The thesis deals with the perception of different leisure time opportunities for younger school children in the city and in the village. The theoretical part describes leisure time,its functions, various definitions and different concepts of free time. Specifies younger school age and leisure time for children and youth. She also devotes herself to school and extracurricular leisure facilities.The practical part contains a survey using questionnaires that were distributed to the children of the junior school in the town and the village. The questionnaires concerned how children spend their free time, but above all how they perceive their leisure time. The conclusion of the practical part includes the evaluation of the questionnaire survey and evaluation of the research assumptions.

Cette thèse a pour objet la grande énigme scolaire de la Révolution française : l’échec de l’école publique et le succès des écoles privées (cette dichotomie publique-privée ayant été créée par la Révolution). Loin de s’expliquer d’abord par le conservatisme politique et religieux des classes populaires, ainsi que les historiens l’ont affirmé depuis la fin du XIXe siècle, la déroute du projet scolaire républicain, n’est en réalité ni évidente de partout (en ville, l’école publique n’est pas en échec), ni linéaire (elle ne survient pas avant le printemps 1795 dans les campagnes). Pour la comprendre, il importe surtout de l’inscrire dans une histoire au long cours : depuis les années 1760, l’école élémentaire (celle où l’on apprend à lire, écrire et compter) a été appropriée par les communautés villageoises, au point de devenir une véritable « institution de proximité », contrôlée dans les faits par le groupe des co-résidents, malgré toutes les règles édictées par la monarchie et l’Église catholique afin d’en confier la direction aux évêques et aux curés. « Institution de proximité », l’école l’est d’autant plus aisément devenue que les enseignants de la fin de l’Ancien Régime (presque tous laïcs) accomplissaient au village (mais pas en ville) un ensemble de services extra-scolaires essentiels à l’affirmation de cet « esprit de localité » que l’on sait être si prononcé dans les communautés rurales du XVIIIe siècle : ce sont eux qui sonnaient les cloches paroissiales, entretenaient l’horloge communale, arpentaient les terres de la communauté et en dressaient la carte, chantaient la messe lors du culte, assuraient l’entretien de l’église et assuraient les fonctions de secrétaire-greffier de la collectivité locale. Au sein du village, l’enseignement dispensé par le maître d’école était du reste lui même perçu comme un lieu de perpétuation de la « personnalité collective locale » : au cours du second XVIIIe siècle, les pratiques pédagogiques des régents d’école ont en effet fini par intégrer le vaste complexe des « coutumes » locales. À ce titre, les communautés rurales imposaient aux enseignants qu’elles recrutaient (et qu’elles regardaient comme leur « serviteur ») qu’ils se conforment en tous points aux pratiques scolaires traditionnelles du village, freinant ainsi l’introduction dans les campagnes des innovations pédagogiques pensées par la Réforme catholique (La Salle, Démia, etc.) et par les Lumières. Bien avant 1789, les collectivités locales ont donc appris à éviter les prescriptions scolaires extérieures au village pour administrer l’école en fonction de leurs propres attentes.La Révolution, bien plus qu’elle ne contrarie cette emprise du local sur l’école, contribue au contraire à accentuer ce processus au long cours, malgré ses ambitions, tôt affirmées et maintes fois rappelées, d’imposer un « État instructeur » – comme l’avaient réclamé les Lumières depuis l’expulsion des Jésuites. À partir de 1789 et jusqu’en l’an II, alors que disparaissent rapidement les autorités de tutelle traditionnelle des petites écoles (évêques, intendants) et que les communautés rurales sortent parallèlement renforcées par la création des municipalités communales, les villages parviennent enfin pleinement à exercer une autorité souveraine sur l’école et ses enseignants. Tout change à partir du printemps 1795, lorsque deux nouvelles lois scolaires tentent d’arracher l’école publique de la sphère des compétences communales. Les villages se détournent aussitôt de cette dernière, pourtant massivement investie l’année précédente, et ouvrent dans le même temps de nombreuses écoles privées (autorisées par les deux mêmes lois). Au fond, il faut d’abord voir dans ce mouvement un moyen pour les collectivités locales de ne pas être dépossédées de leurs usages coutumiers de l’école. [...] / [No summary]

在電子化政府的架構下，民眾最重要的數位意見反映管道可謂是民意電子信箱，然而近年全球許多城市開始建制市民熱線系統，讓民眾得以透過電話向政府反映意見，使整個互動介面更為接近「行動政府」的概念，而在台灣的行政系絡下，「村里長」扮演政府機關與一般民眾互動的中介角色，本研究嘗試了解電子信箱與市民熱線這兩項原意用於促進「直接民主」的意見反應管道，對於村里長的工作產生何種影響，並探討村里長使用電子信箱與市民熱線的情況，以及影響他們對這兩項管道滿意認同的變數。 本研究以台北市里長及台北市市長信箱與1999市民熱線為主要標的，透過量化與質化方法的實證資料，主要發現結果包括：(1)台北市里長較常使用市民熱線，較少使用市長信箱；(2)資訊能力、對案件的時效性要求、問題難度與複雜性將影響村里長選擇市長信箱或市民熱線進行意見反映；(3)市長信箱與市民熱線對里長的正面影響包括解決村里民問題、減少工作負擔、提昇服務時效性、減少人情壓力、可有書面或電子資料備查，作為服務表現的基礎；負面影響則包括受申訴的機會增加、村里長工作有被管道取代的危機；(4)服務品質構面的「資訊可信度」、「問題解決程度」及「易用性」，有用性構面中的「解決里民問題」與「有助工作程度」五個變數對管道的滿意度有正向的影響。 本研究根據研究發現，提出三點實務建議：(1)重視「管道問題適用性」之宣傳；(2)促進村里長與意見反映管道結合的服務綜效；(3)思考管道如何對市民產生「有用性」，以提昇公共接觸效果。 / Under the framework of E-government, e-mail is the most important response channel for citizens to interact with governments. However, many cities around the world start to build citizen hotline systems, allowing people reflect their ideas and suggestions via phone. This fact reveals the opportunities of Mobile Government. In Taiwan, Li-chiefs simultaneously reflect residents’ opinions and help delivery public services. The author tries to figure out (1) how Taipei City Mayor’s E-mail Box and 1999 Citizen Hotline affect the daily works of Li-chiefs; (2) their usage of these two response channels, and (3) what variables might affect Li-chiefs’ satisfaction toward e-mail and citizen hotlines. The study uses Taipei City Mayor’s E-mail Box and Taipei 1999 Citizen Hotline as case examples, and collects both qualitative and quantitative empirical data. The author finds that: (1) The Li-chiefs in Taipei use Taipei 1999 Citizen Hotline more frequently than City Mayor’s E-mail. (2) Information literacy, timeliness and task complexity will affect Li-chiefs’ motives to reflect suggestions via e-mail or citizen hotline. (3) Li-chiefs can use these two channels to solve problems and enhance timeliness. On the other hand, the response channels allow citizens to complain to Li-chiefs more easily, and the positions of Li-chiefs might be replaced by the two channels; and (4) information reliability, problem solving ability, ease of use, the effect of solving citizens’ problems, and helping Li-chiefs’ jobs will positively affect the satisfaction of the channels. Based on the finding, the author suggests the government should: (1) emphasize the “appropriate or right questions” when prompting the channels; (2) teach Li-chiefs how to use response channels well to create synergy; and (3) rethink how response channels produce usefulness for citizens.

<p>Uppsatsen, Kriskommunikation i ett förändrat medielandskap, är en fallstudie på webbplatsen www.krisinformation.se. Utgångspunkten för uppsatsen är det förändrade medielandskapet och vad det innebär för kommunikation i kris. Uppsatsen berör flera olika hörnstenar som är viktiga för framgångsrik kriskommunikation. Hörnstenarna rör bland annat vilken tillit och vilket förtroende användarna har för Krisinformation.se, dess innehåll samt Internet som medium i den förändring som skett i medielandskapet när det gäller kriskommunikation.</p><p>Fallstudien undersöker även om det är privatpersoner eller yrkesverksamma som besöker Krisinformation.se. Den undersöker även vad användarna anser är viktigast när de ska ta del av information i en krissituation gällande om informationen är snabb, kortfattad, relevant eller tydlig. Vi har i fallstudien också studerat vilket medium de använder i olika situationer samt hur de agerar på webbplatsen när det gäller att följa hyperlänkar till vidare information.</p><p>Teoretiska utgångspunkter är teorierna om kriskommunikation och teorin global village. Forskning inom andra områden berörs också, då de är relevanta för uppsatsen och dess syfte. Dessa områden är gatekeeping-teorins förändring, fördelar och nackdelar med Internet, vilka medievanor människor har haft i tidigare kriser, samt forskning om vilket medium människor föredrar i kris.</p><p>Resultatet som framkommit bekräftar tidigare forskning och indikerar på att Internet kan ses som en framgångsrik kanal vid kommunikation i kris. Respondenterna har ett högt förtroende för Krisinformation.se som avsändare och ett ännu högre förtroende för innehållet. De har även högt förtroende för Internet som medium när de ska ta del av information i kris. De prioriterar att informationen förmedlas snabbt, oavsett informationens form i det läget. Något anmärkningsvärt är att respondenterna föredrar att ta del av krisinformation via myndigheters webbsidor. De väljer dock först att hämta informationen på nyhetssidor på Internet, vilket ytterst få har störst förtroende för. Det paradoxala i detta, är att majoriteten av respondenterna föredrar att informationen ska vara sann. De agerar alltså inte som de säger att de vill göra.</p><p>Resultatet som avviker från tidigare forskning, är att det finns fler aktörer än traditionell media som fungerar som guider i det förändrade medielandskapet. Vilka dessa aktörer är och hur de agerar, är värt att undersöka vidare.</p><p><em> </em></p>

Uppsatsen, Kriskommunikation i ett förändrat medielandskap, är en fallstudie på webbplatsen www.krisinformation.se. Utgångspunkten för uppsatsen är det förändrade medielandskapet och vad det innebär för kommunikation i kris. Uppsatsen berör flera olika hörnstenar som är viktiga för framgångsrik kriskommunikation. Hörnstenarna rör bland annat vilken tillit och vilket förtroende användarna har för Krisinformation.se, dess innehåll samt Internet som medium i den förändring som skett i medielandskapet när det gäller kriskommunikation. Fallstudien undersöker även om det är privatpersoner eller yrkesverksamma som besöker Krisinformation.se. Den undersöker även vad användarna anser är viktigast när de ska ta del av information i en krissituation gällande om informationen är snabb, kortfattad, relevant eller tydlig. Vi har i fallstudien också studerat vilket medium de använder i olika situationer samt hur de agerar på webbplatsen när det gäller att följa hyperlänkar till vidare information. Teoretiska utgångspunkter är teorierna om kriskommunikation och teorin global village. Forskning inom andra områden berörs också, då de är relevanta för uppsatsen och dess syfte. Dessa områden är gatekeeping-teorins förändring, fördelar och nackdelar med Internet, vilka medievanor människor har haft i tidigare kriser, samt forskning om vilket medium människor föredrar i kris. Resultatet som framkommit bekräftar tidigare forskning och indikerar på att Internet kan ses som en framgångsrik kanal vid kommunikation i kris. Respondenterna har ett högt förtroende för Krisinformation.se som avsändare och ett ännu högre förtroende för innehållet. De har även högt förtroende för Internet som medium när de ska ta del av information i kris. De prioriterar att informationen förmedlas snabbt, oavsett informationens form i det läget. Något anmärkningsvärt är att respondenterna föredrar att ta del av krisinformation via myndigheters webbsidor. De väljer dock först att hämta informationen på nyhetssidor på Internet, vilket ytterst få har störst förtroende för. Det paradoxala i detta, är att majoriteten av respondenterna föredrar att informationen ska vara sann. De agerar alltså inte som de säger att de vill göra. Resultatet som avviker från tidigare forskning, är att det finns fler aktörer än traditionell media som fungerar som guider i det förändrade medielandskapet. Vilka dessa aktörer är och hur de agerar, är värt att undersöka vidare.

China has achieved unprecedented economic growth and consequent successes in poverty alleviation over the past three decades of economic liberalization and market-oriented reforms. Yet, in order to continue its progress in poverty reduction, while addressing pressing environmental and sociopolitical concerns, it is crucial for China’s leaders to achieve and sustain green, equitable, and robust economic performance in all parts of China. This thesis argues that a reconceptualized and strengthened rural industrialization program would enable China to maintain economic growth and assist with the transition to a domestically driven consumer economy. Moreover, rural industrialization, coupled with targeted administrative and institutional policy modifications, will enable the Chinese government to provide support to millions of its rural poor, thus avoiding social instability and potentially severe internal conflicts. Such a program would also lessen pollution and its associated costs on China’s densely populated cities, by shifting heavy urban industries to relatively less contaminated areas while adopting cleaner, environmentally sustainable technologies, introduced in a participatory manner in consultation with local communities. This approach would concurrently address regional, rural-to-urban, and intra-communal disparities, provide opportunity for “green growth” initiatives, and better equip rural populations to address growing vulnerabilities as a result of climate change.

El trabajo aquí presentado busca, por tanto, comprender el cómo fue usada, socialmente usada, la institución municipal de una villa mediana, tanto desde el punto de vista interno como desde su proyección al exterior. Para hacerlo hemos elegido los años que corrieron como bisagra entre los siglos XVI y XVII y un territorio concreto: la villa de Palomares del Campo en el partido de Huete (Cuenca). El caso de Palomares encaja bien en el sistema que nos permite plantear los supuestos sobre la significación centralizadora de la Monarquía en estos años. Para comprender el marco local es fundamental tener en cuenta las relaciones entre el concejo y la Monarquía y los efectos que los designios de ésta pudieron tener sobre aquél. / The work here presented search, therefore, since there was used, socially secondhand the municipal institution of a medium villa, both from the internal point of view and from the project to do it we have chosen the years that ran as hinge between the XVIth and XVIIth century and a concrete territory the villa of Dovecots of the field in Huete's (Cuenca) .El case of Dovecots fits well in the system that allows us to raise the suppositions on the meaning centralizadora of the Monarchy in these years. To understand the local frame is fundamental bear the relations in mind betweenthe council and the Monarchy and the effects that the plans of this one could have on that one

China has achieved unprecedented economic growth and consequent successes in poverty alleviation over the past three decades of economic liberalization and market-oriented reforms. Yet, in order to continue its progress in poverty reduction, while addressing pressing environmental and sociopolitical concerns, it is crucial for China’s leaders to achieve and sustain green, equitable, and robust economic performance in all parts of China. This thesis argues that a reconceptualized and strengthened rural industrialization program would enable China to maintain economic growth and assist with the transition to a domestically driven consumer economy. Moreover, rural industrialization, coupled with targeted administrative and institutional policy modifications, will enable the Chinese government to provide support to millions of its rural poor, thus avoiding social instability and potentially severe internal conflicts. Such a program would also lessen pollution and its associated costs on China’s densely populated cities, by shifting heavy urban industries to relatively less contaminated areas while adopting cleaner, environmentally sustainable technologies, introduced in a participatory manner in consultation with local communities. This approach would concurrently address regional, rural-to-urban, and intra-communal disparities, provide opportunity for “green growth” initiatives, and better equip rural populations to address growing vulnerabilities as a result of climate change.

The goal of this study is to ascertain how Thailand wages counterinsurgency (COIN). Thailand has waged two successful COINs in the past and is currently waging a third on its southern border. The lessons learned from Thailand’s COIN campaigns could result in modern irregular warfare techniques valuable not only to Thailand and neighboring countries with similar security problems, but also to countries like the United States and the United Kingdom that are currently reshaping their irregular warfare doctrines in response to the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The first set of COIN lessons comes from Thailand’s successful 1965-85 communist COIN. The second set comes from Bangkok’s understudied 1980s-90s COIN against southern separatists. The third set comes from Thailand’s current war against ethnic Malay separatists and radical Islamic insurgents attempting to secede and form a separate state called “Patani Raya,” among other names. Counterinsurgency is a difficult type of warfare for four reasons: (1) it can take years to succeed; (2) the battle space is poorly defined; (3) insurgents are not easily identifiable; and (4) war typically takes place among a civilian population that the guerrillas depend on for auxiliary support. Successful COINs include not only precise force application operations based on quality intelligence, but also lasting social and economic programs, political empowerment of the disenfranchised, and government acceptance of previously ignored cultural realities. Background: In 1965, communist insurgents, backed by the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), began waging an insurgency against Thailand in order to overthrow its government and install a Marxist regime. The Thai government struggled, both politically and militarily, to contain the movement for years, but eventually, it prevailed. Its success was based on a combination of effective strategy and coordination, plus well-designed and run security, political, and economic programs, the latter nowadays called the “three pillars of COIN,” a phrase developed by David Kilcullen, a modern COIN theorist and practitioner. One of Bangkok’s most successful initiatives was the CPM program (civil-military-police), which used a linked chain of local forces, police, and the military to not only provide security for villages, but also economic aid and administrative training to rural peoples. State political programs that undercut communist political programs backed by masterful diplomacy and a constant barrage of rural works helped erode the communist position. The 1980s-90s COIN against southern separatists followed similar lines. The far South’s four border provinces, comprised of 80 percent ethnic Malay Muslims, had been in revolt on and off for decades since Bangkok annexed the area in 1902. Bangkok had waged haphazard COIN campaigns against rebel groups there for decades with mixed results. But after the successful communist COIN was up and running in 1980, Bangkok decided to apply similar ways and means to tackle the southern issue. The government divided its COIN operations into two components: a security component run by a task force called CPM-43, and a political-economic component run by the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center, or SB-PAC. SB-PAC also had a Special Branch investigative capacity. Combined, the 80s-90s southern COIN strategy relied on extensive military intelligence networks to curb violence, civilian administrators to execute local political reforms, and local politicians to apply traditional Malay and Muslim problem solving techniques to keep the peace. These programs worked well against the multitude of southern insurgent groups that conducted sporadic attacks against government and civilian targets while also running organized criminal syndicates. By the end of the 1990s, with a dose of Thailand’s famed diplomacy and help from Malaysia’s Special Branch, Bangkok defeated the southern separatists. In January 2004, however, a new separatist movement in southern Thailand emerged – one based on ethnic Malay separatism and radical Islam. It is a well-coordinated movement with effective operational expertise that attacks at a higher tempo than past southern rebel groups. It moreover strikes civilian targets on a regular basis, thereby making it a terrorist group. Overall, it dwarfs past southern movements regarding motivation and scale of violence. Thai officials think the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Coordinate, or BRN-C, leads the current rebellion, but there are several other groups that claim to also lead the fight. Members of the insurgency are nearly exclusively ethnic Malays and Muslims. The movement demonstrates radical Islamic tendencies thought its propaganda, indoctrination, recruitment, and deeds. It is a takfiri group that kills other Muslims who do not share its religious beliefs, so it wrote in its spiritual rebel guidebook, Fight for the Liberation of Patani. BRN-C seeks to separate the four southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Songkhla from Thailand in order to establish an Islamic republic. The separatists base their revolt on perceived military, economic, cultural, and religious subjugation going back to the early 1900s. And they have a point. The central government has, at different times in the past, indeed treated southerners with tremendous disdain and sometimes violence – especially those considered insurgents. But Bangkok has also instituted scores of economic and social aid programs in the south – mosque building, college scholarships, and medical aid, for example – so it has not been a continual anti-Muslim “blood fest” as government detractors have painted it. Still the maltreatment, certainly many times less than yesteryear, has provided today’s insurgents with ideological fodder for a steady stream of recruits and supporters. Combined with radical Islam, it has bonded the insurgents to a significant degree. Statistically, in the 2005-07-time frame, insurgents assassinated 1.09 people a day, detonated 18.8 bombs a month, and staged 12.8 arson attacks a month. In 2005, they conducted 43 raids and 45 ambushes. The militants target security forces, government civilians, and the local population. They have killed fellow Muslims and beheaded numerous Buddhist villagers. The insurgents’ actions have crippled the South’s education system, justice system, and commerce, and also have maligned Buddhist-Muslim relations. Overall, the separatists pose a direct threat to Thailand’s south and an indirect threat to the rest of the country. Moreover, their radical Islamic overtones have potential regional and global terrorist implications. The Thai Government spent much of 2004 attempting to ascertain whether the high level of violence was, in fact, an insurgency. To begin with, the government, led by PM Thaksin Shinawatra, was puzzled by the fact that the separatists had not published a manifesto or approached Bangkok with a list of demands. By mid-2004, however, the insurgents had staged a failed, region-wide revolt, and their prolific leaflet and Internet propaganda campaign clearly demonstrated that a rebel movement was afoot. By fall 2005, the separatists had made political demands via the press, all of which centered on secession. By 2006, a coup against PM Thaksin succeeded and the military government that replaced him instituted a new COIN strategy for the south that by 2008 had reduced violence by about 40 percent. Some of the tenets of this new strategy were based on Thailand’s past successful COIN strategies. Whether or not the government has concocted a winning strategy for the future, however, remains to be seen. This paper analyses these COIN campaigns through the COIN Pantheon, a conceptual model the author developed as an analytical tool. It is based on David Kilcullen’s three pillars of COIN.

網絡是一個依據人與人之間的互動關係所建構出來的，它即是形成我們日常生活中的一部分，而政策網絡則是從網絡的生活環境概念化，進而系統化的分析方法，是較傳統分析方法更有彈性的分析架構。在現在的社會中，想要製造對立的關係很容易，想要挑出他人的問題也是容易的，但是如何促使人們溝通呢？在這個民眾對政府信任低落的時代，社會上的急需解決的公共議題卻未見減少，若里長能發揮一個更作為連結政府和民眾之間溝通的良好媒介，發揮其作為中介樞紐的功能。本研究更期許里長在核子事故緊急應變的政策宣導中，是一個能讓民眾和政府之間的溝通更為順暢的角色。透過政策網絡中的社會網絡分析方法，嘗試去解析在核二廠周遭地區的里長，他們在緊急應變網絡中所擁有的角色、地位及其對網絡的影響，並進一步提出改善當前緊急應變宣導僵化的困境。 本研究透過社會網絡分析的中介性分析結果，發現雖然在緊急應變宣導的政策網絡中，里長確實擁有強大的動員能量，更在網絡中有無法抹煞的影響力，但里長卻並非網絡的單一中介核心，在地方上的緊急應變宣導網絡中，形成了多元的中介核心，這些網絡參與者或因為公務上的正式關係，或因為掌握核能的專業知識，因此，各自在網絡中占有重要的地位，但是若核子事故發生時，這些參與者又會形成環環相扣的宣導和疏散系統，缺一不可。故本研究認為里長的角色，確實會對緊急應變宣導產生不同層面的影響，里長在網絡中也具有相當深厚的稟賦，但更多時候里長只是消極的在執行。 最後本研究彙整出不同受訪者的意見，歸納出了兩個方向性不同的建議，期望負責緊急應變宣導的單位能重新省思這些根本性的問題：第一，只有讓民眾真正的體驗過，體驗才會轉換成有價值的經驗和記憶；第二，對於緊急應變宣導的結構性省思，政府擁有的人力、資源和時間有限，政府官員相較於民眾是否是更需要宣導的群體？