Název, abstrakt a klíčová slova v anlickém jazyce New corporate law imperativeness and dispositivity Abstract This dissertation thesis focuses on the basic premise that the autonomy of the will, as a fundamental principle of private law, also applies to corporate law. When researching the imperative and dispositive norms of corporate law, one must examine how the autonomy of the will can be manifested and limited. All the limitations of the autonomy of the will to dispose of its private-law relations are realised through certain limits, which set boundaries that cannot be overstepped by the subjects of legal relations. Therefore, this paper contains the categorisation of the types of restrictions on the autonomy of the wills and the limits through which these types of restrictions on the autonomy of the will are realised. Exploring the limits of the autonomy of the will leads to a preliminary conclusion that all these categories follow a general requirement, that the legal actions should be in accordance with the meaning and purpose of law. The meaning and purpose of a legal norm can be considered as a basic criterion for defining the legal norm as imperative or dispositive. However, it must be emphasised that the limits on the autonomy of the will may be imposed not only by imperative norms, but also by...

Submitted by Andrea Hayashi (deachan@gmail.com) on 2016-06-22T14:51:03Z No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-phellipe-marran.pdf: 786585 bytes, checksum: 9aec77621aee01c10d389862c31b74af (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Andrea Hayashi (deachan@gmail.com) on 2016-06-22T14:54:41Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-phellipe-marran.pdf: 786585 bytes, checksum: 9aec77621aee01c10d389862c31b74af (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-22T14:54:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-phellipe-marran.pdf: 786585 bytes, checksum: 9aec77621aee01c10d389862c31b74af (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-06-20 / O objeto desta pesquisa consiste no estudo da concepção de “substância enquanto sujeito” à qual é fundamental para a compreensão do processo de formação do inconsciente político do indivíduo moderno, sob o prisma do idealismo alemão. Mais especificamente, tal estudo busca desenvolver-se a partir de uma articulação entre as obras Fenomenologia do Espírito, Enciclopédia das ciências filosóficas e Ciência da Lógica de Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Propõe-se uma apresentação das interpretações dos conceitos presentes nas obras de alguns estudiosos de Hegel, para elucidar os vínculos entre a reflexão da política e a da própria Sittlichkeit. Para tanto, será do interesse deste estudo expor a leitura que Hegel faz da tensão política da liberdade presente na obra de Immanuel Kant, levando em conta as implicações que tal tensão política acaba por apresentar em três momentos específicos: o primeiro deles é o momento da fundação do Estado; o segundo momento é o da manutenção do Estado; e o terceiro é o da revolução. Ao desenvolver o estudo propomo-nos a realizar investigação da articulação sistêmica entre antropologia e fenomenologia, na medida em que ela permite apreender as determinações recíprocas (negações determinadas) entre educação (Erziehung) e formação (Bildung); articulação e determinações talvez permitam delinear a figura do sujeito à luz das mediações internas à transição entre o que Hegel chamou de “sensação do direito” e “sentimento do direito”. / The purpose of this research is the study of designing "the substance as a subject " is crucial to the understanding of the formation process of the political unconscious of the modern individual from the German idealism’s perspective. More specifically, this study seeks to develop from an articulation between Phenomenology of the Spirit, Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences and Science of Logic, by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. We propose a presentation of the concepts’ interpretations in the works of some scholars of Hegel , to elucidate the links between politics’ reflection and the Sittlichkeit itself . To this end, this study will be of interest to expose the reading that Hegel does of the political tension of freedom in Immanuel Kant’s work , considering the implications that such political tension puts forward three specific moments: the first of them is the moment of foundation of the State; the second moment is the maintenance of the State; and the third is the revolution. In developing the study we propose to do the investigation of the systemic links between anthropology and phenomenology, as it allows to learn the reciprocal determinations (denials determinations) between education (Erziehung) and self-cultivation (Bildung); articulation and determinations may allow to delineate the figure of the subject in the light of the internal intercession between what Hegel called "Law’ Sense" and "Law’s consciousness" mediations.

La notion d’éthique apparaît chez Emmanuel Lévinas à travers la critique de l’ontologie de Martin Heidegger et de la phénoménologie d’Edmund Husserl. Dans cette dimension de l’éthique, deux catégories s’imposent : le Même et l’Autre. Elles jouent toutes deux un rôle primordial. Pourtant, chez Lévinas, apparaît une tendance ontologique, lorsqu’il doit penser la notion du Même et de l’Autre, puisque ces deux notions renvoient à une certaine appropriation de l’être et de l’étant. Ainsi, dans notre recherche sur la pensée de Lévinas, nous essaierons d’expliciter son ontologie. Pour cela, nous commencerons par décrire la conception lévinasienne du monde et du corps. Puis, sur le fondement du monde et du corps, nous décrirons la notion de la subjectivité par le biais d’autres notions comme « l’il y a », la sensibilité, le langage, le temps et Dieu. Nous expliquerons alors leur rapport fondateur en tant que celui-ci constitue la notion de la subjectivité. Ces notions, en effet, justifient notre intérêt porté à l’ontologie de Lévinas et à ses éléments canoniques que sont les ontologies du Même et de l’Autre. A la suite de notre interrogation sur ces deux ontologies, nous décrirons le rôle fondateur de l’ontologie de l’Autre dans le domaine de l’éthique. Enfin, nous expliciterons le sens de l’éthique grâce à l’analyse des notions de mauvaise conscience et de volonté qui permettent de comprendre plus avant l’ontologie de l’Autre. / In Emmanuel Levinas’s work, the concept of ethics appears through a critique of the ontology of Martin Heidegger and the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. In the dimension of ethics the two categories of the Same (Même) and Other (Autre) play primordial roles. At the same time, we find in Levinas’s philosophical discourse an ontological tendency whenever he must consider the concepts of Same and Other, because they recourse to a certain appropriation of existence and the existent. Thus, in our research on Levinas’s thought, we have tried to clarify his ontology in all of its specificity. To bring this specificity to light, we start by describing the concepts of the world and the body. Then, based on these two notions, we describe the notion of subjectivity with other principal concepts such as “the there is” (“l’il y a”), sensitivity, language, time, and God. Their fundamental relationship is explained in a way such that they produce subjectivity. These considerations effectively build up to our principal interest, which is to focus directly upon the particular ontology of Levinas, with its constitutive parts of Same and Other. Drawing upon the philosophical outcomes of our interrogation of these notions, we describe the fundamental role of the ontology of the Other for the meaning of the ethics. The final sections of the text continue this theme by considering the concepts of the guilty conscious and the will.

Submitted by Ana Valéria de Jesus Moura (anavaleria_131@hotmail.com) on 2014-07-24T17:03:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 FÁBIO ROQUE DA SILVA ARAÚJO.pdf: 1582509 bytes, checksum: 8e10d75edde07fae378aaeb21a8a8cd3 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Valéria de Jesus Moura (anavaleria_131@hotmail.com) on 2014-07-24T17:03:38Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 FÁBIO ROQUE DA SILVA ARAÚJO.pdf: 1582509 bytes, checksum: 8e10d75edde07fae378aaeb21a8a8cd3 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-07-24T17:03:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 FÁBIO ROQUE DA SILVA ARAÚJO.pdf: 1582509 bytes, checksum: 8e10d75edde07fae378aaeb21a8a8cd3 (MD5) / A culpabilidade, elemento constitutivo da estrutura analítica do crime, desempenha papel de fundamental importância, na imposição e delimtação da sanção penal. Fruto da construção histórica de um Direito Penal racionalizado e tributário dos direitos fundamentais, a culpabilidade assentou-se sobre o primado do livre-arbítrio, compreendido como capacidade de autodeterminação individual. As recentes descobertas da neurociência cognitiva, acabam por propugnar a existência de um neurodeterminismo, que teria o condão de rechaçar a importância da culpabilidade, consagrando uma intervenção punitiva em descompasso com a dinâmica das relações sociais. A tese neurodeterminista e a consequente abolição da culpabilidade, porém, não possui procedência à luz do atual estágio de desenvolvimento da ciência, e da necessidade de um juízo de reprovação que fundamente a imposição da pena.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo apresentar os conceitos de lei e soberania no Contrato Social de Rousseau sob uma perspectiva histórico-filosófica, retratando o surgimento do modelo filosófico-jurídico da legitimação do poder a o nascimento (ou renascimento, a depender de como se considere o período imperial romano) do conceito de soberania como completa liberdade em relação às leis existentes, ou sujeição apenas à própria razão. A partir desse fato histórico, como de outros relativos à filosofia tardoescolástica de Escoto, com sua distinctio formalis ex natura rei que permitiu a emergência de uma antropologia como a de Rousseau, que divide os seres humanos em camadas sobrepostas e o voluntarismo nominalista de Ockham, que permitiu a elaboração de um conceito como vontade geral. Procura-se demonstrar também como a concepção nominalista de um Deus absconditus tornou a justificação de um poder que é pura vontade separada daqueles que ordena ininteligível. Neste sentido, a crise de heteronomia em relação à transcendência que não é pura heteronomia, mas participação na ordem criada acaba gerando uma crise da heteronomia em razão ao poder secular, dando origem à autonomia soberana do povo pela vontade geral. / The present thesis purpose is to present the concepts of sovereignty and law in Rousseaus Social contract in a historical and philosophical perspective, depicting the appearance of the philosophical-juridical model of legitimization of political power and the birth (or rebirth, depending on whether it can or can not be regarded as existing during the Roman Empire) of the concept of sovereingty as complete liberty from current laws held by the governor, which should be regarded as subject only to his will moderate by his reason (voluntas ratione regulata). Departing from that historical fact, as well as from the late scholastic philosophy of Scotus whose concept of distinctio formalis ex natura rei allowed the conception of a human essence as being composite of separable layers , and of Ockham whose voluntaristic nominalism turned into a possibility the creation of such an idea as that of general will it is shown how Rousseau follows a path that had been long before traced. It was also tried to show how the nominalist conception of a God as being a hidden God (Deus absconditus) made also viable the justification of a power which is pure will separate from those it rules. Thus, the crisis of hetoronomy, derived from the lack of intelligibility of the transcendence, is followed by a crisis of the heteronomy caused by the unintelligibility of the ruler by the ruled. From that will spring the concept of autonomy of the sovereign people of Rousseau.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:24:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2004-03-04Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T19:32:13Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 seabra_a_me_mar.pdf: 546685 bytes, checksum: eba46a300670629ef8653098d2c90e0b (MD5) / O discurso filosófico de Nietzsche percorre a vida em ampla gama de considerações, mas não é difícil visualizar nele uma preocupação educativa, traduzida no propósito de arrancar o homem do estado carente e inseguro a que o teria confinado a cultura moderna, apontando-lhe a saída em uma nova cultura afirmativa e superior. Vista assim, toda a filosofia nietzscheana poderia ser entendida como uma grande crítica à cultura moderna, que o filósofo vê doente e necessitada de médicos para salvá-la. E a cura há que vir daqueles que se proponham a educar a humanidade para aquela elevação, mediante rompimento com idéias, práticas e métodos obsoletos. Todavia, se focarmos o exame em algumas partes de sua obra, veremos existir nelas pensamentos voltados mais diretamente para o tema da educação, em que, sem esforço demasiado, poderíamos ver delineada, ainda que não de maneira sistemática, uma filosofia da educação. Sabemos todos os operadores da esfera educacional que a questão em que se constitui a filosofia da educação é objeto de não poucos debates, parecendo distante o consenso em torno de uma definição. Se nos ativermos, porém, às questões que são colocadas pelas pessoas credenciadas a falar sobre o tema, veremos que dizem respeito a se a educação é direito de todos, se seu objeto é transmissão de conhecimentos, a formação do indivíduo, o desenvolvimento de suas potencialidades, o seu preparo para o exercício de uma profissão, todas essas tarefas, ou a combinação delas. De tudo isso Nietzsche se ocupou em seus escritos, sobretudo naqueles que são considerados por alguns biógrafos e comentadores como os da primeira fase de seu pensamento. E no questionamento da educação pelo filósofo, subjacente à idéia da necessidade de se conduzir a humanidade a uma cultura superior e emancipadora se apresenta aquilo... / The philosophical Nietzsche's speech covers the life in ample gamma of considerations, but it is not difficult to visualize which is always present in its essence an educative concern, translated in the purpose to move the man from the destitute and unsafe state that it would have confined the modern culture, pointing it the exit that will be found in a new affirmative and superior culture. In this aspect, all the Nietzsche's philosophy could be understood it is a great critical to the modern culture, which the philosopher sees sick and needed of doctors to save it. The cure has to come from those who propose to educate the humanity for that elevation, by means of disruption with ideas, practical and obsolete methods that obstructs such mission. However, if we concentrate the examination in some parts of its work, we will see that there are more directly thoughts directed to the subject of the education, where, without too much effort, we could see delineated, yet not in a systematic way, an education's philosophy. We all operators of the educational sphere know that the question what the education's philosophy constitutes is object of not few debates, seeming far a consensus around a definition. If we guide ourselves, however by the subject placed about these questions, we will verify that we see placed by the credential people to talk about the subject are, for example, if the education is everyone's right, if its object is transmission of knowledge, the formation of the individual, the development of his or her potentialities, his or her preparation for the exercise of a profession, all these tasks, or the combination of them. Of all this Nietzsche occupied himself in his writings, over all in those considered by some biographers and commentators as the first phase of his. The questioning of the education by the philosopher, as we will try to evidence, it develops on the... (Complete abstract, click electronic address below)

Grâce à une étude exhaustive de la notion de vie dans l'œuvre d'Arthur Schopenhauer, la thèse répond à la question de la vie et du vivre-encore. Il s'agit de montrer comment la métaphysique schopenhauerienne de la volonté explique et justifie le phénomène de la vie ainsi que celui de la persistance dans le vivre. D'emblée, la thèse propose d'établir la définition ultime et métaphysique de la vie. C'est alors que le phénomène de la vie se trouve défini de part en part comme volonté de vivre et alors, comme un phénomène qui cherche à vivre et à vivre encore. La thèse explique aussi comment les différentes approches de la vie proposées par Schopenhauer permettent de définir cette notion selon une perspective biologique, philosophique, existentielle et métaphorique, mais toujours relativement à la définition métaphysique de la vie. Une étude du sentiment de vie révèle l'épreuve de la vie comme volonté de vivre, c'est-à-dire d'une vie qui se veut toujours elle-même. C'est alors que la vie s'impose en soi comme une nécessité de vivre, mais aussi comme une nécessité de souffrir parce que vivre c'est aussi toujours souffrir. La négation de la volonté comme solution à la douleur de vivre se trouve alors critiquée et remise en cause par un examen des tensions entre le besoin d'affirmation de la volonté dans le phénomène de la vie et l'intention de négation de la volonté chez le sujet qui cherche son salut. Il apparait donc clairement qu'en ayant placé au cœur du sujet une volonté de vivre aveugle et puissante Schopenhauer a fait de la vie un phénomène quasi incorruptible : l'affirmation de la volonté s'impose comme un impératif et ainsi s'impose la vie comme nécessité de vivre. / The thesis answers the question of life and further living by means of an exhaustive study of the concept of life in Arthur Schopenhauer's work. The principal concern is to demonstrate how Schopenhauer's metaphysics explains and justifies the phenomenon of life as well as the phenomenon of the persistence into the living. From the beginning the thesis establishes the ultimate and the metaphysical definition of life. Therefore the phenomenon of life is defined throughout as Will-to-live and then, as a phenomenon that seeks for life and further living. The thesis also shows how Schopenhauer's different approaches to the concept of life allow one to define life from a biological, philosophical, existential and a metaphorical perspective, but which is always related to the metaphysical definition of life. A study of the feeling of life reveals that what is always felt is the Will-to-live i.e. a life that always wants itself. Then life imposes itself into itself as a necessity to live, but also as a necessity to suffer because living always entails suffering. The negation of the will as a solution for existential pain and suffering is therefore criticized and reconsidered by an examination of all the existing tensions between the need of the phenomenon of life to affirm the will and the intention to negate the will in the subject looking for salvation. Subsequently it appears evident that by putting a blind and powerful Will-to-live into the heart of the subject Schopenhauer has rendered life into an almost incorruptible phenomenon: the affirmation of the will imposes itself as an imperative and so life imposes itself as a necessity to live.

Le consentement est probablement l'un des concepts les plus familiers aux juristes. Initiée à son fonctionnement dès le début des études du droit, par le prisme quasi exclusif du droit des obligations, la communauté juridique trouve dans celui-ci un moyen commode d'expliquer l'engagement individuel dans un ensemble de normes. Dès lors, c'est par le consentement que l'on pourrait rendre compte de la volonté, c'est-à-dire de cet élément subjectif qui permet l'application de la règle.Pourtant, après une étude approfondie, deux éléments au moins étonnent. Le premier tient à ce que la réflexion sur ce sujet est quantitativement faible. Le second, quant à lui, consiste dans le fait que la définition même du terme de consentement est trop peu interrogée. Ce faisant, elle varie d'un auteur à l'autre avec toutefois un trait commun: le consentement est presque toujours pensé comme détaché de la personne qui en est l'auteur. Ainsi, on évite d'avoir à s'interroger sur l'acteur principal de l'ordre juridique.Malgré ses mérites, cette vision abstraite est devenue trop excessive pour pouvoir demeurer en l'état. L'absence de définition du concept a pour effet de faire émerger des usages nouveaux de ce dernier. On pensait avoir résolu la question de la subjectivité, et pourtant elle fait retour dans ses manifestations les plus concrètes.Dès lors, notre recherche consistera à essayer de trouver une définition du consentement, en faisant l'hypothèse d'un retour fécond à ses origines. Grâce à cela, on pourra tenter de proposer une nouvelle compréhension du concept et de la subjectivité juridique, en intégrant la dimension émotionnelle dans la réflexion sur le droit. / Consent is probably one of the concepts with which the community of law practitioners is most familiar. Having been introduced to the concept from the beginning of their studies, and almost exclusively in the context of contract law, the community of law practitioners finds it a convenient way to explain how an individual can choose to put his/her behavior under the rule of the law; consent indicates the presence of individual will, that is to say, the subjectivity of the individual exercising consent.Nevertheless, an examination of consent in the context of French law reveals that relatively little research has been done on this topic, and the very definition of the term rarely comes under close consideration. As a result, definitions vary, but retain a common element in that consent is almost always considered separately from the individual exercising it.This abstract approach, although it has its merits, must evolve. The lack of definition of the concept of consent results in it being put to new uses. The judicial community thought that consent would resolve the question of subjectivity, when in fact it only increases the need for a proper study. Therefore, we will seek a definition of consent, by taking an etymological approach. Based on this we will attempt to propose a new understanding of consent and juridical subjectivity, by integrating the emotional aspects of subjectivity into thinking and discussion on law.

Submitted by Luciana Sebin (lusebin@ufscar.br) on 2016-09-27T13:51:07Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DissLPC.pdf: 1442685 bytes, checksum: aec7a034d86a5df7f2d637173fc43e85 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marina Freitas (marinapf@ufscar.br) on 2016-09-27T19:51:15Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 DissLPC.pdf: 1442685 bytes, checksum: aec7a034d86a5df7f2d637173fc43e85 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marina Freitas (marinapf@ufscar.br) on 2016-09-27T19:51:21Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 DissLPC.pdf: 1442685 bytes, checksum: aec7a034d86a5df7f2d637173fc43e85 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-09-27T19:51:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DissLPC.pdf: 1442685 bytes, checksum: aec7a034d86a5df7f2d637173fc43e85 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-02-24 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / In Of the Social Contract, Rousseau says that in the civil state the man enjoys individual freedom at the same time as a member of the social body, whose general will is the driving force of the State. That is, the philosopher shows that, on the other hand, the general will, founded through the metaphor of the social body united for the common good of the members, is sovereign to drive life in society and, on the other, the man is to be free in that, as a member of that body, rules your life through laws that he erects on himself, because to be truly master of himself is nothing but to listen the voice of duty or consults the reason, rather than the physical impulse that drives human life in the state of nature. Therefore, according to Gérard Lebrun, Rousseau’s social pact confines the man in the public good, denying him individual freedom. Our research consists to examine as is possible to think the general will and individual freedom in society, aiming to refute the criticism of Lebrun. / Em Do Contrato social, Rousseau diz que no estado civil o homem goza de liberdade individual ao mesmo tempo em que é membro do corpo social, cuja vontade geral é a força motriz do Estado. Isto é, o filósofo mostra que, de um lado, a vontade geral, fundamentada através da metáfora do corpo social unido em prol do bem comum dos associados, é soberana para dirigir a vida em sociedade e, de outro, o homem é um ser livre na medida em que, como integrante desse corpo, rege sua vida por meio de leis que ele mesmo erige sobre si, porquanto ser verdadeiramente senhor de si nada é senão ouvir a voz do dever ou consultar a razão, ao invés do impulso físico que dirige a vida humana no estado de natureza. Entretanto, para Gérard Lebrun, o pacto social de Rousseau confinaria o homem no bem público, negando-lhe a liberdade individual. Nossa pesquisa consiste em analisar como é possível pensar a vontade geral e a liberdade individual na sociedade, visando refutar a crítica de Lebrun.

Submitted by Viviane Lima da Cunha (viviane@biblioteca.ufpb.br) on 2015-12-07T14:14:13Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 630551 bytes, checksum: a248f59e81f913b9601f38a16f8226cd (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-12-07T14:14:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 630551 bytes, checksum: a248f59e81f913b9601f38a16f8226cd (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-03-02 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This dissertation deals with the fundamentals of cosmopolitan right in Immanuel Kant’s philosophical thought. As, for Kant, without cosmopolitan law to guarantee peace among nations, it is not possible to guarantee rights even among individuals, and without a guarantee of the rights among individuals, there is no exercise of freedom, Kant’s interest in cosmopolitanism reveals itself linked to the project of the Enlightenment, a project he exposes in his booklet Answer the Question: What is Enlightenment? Grounding on concepts as freedom, legality, right, justice – which, according to Kant, have their foundations a priori on human reason, being therefore recognized as such by all human race – we will approach Kant’s analyses on a concept of right able to ensure endurable peace, founded in the cosmopolitan law. This research will follow Kant’s analyses of the connections between his concept of morals – to which Enlightenment’s project of freedom is bounded – and the problem of history and cosmopolitanism in his works on political philosophy and philosophy of law. In this course, we will be dealing with important concepts of Kant's philosophy of morals, on which are based his concepts relative to law, such as autonomy, heteronomy, freedom of the will, coercion, morality and legality. These concepts will give us elements to understand the bridge from the law among individuals within the state to the establishment of a universal right, or cosmopolitan law, among the nations, a bridge that should reveal what Kant means by his concept of progress of mankind defined as moral progress. / Esta dissertação trata dos fundamentos do direito cosmopolita no pensamento de Immanuel Kant. Na medida em que, para Kant, sem um direito cosmopolita que garanta a paz entre as nações, não é possível a garantia nem mesmo dos direitos entre os indivíduos no interior dos Estados e, sem a garantia de direitos entre os indivíduos, não há exercício da liberdade, o interesse de Kant no cosmopolitismo revela-se vinculado ao projeto do Esclarecimento, que ele expõe em seu opúsculo Resposta à Pergunta: que é Esclarecimento? Com base nos conceitos de liberdade, legalidade, direito, justiça – que segundo Kant têm seus fundamentos a priori na razão humana, sendo por isso reconhecidos como tais por todo o gênero humano – vamos abordar as análises de Kant referentes a um direito que torne possível uma paz duradoura, fundada num direito cosmopolita. Esta pesquisa seguirá as análises de Kant do vínculo entre o conceito de moral – no qual o projeto de liberdade do Esclarecimento se insere – e o problema da história e do cosmopolitismo em seus trabalhos sobre filosofia política e filosofia do direito. Nesse percurso, vamos examinar conceitos importantes da reflexão kantiana sobre a moral, que estão na base de sua concepção do direito, tais como, autonomia, heteronomia, liberdade da vontade, coação, moralidade e legalidade. Esses conceitos irão nos dar elementos para entender a passagem do direito entre os indivíduos no interior dos Estados à instituição de um direito universal, ou cosmopolita, entre as nações, passagem que vai configurar o que Kant entende por progresso da humanidade como progresso moral e jurídico.