Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-17T15:12:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 CatarinaR_DISSERT.pdf: 573602 bytes, checksum: 83caeaada44bac16fdb1463348983765 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-06-28 / This work posits a mutual implication between metaphysics and morality in the philosophy of Schopenhauer and seeks to clarify the many nuances that take place in this relation. Each chapter offers a perspective in which the relation between metaphysics and morality can be addressed. Thus, by exposing some important aspects of representation theory of Schopenhauer, we try, in the first chapter, explain the relationship between his idealism and his conception of morality; in the second chapter, the determinism present both in nature and in moral actions, determinism that establishes the relationship between morality and metaphysics through the very notion of a metaphysical nature; in the third chapter, relationship between metaphysics and morality that takes place through the notion of freedom as denial of the previous determinism, freedom possible to the genius, to the saint and to the ascetic. All of these perspectives, however, presuppose the distinction between phenomenon and thing-initself, figuring this distinction as crucial in building of this metaphysic that seeks to protect the moral significance of the world while denying the existence of God / Este trabalho afirma uma m?tua implica??o entre metaf?sica e moralidade na filosofia de Schopenhauer e busca explicitar as diversas nuan?as na qual se d? essa rela??o. Cada cap?tulo apresenta uma perspectiva na qual a rela??o entre metaf?sica e moralidade pode ser abordada. Desse modo, atrav?s da exposi??o de alguns aspectos importantes da teoria da representa??o de Schopenhauer, tentamos, no primeiro cap?tulo, explicitar a rela??o entre seu idealismo e sua concep??o de moralidade; no segundo cap?tulo, o determinismo presente tanto na natureza quanto nas a??es morais estabelece a rela??o entre moralidade e metaf?sica atrav?s da pr?pria no??o de metaf?sica da natureza; no terceiro cap?tulo, a rela??o entre metaf?sica e moralidade se d? atrav?s da no??o de liberdade como nega??o do determinismo anterior, liberdade essa poss?vel ao g?nio, ao santo e ao asceta. Todas essas perspectivas, entretanto, pressup?em a distin??o entre fen?meno e coisa-em-si, figurando tal distin??o como indispens?vel na constru??o dessa metaf?sica que busca resguardar a significa??o moral do mundo ao mesmo tempo em que nega a exist?ncia de Deus

Esta tese apresenta uma discussão sobre infância e subjetividade moderna relacionada com a emergência do pensamento pós-metafísico. Apoiada em pensadores que delineiam os traços da modernidade, da subjetividade e da infância, não invalidando suas concepções, procura demonstrar as insuficiências desse modelo para pensarmos os processos de educação da infância na atualidade. Procurando apontar como foram forjadas as diferentes concepções de infância na modernidade, associada à noção de um sujeito portador de sentido para a realidade, percorre esta investigação o seguinte itinerário: num primeiro momento, apresenta um estudo de Montaigne, Descartes, Rousseau, Kant a partir do horizonte da modernidade; num segundo, estabelece uma crítica aos conceitos desenvolvidos por esses pensadores, no que concerne à temática investigada, a partir de Nietzsche, Adorno e Benjamin. Esta análise aponta para o esgotamento tanto da modernidade, quanto do conceito infância, como do princípio da subjetividade. Na tentativa de oferecer um aporte às insuficiências do projeto moderno, buscou-se a partir do estabelecimento da perspectiva pós-metafísica a possibilidade de uma leitura que permita um melhor entendimento da infância nos cenários atuais. A abordagem filosófica utilizada teve por norte a filosofia da consciência de corte moderna e a filosofia da linguagem como alternativa para saldar os débitos da modernidade. Uma das conclusões é que, no contexto do pensamento pós-metafísico, a infância assume contornos propiciados pela constatação de que ela é plural. Finalmente, aponta para a necessidade da busca de pontos de confluências no que diz respeito a uma filosofia da infância. O estudo permeia a tensão entre a necessidade da universalidade, e da relatividade no universo infantil Além disso, esta tese, a partir da aproximação da teoria de Habermas, um dos expoentes do pensamento pós-metafísico, permite novas interpretações tanto da infância quanto da subjetividade no sentido de que nesse horizonte há um deslocamento e a renovação desses conceitos que trazem contribuições profícuas tanto para a filosofia quanto para a educação. / This thesis presents a debate about childhood and modern subjectivity with the emergency of the post-metaphysic thought. Based on thinkers who outline the modernity characteristics of subjectivity and childhood, it does not disregard its conceptions but it tries to demonstrate the shortcomings of this model to analyze the processes of childhood education nowadays. Trying to indicate how different conceptions of childhood were established in the modernity, and also considering the notion of a subject who carries the sense of the reality, this study follows this itinerary: first, it presents a study of Montaigne, Descartes, Rousseau and Kant from the horizon of the modernity; second, it criticizes the concepts developed by these thinkers regarding the subject of this thesis and based on Nietzsche, Adorno and Benjamin. This analysis shows the weakness of the modernity, as well as of the concept of childhood and the principle of subjectivity. Trying to offer a contribution to the shortcomings of the modern project, we tried, from the establishment of the postmetaphysics perspective, to have a reading that allows a better understanding of childhood these days. The philosophical approach used was guided by the modern philosophy of the conscience and the language philosophy as alternatives for the shortages of the modernity. One of the conclusions is that in the context of the post-metaphysical thought childhood takes characteristics resulting of the verification that it is plural. Finally, this study shows the need to search for confluence aspects regarding the philosophy of childhood. Besides this, from the approximation to the theory of Habermas, one of the exponents of the post-metaphysics thought, this study allows us new interpretations of both childhood and subjectivity considering that under this horizon there is a dislocation and renovation of these concepts that bring useful contributions for both philosophy and education.

Dans le Traité 33 (II 9), Plotin se dresse contre les « gnostiques » : ceux qui disent que le démiurge et le monde sont mauvais. Ses critiques sont précédées par une introduction qui résume sa doctrine de l’Un-Bien et de l’Intellect. Dans le premier chapitre du Traité 33, à partir des thèses de ses adversaires, Plotin construit une série de propositions concernant les réalités premières – leur nombre, leur nature et leurs actions. Il dénonce les erreurs de chaque proposition, comme conduisant à la construction d’un univers des intelligibles défectueux, ignorants et impuissants. La thèse porte sur la place de la métaphysique de Plotin dans sa polémique antignostique. Les arguments qui introduisent cette polémique sont construits de manière à pouvoir rejoindre les principales conceptions du principe premier : celles proposées par les principales écoles philosophiques et celles qui ont été élaborées par les différents courants du gnosticisme et du christianisme. Plotin s’intéresse à ces doctrines nouvelles, émergentes en marge des écoles philosophiques. Le rapport entre Plotin et le christianisme est l’objet de notre attention. La perspective métaphysique permet d’examiner tous les courants doctrinaux du christianisme primitif. Une partie de la critique plotinienne va à l’encontre des efforts des chrétiens à respecter les exigences du monothéisme par rapport à l’idée d’un « autre Dieu ». À leur opposé se situent les gnostiques qui proposent une multiplication des entités issues du premier principe. Ainsi, la conception plotinienne du principe transcendant, après lequel viennent les hypostases ayant rang de principes, répond aux interrogations de ses nombreux adversaires. / In Treatise 33 (II 9), Plotinus stands against the “Gnostics”: those who consider the demiurge and the cosmos to be evil. His criticisms are preceded by an introduction summarizing the Plotinian doctrine of the supreme principle – the One. In the first chapter of Treatise 33, based on the theses of his opponents, Plotinus constructs a series of propositions concerning the first realities - their number, their nature and their activities. He denounces the errors of each proposition as leading to the construction of a universe of defective, ignorant and helpless intelligibles. This thesis deals with the place of the metaphysics of Plotinus in his anti-Gnostic polemics. The arguments constituting these polemics are constructed to fit within the principal conceptions of the first principle - not only those proposed by the main philosophical schools, but especially those designed within different currents of Gnosticism and of Christianity. Plotinus is interested in these new doctrines emerging on the margins of the established philosophical schools. The object of our attention is the relationship between Plotinus and Christianity. The metaphysical perspective enables us to examine all the doctrinal currents of primitive Christianity. Part of Plotinian criticism may go against the efforts of Christian writers to respect the demands of monotheism in relation to the idea of "another God". At their opposite are the Gnostics, who propose multiplication of entities derived from the first principle, the Pleroma. Thus, the Plotinian conception of the supreme principle, after which come the hypostases having the rank of principles, answers the questions posed by his adversaries.

Cette étude propose une interprétation de l'œuvre de Bergson à partir d'un aspect crucial de sa métaphysique et de sa méthode : la critique des « faux problèmes » philosophiques – « faux » en raison de la manière dont ils furent posés par une tradition barrant ainsi l'accès non seulement aux problèmes véritables, mais encore à des questions que l'on peut tenir pour des « questions vitales ». Si la critique des faux problèmes constitue chez Bergson à la fois le centre de gravité de sa méthode et la singularité de sa métaphysique, c'est qu'elle permet l'instauration d'une nouvelle métaphysique, pour laquelle ces questions vitales vont de pair avec la considération du temps, dont l'oubli est à l'origine des faux problèmes de la métaphysique traditionnelle. Cette nouvelle métaphysique trouve cependant son accomplissement véritable moins dans la spéculation que dans des actions créatrices, c'est-à-dire des actions capables non seulement de dissoudre des faux problèmes mais surtout d'inventer de nouvelles manières de vivre. / This thesis intends to propose an interpretation of Bergson’s work taking as a starting point a crucial aspect in his metaphysics and his method, namely the criticism of the so-called “false philosophical problems”; “false” because of the way they were formulated by a tradition thus preventing the access not only to the genuine problems, but also to questions that can be considered to be of paramount if not vital importance. The reason why the criticism of false problems appears as the centre of gravity of Bergson’s method as well as a particularity which singles out his metaphysics, is because it actually establishes a new metaphysics whose attention to these issues of vital importance goes hand in hand with the acknowledgment of time whose neglecting is the source of the false problems encountered in traditional metaphysics. This new type of metaphysics finds its accomplishment less in speculation than in creative actions, that is to say actions which have the power to invent new ways of life after the dissolution of the false problems.

Le présent ouvrage souhaite montrer que la création de l’esthétique philosophique par Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, ainsi que la multiplication des écrits théoriques sur l’art orientés à partir de la problématique du goût, sont deux tentatives différentes de répondre à la question métaphysique du dualisme des substances ainsi qu’aux problèmes posés par leurs interactions réciproques. L’enjeu de cette recherche est double. Il s’agit, d’une part, de donner la réplique à Kant qui, dans un note devenue célèbre de la CRP, affirme qu’« esthétique » et « critique du goût » sont des termes synonymes. Il sera démontré que ces deux termes ne sont pas synonymes, qu’esthétique philosophique et critique du goût ne sont pas deux manières équivalentes de questionner l’art, bien qu’elles partagent, sur le plan ontologique, un certain nombre de présupposés. D’autre part, et c’est là que l’enjeu historiographique croise l’enjeu philosophique, nous verrons que ces présupposés ne sont pas propres au 18e siècle mais proviennent d’une longue tradition des rapports texte-image, du statut théologique et ontologique de l’image, de la représentation sculptée, de la mímêsis. Aussi, l’intérêt des questions formulées à partir du constat de l’échec patent de la métaphysique de l’Art et du caractère très largement insuffisant des esthétiques du goût dépasse largement le cadre du siècle des Lumières. / This book intends to demonstrate that the creation of philosophical aesthetics by A. G. Baumgarten, as well as the multiplication of theoretical writings about art guided by the problematics of taste, are two different ways to propose a solution to solve the metaphysical question of the dualism of substances and the problem of theirs mutual interactions. The stake is double. First, it is a response to Kant, who says in a CPR’s note which became famous that « aesthetics » and « critics of taste » are the same thing. It will be shown that it is not the case, although those two approaches share similar presuppositions. We will also see, and on that point the historiographic stake meets the philosophical one, that those presuppositions are not specific to the 18th century but came from the long tradition of text-image relations, of theological and ontological status of image, of carved representation, of mímêsis. So, the interest of the questions which are formulated because of the evident failure of metaphysics of Art and the failings of aesthetics of taste exceeds widely the framework of Enlightenment.

La question de l’idéalisme leibnizien, qui permet d’entrer au cœur de la métaphysique de Leibniz, intéresse encore aujourd’hui de nombreux commentateurs. Ceux-ci utilisent les termes « réalisme », « idéalisme », voire « phénoménalisme », pour caractériser la métaphysique leibnizienne et un travail doit être fait pour rassembler et comparer leurs analyses, ce que nous proposons de faire d’abord dans ce mémoire. Ce sont surtout les textes mêmes de Leibniz qui seront abordés dans le présent travail et qui permettront de proposer la lecture suivante : si la métaphysique leibnizienne est réaliste en ce sens qu’elle met en place une entité elle-même « mind-independent », c'est-à-dire la monade, elle peut être considérée comme idéaliste (idéalisme substantiel), puisque cette entité, étant sans partie et sans étendue, est en ce sens idéelle. Et si tout peut se réduire à cette monade, c’est toute la fondation de la métaphysique de Leibniz qui se retrouve à être idéelle. Or, ceci ne règle pas le statut des corps qui peuvent être considérés soit comme de simples phénomènes réductibles aux perceptions des monades (idéalisme matériel), soit comme des êtres ayant une réalité indépendante d’un esprit, lesquels se réduiraient cette fois aux monades qui les composent (réalisme matériel). Face à ces deux possibilités, nous développerons une position mitoyenne qui défend l’idée que les corps sont en effet composés de monades qui leur procurent une certaine réalité, mais qu’ils dépendront toujours de l’action d’un esprit qui lui seul pourra leur procurer une certaine unité. / Many commentators try to read Leibniz either as an idealist or a realist, adding a phenomenalist reading to theses first two analyses. However, those terms are however often used with ambiguities, making Leibniz sometimes an even more complex philosopher. The first purpose of this master’s thesis is to gather and compare all these interpretations in order to clarify Leibniz’s thought. In this study, his writings will be used to defend the following interpretation : Leibniz can be considered as a realist since he develops a theory where monads act as « mind-independent » entities. Nonetheless, these monads are non-extended and without parts. Therefore, we can present an idealistic understanding of Leibniz, for they are the “basic building-blocks” of his metaphysic. Still, clarifications need to be made concerning the body. It can either be “real”, if it is seen as an aggregate of monads. Or, it can be considered a “mind-dependent” phenomenon if seen as the result of monadic perceptions. We will develop, between these two possibilities, an intermediate position stating that bodies are indeed aggregates of monads (matter realism). However they must be considered as phenomena for this same reason (phenomenalism). Corporeal aggregates require the action of the mind which alone can give them unity. On the contrary monads are said to be unum per se. Bodies are therefore phenomena but precisely well founded in the monads that compose them.

The thesis is called Emmanuel Lévinas Ethics and its aim is to explain the ethical concept of this original French philosopher. The first part of the thesis is focused on important influences that were important for Lévinas' philosophical work. The next part of the thesis deals with dialogical personalism as a philosophical direction into which Lévinas is most often classified. The third and most important part deals with the motives that led Lévinas to the elaboration of his ethical theses and subsequently parts of these theses are processed. It turns out that the basic aspect of his theory is the social relationship of the 'I' with the Second, through which the path to transcendence leads .Lévinas' conception is considered as a sort of ethical turn in philosophy and can be considered as a return to man. Properly conceived ethics based on respect, Levinas considers being "prima Philosophia".

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:30:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Eduardo Kupper Pacheco de Aguirre.pdf: 594174 bytes, checksum: fe79fbfb302450f7c7c088bb162ed415 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-05-27 / This work analyzed the metaphysic evolution of the Theory of Crime causal theory by starting and finishing in the finalist theory. The concept of crime over several times has been undergoing changes and to describe them were found the philosophical underpinnings of each of these currents. Were evaluated with different dogmatic approaches of scholars such as Liszt, Beling, among others. We conclude believing that discussions on the concept of crime should not end quite the contrary, the existence of climate and new understandings of criminal acts must always be present in the intricacies of criminal law in order that the theory can continue evolving and largely given to the interests of society / Esta dissertação analisou a evolução metafísica da Teoria do Delito começando pela teoria causalista e terminando na teoria finalista. O conceito de delito ao longo de diversas épocas vem passando por transformações e para descrevê-las foram observados os fundamentos filosóficos de cada uma destas correntes. Foram avaliadas diferentes dogmáticas com as abordagens de doutrinadores, tais como: Lizst, Beling, Mezger, entre outros. Concluiu-se que as discussões sobre a conceituação do delito não devem se encerrar, muito pelo contrário, as críticas e os novos entendimentos sobre a ação delituosa devem estar sempre presentes na discussão jurídico-penal, a fim que a teoria possa continuar evoluindo e atendendo amplamente aos interesses da sociedade

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jose Renato Salatiel.pdf: 884932 bytes, checksum: 8fdd5731b5f2d391dd75a1ae2f191b96 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-11-19 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The theme of this thesis is the concept of Chance in the philosophy of the American thinker Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), a concept associated with the doctrine that he called Tychism. In this work, I propose to interpret different senses of the concept of chance that can be found in the work of the author, seeking to read them again in light of his philosophical system. I advocate, too, the hypothesis that Chance, one of the main concepts of peircean philosophy, must be interpreted from the systemic perspective of his work and in light of modern theories of complexity. I proposed, as a justification for this research, to make a contribution that will support an understanding of various aspects of peircean metaphysics, given the consideration that the concept of Chance, so present in contemporary scientific literature, is worked in an innovative and, we can say, pioneering way by the author. In the development of this work, I adopted, always, the criterion of reference to Peirce s original work, also referring to the scholarly literature concerning the theme in question / O tema desta tese é o conceito de Acaso na filosofia do pensador norte-americano Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), associado à doutrina que ele denomina Tiquismo. Propomo-nos, neste trabalho, interpretar sentidos diferentes da noção de acaso encontráveis na obra do autor, buscando relê-los à luz de seu sistema filosófico. Defendemos, também, a hipótese de que o Acaso, um dos principais conceitos da filosofia peirciana, deve ser interpretado sob uma perspectiva sistêmica de sua obra e à luz das modernas teorias da complexidade. Supomos, como justificativa da presente pesquisa, trazer uma contribuição que venha subsidiar o entendimento de aspectos da metafísica peirciana, a par da consideração de que o conceito de Acaso, tão presente na literatura cientifica contemporânea, ser trabalhado de forma inovadora e, pode-se dizer, pioneira, pelo autor. No desenvolvimento do trabalho, adotamos, sempre, o critério de remissão à obra original de Peirce, recorrendo também à literatura de comentários afeita ao tema em pauta

Le platonisme mathématique, la thèse selon laquelle les mathématiques portent sur des objets abstraits existant de manière indépendante à notre esprit et notre langage, est un des sujets les plus débattues dans la philosophie des mathématiques. L’image des mathématiques qui s’en dégage est souvent perçue comme se heurtant à des problèmes épistémologiques considérables : si il est vrai que les mathématiques sont une science qui porte sur des objets en dehors de l’espace et du temps, comment nous, des êtres situés spatio-temporellement, pouvons avoir une quelconque connaissance mathématique ? En conséquence, la défense du platonisme et le débat sur l’ontologie des mathématiques se sont largement concentrées sur cette dimension épistémologique. Dans ce travail de thèse, nous essaierons de réitérer le rôle de la métaphysique et de la pratique des mathématiques dans le débat sur l’ontologie des objets mathématiques. Notre objectif principal est plus particulièrement le développement et l’application d’un programme métaphysique général, capable de rendre compte des aspects ontologiques des mathématiques qui sont propres à une interprétation platoniste des mathématiques. Pour ce faire, notre stratégie consiste à insister tout d’abord sur le besoin de clarification des thèses platonistes concernant la nature abstraite des objets mathématiques et l’indépendance de ces objets et à essayer d’étendre la portée du platonisme au-delà des concepts et théories mathématiques habituelles. / Mathematical platonism is the idea according to which mathematics is about a domain of abstract objects, existing independently of our though and language. It is one of the central subjects in philosophy of mathematics, and is often considered to face important epistemological problems. If, as the platonist thinks, mathematics really are a science of objects outside of space and time, then how is mathematical knowledge even possible? As a consequence of the epistemological problem, the debate has focused mainly around the epistemological dimension of platonism. In this study however, we will try to move away from epistemology and restate the role of metaphysics and mathematical practice in the ontological debate on mathematical objects. Our main objective will be to develop and apply a general metaphysical program in order to explain the ontological aspects of a platonist interpretation of mathematics. In order to do this, it will be necessary to clarify the abstract nature of mathematical objects and the ontological independence of these entities, and to extend the scope of platonism beyond the usual concepts and mathematical theories.