de déploiement de cet espace. Cette formation interne sera appréhendée par un angle dynamique, issu des travaux fournis par l’œuvre morphologique de René Thom. Au travers de la théorie des catastrophes (TC), il a dressé une liste de formes stables et de processus de changement, instables dans le temps, mais robustes dans les dimensions qui en permettent le déploiement. Depuis l’analyse d’un système dynamique nécessaire à l’intelligence de ce déploiement, une articulation problématique se découvre : l’organisation de la dimension collective dans l’immanence, et la gestion politique de la dimension historique, incitent à questionner l’historicité interne des collectivités, à partir de la notion de processus morphologique et selon les déformations que ce processus peut connaître. Les éclairages que cette notion de processus apporte, indiquent l’effectivité d’un travail de la forme, dans l’étude du tenir ensemble des collectivités politiques. / This work aims to understand the way societies are shaped and to identify the constraints within they move themselves. It tries to answer the question of how social agents turn out to act collectively in shared social space, in other words to make society. This work take forms into account following Marcel Gauchet’s work. Indeed Marcel Gauchet has managed to grasp the differentiated patterns structuring collective life, characterising them as resulting from the deployment of an autonomous functioning of human-social communities, by extraction from heteronomy. The present work goes on step further and, considering the establishment and possible change of the configurations of a human-social space, it wonders about the constraining framework of the formation of this space. This internal shaping is looked into from René Thom’s morphological approach. Indeed, through his Catastrophe Theory (CT), René Thom compiled a list of stable forms and processes of change, unstable over time, but steady as far as the conditions of their formation are concerned. It accentuates the core issue: the organization of the collective dimension through immanence, and the political management of the historical dimension drive us to examine the inner historicity of communities from the concept of morphological process and according to the distortions it may undergo. This concept proves useful to understand the morphological dynamic which enable communities to hold together.

Die Idee der Selbstbestimmung ist ein Konzept, welchem im historischen sowie aktuellen pädagogischen Diskurs eine hohe Bedeutung zugemessen wird. Ausgehend von der Epoche der Aufklärung wird der Mensch als vernunftbegabtes Wesen mit der Fähigkeit zum selbstbestimmten Handeln verstanden. Gleichzeitig hat sich, mit Beginn der Pädagogik als Wissenschaft, aus dem theoretisch und praktisch scheinbar nicht zu lösenden, Widerspruch zwischen subjektiver Autonomie und intentionaler Heteronomie ein Problem aufgetan, dessen Lösungsversuche den erziehungswissenschaftlichen Diskurs bis heute prägen. Wird dem Kind die Fähigkeit und das Recht auf selbstbestimmtes Handeln ausdrücklich anerkannt, ist jede pädagogische Intervention als fremdbestimmt abzulehnen. Dies würde im schlimmsten Fall bedeuten, dass die Erziehung sich selbst abschafft. Wenn man Autonomie allerdings als Kompetenz versteht, die am Ziel eines Entwicklungsprozesses steht, stellt sich die Frage ob ein Mensch ohne Erziehung überhaupt in diesen Zustand gelangen kann. Vor dem Hintergrund des Selbstbestimmungsdiskurses, des pädagogischen Paradox, der Bindungstheorie und lernpsychologischer Ansätze, wird in der Arbeit der Frage nachgegangen, ob und inwiefern Schüler, denen aktuell keine oder nur wenige Teilkompetenzen für selbstbestimmtes Lernen zugeschrieben werden, selbstbestimmt lernen können.

This thesis considers Kant's departure from moral naturalism. In doing so, it explores the relationship between ethics, naturalism, normativity and freedom. Throughout this exploration, I build the case that Kant's ethics of autonomy allows us to make better sense of ethics than Hume's moral naturalism. Hume believes that morality is ultimately grounded in human nature. Kant finds this understanding of ethics limiting. He insists that we are free - we can critically reflect upon our nature and (to an extent) alter it accordingly. This freedom, I contend, renders the moral naturalist's appeal to nature lacking. Of course, a Kantian conception of freedom - some form of independence from the causal order - is fairly unpopular in contemporary circles. In particular, a commitment to naturalism casts doubt on such a notion of freedom. I argue with Kant that such a conception of freedom is essential to the conception of ourselves as rational agents. The critical turn, unlike naturalism, warrants this conception of freedom, accommodating the point of view of our rational agency. It thus allows Kant's ethics of autonomy to better grasp certain key elements of morality - normativity and our agency - than Hume's moral naturalism.

Die Idee der Selbstbestimmung ist ein Konzept, welchem im historischen sowie aktuellen pädagogischen Diskurs eine hohe Bedeutung zugemessen wird. Ausgehend von der Epoche der Aufklärung wird der Mensch als vernunftbegabtes Wesen mit der Fähigkeit zum selbstbestimmten Handeln verstanden. Gleichzeitig hat sich, mit Beginn der Pädagogik als Wissenschaft, aus dem theoretisch und praktisch scheinbar nicht zu lösenden, Widerspruch zwischen subjektiver Autonomie und intentionaler Heteronomie ein Problem aufgetan, dessen Lösungsversuche den erziehungswissenschaftlichen Diskurs bis heute prägen. Wird dem Kind die Fähigkeit und das Recht auf selbstbestimmtes Handeln ausdrücklich anerkannt, ist jede pädagogische Intervention als fremdbestimmt abzulehnen. Dies würde im schlimmsten Fall bedeuten, dass die Erziehung sich selbst abschafft. Wenn man Autonomie allerdings als Kompetenz versteht, die am Ziel eines Entwicklungsprozesses steht, stellt sich die Frage ob ein Mensch ohne Erziehung überhaupt in diesen Zustand gelangen kann. Vor dem Hintergrund des Selbstbestimmungsdiskurses, des pädagogischen Paradox, der Bindungstheorie und lernpsychologischer Ansätze, wird in der Arbeit der Frage nachgegangen, ob und inwiefern Schüler, denen aktuell keine oder nur wenige Teilkompetenzen für selbstbestimmtes Lernen zugeschrieben werden, selbstbestimmt lernen können.:1 Einleitung I Der Selbstbestimmungsgedanke 2 Etymologische Einordnung 3 Autonomie aus philosophischer Sicht 3.1 Autonomie als Selbstgesetzgebung in der Moralethik Kants 3.2 Autonomie als moralisches Ziel 3.3 Das Recht auf selbstbestimmtes Handeln 4 Die Pädagogik der Selbstbestimmung im Diskurs 4.1 Das pädagogische Paradox 4.2 Von Selbstbestimmung als Erziehungsziel zur Selbstbestimmung als Erziehungsnotwendigkeit 4.2.1 Das klassisch kantische Modell der Erziehung 4.2.2 Der Umbruch 4.2.3 Das Kind als Akteur seiner eigenen Entwicklung 4.3 Schlussfolgerungen und Kritik an einem perfektiblen Menschenbild 5 Selbstbestimmung vs. Angewiesensein? 5.1 Die Bindungstheorie 5.2 Die Komplementarität von Autonomie und Angewiesensein 5.3 Bindung und kognitive Entwicklung II Selbstbestimmtes Lernen 6 Begriffsklärung 6.1 Selbstbestimmtes Lernen 6.2 Selbstgesteuertes Lernen 7 Voraussetzungen selbstbestimmten Lernens aus lernpsychologischer Sicht 7.1 Selbstgesteuertes Lernen bei Neber 7.2 Selbstbestimmungstheorie der Motivation von Deci & Ryan 7.3 Boekaerts‘ drei Schichten der Selbstregulation 7.4 Das INVO-Modell von Hasselhorn & Gold 7.4.1 Kognitive Voraussetzungen 7.4.2 Motivational-volitionale Voraussetzungen 8 Zusammenführung 9 Grenzen des Kognitivismus‘ III Selbstbestimmung und Förderschwerpunkt Lernen 10 Voraussetzungen selbstbestimmten Lernens im Kontext von Beeinträchtigungen im Lernen 11 Andere Sichtweisen auf das Phänomen Lernbeeinträchtigung 12 Fazit: Inklusion IV Ableitende Kerngedanken zum selbstbestimmten Lernen 13 Selbstbestimmung als Kompetenz 14 Rahmenbedingungen selbstbestimmten Lernens 14.1 Unterricht 14.2 Lernumwelt 14.3 Lehrerverhalten 15 Schlussbetrachtung Literaturverzeichnis Darstellungsverzeichnis