The impact of the law on the lives of homeless people in Queensland has, to date, remained largely unexplored by legal academics and researchers. This is despite the fact that homeless people experience a number of legal difficulties that seriously affect their lives. This thesis by published papers aims to make a significant and original contribution to filling this gap in the research evidence by presenting the results of analyses of the legal, theoretical and practical issues that arise in the context of homeless persons' interactions with the legal system in Queensland. Most notably, it is comprised of three pieces of empirical research which identify those areas of law that impact most on homeless people in Queensland and explore the consequences of the operation of these laws on their lives. In sum, this thesis examines the extent of the law's influence on the lives of homeless people in Queensland, and finds that the consequences of the law's operation on homeless people in Queensland are serious. The thesis first examines the effect on Queensland's homeless people of laws which regulate behaviour conducted in public space. The criminal offences of vagrancy, begging and public nuisance are analysed; their historical origins, the reasons for their retention on modern statute books, and arguments in favour of their repeal are discussed. The impact of 'public space law' on homeless people in Queensland is also explored through a survey of 30 homeless people residing in inner-city Brisbane. This part of the thesis concludes that public space law in Queensland results in breaches of homeless persons' human rights, as well as the contravention of rule of law principles. The thesis then explores the impact of the law on homeless persons' experiences of citizenship. Empirical research and theoretical analysis demonstrate that the application of various laws, particularly public space laws, social security laws and electoral laws, encroaches on homeless persons' citizenship rights. The thesis then reports on the results of a unique survey of Queensland's homelessness service providers. This survey is the most extensive piece of empirical research ever conducted on the extent to which various laws impact on homeless people. Respondents were asked to indicate which areas of law impact most adversely on their homeless clients. Based on the research findings outlined above, the hypothesis was that criminal law issues, particularly public space offences, would be proven to impact particularly adversely on homeless people in Queensland. Somewhat unexpectedly, the findings of the survey indicated that fines law, debt law and family law difficulties are those legal difficulties most often encountered by homeless people in Queensland. Difficulties produced by criminal laws, social security laws and electoral laws, while still generally relevant, rated less highly. However, the survey did demonstrate that experiences differ between sub-groups within the homeless population, for example Indigenous homeless people were reported to be most affected by criminal law issues, while young homeless people were reported to be most affected by social security law issues. Together, the five papers which comprise this thesis make an original and substantial contribution to knowledge by identifying empirically for the first time the various laws that have a significant impact on the lives of homeless people in Queensland, and analysing the consequences of this in terms of their effect on homeless persons' citizenship rights, human rights and rule of law entitlements.

Par l’arrêt Pla et Puncernau contre Andorre du 13 juillet 2004, la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme a fait une entrée remarquée dans le contrôle de l’interprétation des actes juridiques privés. Tenante d’une conception réaliste du droit, elle a élaboré des Principes européens d’interprétation qui sont autant d’obligations qui pèsent sur le juge national. La CJUE partage en grande partie ces principes, mais possède ses particularités et hésite encore à s’aligner sur le contrôle du juge de Strasbourg. Le juge français est quant à lui confronté à des directives d’interprétation qui sont de simples conseils, tandis que la Cour de cassation se refuse à opérer un autre contrôle que celui de la dénaturation. Dès lors, elle n’est pas en mesure de redresser les fautes commises par les juges du fond notamment, et encourt le risque d’engager la responsabilité de l’Etat français devant la Cour EDH. Si la Cour de cassation a entamé une réflexion sur la façon de rendre la justice en coordination avec les cours européennes, la modification du système herméneutique français se heurte à de nombreux obstacles révélateurs de la conception traditionnelle du droit français des obligations. / With the case of Pla and Puncernau versus Andorra on 13 July 2004, the European Court of Human Rights has made a dramatic entrance in the supervision of the interpretation of private contracts. Defending a realist conception of law, it developed European Principles of interpretation, which are obligations for national courts. The CJEU largely shares these principles, but has its particularities and it is still reluctant to align with the Strasbourg Court’s supervision. The French judge is itself faced with interpretive guidelines that are simple advice, while the Court of Cassation refused to operate another supervision than the denaturation. Therefore, it is not able to correct the errors committed by the trial judges in particular, and takes the risk to commit a violation of the European law. If the Supreme Court considers by now how to deliver justice in coordination with the European courts, changing the French hermeneutic system faces many obstacles revealing the traditional conception of French law of obligations.

Constitutionalizaton of Law’s different areas is a phenomenon gradually more ingrained in our cultural and legal framework. Maybe the best demonstration is the increasingly prominent role of the Constitutional Court (TC) – Constitution’s Supreme Interpreter – in defining and redefining concepts, rights and legal principles touching a range of subjects, from TaxLaw to Human Rights. This is relevant to understand the Law and its current effects whether it is valued positively or negatively. / La constitucionalización de las distintas áreas del Derecho es un fenómeno cada vez más arraigado en nuestra cultura y contexto jurídicos. Tal vez la forma más evidente en que se haya manifestado sea el creciente protagonismo del Tribunal Constitucional (TC), supremo intérprete de la Constitución, en la significación y resignificación de conceptos, derechos y principios jurídicos que, a través de sus sentencias, han afectado desde el derecho tributario hasta los derechos humanos. Sea que esto se valore positiva o negativamente, su relevancia para comprender el derecho y sus efectos en la actualidad es innegable.

The traditional model of initial training of judges in Spain and in other countries has been focused, and is still focused, on the mechanical digestion of a pile of stereotyped notions related to several legal subjects.This knowledge is presented with no references to specific legal disputes and does not meet at all, neither the profile of modern complex constitutional legal systems consisting of several levels, internally changing and conflicting; nor the practice of those systems. It does correspond, however, the historical model of the Napoleonic judge, who tends to act as a mechanical enforcer of the law and the longa manu of the real power rather than guardian of the citizens’ basic rights. The alternative to this kind of judicial training would be a system of training incorporating a high quality operative knowledge of the positive law actually in force, together with a theoretical-philosophical training in line with the suggestions made by Manuel Sacristán of «a level of exercise of thinking» based on the specific field and activity inherent to that group of legal practitioners. / El modelo tradicional de formación inicial de jueces para el desempeño del rol, en España, pero no solo, se ha cifrado y se cifra en la asimilación mecánica de todo un cúmulo de nociones estereotipadas relativas a las diversas disciplinas. Se trata de un bagaje que, por su carácter desproblematizador, no se ajusta en absoluto al perfil de los modernos ordenamientos constitucionales complejos, dotados de distintos niveles y, con frecuencia, internamente conflictivos y cambiantes; y menos a su práctica.Pero responde, en cambio, al histórico tipo de juez del modelo napoleónico, longa manu del poder en acto más que garante de derechos, tendencial aplicador mecánico. La alternativa a esta clase de formación estaría en otra que incorporase a un buen conocimiento operativo del derecho positivo en su ser actual y realmente vigente, una formación teórico-filosófica en la línea sugerida una vez por Manuel Sacristán, como «un nivel de ejercicio del pensamiento» a partir de y sobre el específico campo temático y de la actividad propia de tal clase de operadores.

The legal historical development of fairness in the South African common law of contract is investigated in the context of the political, social and economic developments of the last four centuries. It emerges that the common law of contract is still dominated by the ideologies of individualism and economic liberalism which were imported from English law during the nineteenth century. Together with the theories of legal positivism and formalism which are closely related to parliamentary sovereignty and the classical rule of law, these ideals were transposed into the common law of contract through the classical model of contract law which emphasises freedom and sanctity of contract and promotes legal certainty. This approach resulted in the negation of the court’s equitable discretion and the limitation of good faith which sustain the social and economic inequalities that were created under colonialism and exacerbated under apartheid rule. In stark contrast, the modern human rights culture grounded in human dignity and aimed at the promotion of substantive equality led to the introduction of modern contract theory in other parts of the world. The introduction of the Constitution as grounded in human dignity and aimed at the achievement of substantive equality has resulted in a sophisticated jurisprudence on human dignity that reflects a harmonisation between its Western conception as based on Kantian dignity and ubuntu which provides an African understanding thereof. In this respect, ubuntu plays an important role in infusing the common law of contract with African values and in promoting substantive equality between contracting parties in line with modern contract theory. It is submitted that this approach to human dignity should result in the development of good faith into a substantive rule of the common law of contract which can be used to set aside an unfair contract term or the unfair enforcement thereof. / Private Law / LL. D.

For the past two decades, statebuilding has been the object of a growing attention from practitioners and scholars alike. ‘International statebuilding’, as its dominant approach or model guiding the practices of national and international actors, has sparked numerous discussions and debates, mostly around its effectiveness (i.e. if it works) and deficiencies (i.e. why it often fails). Surprisingly, little efforts have been made to investigate what international statebuilding, in the multiple ways it is mobilized by various actors, actually produces on the political dynamics of the ‘fragile’ contexts it is supposed to support and reinforce. Using an instrumentation perspective, this dissertation addresses this gap by exploring the relationship between the micro-dynamics of the uses of international statebuilding instruments and the fragility of contexts. This exploration is articulated around five essays and as many angles to this relationship. Using the case of Hamas, Essay I explores the European Union’s (EU) terrorist labelling policy by questioning the nature and modalities of the enlisting process, its use as foreign policy tool and its consequences on its other agendas, especially its international statebuilding efforts in Palestine. Essay II examines a Belgian good governance incentive mechanism and sheds the light on the tension between the claimed apolitical and objective nature of the instrument and the politicization potential embedded in its design and modalities, naturally leading to a convoluted implementation. Essay III analyses the localization dynamics of transitional justice in Burundi and unveils the nature, diversity and rationale behind transitional justice subversion techniques mobilized by national and international actors, which have produced a triple form of injustice. Essay IV widens this scope in Burundi, developing the argument that the authoritarian trend observed in the 2010-2015 period did not only occur against international statebuilding but also through self-reinforcing subversion tactics of its appropriation. Finally, essay V deepens the reflection on appropriation by attempting to build a theory of regime consolidation through international statebuilding subversion tactics. Overall, the incremental theory building reflection of the essays converges towards the assembling of a comprehensive framework of the in-betweens of the normative diffusion of liberal democracy, the inner-workings of its operationalization through the resort to the international statebuilding instrument and the intermediary constraints or objectives of actors not only interfering with its genuine realization but also contributing to its antipode of regime consolidation, conflict dynamics and authoritarianism. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Nous partons d’un constat :plusieurs Etats d’Afrique, en général, et d’Afrique centrale, en particulier, connaissent un déficit très aigu de justice et de démocratie dans la répartition de biens sociaux premiers. En outre, ces Etats ne sont pas bien organisés politiquement, économiquement et socialement. Par conséquent, ils ne respectent pas les principes de justice politique à l’échelle domestique, ni les principes du droit des peuples au niveau international ou supranational. <p>Devant ce constat amer, nous nous sommes proposé de réfléchir en profondeur sur la théorie de la justice politique de Rawls en vue de nous imprégner de principes susceptibles de garantir les droits et devoirs fondamentaux des citoyens et des peuples bien ordonnés.<p>Nous avons ainsi examiné les conditions de possibilité de l’application de la théorie de la justice politique de Rawls pour une intégration politique réussie à l’échelle interne, en République Démocratique du Congo, et au niveau international ou supranational des Etats de l’Afrique centrale. Il ressort que la mise en place des institutions politiques, économiques, socioculturelles viables, de l’Etat de droit et du modèle de la démocratie représentativo-délibérative constituent, à notre sens, des préalables indispensables en vue de postuler, à un second niveau, une intégration politique supranationale dans la sous-région de l’Afrique des Grands Lacs caractérisée par des guerres récurrentes interétatiques. Les principes rawlsiens du droit des peuples peuvent aider à repenser la politique étrangère des pays de la sous-région de l’Afrique centrale et celle des organisations supranationales existantes. <p>Néanmoins, nous avons soutenu que l’application de certains principes rawlsiens du droit des peuples, comme celui du respect des traités et des engagements, nécessite que ceux-ci soient signés au sein d’une « fédération pacifique » des Etats. En effet, dans l’entendement d’Emmanuel Kant, des traités signés dans une « fédération pacifique » mettent fin à la fois aux guerres présentes et futures.<p>Dans cet ordre d’idées, nous avons souligné qu’une « fédération pacifique » des Etats pourra créer un cadre important pour l’émergence d’une « communauté de sécurité » au sens deutschien du terme, nécessaire pour la paix durable dans la sous-région de l’Afrique des Grands Lacs. La « communauté de sécurité » préconise que les Etats entretenant des relations réciproques ne recourent pas à la violence physique et règlent leurs problèmes par des « mécanismes de changement pacifique ». Dans cette logique, la guerre n’est plus facilement envisageable. De plus, nous avons estimé, en nous inspirant d’Habermas, qu’il est pertinent que les pays de l’Afrique centrale s’engagent sur la voie de l’« afrofédération », assurant la transformation des traités interétatiques conclus en une Constitution politique que chaque Etat de la fédération devra respecter.<p> / Doctorat en Philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

On Constate aujourd’hui une avancée significative du processus de démocratisation au Togo et au Zimbabwe grâce à la politique de la conditionnalité démocratique de l’aide européenne au développement et aux sanctions financières édictées contre ces pays. C’est la synergie des forces externes et internes qui a contribué au changement de politique au Togo et au Zimbabwe. La mobilisation de la société civile a également été utile. Cependant, le système politique produit par la politique de la conditionnalité n’est que de façade car les résultats obtenus ne sont pas à la hauteur des attentes. Le bilan est mitigé. Les réformes entreprises au Togo et au Zimbabwe ne sont qu’apparentes. La dépendance de l’aide a engendré la corruption, les dettes, et a sapé les investissements. Tant que des solutions appropriées n’auront pas été trouvées à l’aspiration démocratique des peuples africains en tenant compte de leurs réalités sociales, culturelles, économiques et politiques ; les crises sociopolitiques risquent de perdurer sur le continent. L’Afrique a besoin aujourd’hui d’une institution forte capable de concilier la démocratie et le développement. Elle a aussi besoin de l’indépendance budgétaire et monétaire. / Today there is a significant advance in the democratization process in Togo and Zimbabwe because of the political democratic conditionality for EU development aid and financial sanctions imposed against the country. It is the synergy of internal and external forces that contributed to the change in policy in Togo and Zimbabwe. The mobilization of civil society has been helpful. However, the political system produced by policy conditionality is only façade since the results are not up to what was expected. The results are mixed. The reforms undertaken in Togo and Zimbabwe are only apparent. In addition, aid dependence has fostered corruption, debt, and undermined investment. Unless appropriate solutions can be found to the democratic aspirations of the African peoples, taking into account their social, cultural, economic and political realities; sociopolitical crises are likely to persist on the continent. Africa today needs a strong institution capable of reconciling democracy and development. It also needs fiscal and monetary independence

Le renouveau du constitutionnalisme amorcé dans les années 1990 en Afrique subsaharienne francophone et la menace sécuritaire grandissante à travers le monde réorientent la problématique des rapports qu’entretient la liberté d’opinion avec l’ordre public sécuritaire. La reconnaissance constitutionnelle de la liberté d’opinion exige que l’exercice de cette liberté se fasse dans le respect de l’ordre public matériel, avec au coeur de cet ordre juridicisé, la sécurité des personnes, des biens et du territoire national par extension. Cette reconnaissance impose de s’interroger sur la conciliation de la liberté d’opinion avec l’ordre public sécuritaire en Afrique subsaharienne francophone (Bénin- Côte d’Ivoire-Sénégal) à la lumière de l’expérience des grandes démocraties contemporaines (Allemagne-France). Dans la présente recherche, l’exigence de conciliation s’appuie sur des fondements constitutionnels et son respect doit être assuré par un ensemble de garanties juridiques. Cependant, la conciliation trouve ses limites dans les contingences politiques, économiques et sociales propres aux États de l’Afrique subsaharienne francophone. En effet, dans des pays où l’État de droit est en gestation,la conciliation de deux normes de valeur constitutionnelle est incertaine, surtout lorsque l’une d’entre elle, la liberté d’opinion, peut être mise en oeuvre contre le pouvoir politique tandis que l’autre, l’ordre public sécuritaire, peut lui servir de prétexte pour limiter l’exercice de cette liberté. La réflexion invite in fine à repenser la conciliation de la liberté d’opinion avec l’ordre public sécuritaire comme un nouveau principe constitutionnel en Afrique subsaharienne francophone. / The renewal of constitutionalism, initiated in the 1990’s in francophone sub-Saharan Africa,and the worldwide growing security threat reorient the issue of the relationships between freedom of opinion and public security order. The constitutional recognition of freedom of opinion requires that the exercise of this freedom be done according to substantive public policy, with, at the heart of this legalised policy, the safety of people, property and, by extension, national territory. This recognition demands that we question the conciliation of freedom of opinion with public security order in francophone sub-Saharan Africa (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal) in the light of the experience of great contemporary democracies (Germany, France). In this research, constitutional grounds support the conciliation requirement and its respect must be ensured by legal guarantees. However, conciliation finds its limits in the political, economic and social contingencies specific to the francophone sub-Saharan States of Africa. Indeed, in these countries where the rule of law is building up, the conciliation of two constitutional standards is uncertain, especially when one of them, freedom of opinion, can threaten political power whereas the other one, public security order, can become an excuse to limit the exercise of this freedom. The essay invites in fine to reconsider the conciliation of freedom of opinion with public security order as a new constitutional principle in francophone sub-Saharan Africa.

Distinguer entre le droit commun et le droit spécial est une habitude fortement ancrée chez les juristes, dans le domaine de la théorie comme de la pratique. Les rôles attribués à cette distinction sont d’une grande diversité ; mais ils sont aussi sous la menace de deux phénomènes : la multiplication des degrés de spécialité et le développement de rapports -horizontaux - entre droits communs d'une part, et entre droits spéciaux d'autre part. Véritable "summa divisio", elle disposerait cependant toujours d’une vertu ordonnatrice très importante,tant pour le législateur que pour le juge, et tant à l’université que dans la pratique.Il y a pourtant un singulier paradoxe. Le droit commun et le droit spécial sont indéfinissables ; leur relativité est telle qu’ils ne se conçoivent pas abstraction faite l’un de l’autre. Et, toutefois, la relation qu’ils entretiennent est généralement décrite en termes d’opposition. Or, la relativité appelle bien plutôt la collaboration que l’opposition.C’est ainsi que, s’agissant de l’élaboration du droit, des influences positives sont à l’oeuvre. Le droit commun et le droit spécial se servent mutuellement de modèle. Leur évolution se déroule en contemplation l'un de l'autre. Cela permet surtout, concernant l’application du droit, de réfuter l’idée suivant laquelle le droit commun et le droit spécial s’excluraient mécaniquement. En dehors des hypothèses prévues par le droit écrit, aucun fondement ne justifie l’exclusivisme. Ce dernier ne dispose en outre que d’un régime juridique plein d’incertitude. La valeur de la solution préconisée par l’adage "Specialia generalibus derogant" n’est que celle d’une présomption, simple. « Sur-mesure », le droit spécial est supposé mieux adapté à la situation litigieuse, mais il peut concrètement se révéler moins approprié que le droit commun / Distinguishing between general and specific rules of law is a deeply rooted habit among civilist lawyers, concerning the field of theory as the practice one. The roles of this distinction are very different, but they are threatened by two kinds of phenomenas as well : the increasing degreesof specialization and the development of -horizontal- relationship between general rules of lawon the one hand, and specific rules of law in the other hand. As a genuine, it would work,however, always as a good way to order the priority of different rules of law for both legislature and judges, both in academia and in practice.There is however a singular paradox. The general and specific rules of law can't be defined,their relativity is such an obvious one that they inconceivable if the other doesn't exist. According to this idea, their relationship is usually described in terms of opposition. Yet, the meaning of "relativity" is closer to collaboration rather than opposition.Thus, as regards to the development of the law, positive influences are at work. General and specific rule of law are a model to each other. Their evolution takes place in contemplation ofeach part. This especially helps the application of law to refute the idea that the general andspecific rules of law are mechanically mutually exclusive. A part from the possibilities provided by statute law, no basis justifies exclusiveness. Furthermore, specific rules of law sometimes contain a lot of less-defined rules. The value of the solution advocated by the adage "specialia generalibus derogant " is just a presumption, a simple one. A specific rule of law is supposes to be perfectly adapted to a situation, but it may pragmatically, about some case, be less appropriate than the general rule of law.