Text in Afrikaans / Daar is 'n toenemende bewuswording van die noodsaaklikheid van effektiewe beskerming vir minderhede. Die rede vir hierdie toenemende erkenning aan die behoefte aan minderheidsbeskerming is waarskynlik toe te skryf aan die beset dat dit nie alleen die minderheidsaandeelhouers is wat skade ly in geval van benadelende optrede nie, maar ook die ekonomie. Maatskappye word ingevolge die beginsel van meerderheidsbewind bestuur, met die gevolg dat die minderheid onderworpe is aan die wil van die meerderheid. Die minderheid kan hulself hierdeur in 'n onbenydenswaardige posisie bevind, veral indien die meerderheid hul mag aanwend om hul eie belange te bevorder. Gemeenregtelik is die reel in Foss v Harbottle 'n struikelblok vir minderheidsaandeelhouers wat gedingvoering beoog. In 'n poging om die gebrekkige gemeenregtelike beskerming van minderhede te ondervang, is bepaalde statutere maatreels ingevoer. Die evaluasie van hierdie maatreels geskied aan die hand van 'n regsvergelykende ondersoek na verskeie buitelandse stelsels, waarvan die van Nieu-Seeland en Kanada uit staan vanwee die innoverende aard van hul statutere beskermingsmaatreels. Die gevolgtrekking is dat die beskerming wat die Suid-Afrikaanse statutere maatreels aan minderhede bied, onbevredigend is om verskeie redes. Eerstens is hierdie maatreels dikwels te eng bewoord wat daartoe lei dat die aanwendingsveld van die maatreels beperk is. Tweedens hou die maatreels nie tred met ontwikkelings elders in die wereld en veranderende omstandighede en behoeftes in die praktyk nie. Derdens ontbreek goed geformuleerde remedies wat aanvullend tot artikel 252 van die Wet sal wees. Daar is verder bevind dat ad hocwysigings van bestaande maatreels nie die gewenste resultaat gaan bereik nie en 'n algehele hervorming van die Suid-Afrikaanse maatskappyereg word aanbeveel. Ten slotte word konkrete voorstelle in die vorm van konsepwetgewing gemaak en word vergesel van verduidelikende notas. Hierdie wetgewing is hoofsaaklik aan die hand van die Nieu-Seelandse en Kanadese modelle geformuleer. / There is a growing awareness of the need for effective protection of minority shareholders. This can probably be ascribed to the acknowledgement of the fact that prejudicial conduct harms not only minority shareholders, but also the economy at large. Companies are governed by the principle of majority rule; consequently the minority is subjected to the will of the majority. This often places the minority in an invidious position, especially when the majority use their power to further their own interests. The rule in Foss v Harbottle presents a stumbling block to minority shareholder action. Certain statutory measures have been introduced in an effort to counter defective minority protection. These statutory measures are evaluated in the light of a comparative study of several foreign jurisdictions, the most prominent of which are New Zealand and Canada, because of the innovative nature of the measures which they employ. The conclusion arrived at is that, for various reasons, the protection afforded minorities by the South African statutory measures is unsatisfactory. Firstly, the wording of these measures is narrowly construed; this in turn results in a narrow field of application. Secondly, these measures are not in step with developments elsewhere in the world and with the changing circumstances and needs in practice. Thirdly, well-formulated remedies needed in order to supplement section 252 of the Act are non-existent. It has also been found that ad hoc amendments of existing measures will not achieve the required result, and consequently a complete reform of South African company law is recommended. Finally, specific recommendations in the form of draft legislation are made; these are accompanied by explanatory notes. This draft legislation was formulated primarily along the lines of the New Zealand and Canadian models. / Private Law / LL.D.

Esta tese tem como propósito o estudo da limitação dos poderes do controlador como mecanismo fundamental de proteção dos demais acionistas que integrem as companhias fechadas, sobretudo no contexto das operações de transferência de controle, nas quais é frequente que os minoritários fiquem impossibilitados de vender conjuntamente suas ações na mesma operação em que o controlador tiver transferido a sua participação a terceiros. A questão possui relevância na medida em que o art. 254-A da Lei das Sociedades por Ações (LSA Lei no 6404/1976) não cuida das companhias fechadas, e a obrigatoriedade da realização de oferta pública decorrente de alienação de controle nele prevista destina-se tão somente às companhias abertas. Na análise do assunto, discute-se a limitação dos poderes do controlador como o núcleo dos mecanismos de proteção das minorias, tendo em vista principalmente que as decisões nas companhias fechadas brasileiras são tomadas, como regra, por uma maioria estável, ficando os demais acionistas em uma posição de mera subordinação às decisões tomadas pelos controladores. É imperativo esclarecer que não se pretende assumir uma posição estanque de defesa dos minoritários, tampouco uma postura de ataque ao controlador. Ao revés, o verdadeiro desafio está em contrabalancear o legítimo poder conferido ao controlador, com os interesses dos minoritários. Para tanto, ao tema é conferido um tratamento de composição de interesses mediante o estabelecimento de limites aos poderes do controlador na exata medida necessária à proteção das minorias, sem, contudo, destronar o predomínio da maioria. Utilizam-se como fontes de pesquisa a literatura revisada nacional disponível em livros, periódicos, jurisprudência, decisões administrativas e na legislação pertinente ao tema. Na escassez de regulamentação substanciosa, complementa-se o estudo com teoria extraída da doutrina e da jurisprudência estrangeiras. / This thesis aims to study the limitation of the powers of the controller as a fundamental mechanism for the protection of the other shareholders that are part of the closely held companies, especially in the context of transfer of control transactions, in which it is common for minority remain unable to jointly sell their shares in the same transaction that the controller has transferred its equity interest to third parties. The matter is relevant as the article 254-A of Corporate Law (LSA Lei no 6.404/1976) does not regulate closely held companies, and the obligation to make public offering resulting from de transfer of control provided in such article is intended solely to publicly held companies. In analyzing the subject, it is discussed limiting the powers of the controller as the minority protection mechanisms core, especially in view of the fact that decisions in Brazilian closely held companies are taken, as a rule, by a stable majority, being the other shareholders in a position of mere subordination to the decisions taken by controllers. It is imperative to clarify that it is not intended to assume a standing position defending the minority, nor a posture of attack the controller. To the contrary, the real challenge is counterbalance the legitimate power given to the controller with the minority interests. Therefore, the subject is addressed in a sense of composition of interests by establishing limits to the powers of the controller in the exact extent necessary for the protection of minorities, without, however, dethrone prevalence of majority. As sources of research are used the national reviewed literature available decisions and pertinent legislation. In dearth of material rules, the study will be complemented with foreign doctrine and case law.

[pt] Este trabalho mostra que as regras brasileiras de dividendos mínimos fazem com que a distribuição de proventos no Brasil seja alta relativamente aos Estados Unidos, apesar da fraca proteção oferecida pela lei das S.A. aos acionistas minoritários no Brasil. Ainda assim, subterfúgios legais permitem que 42% de uma ampla amostra de empresas não financeiras com ações listadas na Bovespa distribuem menos dividendos do que o previsto em estatuto. Tal retenção de ganhos poderia ser benéfica aos acionistas, visto que garante financiamento a novos projetos. Entretanto, dados de investimentos das empresas listadas na Bovespa mostram que este não parece ser o caso: à exceção de períodos com forte restrição ao crédito, a regra brasileira de dividendos mínimos protege os acionistas minoritários sem prejudicar a capacidade das firmas financiarem oportunidades de investimento. / [en] This paper shows that Brazil s mandatory dividend rules partly explain why its average dividend yield is higher than in the U.S. And yet, several Brazilian firms bypass the mandatory dividend rules. We show that 42% of a broad sample of nonfinancial firms with shares listed at Bovespa use legal loopholes to pay fewer dividends than the amount that their statutes call for. The data suggest that the main reason for these firms to bypass the dividend rules is not to ensure financing for new projects. Instead, lower dividend payments seem to pave the way for the controlling shareholders to dilute the cash-flow rights of minority shareholders. Thus, short of credit crunch, the Brazilian mandatory dividend rules do protect minority shareholders, without making harder for firms to finance investment opportunities.

En kapitaltäckningsgaranti kan användas för att rädda ett aktiebolag som hamnar i en kapitalbristsituation från likvidationsplikt. En kapitaltäckningsgaranti innebär att en fysisk eller juridisk person avger ett ensidigt löfte om att tillskjuta medel till det mottagande aktiebolaget om ekonomin försämras till den grad att det registrerade aktiekapitalet understiger hälften. En sådan situation är ålagd handlingsdirigerande regler som kan resultera i likvidation enligt 25 kap. Aktiebolagslag (2005:551), ABL. Genom att en garant åtar sig att vid avrop eller enligt överenskommelse tillskjuta medel till mottagaren kan verksamheten fortsätta bedrivas. Kapitaltäckningsgarantier regleras inte i ABL utan har istället varit föremål för diskussion i den juridiska doktrinen. Eftersom reglerna om kapitalbrist är uppställda i borgenärsintresse diskuteras ofta frågor kopplade till det bolaget som mottar en kapitaltäckningsgaranti. Enligt vår mening saknas det diskussion kring hur ett aktiebolag som garant kan påverkas av ett sådant åtagande. En fråga som uppstår är huruvida det överhuvudtaget kan anses rationellt att ställa ut en kapitaltäckningsgaranti och betydelsen av huruvida det sker inom eller utom ett koncernförhållande. Eftersom utställande av en kapitaltäckningsgaranti innebär att garanten tar på sig en ekonomisk risk bör det anses fördelaktigt om garanten kan kontrollera åtagandet i största möjliga utsträckning. Genom att en kapitaltäckningsgaranti utställs till ett bolag som garanten har insyn i och kan kontrollera kan potentiella risker minimeras. Garanten kan även se till att skyldigheterna enligt garantin begränsas för att uppnå förutsebarhet. I en koncern ska styrelsen i moderbolaget verka för koncernens bästa. För det fall en kapitaltäckningsgaranti ställs ut inom ett koncernförhållande innebär det att utställaren bör gynnas av mottagarens ekonomiska förbättring. Ett åtagande som sker mellan bolag i samma koncern innebär dessutom ett ökat skydd för garantens minoritetsaktieägare eftersom utställandet sker i bolagets intresse vilket även innebär att kapitaltäckningsgarantin är utställd i aktieägarnas intresse.

I förevarande uppsats behandlas frågor i gränslandet mellan processrätt och associationsrätt, närmare bestämt den processform som stipuleras för tvister med anledning av inlösen av minoritetsaktier. Av hävdvunnen princip ska inlösentvister slitas genom ett legalt skiljeförfarande som första instans. Givet att stadganden om legala skiljeförfaranden i dag utgör en tämligen sällsynt företeelse i svensk rätt, samt mot bakgrund av den starka presumtion mot specialfora som råder, är det följaktligen av intresse att diskutera ifrågavarande tvistemålsreglerings ändamålsenlighet. Syftet med uppsatsen är således att dels analysera ändamålsenligheten av ett legalt skiljeförfarande som primär tvistlösningsform vid inlösen av minoritetsaktier, dels att presentera några synpunkter avseende regleringens utformning de lege ferenda.      I analysen avseende regleringens ändamålsenlighet behandlas initialt de argument lagstiftaren lyft fram som avgörande vid valet av tvistlösningsform. Analysen visar att dessa argument inte är särdeles välgrundade i bemärkelsen att de inte självständigt kan motivera den processuella särreglering som stadgas för inlösentvister. Vidare uppmärksammas flera andra rättsliga och praktiska problem som kan uppstå i samband med att tvisten ska prövas av skiljemän i stället för allmän domstol, såsom hinder för verkställighet av skiljedomen utomlands. Den övergripande slutsatsen av analysen är att ändamålsenligheten av det legala skiljeförfarandet vid inlösen av minoritetsaktier med fog kan ifrågasättas.      Beträffande tvistlösningsregleringens utformning de lege ferenda, presenteras i uppsatsen två förslag till lagändringar. Det första förslaget utgår från ett fakultativt legalt skiljeförfarande. Sålunda presumeras alltjämt skiljeförfarande som primär processform, men kompletteras med möjligheten till föreskrift i bolagsordningen att tvisten ska prövas i allmän domstol. Det andra förslaget tar avstamp i en form av självreglering, där allmän domstol som huvudregel är behörig att ta upp talan. Undantag härifrån kan göras genom föreskrift i bolagsordningen vari stadgas att tvisten i stället ska prövas av skiljemän. En sådan föreskrift har samma verkan som ett skiljeavtal.      Sammanfattningsvis och i ljuset av de slutsatser som presenteras, påvisar uppsatsen att det finns skäl att se över och ändra nuvarande särreglering med legalt skiljeförfarande som tvistlösningsform vid inlösen av minoritetsaktier. / The thesis addresses issues regarding procedural law and the right of association, more specifically, the proceedings in disputes regarding buy-out of minority shareholders. By tradition, buy-out disputes shall be submitted for arbitration. Since compulsory arbitration is a rather rare phenomenon in modern Swedish law, and in consideration of the prevailing presumption against special fora, it is of interest to discuss the appropriateness of this special legislation. Thus, the purpose of the thesis is to analyse the appropriateness of compulsory arbitration as the primary form of dispute resolution in case of a buy-out of minority shareholders, and to present some comments concerning the legislation de lege ferenda.      In the analysis regarding the appropriateness of the legislation, the arguments put forward by the legislator as crucial when determining the form of dispute resolution, are addressed initially. The analysis suggests that these arguments independently cannot warrant the special legislation stipulated for buy-out disputes. Furthermore, several other legal and practical problems that may arise in connection with having the dispute settled by arbitrators instead of a general court are brought to attention, exempli gratia the impediment to enforcement of arbitral awards in a foreign country. Overall, the analysis leads to the conclusion that the appropriateness of compulsory arbitration in case of a buy-out of minority shareholders can be questioned.      As to the dispute resolution legislation de lege ferenda, two legislative proposals are presented in the thesis. The first proposal promotes a non-compulsory arbitration. Hence, arbitration would still be the primary form of dispute resolution but supplemented with the option of prescribing in the articles of association of the company that the dispute shall be settled by a general court. The second proposal stipulates a sort of self-regulation, whereby the parties, as a general rule, can bring the action before a general court. Exception from the general rule can be made by a provision in the articles of association prescribing that the dispute shall be settled by arbitrators. Such provision would have the same force as an arbitration agreement.      In summary, and in the light of the conclusions presented, the thesis implies that there are reasons to review and change the present special legislation with compulsory arbitration stipulated for disputes in case of a buy-out of minority shareholders.

本論文為管理層收購法律規範理論與實務之研究，比較台灣與日本兩國法律規範及實務運作方式，借鏡上市公司股權結構及管理層收購發動背景與我國相似之日本，檢討我國管理層收購之相關法規範，並試提出修正建議。 在管理層收購下，管理層一方面為收購方，一方面亦為目標公司之決策機構，其間之利益衝突不言而喻，且管理層收購亦伴隨著逐出少數股東之下市交易，如何能確保交易公平並保障少數股東之利益，為各國法規範管理層收購之一大重點。 本文以2011年國際私募基金Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P.來台收購我國半導體大廠國巨股份有限公司一案帶入我國管理層收購之法規範及實務運作，並點出該案及其後一連串之修法下我國法仍存在之問題，再探討日本法下管理層收購之相關規範及實務運作模式，並以日本兩實務案例：日立集團旗下之日立機材株式會社創始股東聯合國際私募基金凱雷集團發動管理層收購事件、日本判決著名案件Rex Holdings管理層收購事件兩案，深入探討日本法之管理層收購實務運作及相關判決，最後則以兩國實務案例比較，進一步檢討我國法之問題。

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maître en Droit (LL.M) Option Droit des Affaires" / Dans une perspective pratique et axée sur le droit transactionnel, l'auteur dresse un portrait global du régime juridique s'appliquant aux actionnaires minoritaires de sociétés par actions publiques canadiennes. Pour ce faire, il aborde, dans un premier temps, les divers mécanismes transactionnels utilisés par les sociétés désirant procéder à une opération de changement de contrôle. Dans un deuxième temps, il enchaîne en expliquant les enjeux entourant la protection des actionnaires minoritaires pour, par la suite, décrire les obligations afférentes au Règlement Q-27. Finalement, il propose une analyse du traitement des porteurs minoritaires à la lumière, d'une part, de la gouvernance d'entreprise et, d'autre part, de l'activisme des investisseurs institutionnels. / In a practical perspective based on transactionallaw, the author shows a global portrait of the legal regime applicable ta minority shareholders of Canadian publicly listed corporations. Firstly, he tackles the various transactional mechanisms used by corporations that want ta proceed ta a change of control operation. Secondly, he continues by explaining the issues surrounding the protection of minority shareholders. Then, he describes the obligations related ta Rule Q-27. Finally, he proposes an analysis of minority shareholders treatment in light of, on one hand, corporate governance and, on the other hand, institutional investors activism.

Dans une perspective pratique et axée sur le droit transactionnel, l'auteur dresse un portrait global du régime juridique s'appliquant aux actionnaires minoritaires de sociétés par actions publiques canadiennes. Pour ce faire, il aborde, dans un premier temps, les divers mécanismes transactionnels utilisés par les sociétés désirant procéder à une opération de changement de contrôle. Dans un deuxième temps, il enchaîne en expliquant les enjeux entourant la protection des actionnaires minoritaires pour, par la suite, décrire les obligations afférentes au Règlement Q-27. Finalement, il propose une analyse du traitement des porteurs minoritaires à la lumière, d'une part, de la gouvernance d'entreprise et, d'autre part, de l'activisme des investisseurs institutionnels. / In a practical perspective based on transactionallaw, the author shows a global portrait of the legal regime applicable ta minority shareholders of Canadian publicly listed corporations. Firstly, he tackles the various transactional mechanisms used by corporations that want ta proceed ta a change of control operation. Secondly, he continues by explaining the issues surrounding the protection of minority shareholders. Then, he describes the obligations related ta Rule Q-27. Finally, he proposes an analysis of minority shareholders treatment in light of, on one hand, corporate governance and, on the other hand, institutional investors activism. / "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maître en Droit (LL.M) Option Droit des Affaires"

La question du niveau optimal de transparence sur les marchés financiers a trouvé un terrain de débat exemplaire : celui de la propriété économique des sociétés cotées. La conception de nouveaux produits financiers et le développement de stratégies activistes ont provoqué une remise en question des règles de déclaration de franchissements de seuils de contrôle. Cette thèse analyse les conséquences économiques des évolutions réglementaires, évalue la pertinence des déclarations de l’acquéreur, et propose un nouveau cadre conceptuel intégrant la possibilité de comportements stratégiques des acteurs concernés. Selon nos résultats empiriques, les informations contenues dans les annonces sont pertinentes, même lorsque le blockholder s’engage à rester passif. Notre modèle théorique suggère que les blockholders utilisent le délai de déclaration de manière stratégique, et qu’un raccourcissement de ce délai serait favorable aux actionnaires minoritaires. / The debate on the optimum level of transparency in financial markets found a major point of controversy: the ownership of public companies. The design of new financial products and the development of shareholder activism called the blockholding disclosure rules into question. This thesis analyzes the economic impact of changes in regulation, measures the value relevance of the content of blockholding announcements, and introduces a new conceptual framework allowing strategic behavior of the involved economic agents. According to our empirical results, the information disclosed by blockholders are value relevant, even when the blockholder commits to remain passive. Our theoretical model suggests that blockholders make a strategic use of the reporting window, and predicts that a shortening of the legal time period would be favorable to minority shareholders.

La présente étude a pour objet de montrer que les moyens de la protection des actionnaires minoritaires en droit chinois et en droit français ne sont pas soumis à des critères fondamentalement différents. Dans les sociétés anonymes, les règles juridiques visent à trouver un équilibre des rapports entre les actionnaires majoritaires et minoritaires, ainsi qu’entre les actionnaires et la société ou le groupe de sociétés.C’est l’intérêt social et le principe d’égalité qui guident le législateur et le juge de proposer des solutions convenables.Il importe de noter qu’en droit français, les dispositions sur les responsabilités et les moyens de recours pour les minoritaires sont d’applications faciles qu’en droit chinois. D’ailleurs, la recherche de l’acquisition des sociétés cotées chinoises sous l’angle de la protection des minoritaires, tout à fait différent à l’offre publique en droit français, présente les particularités du marché réglementé chinois et mérite que les investisseurs étrangers découvrent davantage. / The dissertation aimed to point out that the methods of the protection of minority shareholders in Chinese law and in French law are not subject to the different criteria. In company limited by shares, the legal provisions intend to find a balance of relation between majority shareholders and minority shareholders, and between the shareholders and the company or group of company. It is corporate profits and the principal of equality that direct legislators and judges to suggest applicable solutions.It is important to notify that in French law, legal provisions about the responsibility of majority shareholders or company leaders and the ways of resort of minority shareholders provide reference for improvement of Chinese law. Besides, the study of acquisition of chinese listed companies, looked from the angle of the protection of minority shareholders, very different from tender offer in French law, demonstrate the characteristics of Chinese stock market and deserve foreign investors’ enough attention.