租賃是使用權與所有權分離的一種企業或個人取得資產使權的方式。但是租賃市場中卻隱含二種潛在的訊息不對稱問題--逆向選擇與道德機問題。本文首先導出存在逆向選擇問題時之最適租約，並與充分訊息時之最適租約相比較。隨後我們也導出道德危機與逆向選擇問題並存時之最適租約。 　　有鑑於租賃對企業與個人的重要性，本文希望利用機制設計的方式來設計出存在訊息不對稱問題下的最適租約，以幫助租賃市場更有效地運作。針對逆向選擇問題，我們希望能利用誘因相容的直接控制機制，透過契約的設計，由承租人自己選擇租約，來幫助出租人分辦承租人之類型，並依此決定最適的租賃契約。針對道德危機問題，探究其成因主要是由於租約到期時資產的殘值完全不影響承租人報酬所致，所以我們希望能設計一組能使作維護努力的承租人得到充分獎勵的租約，也就是透過讓承租人作努力決策時將資產殘值納入考量的方式，使承租人的努力決策對出租人也是最適的。

A computational grid is a hardware and software infrastructure that provides dependable, consistent, pervasive, and inexpensive access to high-end computational capabilities. In the presence of grid users who are autonomous, rational, and intelligent, there is an overall degradation of the total efficiency of the computational grid in comparison to what can be achieved when the participating users are centrally coordinated . This loss in efficiency might arise due to an unwillingness on the part of some of the grid resource providers to either not perform completely or not perform to the fullest capability, the computational jobs of other users in the grid. In this thesis, our attention is focused on designing grid resource procurement mechanisms which a grid user can use for procuring resources in a computational grid based on bids submitted by autonomous, rational, and intelligent resource providers. Specifically, we follow a game theoretic and mechanism design approach to design three elegant, different incentive compatible procurement mechanisms for this purpose: G-DSIC (Grid-Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible) mechanism which guarantees that truthful bidding is a best response for each resource provider, irrespective of what the other resource providers bid G-BIC (Grid-Bayesian Nash Incentive Compatible) mechanism which only guarantees that truthful bidding is a best response for each resource provider whenever all other resource providers also bid truthfully G-OPT (Grid-Optimal) mechanism which minimizes the cost to the grid user, satisfying at the same time, (1) Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (which guarantees that truthful bidding is a best response for each resource provider whenever all other resource providers also bid truthfully) and (2) Individual Rationality (which guarantees that the resource providers have non-negative payoffs if they participate in the bidding process). We evaluate the relative merits and demerits of the above three mechanisms using game theoretical analysis and numerical experiments. The mechanisms developed in this thesis are in the context of parameter sweep type of jobs, which consist of multiple homogeneous and independent tasks. We believe the use of the mechanisms proposed transcends beyond parameter sweep type of jobs and in general, the proposed mechanisms could be extended to provide a robust way of procuring resources in a computational grid where the resource providers exhibit rational and strategic behavior.

「比爾與梅琳達•蓋茲基金會」（Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation）從成立至今，捐出超過300億美元的鉅款，資助了近8000項慈善公益專案，其範圍橫跨了全世界極貧地區，挽救無數寶貴生命，堪稱全球影響力最大的公益基金會。 從資訊軟體專業起家的Bill Gates對慈善領域並不熟悉，但卻能在短時間內利用觸媒特性，快速建立合作夥伴系統、吸納捐款與資源，充份發揮平台的正向網絡效應及鎖定效應，迅速壯大基金會規模，並高度有效率運用資源，讓每一分錢的價值發揮到最大，足以作為學習借鏡。 本研究目的在找出「比爾與梅琳達•蓋茲基金會」的經營模式與機制設計，並依此探討其對全人類社會關鍵議題的影響與貢獻；及其關鍵性成功因素，同時探究其對慈善事業及其他公益組織有何影響。希望藉此提供台灣其他非營利組織一些建議，讓它們能從蓋茲基金會的成功經驗中學習，或是在此基礎上創新。 本研究發現，蓋茲基金會創新的觸媒平台經營模式與獨特的機制設計 -「對其目標市場及客戶客觀精確且完整深入的研究分析」、「創意的捐贈機制協助其建立強大的夥伴生態系統進而發揮平台強大的網絡效應」、「高度目標導向的專案執行並重視績效與考核」、「資源高度有效率運用且以量化為溝通的準則」、「有系統地將內隱經驗轉化為外顯知識」，以及「將企業營運經營管理與公司治理理念導入非營利組織」為其關鍵成功因素。 / Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation has so far donated more than 30 billion US. dollars to fund about 8,000 charitable projects, which benefit those extremely poor areas in the world and save countless lives. It may be deemed as the world's most influential philanthropic organization. However, it is well-known that Bill Gates is not familiar with philanthropy work, but somehow he has leveraged characteristic catalyst to build the partner ecosystem efficiently to attract donations and resources; moreover, he helps the organization to fully utilize the platform’s positive network and lock-in effects to help expanding the scale of the Foundation rapidly. It is known that Gates Foundation with Gate’s leadership is good at maximizing resources’ value. Thus this study aims to identify the business model and the mechanism design of Gates Foundation. It deeply investigates each activity from the platform’s value propositions to find out its key success factors. Meanwhile, it explores this model and how it causes impact on philanthropic industry. This study hopes to provide advice for non-profit organizations so that they could learn from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation’s experiences or even mirror some of the original strategic thoughts of its mechanism designs once they decide to develop more aggressively on the philanthropy. The study found the key success factors of Gates Foundation as bellow: •Deep insight and complete analysis on its target markets and customers. •Creative donation mechanisms that helps to form a strong partner ecosystem, and bring positive network effect to the platform. •Goal-oriented project that is highly executed and emphasized on the performance evaluation. •High efficiency on the use of resources and how its value is maximized. •Transfer implicit experience into explicit knowledge & know-how. •Utilize management knowledge & methodology of global enterprise and practice it in philanthropic organization.

Cette thèse est composée de trois essais en économie forestière. Les deux premiers s'intéressent à la fixation de la redevance optimale à laquelle fait face le propriétaire d'une ressource forestière dans un contexte d'information asymétrique. Le troisième analyse l'impact à long terme du recyclage sur la surface de terre affectée à la forêt. La gestion des ressources forestières implique souvent la délégation des droits de coupe par le propriétaire forestier à une entreprise exploitante. Cette délégation prend la forme d'un contrat de concession par lequel le propriétaire forestier octroie les droits d'exploitation aux compagnies forestières, en contrepartie d'une redevance (transfert monétaire). L'octroie des droits d'exploitation s'effectue généralement sous plusieurs modes, dont les plus répandus sont les appels d'offres publics et les contrats de gré à gré, où le propriétaire forestier et la firme exploitante spécifient entre autres la redevance dans les clauses d'exploitation de la forêt. Pour déterminer le mécanisme optimal (choix de la firme, âge de coupe et redevance), le propriétaire forestier a idéalement besoin de connaître les coûts de coupe et de reboisement. Or en réalité, les firmes sont mieux informées sur leurs coûts que le propriétaire forestier. Dans ce contexte d'information asymétrique, le mécanisme optimal doit donc prendre en considération des contraintes informationnelles. Les deux premiers essais caractérisent, sous ces conditions, l'âge de coupe optimal (la rotation optimale) et la redevance optimale. Le premier essai examine le contrat optimal quand le propriétaire forestier cède les droits de coupes à une firme par un accord de gré à gré ou par une procédure d'appel d'offre public au second prix. L'analyse du problème est menée premièrement dans un contexte statique, dans le sens que les coûts de coupe sont parfaitement corrélés dans le temps, puis dans un contexte dynamique, où les coûts sont indépendants dans le temps. L'examen en statique et en dynamique montre que la rotation optimale va satisfaire une version modifiée de la règle de Faustmann qui prévaudrait en information symétrique. Cette modification est nécessaire afin d'inciter la firme à révéler ses vrais coûts. Dans le cas statique, il en résulte que la rotation optimale est plus élevée en information asymétrique qu'en situation de pleine information. Nous montrons également comment le seuil maximal de coût de coupe peut être endogénéisé, afin de permettre au propriétaire d'accroître son profit espéré en s'assurant que les forêts non profitables ne seront pas exploitées. Nous comparons ensuite la redevance optimale en information asymétrique et symétrique. Les redevances forestières dans un arrangement de gré à gré étant généralement, en pratique, une fonction linéaire du volume de bois, nous dérivons le contrat optimal en imposant une telle forme de redevance et nous caractérisons la perte en terme de profit espéré qui résulte de l'utilisation de ce type de contrat plutôt que du contrat non linéaire plus général. Finalement, toujours dans le contexte statique, nous montrons à travers un mécanisme optimal d'enchère au second prix qu'en introduisant ainsi la compétition entre les firmes le propriétaire forestier augmente son profit espéré. Les résultats obtenus dans le contexte dynamique diffèrent pour la plupart de ceux obtenus dans le cas statique. Nous montrons que le contrat optimal prévoit alors que chaque type de firme, incluant celle ayant le coût le plus élevé, obtient une rente strictement positive, laquelle augmente dans le temps. Ceci est nécessaire pour obtenir la révélation à moindre coût à la période courante du véritable type de la firme. Comme implication, la rotation optimale s'accroît aussi dans le temps. Finalement, nous montrons qu'il y a distorsion en asymétrique d'information par rapport à l'optimum de pleine information même pour le coût le plus bas (la réalisation la plus favorable). La concurrence introduite dans le premier essai sous forme d'enchère au second prix suppose que chaque firme connaît exactement son propre coût de coupe. Dans le deuxième essai nous relâchons cette hypothèse. En réalité, ni le propriétaire forestier ni les firmes ne connaissent avec précision les coûts de coupe. Chaque firme observe de manière privée un signal sur son coût. Par exemple chaque firme est autorisée à visiter un lot pour avoir une estimation (signal) de son coût de coupe. Cependant cette évaluation est approximative. Ainsi, le coût de chaque firme va dépendre des estimations (signaux) d'autres firmes participantes. Nous sommes en présence d'un mécanisme à valeurs interdépendantes. Dans ce contexte, la valeur d'une allocation dépend des signaux de toutes les firmes. Le mécanisme optimal (attribution des droits d'exploitation, redevance et âge de coupe) est exploré. Nous déterminons les conditions sous lesquelles le mécanisme optimal peut être implémenté par une enchère au second prix et dérivons la rotation optimale et le prix de réserve dans le contexte de ce type d'enchère. Le troisième essai de la thèse analyse l'impact à long terme du recyclage sur la surface de terre affectée à la forêt. L'un des principaux arguments qui milite en faveur du recours au recyclage est que cela entraînerait une réduction de la coupe de bois, épargnant ainsi des arbres. L'objectif est donc d'aboutir à un nombre d'arbres plus important qu'en l'absence de recyclage. L'idée d'accroître le stock d'arbre tient au fait que les forêts génèrent des externalités: elles créent un flux de services récréatifs, freinent l'érosion des sols et des rives des cours d'eau et absorbent du dioxyde de carbone présent dans l'atmosphère. Étant donné la présence d'externalités, l'équilibre des marchés résulterait en un nombre d'arbre insuffisant, justifiant donc la mise en oeuvre de politiques visant à l'accroître. Le but de ce troisième essai est de voir dans quelle mesure la promotion du recyclage est un instrument approprié pour atteindre un tel objectif. En d'autres mots, comment le recyclage affecte-t-il à long terme la surface de terre en forêt et l'âge de coupe? Nous étudions cette question en spécifiant un modèle dynamique d'allocation d'un terrain donné, par un propriétaire forestier privé, entre la forêt et une utilisation alternative du terrain, comme l'agriculture. Une fois les arbres coupés, il décide d'une nouvelle allocation du terrain. Il le fait indéfiniment comme dans le cadre du modèle de Faustmann. Le bois coupé est transformé en produit final qui est en partie recyclé comme substitut du bois original. Ainsi, les outputs passés affectent le prix courant. Nous montrons que, paradoxalement, un accroissement du taux de recyclage réduira à long terme la surface forestière et donc diminuera le nombre d'arbres plantés. Par contre l'âge de coupe optimal va s'accroître. L'effet net sur le volume de bois offert sur le marché est ambigu. Le principal message cependant est qu'à long terme le recyclage va résulter en une surface en forêt plus petite et non plus grande. Donc, si le but est d'accroître la surface en forêt, il pourrait être préférable de faire appel à d'autres types d'instruments de politique que celui d'encourager le recyclage. / This thesis consists of three essays. The first two deal with the design of optimal royalty contracts for forestry exploitation under asymmetric information. The third examines the impact of recycling on the long-run forestry. The management of forest resources often involves the delegation of the harvesting operation by the forest owner to a harvesting firm. This delegation takes the form of a concession contract in which the forest owner leases logging rights to companies specialized in planting and harvesting, in return for preestablished royalty payments. The royalty (monetary transfers) can be set through different methods. For example, the forest owner can organize an auction among firms. Another way is to negotiate directly with a single firm the terms of the exploitation of the forest and hence the monetary transfers. To set the royalty schedule, the forest owner ideally needs to know the firms' costs, namely the harvesting and planting costs. In practice however firms are better informed about their costs than the forest owner. Under this asymmetry of information, the optimal royalty must therefore take into account informational constraints. The first two essays characterize the optimal royalty and the optimal rotation period under those conditions. The first essay analyzes the optimal contract under the assumption that the harvesting cost of each firm is perfectly known to itself but not to the forest owner. The problem is examined both in a static context, where the costs are perfectly correlated over time, and in a dynamic context where the costs are intertemporally independent. It is shown that both in the static and in the dynamic cases, the optimal rotation will satisfy a modified version of the Faustmann rule which holds under symmetric information, the modification being necessary in order to induce cost revelation on the part of the harvesting firm. As a result, looking first at the static case, the optimal rotation period will be longer in the asymmetric information case than in the symmetric information case. It is also shown how the cut-off cost can be endogenized, thus increasing the owner's expected profit by making sure that unprofitable forests are not exploited. Finally the comparison is made of the royalty in the symmetric and asymmetric information cases. Because forest contracts are in practice typically linear in the volume harvested, the optimal royalty is derived under the constraint that it is a linear function of the volume harvested and the loss in expected welfare from using a linear contract instead of the theoretically more general nonlinear contract is characterized. Finally, still in the static context, it is shown that the forest owner could raise its expected profit by allowing competition among firms through public auctions. It is shown in the dynamic context that, unlike in the static case, all firms, including the highest-cost type, get a strictly positive rent. It is also shown that the firm's rent rises over time. This is necessary in order to get revelation at a lower cost in the current period. Therefore, the optimal rotation increases over time as well. The optimal contract under asymmetry of information also has the effect of distorting the lowest-cost firm in this case. In the second essay, the assumption that the harvesting cost of each firm is perfectly known to itself is dropped. Indeed, in practice neither the forest owner nor the firms know the costs perfectly. Each firm only observes a signal of its cost. For example each firm may be allowed to survey a tract of forest to obtain an estimate (signal) of its cutting cost. Given that its observation is imperfect, a firm's cost will therefore depend on estimations (signals) by the other firms as well, which are private information. This second essay then raises the problem of auction design with firms whose values (costs) are interdependent. In this context, the value of an allocation will depend on the signals of all of the participating firms. The optimal contract is characterized and the conditions under which the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a second price auction are explored. The optimal rotation and the reservation price are derived under this auction mechanism. The third essay studies the effect of recycling on the land area devoted to forestry in the long run. Interest in recycling of forest products has grown in recent years, one of the goals being to conserve trees or possibly increase their number to compensate for positive externalities generated by the forest and neglected by the market. This paper explores the issue as to whether recycling is an appropriate measure to attain such a goal. We do this by considering the problem of the private owner of an area of land, who, acting as a price taker, decides how to allocate his land over time between forestry and some other use, and at what age to harvest the forest area chosen. Once the forest is cut, he makes a new land allocation decision and replants. He does so indefinitely, in a Faustmann-like framework. The wood from the harvest is transformed into a final product which is partly recycled into a substitute for the virgin wood, so that past output affects the current price. We show that in such a context, increasing the rate of recycling will result in less area being devoted to forestry. It will also have the effect of increasing the harvest age of the forest, as long as the planting cost is positive. The net effect on the flow of virgin wood being harvested to supply the market will as a result be ambiguous. An important point however is that recycling will result in less trees in the long run, not more. It would therefore be best to resort to other means if the goal is to conserve the area devoted to forestry.

A fundamental question in a sequential decision making setting under uncertainty is “how to allocate resources amongst competing entities so as to maximize the rewards accumulated in the long run?”. The resources allocated may be either abstract quantities such as time or concrete quantities such as manpower. The sequential decision making setting involves one or more agents interacting with an environment to procure rewards at every time instant and the goal is to find an optimal policy for choosing actions. Most of these problems involve multiple (infinite) stages and the objective function is usually a long-run performance objective. The problem is further complicated by the uncertainties in the sys-tem, for instance, the stochastic noise and partial observability in a single-agent setting or private information of the agents in a multi-agent setting. The dimensionality of the problem also plays an important role in the solution methodology adopted. Most of the real-world problems involve high-dimensional state and action spaces and an important design aspect of the solution is the choice of knowledge representation. The aim of this thesis is to answer important resource allocation related questions in different real-world application contexts and in the process contribute novel algorithms to the theory as well. The resource allocation algorithms considered include those from stochastic optimization, stochastic control and reinforcement learning. A number of new algorithms are developed as well. The application contexts selected encompass both single and multi-agent systems, abstract and concrete resources and contain high-dimensional state and control spaces. The empirical results from the various studies performed indicate that the algorithms presented here perform significantly better than those previously proposed in the literature. Further, the algorithms presented here are also shown to theoretically converge, hence guaranteeing optimal performance. We now briefly describe the various studies conducted here to investigate problems of resource allocation under uncertainties of different kinds: Vehicular Traffic Control The aim here is to optimize the ‘green time’ resource of the individual lanes in road networks that maximizes a certain long-term performance objective. We develop several reinforcement learning based algorithms for solving this problem. In the infinite horizon discounted Markov decision process setting, a Q-learning based traffic light control (TLC) algorithm that incorporates feature based representations and function approximation to handle large road networks is proposed, see Prashanth and Bhatnagar [2011b]. This TLC algorithm works with coarse information, obtained via graded thresholds, about the congestion level on the lanes of the road network. However, the graded threshold values used in the above Q-learning based TLC algorithm as well as several other graded threshold-based TLC algorithms that we propose, may not be optimal for all traffic conditions. We therefore also develop a new algorithm based on SPSA to tune the associated thresholds to the ‘optimal’ values (Prashanth and Bhatnagar [2012]). Our thresh-old tuning algorithm is online, incremental with proven convergence to the optimal values of thresholds. Further, we also study average cost traffic signal control and develop two novel reinforcement learning based TLC algorithms with function approximation (Prashanth and Bhatnagar [2011c]). Lastly, we also develop a feature adaptation method for ‘optimal’ feature selection (Bhatnagar et al. [2012a]). This algorithm adapts the features in a way as to converge to an optimal set of features, which can then be used in the algorithm. Service Systems The aim here is to optimize the ‘workforce’, the critical resource of any service system. However, adapting the staffing levels to the workloads in such systems is nontrivial as the queue stability and aggregate service level agreement (SLA) constraints have to be complied with. We formulate this problem as a constrained hidden Markov process with a (discrete) worker parameter and propose simultaneous perturbation based simulation optimization algorithms for this purpose. The algorithms include both first order as well as second order methods and incorporate SPSA based gradient estimates in the primal, with dual ascent for the Lagrange multipliers. All the algorithms that we propose are online, incremental and are easy to implement. Further, they involve a certain generalized smooth projection operator, which is essential to project the continuous-valued worker parameter updates obtained from the SASOC algorithms onto the discrete set. We validate our algorithms on five real-life service systems and compare their performance with a state-of-the-art optimization tool-kit OptQuest. Being ��times faster than OptQuest, our scheme is particularly suitable for adaptive labor staffing. Also, we observe that it guarantees convergence and finds better solutions than OptQuest in many cases. Wireless Sensor Networks The aim here is to allocate the ‘sleep time’ (resource) of the individual sensors in an intrusion detection application such that the energy consumption from the sensors is reduced, while keeping the tracking error to a minimum. We model this sleep–wake scheduling problem as a partially-observed Markov decision process (POMDP) and propose novel RL-based algorithms -with both long-run discounted and average cost objectives -for solving this problem. All our algorithms incorporate function approximation and feature-based representations to handle the curse of dimensionality. Further, the feature selection scheme used in each of the proposed algorithms intelligently manages the energy cost and tracking cost factors, which in turn, assists the search for the optimal sleeping policy. The results from the simulation experiments suggest that our proposed algorithms perform better than a recently proposed algorithm from Fuemmeler and Veeravalli [2008], Fuemmeler et al. [2011]. Mechanism Design The setting here is of multiple self-interested agents with limited capacities, attempting to maximize their individual utilities, which often comes at the expense of the group’s utility. The aim of the resource allocator here then is to efficiently allocate the resource (which is being contended for, by the agents) and also maximize the social welfare via the ‘right’ transfer of payments. In other words, the problem is to find an incentive compatible transfer scheme following a socially efficient allocation. We present two novel mechanisms with progressively realistic assumptions about agent types aimed at economic scenarios where agents have limited capacities. For the simplest case where agent types consist of a unit cost of production and a capacity that does not change with time, we provide an enhancement to the static mechanism of Dash et al. [2007] that effectively deters misreport of the capacity type element by an agent to receive an allocation beyond its capacity, which thereby damages other agents. Our model incorporates an agent’s preference to harm other agents through a additive factor in the utility function of an agent and the mechanism we propose achieves strategy proofness by means of a novel penalty scheme. Next, we consider a dynamic setting where agent types evolve and the individual agents here again have a preference to harm others via capacity misreports. We show via a counterexample that the dynamic pivot mechanism of Bergemann and Valimaki [2010] cannot be directly applied in our setting with capacity-limited alim¨agents. We propose an enhancement to the mechanism of Bergemann and V¨alim¨aki [2010] that ensures truth telling w.r.t. capacity type element through a variable penalty scheme (in the spirit of the static mechanism). We show that each of our mechanisms is ex-post incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and socially efficient

Diese Dissertation befasst sich in drei voneinander unabhängigen Kapiteln mit dem Forschungsfeld des ökonomischen Designs. Das "Design" von Situationen wirtschaftlicher Interaktion hat zum Ziel, den Verlauf und das Ergebnis der jeweiligen Interaktion zu steuern. In dieser Arbeit werden mathematisch-theoretische "Designs" zum einen formal entwickelt und diese zum anderen durch politische oder soziale Institutionen realisiert. Das erste Kapitel thematisiert die Implementierung von Sozialwahlfunktionen in einem kollusiven Umfeld. Es wird gezeigt, wie die gezielte Schaffung von asymmetrischer Information zwischen den kolludierenden Parteien deren Koordination erschweren und die Implementierung erleichtern kann. Im zweiten Kapitel wird dieser Ansatz im Kontext der Bestechlichkeit bei Finanzaudits angewendet. Korruption kann verhindert werden, wenn der bestechliche Akteure eine Warnung über anstehende Kontrollen erhält, nicht jedoch der bestechende Akteur. Das dritte Kapitel wiederum untersucht "Design" in Form von Markt- und Wettbewerbsregulierung. Eine Beschränkung des Wettbewerbs - durch eine Begrenzung der Zahl miteinander konkurrierender Firmen - kann entgegen der ökonomischen Intuition wohlfahrtsoptimierend sein. / This thesis contributes to the field of economic design in three independent chapters. Taking the perspective of a "designer", it derives formal solutions in the framework of economic theory and suggests political as well as social institutions to put these solutions to practice. The first chapter employs mechanism design to mitigate the problem of collusion. It shows how the implementation of social choice functions can be achieved by introducing asymmetric information into a system prone to collusion. In the second chapter, this methodology is applied to the context of corruption in auditing. Bribery is impeded by selectively warning one - and only one - of the corruptive parties about upcoming inspections. Finally, the third chapter studies market regulation as a means of "design". Contrary to economic intuition, it may be beneficial in terms of welfare to limit competition by restricting the number of firms allowed to enter a market.

Designing mechanical products in a competitive environment can present unique challenges, and designers constantly search for innovative ways to increase efficiency. One way to save space and reduce cost is to use ortho-planar compliant mechanisms which can be made from sheets of material, or lamina emergent mechanisms (LEMs). This thesis presents principles which can be used for designing LEMs. Pop-up paper mechanisms use topologies similar to LEMs, so it is advantageous to study their kinematics. This thesis outlines the use of planar and spherical kinematics to model commonly used pop-up paper mechanisms. A survey of common joint types is given, as well as an overview of common monolithic and layered mechanisms. In addition, it is shown that more complex mechanisms may be created by combining simple mechanisms in various ways. The principles presented are applied to the creation of new pop-up joints and mechanisms, which also may be used for lamina emergent mechanisms. Models of the paper mechanisms presented in Chapter 2 of the thesis are found in the appendix, and the reader is encouraged to print, cut out and assemble them. One challenge associated with spherical and spatial LEM design is creating joints with the desired motion characteristics, especially where complex spatial mechanism topologies are required. Hence, in addition to a study of paper mechanisms, some important considerations for designing joints for LEMs are presented. A technique commonly used in robotics, using serial chains of revolute and prismatic joints to approximate the motion of complex joints, is presented for use in LEMs. Important considerations such as linkage configuration and mechanism prototyping are also discussed. Another challenge in designing LEMs is creating multi-stable mechanisms with the ability to have coplanar links. A method is presented for offsetting the joint axes of a spatial compliant mechanism to introduce multi-stability. A new bistable spatial compliant linkage that uses that technique is introduced. In the interest of facilitating LEM design, the final chapter of this thesis presents a preliminary design method. While similar to traditional methods, this method includes considerations for translating the mechanism topology into a suitable configuration for use with planar layers of material.