- Doctoral Thesis Second Nature: A Contribution to the Social Philosophy of Art (Jakub Stejskal) In what sense can one speak of art as a source of insight into the social? In my thesis I focus on criticizing a position that explains art's social-cognitive potential in terms of its purported intrinsic adherence to a normative view of society as a reconciled second nature: Art either offers insight into the nature of social reality as such a second nature or it makes us feel its unreconciled condition and becomes a promise of reconciliation. I identify two traditions of art interpretation holding this position, which both have their intellectual roots in early German Idealism: the Frankfurt Critical Theory and analytic Kantian Revisionism. In the writings of their adherents art is - implicitly or explicitly - understood essentially as a means of enchantment and affirmation that can at most suppress its affirmative character in the name of future reconciliation. Against this conception I develop an understanding of artistic modernism as belonging to an aesthetics of disenchantment, which takes art to be a way of establishing a specific cognitive distance from the social second nature without evoking reconciliation.

Nous proposons dans ce travail une interprétation de la référence à la psychanalyse chez Adorno et Horkheimer, en partant de son usage dans un champ inattendu, quoique central : la critique de la rationalité. Adorno et Horkheimer affirment, notamment dans la Dialectique de la raison, que la raison, concept à la fois central et structurant pour la société moderne capitaliste, entre en conflit avec elle-même jusqu'à son autodestruction, qui doit être comprise comme passage dans la folie. Nous entendons soutenir que cette affirmation peut être comprise de manière non-métaphorique par le recours à la psychanalyse, à partir d’une double lecture de leurs écrits, à la fois génétique et micrologique. Nous situons la genèse du croisement entre psychanalyse et critique de la rationalité dans leurs premiers travaux, au moment de traiter du rapport entre psychologie et théorie de la connaissance, d’abord dans une perspective philosophique néokantienne, puis dans le cadre du programme de recherches interdisciplinaires des années trente. Ce croisement précoce conduit Adorno et Horkheimer à s’intéresser tant à la part inconsciente qui travaille les processus de connaissance, qu’à la logique des phénomènes apparemment les plus irrationnels. Nous réinterprétons ainsi les travaux des années trente et quarante comme la mise au jour d’une conjonction de formes spécifiques de rationalisation sociale avec la montée de phénomènes sociaux particulièrement irrationnels, notamment liés à l’émergence du fascisme. Cette conjonction mène alors à la thématisation psychanalytique de l’autodestruction de la raison. Notre thèse est que la mise au jour de ce paradigme critique singulier – qui associe approche psychanalytique, critique de la raison et théorie de la connaissance – révèle de façon cohérente et globale la fonction attribuée à la psychanalyse par ces auteurs : rendre compte de la déraison comme effet de la logique contradictoire que la société moderne capitaliste établit entre nature et histoire. Nous pouvons ainsi conclure notre travail en analysant à quelle condition une théorie de la connaissance dialectique et critique est susceptible de ne pas reconduire l’écueil que la psychanalyse a permis d’identifier au niveau social, à savoir la réduction du rapport entre histoire et nature à un rapport de domination. Nous entendons ainsi montrer les potentialités critiques de ce paradigme dans le cadre des débats contemporains sur les pathologies de la raison. / In this study, we will propose an interpretation of the psychoanalytic references in the works of Adorno and Horkheimer, by starting from the way they are used in an unexpected, and yet central, field: the critique of rationality. Especially in Dialectics of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer affirm that reason, a concept that is both central and structuring to the modern capitalist society, comes into conflit with itself to the point of its self-destruction, which should be understood as a passage to madness. We intend to defend that this affirmation can be understood, by having recourse to psychoanalysis, in a non-metaphorical manner, starting from a double reading, both genetic and micrologic, of their writings. We situate the genesis of the intersection between psychoanalysis and the critique of rationality in their early works, when they were dealing with the relationship between psychology and the theory of knowledge, at first in a neo-Kantian perspective, then within the framework of the program of interdisciplinary research in the thirties. This precocious intersection led them to become interested as much in the unconscious part which works through the process of knowledge, as in the logic of phenomena which are apparently the most irrational. We therefore interpret their works from the thirties and forties as the unveiling of a conjunction of specific forms of social rationalization with the rising of particularly irrational phenomena, especially related to the emergence of fascism. This conjunction then leads to the psychoanalytical thematisation of reason’s self destruction. Our thesis is that by disclosing this singular critical paradigm – which links together the psychoanalytical approach, the critique of reason, and the theory of knowledge – the function attributed to psychoanalysis by these authors can be revealed in a global and coherent fashion: accounting for unreason as an effect of the contradictory logic that the modern capitalist society establishes between nature and history. We can therefore conclude our work by analyzing on what condition a dialectical and critical theory of knowledge is likely to avoid the pitfall that psychoanalysis has allowed to identify at the social level, i.e. the reduction of the relation between history and nature to a relation of domination. In this way, the critical potentials of this paradigm within the framework of contemporary debates on the pathologies of reason can be brought to light.

Can Hegel's Philosophy of Right do without the Science of Logic?”. The question posed by this paper’s title refers to the attempts of some contemporary authors, amongst them Axel Honneth, to update the central theses of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, though precisely (and deliberately) doing so without its alleged dependence on the Science of Logic. On account of several methodological and hermeneutical reasons, it is not easy to answer this question. It is well known that Hegel emphatically asserts that both works and philosophical projects depend on each other, but there is no consensus amongst specialists on how much the Logic actually influences the Philosophy of Right and in what way it does so. On the other hand, clearly any social philosophy needs a logical theory in a broad sense, whether it may be Hegelian or not. This is even more so if the aim is to update the Hegelian construction implicit in the notion of freedom. In any case, the discussion seems to bring forth the paradox of asserting both the current relevance and the obsolescence of the Hegelian notion of freedom. / La pregunta planteada en el título de esta contribución alude a los intentos de algunos autores contemporáneos, entre ellos el de Axel Honneth, por reactualizar los planteamientos centrales de la Filosofía del Derecho de Hegel, pero prescindiendo precisamente (y deliberadamente) de su supuesta dependencia de la Ciencia de la Lógica. Responder a esa pregunta no es fácil por diversas razones, metodológicas y hermenéuticas. Es sabido por cierto que Hegel sostiene enfáticamente la dependencia entre ambas obras y empresas filosóficas, pero no hay consenso entre los especialistas sobre qué peso real y de qué tipo posee la Lógica sobre la Filosofía del Derecho. De otro lado, es evidente que cualquier filosofía social requiere de una concepción lógica en sentido amplio, sea esta hegeliana o de otro tipo, más aun si lo que se pretende es actualizar la construcción hegeliana implícita en el concepto de libertad. En cualquier caso, la discusión parece mostrar un hecho paradójico que consiste en afirmar simultáneamente la actualidad y la obsolescencia de la concepción hegeliana de la libertad.

Ce travail réinterroge la philosophie sociale critique d’Adorno à partir des concepts de règle et de jeu. Il a pour objectif d’exposer la théorie de la société d’Adorno et d’en questionner les fondements. Ces fondements, telle est notre thèse, peuvent être conceptualisés dans un langage propre à la sociologie de l’action si on les reformule en termes de « règles », de « suivi des règles » et de « jeu » – concepts qu’Adorno lui-même utilise afin de décrire le social, plus précisément la société capitaliste dans laquelle il vivait. Le fameux tout « non-vrai », qu’est la société selon Adorno, peut ainsi être compris comme un jeu réglé par lui-même, indépendamment de l’intentionnalité des acteurs. Cette reformulation de la philoso-phie sociale d’Adorno nous permet de la faire dialoguer avec d’autres conceptions du social (Weber, Ha-bermas, Descombes, Searle et le structuralisme) et de montrer à quel point l’objet d’Adorno diffère de celui de Weber, de Habermas et de Searle alors qu’il est commensurable à celui du structuralisme. La méthode pour saisir cet objet, à savoir les règles non intentionnelles qui structurent le jeu social, est celle de Freud (interprétation, lecture symptômale). Adorno, toutefois, se distingue du structuralisme et aussi de Freud en ce qu’il pense pouvoir établir un lien entre société capitaliste et le social réglé comme un jeu inaccessible aux acteurs : ce jeu est non seulement l’objet de recherche d’Adorno mais aussi l’objet de sa critique. Notre travail s’emploie à étayer la possibilité de cette critique qui ne vise rien de moins que les conditions de possibilité du vivre en commun telles qu’elles ont été établies par la philosophie sociale structuraliste ainsi que par Freud : des règles à effet inconscient qui font en sorte que tous les acteurs ne réalisent ou ne di-sent pas les mêmes significations font l’objet de la critique adornienne. Critiquer ces règles implique de montrer qu’une critique de l’institution verticale des sujets est possible sans détruire ni poser comme abso-lu la subjectivité elle-même. Cette critique devient envisageable à partir du moment où l’on examine la pratique qui est incluse dans le suivi aveugle de la règle : au sein de cette « fausse » pratique – qu’Adorno appelle la pratique d’identification – se dégage une pratique autre qui met en question la soumission aveugle à la règle. Cette pratique critique est également appelée « jeu ». Notre travail se conclut sur l’exposition de cette pratique et de son potentiel critique au sein du jeu qu’est la société capitaliste. / This work reexamines the social critical philosophy of Adorno, starting form the concepts of rule and of game. It aims to expose the social theory of Adorno and to question its foundations. These foundations can be conceptualized in a language specific to the sociology of action if they are rephrased in terms of rules, rule-following and game; concepts which Adorno himself uses to describe the social, spe-cifically the capitalist society in which he lived. The famous all "non-true" which society is according to Adorno, can be understood as a game working in itself, regardless of the intentionality of the actors. This rephrasing of the social philosophy of Adorno allows us to dialogue with the other approaches of the social (Weber, Habermas, Descombes, Searle and the structuralism) and to show how the object of Adorno differs from that of Weber, Habermas and Searle, how it is commensurable with that of structuralism. The Method to seize the object, i.e. the rules that structure the unintentional social game, is the method of Freud (interpretation, symptomatic reading). Adorno, however, differs from structuralism and also from Freud’s conception of the social because he thinks that he can establish a link between capitalist society and the social regulated as a game inaccessible to players: for Adorno this game is not only the object of research but also the object of his criticism. Our work goes on to justify the possibility of such criticism that targets nothing less than the conditions of possibility of common living. What was established by structur-alist social philosophy as well as by Freud is the subject of criticism of Adorno: rules whose effects are unconscious, which ensure that all players do not realize or do not say the same meanings. To criticize these rules implies showing that the critique of vertical instituted subjects is possible without destroying subjec-tivity nor positing it as absolute. This criticism becomes possible from the moment you look at the prac-tice included in the blind following of the rule which is the "wrong" practice - Adorno calls this practice of identification ; the right practice included in practice of identification challenges the blind submission to

Vilken grundläggande idé utgår vi ifrån när vi talar om förnuft och rationalitet och vilka konsekvenser får detta för synen på individen, individen i samhället samt individen i datasystemet? Uppsaten belyser problematik rörande den icke-situerade individen, vilken inte är en individ utan snarare en skenbar produkt utav homogena värderingar.

Suicide holds an ambivalent position in contemporary social and cultural contexts. It questions what it means to live and die, yet provides no clear-cut answers about death or dying, life or living. This thesis explores some of the ways suicide has been understood and represented, to demonstrate that knowing suicide is dependent not only on what suicide means, but also on how meanings of suicide become part of knowledge. Knowing suicide is not a matter of responding to it as self-evident, transparent, neutral and obvious, but rather is implicated in social processes and norms central to how knowledge gains intelligibility. Guided by poststructuralist, postmodernist, feminist and postfeminist philosophies, the thesis takes up gender and gendering as its central focus, to interrogate how knowledge about suicide becomes knowledge. Critically examining a wide variety of textual sources, it argues that suicide is principally rendered as a masculine, and even a masculinist, practice. Knowing suicide today is anchored in suicidology - the study of suicide - and maintained by institutional sites of practice including sociology, law, medicine, psy-knowledge and newsprint media, each of which is analysed here. Suicide as masculine and masculinist practice is invoked through multiple, often-contradictory and inextricably linked readings of gender, even while claiming homogeneity. Its gendered foundations can however be made to appear gender-neutral, even when actually gender-saturated. The twin gender movements of neutrality and repleteness are in fact crucial to the knowing of suicide. The thesis establishes that knowing suicide can never occur outside discourse. Even more importantly, how suicide enters discourse cannot be thought outside gender. The body matters to the production of deeply problematic understandings of agency, intent and violence, on which the production of suicide as masculine and masculinist depends. It becomes clear that such dependence rests not only on gender, but also on race and sexuality, as conditions of its knowing. The thesis suggests that further attention be given to the production and maintenance of highly reductive and limiting homogenous truth claims in suicide - truth claims that validate and privilege some interpretations of suicide, at the expense of rendering others less legitimate and serious. If the processes and practices of interpreting suicide become a site of permanent debate, they are more likely to challenge the ways in which masculinist ways of knowing render, and limit, the intelligibility of suicide.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:34:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Maria Rosalia Pinfildi Gomes.pdf: 2013981 bytes, checksum: 87e09ff40b78b1c122ecd2fd1bc70789 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-01-23 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / One frequently resorts to science to legitimize the primacy attributed to Biotechnology and to the privileged protection granted to the rights of intellectual property that are conferred on it. Therewith, there is a tendency to accept, as a presupposition, that the future must and will be shaped by the biotechnological advances. Therefore, any criticism to the development of new technologies seems to constitute an opposition to the unfolding of the future and to science itself. In this dissertation we intend to inquire what values inform science, since it sets the course of this development, remaining for the global economy the role of providing the structures to its effective implementation. There seems to be a race towards the legitimization, founded on the authority and prestige of science, of the development and use of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs); science, however, does not authorize such legitimization. On the contrary, the Genetically Modified Organisms which promise an agricultural revolution bear the mark of the political economy of globalization, given that its development has been taken as an objective of the global neoliberal economy, as well as a means of strengthening its structures. / Freqüentemente recorre-se à ciência para legitimar a prioridade atribuída à Biotecnologia e à proteção privilegiada concedida aos direitos de propriedade intelectual que lhe são conferidos. Com isso há uma tendência a aceitar, como pressuposto, que o futuro deverá ser, e será modelado pelos avanços biotecnológicos. Por isso, qualquer crítica ao desenvolvimento de novas tecnologias parece constituir uma oposição ao desdobrar do futuro e à própria ciência. Na presente dissertação pretende-se questionar que valores informam a ciência, já que é ela que define a rota, restando à economia global fornecer as estruturas para sua efetiva implementação. Parece estar ocorrendo uma corrida visando à legitimação do desenvolvimento e emprego de Organismos Geneticamente Modificados (OGMs) na autoridade e prestígio da ciência, contudo, a ciência não autoriza tal legitimação. Ao contrário, os Organismos Geneticamente Modificados que prometem uma revolução agrícola -, trazem a marca da economia política da globalização, haja vista que seu desenvolvimento tem sido tomado, como um objetivo da economia neoliberal global, bem como um meio de fortalecer suas estruturas.

Submitted by Simone Maisonave (simonemaisonave@hotmail.com) on 2016-09-08T13:47:15Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Dirlei de Azambuja Pereira_Tese.pdf: 1071105 bytes, checksum: 13df1af61878556fa583cb9635688377 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Simone Maisonave (simonemaisonave@hotmail.com) on 2016-09-08T13:47:25Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Dirlei de Azambuja Pereira_Tese.pdf: 1071105 bytes, checksum: 13df1af61878556fa583cb9635688377 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Aline Batista (alinehb.ufpel@gmail.com) on 2016-09-08T21:43:29Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Dirlei de Azambuja Pereira_Tese.pdf: 1071105 bytes, checksum: 13df1af61878556fa583cb9635688377 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-09-08T21:43:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Dirlei de Azambuja Pereira_Tese.pdf: 1071105 bytes, checksum: 13df1af61878556fa583cb9635688377 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-03-31 / Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico - CNPq / Paulo Freire, ao construir a sua pedagogia, recebeu influências diversas. Na teoria do pedagogo brasileiro, podem ser encontradas categorias filosóficas provenientes da Fenomenologia, do Existencialismo, do Cristianismo, da Teologia da Libertação, da Hermenêutica, do Marxismo e do Humanismo. Diante dessa constatação, há a necessidade de ser questionada a viabilidade de um diálogo que tenciona articular tantas e complexas influências. Haveria na obra de Paulo Freire apenas uma justaposição de fontes filosóficas? Seria o pedagogo brasileiro um autor eclético? Ou Freire elabora uma síntese intelectual, criativa e original, sem lesar, em seu cerne, os paradigmas filosóficos com os quais dialoga? Por meio da investigação desenvolvida, de matriz bibliográfica, concluiu-se que a última possibilidade exposta é a mais coerente em se tratando da teoria freiriana. O pedagogo brasileiro, como já asseveraram muitos estudiosos de sua obra, realiza uma síntese. Feita essa verificação, constatou-se que resta ainda sem resposta o fundamento de tal síntese, ou seja: se Freire desenvolveu esse processo, qual seria o núcleo sintético que o realiza? A resposta apresentada, frente a essa interrogativa, é que o núcleo que sintetiza as diversas categorias, que influenciam a pedagogia de Paulo Freire e que são oriundas de diferentes correntes filosóficas, é a ideia de transformação social radical na mesma perspectiva desenvolvida na filosofia social marxiana, entendida, neste contexto, como o movimento que envolve uma discussão radical sobre classe social e alienação, que decorrem do modelo social do capital e que, obrigatoriamente, precisam ser superadas tendo em vista a plena realização da emancipação humana. A contribuição intelectual e criativa que Paulo Freire oferece para a conquista desse horizonte é uma elaboração pedagógica que rigorosamente pensou e pôs em prática. A pedagogia freiriana, é relevante explicitar, potencialmente embasa uma práxis educativa radicalmente transformadora. Ainda seria oportuno argumentar que só foi possível para Freire trazer para o seu construto teórico as contribuições de diferentes correntes filosóficas, porque todas elas, com suas especificidades, providenciam determinações mais precisas para um projeto educativo que tem como horizonte a transformação social radical, que leve à superação do sistema social do capital e efetive a emancipação humana. E esse objetivo é o fio condutor que permeia a teoria de Karl Marx. / In order to build his pedagogy, Paulo Freire was influenced by several theories and, in his pedagogy, there can be found philosophical categories from Phenomenology, Existentialism, Christianity, Theology of Liberation, Hermeneutics, Marxism and Humanism. Considering this fact, there is a necessity of questioning the feasibility of a dialogue that intends to articulate so many and complex influences. Would there be, in Paulo Freire‘s work just an overlapping of philosophical sources? Would Brazilian teacher be an eclectic author? Does Freire develop an intellectual creative and original synthesis without damage, at its core, the philosophical paradigms? Through the research carried out, based on bibliographic literature, we conclude that the latter possibility is more coherent in Freirian theory. Freire, as asserted many scholars of his work, performs a synthesis. Accepting this thesis, it was found that remains unanswered the foundation of such a synthesis, i.e.: if Freire developed this process, which would be the synthetic core that performs the synthesis? The answer to this question is that the core summarizing the various categories that influenced Paulo Freire‘s pedagogy are from different philosophies. It is the idea of a radical social transformation in the same perspective outlined by Marxian social philosophy. It is understood in this context as the movement that involves a radical discussion of social class and alienation, under capitalism social model that needs to be overcome with a view to fulfill human emancipation. The intellectual and creative contributions that Paulo Freire offers to achievement of this horizon is a pedagogical preparation to rigorous thought and implement. Freire's pedagogy emphasized a radical transformative educational praxis. We argued that it was possible to Freire bring his theoretical contributions of different philosophical, because all of them, with their specific features, provide very precise determinations for an educational project which has a horizon of the radical social transformation. This transformation takes to overcome the social system of the capital and visualizes effective human emancipation. Human emancipation is the argumentative path that permeates Karl Marx‘s theory.

In The gendered Human Being. Gender Difference from the Perspective of Helmuth Plessner's Philosophical Anthropology, gender difference in the two-gender model is examined from the perspective of philosophical anthropology. For this purpose, three social constructivist theories of gender difference are brought into conversation with each other under the prism of lived body-body-person. In this way, the work aims to catch a glimpse of the gendered human being in all the spheres that open up their world. Key words: Helmuth Plessner, Philosophical Anthropology, anthropology, gender difference, gender studies, philosophy of the twentieth century, phenomenology, social philosophy, Judith Butler, Doing Gender, theory of interaction, constructivism

Die vorliegende Untersuchung entwickelt einen Vorschlag für ein neues Verständnis von Erwerbsarbeit vor dem Hintergrund ihres laufenden Wandels als Brennpunkt der gegenwärtigen tiefgreifenden Transformation westlicher kapitalistischer Gesellschaften. Die Bedeutung und Rolle von Arbeit für gelingende Lebensführung sowie für die Konstitution der Arbeitsgesellschaft als solcher sind hier unverständlich geworden; auf praktischer Ebene ergeben sich verschiedene Probleme und Gestaltungsschwierigkeiten von Arbeit als gesellschaftliche Institution und Praxis eines guten, menschenwürdigen Lebens. Diese Bedeutung wird in der Untersuchung als moralischer Wert von Arbeit als Kern eines dauerhaft aneignungsfähigen, formalen Arbeitsverständnisses herausgearbeitet. Ihren Erscheinungen und Bedingungen nach wird die Arbeitsgesellschaft als subjektiviert und – im begrifflichen Anschluss an die nach Hegel entwickelte Beschreibung gesellschaftlicher Krisen Rahel Jaeggis – mithin als krisenhaft qualifiziert. Diese Darstellung ermöglicht es, vor einer Neuinterpretation des Hegelschen Arbeitsverständnisses im Anschluss an Andreas Arndt den wesenhaften normativen Gehalt und die normative Dimension von Arbeit offenzulegen, die auf praktischer Ebene ihren moralischen Wert stiften: Ausgehend von ihrer transformativen Grundstruktur, dialektischen Verfassung und teleologischen Gerichtetheit ist Arbeit Institution und Praxis der Selbstverwirklichung des Subjekts unter ganz bestimmten Bedingungen. Wo deshalb allein Narrative (nicht Begriffe) von Arbeit, die dieses Wesen vermitteln, aneignungsfähig sind, lassen sich diese Bedingungen im Nachvollzug der Genese unseres Arbeitsverständnisses sowie in der kritischen Zusammenführung von aktuellen sozial- und moralphilosophischen Auseinandersetzungen mit Arbeit schließlich so offenlegen, dass das hier formal gefasste Arbeitsverständnis aktuell für die praktischen Belange der Krise und für die interdisziplinären Fragen an Arbeit aufschlussreich ist. / The present study develops a proposal for a new understanding of paid work in view of its current transformation, which is considered as the focal point of the current fundamental transformation of western capitalist societies. The significance and role of work for a Good life and for the constitution of society have become unintelligible here; on a practical level, there are various problems and difficulties of work as a social institution and practice of a Good, Decent life. The present study shows this meaning as the Moral Value of work, which is shown as the core of a permanent approbiatible, formal understanding of work. According to its current manifestations and conditions, western capitalist societies can be qualified as subjectivized and - in the conceptual connection to the description of social crises, which Rahel Jaeggi developed according to Hegel - as crisis-ridden. This diagnosis makes it possible, via reinterpreting Hegel's understanding of work following Andreas Arndt, to reveal the essential normative content and the normative dimension of work; also to show that both creates the Moral Value of work on a practical level: Work is - based on its transformative basic structure, its dialectical constitution and its teleological directionality - the institution and practice of self-realization of the subject under very specific conditions. Where exclusively narratives (not concepts) of work that convey these intrinsic qualities are approbiatible, these conditions can be finally revealed by retracing the evolution of our understanding of work and in discussing the current social- and moral-philosophical argument with work: Finally in a way that the unfolded formally understanding of work is revelatory for the practical and interdisciplinary questions about of work.