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The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers
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Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
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Showing 1 to 6 of 6 (0.029 seconds)Spelling suggestions: "subject:"[een] JOHN AUSTIN"" "subject:"[enn] JOHN AUSTIN""
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[en] THE CONCEPT OF SANCTION IN THE ANALYTICAL JURISPRUDENCE / [pt] O CONCEITO DE SANÇÃO NA TEORIA ANALÍTICA DO DIREITONATHALIA FERREIRA MASSON 10 January 2008 (has links)
[pt] A presente dissertação diz respeito a um dos temas
centrais da
Teoria do Direito: o conceito de sanção. Muitos dos
conceitos jurídicos
básicos - inclusive o próprio conceito de Direito -
encontram-se
estritamente conectados com ele, de forma que um estudo
cuidadoso
sobre esse tema possibilitará que muitas outras questões
fundamentais
do Direito sejam, senão resolvidas, ao menos aclaradas. As
inúmeras
subdivisões que a complexidade do tema acarreta tornaram
necessárias
delimitações quanto ao objeto de estudo. Portanto, dentro
da ampla
esfera interessante ao pesquisador empenhado em deslindar
o tema,
optou-se por centrar a pesquisa em objetivos mais
modestos: o de
reconhecer e apresentar os principais problemas que
encerram o conceito
de sanção para a teoria do direito em três autores
específicos - Jeremy
Bentham, John Austin e Hans Kelsen - pertencentes a uma
mesma
tradição de pensamento jurídico, a Teoria Analítica do
Direito (analytical
jurisprudence). Tal escolha é facilmente justificável, em
virtude da
centralidade do conceito em suas concepções de Direito. / [en] The present work refers to one of the central subjects of
the Legal
Theory: the concept of sanction. Many of the basic legal
concepts - and the
concept of Law itself - are strictly connected with it, in
such a way that a careful
study on this subject will make possible that many other
basic questions of the
Law are, if not solved, at least clarified. Because of the
innumerable
subdivisions caused by that the complexity of the subject,
it had become
necessary to delimitate the studied object. Therefore,
within the wide area of
interest presented by the subject, the researcher has
opted to focus his/her
work on more modest objectives: to recognize and to
present the main
problems concerning the concept of sanction inside the
work of three specific
authors - Jeremy Bentham, John Austin and Hans Kelsen -,
being them all part
of the same legal thought tradition, the analytical school
of jurisprudence. Such
choice is justified by the unquestionable importance that
the authors confer to
the sanctions in their legal theories.
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Direito e interpretação na tradição do positivismo jurídico: uma análise de John Austin, H. L. A. Hart e seus críticos / Law and interpretation in tradition of legal positivism: one analyze of John Austin, H. L. A. Hart and his criticismJaber Lopes Mendonça Monteiro 13 August 2012 (has links)
Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O objetivo desta dissertação de mestrado é examinar as teses centrais do positivismo jurídico de John Austin e de H. L. A. Hart. Analiso inicialmente as críticas que Hart faz à teoria do direito como comando, proposta inicialmente por Austin na primeira metade do século XIX. Em seguida, ocupo-me das críticas de Ronald Dworkin ao positivismo jurídico, bem como das tentativas recentes de se retomar a teoria do direito como comando. Por fim, procuro mostrar de que forma a discussão em torno das críticas ao positivismo legal foi recebido no contexto do debate teórico-jurídico no Brasil. / The aim of this dissertation is to examine John Austins and H. L. A. Harts defense of legal positivism. I firstly analyze Harts criticism of Austins theory of law as command. Then I examine Ronald Dworkins criticism of legal positivism, as well as recent attempts to resume and defend the theory of law as command. In the final part of this dissertation I examine the how the debate on legal positivism was received in the context of Brazilian tradition of legal theory.
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Direito e interpretação na tradição do positivismo jurídico: uma análise de John Austin, H. L. A. Hart e seus críticos / Law and interpretation in tradition of legal positivism: one analyze of John Austin, H. L. A. Hart and his criticismJaber Lopes Mendonça Monteiro 13 August 2012 (has links)
Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O objetivo desta dissertação de mestrado é examinar as teses centrais do positivismo jurídico de John Austin e de H. L. A. Hart. Analiso inicialmente as críticas que Hart faz à teoria do direito como comando, proposta inicialmente por Austin na primeira metade do século XIX. Em seguida, ocupo-me das críticas de Ronald Dworkin ao positivismo jurídico, bem como das tentativas recentes de se retomar a teoria do direito como comando. Por fim, procuro mostrar de que forma a discussão em torno das críticas ao positivismo legal foi recebido no contexto do debate teórico-jurídico no Brasil. / The aim of this dissertation is to examine John Austins and H. L. A. Harts defense of legal positivism. I firstly analyze Harts criticism of Austins theory of law as command. Then I examine Ronald Dworkins criticism of legal positivism, as well as recent attempts to resume and defend the theory of law as command. In the final part of this dissertation I examine the how the debate on legal positivism was received in the context of Brazilian tradition of legal theory.
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Les degrés du silence : de la juste place du sens dans le langage et dans la perception chez Austin et Merleau-Ponty / Degrees of silence : the right place of sense in language and perception in the works of Austin and Merleau-PontyRoux, Jeanne-Marie 26 November 2015 (has links)
Nous comparons deux manières de refuser le « problème de la perception » – la perception permet-elle de connaître la réalité dès lors qu’existent l’illusion et l’hallucination ? Austin et Merleau-Ponty critiquant le présupposé qui pense la perception comme étant vraie ou fausse, et affirmant la différence de la perception et de la pensée, parviennent-ils à penser une authentique vérité ? La thèse d’un « silence » des sens pour Austin, ou son insertion dans le sensible pour Merleau-Ponty sont-elles sceptiques ? Nous montrons : 1/ Qu’Austin pense une objectivité du vrai, qu’il soutient en reconsidérant le langage – en mettant l’accent sur l’acte que réalise la parole –, la signification – dépendante, mais non remplacée, par la valeur de cet acte –, et la vérité – ni une correspondance pré- donnée ni un accord intersubjectif contingent. 2/ Que, de manière similaire, Merleau-Ponty se concentre sur la parole et critique l’idéal d’adéquation, mais que, soucieux de « l’origine de la vérité », il conserve l’idée d’une signification originaire du perçu (et donc d’un silence qui n’est que de degré) et engage une réforme pour intégrer le sens à l’être, mais ne réussit pas, in fine, à rendre compte de la vérité dont il cherchait la source. 3/ Que ces réussites diverses peuvent être rapportées à l’entente que ces auteurs se font des conventions linguistiques : là où le couple de l’échantillon et du modèle permet à Austin de penser un rapport souple, mais non ambigu, entre le langage et le monde, Merleau-Ponty conserve de l’idéalisme une conception rigide du langage, où la sédimentation du sens est une dévitalisation. / We compare two ways of refusing the “problem of perception” – given the possibility of illusion and hallucination, does perception allow us to know reality? While both Austin and Merleau-Ponty reject the presupposition that perception can be true or false, and assert the difference between perception and thought, do they still manage to conceive a proper idea of truth? Are the austinian thesis of a “silence of the senses” and the insertion of silence in the senses by Merleau-Ponty sceptical thesis? We show: 1/ That Austin does believe in the objectivity of truth, which he shows by reconsidering language – focusing on the act of speech –, meaning – dependent on, but not replaced by, the value of this act –, and truth – neither a pre-given correspondence, nor a contingent intersubjective agreement. 2/ That, similarly, Merleau-Ponty focuses on speech and criticizes the ideal of adequacy, but that he also cares about the “origin of truth” and for that reason maintains the idea of an “originary meaning” of perception (and thus of a silence which is only relative) and reforms ontology in order to integrate meaning into being in such a way that he does not succeed finally in accounting for the truth he was looking for. 3/ That these different results should be linked to the way both philosophers understand linguistic conventions: whereas the couple of pattern and sample allows Austin to think a flexible and vivid, but non ambiguous, relationship between language and world, Merleau-Ponty inherits from idealism a rigid conception of language, for which the sedimentation of meaning is always a devitalization.
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A Defense of Soft Positivism: Justice and Principle ProcessesDiener, Keith William 12 June 2006 (has links)
This thesis addresses the historic debate between natural law theorists and positivists. After providing a foundation for the debate by discussing the thirteenth century natural law theory of St. Thomas Aquinas and the criticisms of it by positivist philosopher John Austin, this thesis turns to the theory of H.L.A. Hart. My primary aim is to outline a defense of the soft positivism of H.L.A. Hart in face of the criticisms of Ronald Dworkin by appealing to two nonexclusive roots of moral principles in the law: justice and criminal law.
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A Pragmatic Standard of Legal ValidityTyler, John 2012 May 1900 (has links)
American jurisprudence currently applies two incompatible validity standards to determine which laws are enforceable. The natural law tradition evaluates validity by an uncertain standard of divine law, and its methodology relies on contradictory views of human reason. Legal positivism, on the other hand, relies on a methodology that commits the analytic fallacy, separates law from its application, and produces an incomplete model of law.
These incompatible standards have created a schism in American jurisprudence that impairs the delivery of justice. This dissertation therefore formulates a new standard for legal validity. This new standard rejects the uncertainties and inconsistencies inherent in natural law theory. It also rejects the narrow linguistic methodology of legal positivism.
In their stead, this dissertation adopts a pragmatic methodology that develops a standard for legal validity based on actual legal experience. This approach focuses on the operations of law and its effects upon ongoing human activities, and it evaluates legal principles by applying the experimental method to the social consequences they produce. Because legal history provides a long record of past experimentation with legal principles, legal history is an essential feature of this method.
This new validity standard contains three principles. The principle of reason requires legal systems to respect every subject as a rational creature with a free will. The principle of reason also requires procedural due process to protect against the punishment of the innocent and the tyranny of the majority. Legal systems that respect their subjects' status as rational creatures with free wills permit their subjects to orient their own behavior. The principle of reason therefore requires substantive due process to ensure that laws provide dependable guideposts to individuals in orienting their behavior.
The principle of consent recognizes that the legitimacy of law derives from the consent of those subject to its power. Common law custom, the doctrine of stare decisis, and legislation sanctioned by the subjects' legitimate representatives all evidence consent.
The principle of autonomy establishes the authority of law. Laws must wield supremacy over political rulers, and political rulers must be subject to the same laws as other citizens. Political rulers may not arbitrarily alter the law to accord to their will.
Legal history demonstrates that, in the absence of a validity standard based on these principles, legal systems will not treat their subjects as ends in themselves. They will inevitably treat their subjects as mere means to other ends. Once laws do this, men have no rest from evil.
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