MAGALHÃES FILHO, Glauco Barreira. O imaginário protestante e o estado de direito. 2010. 254f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Sociologia) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Departamento de Ciências Sociais, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Sociologia, Fortaleza-CE, 2010. / Submitted by GLAUBENILSON CAVALCANTE (glaubenilson@yahoo.com.br) on 2011-11-23T14:29:11Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2010_TESE_GBMFILHO.pdf: 2109948 bytes, checksum: 0b804f8cf94369f057e6805fe075052f (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Maria Josineide Góis(josineide@ufc.br) on 2011-11-23T14:56:27Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2010_TESE_GBMFILHO.pdf: 2109948 bytes, checksum: 0b804f8cf94369f057e6805fe075052f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2011-11-23T14:56:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2010_TESE_GBMFILHO.pdf: 2109948 bytes, checksum: 0b804f8cf94369f057e6805fe075052f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 / A presente tese intitula-se O Imaginário Protestante e o Estado de Direito. O imaginário, em seu sentido estático, é concebido como representação do mundo, da cultura ou da fé. No sentido dinâmico, é a faculdade de reestruturar imagens, o projeto do que virá a ser. O imaginário social é uma projeção de valores coletivos de uma sociedade ou de um grupo social. Nós destacamos o imaginário de grupos religiosos protestantes, bem como as articulações entre imaginário social e imaginário individual, imaginário e ação social. O protestantismo que nos interessa é principalmente o calvinismo independente do século XVII na Inglaterra, embora não negligenciemos suas associações precedentes com o luteranismo e o calvinismo genebrino. O Estado de Direito é o Estado com limites constitucionais determinado pela separação e controle recíproco dos poderes, bem como pelo reconhecimento da autonomia humana pelos direitos individuais. O objetivo da pesquisa é mostrar como as doutrinas protestantes se transpuseram analogicamente para o campo político-jurídico de modo a estabelecer os fundamentos do Estado de Direito, bem como identificar a contribuição da militância política, ideológica e armada dos puritanos para o estabelecimento pioneiro do Estado de Direito na Inglaterra. A pesquisa segue o paradigma weberiano, o qual admite as crenças como motivo para as ações, bem como concebe a existência de uma força de transformação exercida pelas idéias. Algumas pesquisas e conclusões de Durkheim acerca da divisão do trabalho social e de Peter L. Berger acerca da secularização são também recepcionadas. É privilegiado um modelo de desenvolvimento de longa duração nos termos de Norbert Elias. O recorte temporal de maior destaque é o século XVII. Como material de pesquisa, nós utilizamos informações historiográficas e documentos produzidos no cenário histórico destacado

This study aims to analyze the impact of the rule of choice of nationality as a factor reducing the polipatria, as is most common in use today by the Democratic State of Law. This analysis is done from the perspective of the primacy International Law over National Law. So, therefore, is that it questions the possibility of positive, the original constituent power of constitutional rule unconstitutional on loss of nationality. With the support of the constitution also asks the possible existence of unconstitutional standards in the discipline of legal naturalization. It is using the theory of nationality and the legal concept of law of International Law, both in Pontes de Miranda. / Fundação de Amparo a Pesquisa do Estado de Alagoas / O presente estudo objetiva analisar a incidência da regra da optabilidade por uma nacionalidade como fator redutor da polipatria, conforme é o uso mais comum na atualidade pelos Estados Democráticos de Direito. Tal analise é feita a partir da perspectiva de primazia do Direito das Gentes sobre o Direito Nacional. Assim, portanto, é que se questiona a possibilidade de positivação, pelo poder constituinte originário, de norma constitucional inconstitucional em matéria de perda da nacionalidade. Com amparo na constitucionalização dos direitos também se indaga a possível existência de normas inconstitucionais na disciplina legal da naturalização. Faz-se uso da teoria da nacionalidade jurídica e da noção de Direito das Gentes, ambas em Pontes de Miranda.

af / Suid-Afrika is sedert 27 April 1994 'n materiele regstaat, wat deur beide uitdruklike en 'ongeskrewe' fundamentele waardes onderskraag word. Dit is juis hierdie fundamentele waardes wat 'n blote formele konstitusie (as grondslag van 'n relative democracy) van 'n oppermagtige grondwet (as basis van 'n materiele standard-setting democracy) onderskei. Alhoewel daar 'n lewendige debat oor die toepaslikheid van die talle tradisionele grondwetuitlegmetodes gevoer word, is daar nietemin tans geen oorhoofse waardebaseerde paradigma vir grondwetuitleg nie. Soms wil dit voorkom asof fundamentele grondwetlike waardes net as normatiewe retoriek, in stede van materiele riglyn, by grondwetuitleg gebruik word. Die owerheidsgesag is aan hoer normatiewe regsbeginsels gebonde wat grotendeels in die fundamentele regte-akte (as deel van 'n oppermagtige grondwet) vervat is. Die gewaarborgde fundamentele regte dien derhalwe as konkretisering van beide die regstaat en die demokrasie: die materiele regstaatbegrip is die basis van _die grondwetlike staat. Die materiele regstaat, as geregtigheidstaat, kan dus gesien word as die eindbestemming van die grondwet as lex fundamentalis in die regsorde. 'n Oppermagtige grondwet is egter onlosmaaklik verbind aan die materiele regstaat. Daarom behels grondwetuitleg noodwendig die aktivering van die grondwetlik-gepositiveerde waardes. Hierdie normatiewe regsbeginsels en fundamentele waardes wat in die grondwet as grundnorm van die geregtigheidstaat beliggaam is, moet dan deur 'n onafhanklike regbank gehandhaaf en afgedwing word. In beginsel is grondwetuitleg gemoeid met die identifisering, handhawing en aktivering van die fundamentele waardes wat 'n oppermagtige grondwet onderskraag. Waarde-aktiverende grondwetuitleg is nietemin nie 'n bloudruk waarmee aile praktiese uitlegprobleme opgelos kan word nie, maar 'n oorhoofse waardebaseerde paradigma: 'n dwingende, normatiewe verwysingsraamwerk waarvandaan, waarbinne en waarheen grondwetuitleg op pad is. Die tradisionele grondwetuitlegmetodiek is bloat aanvullende tegnieke wat 'n waarde-aktiverende paradigma van grondwetuitleg ondersteun. Aangesien fundamentele waardes onlosmaaklik deel van die materiele regstaat is, moet grondwetuitleg nie net waardebaseer nie, maar ook waardegerig wees; nie net waardes handhaaf nie, maar ook bevorder en aktiveer; nie net waardes weerspieel nie, maar ook aktief vestig. 86 'n raamwerk vir grondwetuitleg behels die 'animering' en konkretisering van fundamentele waardes, ideale en standaarde wat die materiele regstaat onderle, kortom, waarde-aktiverende grondwetuitleg as vergestalting van die materiele regstaat. / On 27 April1994 South Africa became a constitutional state (Rechtsstaat), underpinned by both express, and 'unwritten' fundamental constitutional values. These values represent the distinction between a formal constitution (ie the basis of a relative democracy), and a supreme constitution (the foundation of a material standard-setting democracy). Although the merits of various methods of constitutional interpretation are hotly debated, no general value-based paradigm for constitutional interpretation has yet been established. At times it seems as if fundamental constitutional values are merely invoked as normative rhetoric during constitutional interpretation, rather than as substantive guidelines. Government institutions are bound by these higher normative legal principles, which in a supreme constitution are articulated primarily in the bill of fundamental rights. The guaranteed fundamental rights are a concretisation of both the constitutional state and democracy: the material law state principle (Rechtsstaatprinzip) as the foundation of the constitutional state. The Rechtsstaat as 'just state' is the ultimate goal of a supreme constitution as lex fundamentalis in the legal order. A supreme constitution is inextricably linked to the Rechtsstaat. As a result, constitutional interpretation inevitably involves animating and activating values positivised within the constitution.These normative legal principles and fundamental values must be maintained and enforced by an independent judiciary. In principle, constitutional interpretation deals with the identification, maintenance and animation of the fundamental values underlying a supreme constitution. Value-activating constitutional interpretation is not a blueprint for resolving all practical interpretive problems, but it is a general value-based paradigm: a peremptory, normative frame of reference from which, within which and towards which all constitutional interpretation should be directed. The traditional methodologies of constitutional interpretation are merely ancillary techniques supporting a value-activating paradigm of constitutional interpretation. Since fundamental values undeniably form part of the Rechtsstaat, constitutional interpretation should not only be value-based, but also values-directed; should not merely uphold the values, but also promote and activate them; should not only reflect the values, but also actively establish them. Such a framework for constitutional interpretation involves the animation and concretisation of the fundamental values, standards and ideals underlying the constitutional state: valueactivating constitutional interpretation as embodiment of the Rechtsstaat. / Law / LL.D. (Law)

The legislative supremacy of Parliament, a dominant characteristic of the Westminster system of government, has for a long time been the basic norm of South African constitutional law. In line with the Westminster prototype, the South African judiciary did not have the power to review the substantive validity of legislation. The creation of a new order, based on a supreme Constitution which entrenches fundamental rights and gives the courts the power to review not on! y the procedural validity but also the substantive validity of legislation, has brought about a significant change. This thesis examines the role of the South African judiciary during the transition from a system of legislative supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy and judicial review. The thesis is based on the interim Constitution of 1993. The entrenchment of fundamental human rights in the Constitution implies a greater role for the judiciary. The judiciary has to apply and interpret the human rights provisions vigorously and fearlessly. The human rights provisions have to be applied and interpreted with a keen awareness that a system of constitutional supremacy differs materially from one of legislative supremacy. In a system of legislative supremacy the intention of the legislature is paramount; in a system of constitutional supremacy the Constitution is supreme and overrides all laws, including Acts of Parliament, which are in conflict with it The doctrine of legislative supremacy has in the past led to a literalist and mechanical application of law; this has had a negative impact on the constitutional role of the South African judiciary. The provisions of a Constitution, especially its human rights provisions, are framed in wide and open ended terms; these need to be elaborated before they can be applied; the nature of these provisions, their purpose and the larger objects of the Constitution are important. The interpretation of the provisions of a supreme Constitution is incompatible with a literalistic and mechanical approach. A purposive and liberal or generous approach is called for. A framework and approach to the interpretation and application of South Africa's Bill of Rights are suggested in the thesis. / Constitutional International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.

Ten einde arbitrere uitoefening van die diskresionere bevoegdhede waarmee staatsarnptenare beklee word, te voorkom en te beperk, is beheer van sodanige bevoegdhede noodsaaklik. In die verhandeling word die rol wat die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika, 1993 (Wet 200 van 1993) kan vervul in die uitoefening van beheer oor die diskresionere bevoegdhede van staatsarnptenare ontleed. Sodanige ontleding geskied met verwysing na die Handves van Menseregte en instellings en ampte wat hulle gesag en bevoegdhede aan die 1993-Grondwet ontleen. Bykomend hiertoe, word ondersoek ook ingestel na die belang en relevansie van konstitusionalisme binne die konteks van publieke administrasie. / In order to prevent and to limit the arbitrary exercise of discretionary powers with which public officials are endowed, it is necessary to control such powers. This dissertation explores the role which the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act 200 of 1993) can fulfil in the exercise of control over the discretionary powers of public officials. Analysis of the role of the 1993-Constitution in this regard, is done with reference to the Bill of Rights and institutions and offices which derive their authority and powers from the Constitution. In addition hereto, the importance and relevance of constitutionalism within the context of public administration is also explored. / Public Administration and Management / M.A.

This short dissertation deals with separation of powers and federalism in African constitutionalism through the South African case. It investigates the extent to which the new South Africa complies with these two principles. The separation of powers in the new South Africa gives rise to a sui generis parliamentary regime, which is borrowing both from the Westminster model and the presidential one. On the other hand, the principle of federalism has been taken into consideration seriously, but South Africa has not become a fully-fledged federation. The result is a well-matched marriage between semi-parliamentarism and quasifederalism, which is the South African contribution to constitutionalism and democracy required by the African Renaissance. The dissertation comes to the conclusion that all in all the new South Africa complies with the two constitutional principles under consideration. It is a constitutional state, one of the very few exceptions on a continent laboriously emerging from authoritarianism. / Law / Thesis (LL.M.)--University of South Africa, 1998. / LL. M. (Law)

What do the current Constitutions of Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela   have in common? These are all part of what is known asthe new Latin American constitutionalism, a recenttheory  of  Constitutional  Law  that  offers  a new approach to analize the role of constitutionalism inthe present times.THĒMIS-Law Review had the opportunity to interview the main representative of this Latin American constitutionalism, with regard to what this new proposal is about, the solutions it presents, the challenges it faces, as well as the reading it offers about constitutional phenomenons and Constitutional Law institutions. / ¿Qué tienen en común las Constituciones vigentesde Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador y Bolivia? Todas ellas son parte de lo que se denomina el nuevo constitucionalismo latinoamericano, una corriente del Derecho Constitucional que propone un nuevo enfoque para analizar el rol del constitucionalismo en nuestros tiempos.THĒMIS-Revista de Derecho tuvo la oportunidad de conversar con uno de los principales teóricos de este constitucionalismo latinoamericano, respecto de qué trata esta nueva propuesta, las soluciones que ella plantea, los retos que se le presentan, así como la lectura que ofrece respecto de los fenómenos constitucionales e instituciones del Derecho Constitucional.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:33:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Fernando Fabiani Capano.pdf: 849796 bytes, checksum: 890e5b2afe86af98005c7ef8394adc71 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-08-30 / Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie / The present work intends to study, in the context of the constitutionalism, which was and which is the paper of the Judicial Power in the historical consolidation of the basic rights of the human being. It still intends to investigate great part of the most important doctrinal production concerning the doctrine of the separation of powers, giving ballast to the quarrel concerning the birth, growth and consolidation of the paper of Constitutional Justice as warranting force of the values sculptured in the Constitutions of the countries with democratic experience. In this line of reasoning, this work adopts as starting point the phenomenon of the legalization of the politics or the politicalization of the law, understood here as a social phenomenon, which demonstrate the new role assumed by the Judiciary Power in the current days. In the next chapter, this work reconstructs the historical line of the formation of the State, starting with the Liberal State and the rights of freedom, going trough the Social State and the consolidation of the social rights, finishing with the formation of the Constitutional State and the sprouting supply-individual right, also involving the sphere of solidarity and fraternity rights. In the third chapter, the concern is the doctrine of the separation of powers, passing for its conception and evolution, in the attempt to point out the work of the jurisdictional function as counterpoint of the other instituted powers. During the fourth chapter, this work demonstrates the movement of the constitutionalism, considering the center role that the Constitution acquired modernly, and the concepcion of Justice Constitutional in diverse countries. The third chapter also brings the problem of the neoconstitutionalism as new Law theory, demonstrating the methods of interpretation of the Constitutional Law, intending to give handle of the mission that constitutional principles have, in the modern Constitutions, by becoming effective, using the direct application of values, as well as the problem of the judicial ativism that, in many times, exceeds the tenuous line between the legitimacy of the proper judicial function and the usurpation of the political decisions conceived in legitimate process in other democratic spheres. Finally, study perceives the necessity of the balance between the diverse state functions, to maintenance a healthy democratic system. / O presente trabalho pretende aferir, no contexto do movimento do constitucionalismo, qual foi e qual é o papel do Poder Judicial na consolidação histórica dos direitos fundamentais do ser humano. Pretende, ainda, investigar grande parte da mais importante produção doutrinária acerca da separação de poderes, dando lastro à discussão sobre nascimento, crescimento e consolidação do papel da Justiça Constitucional como força garantidora dos valores esculpidos nas Constituições dos países com prática democrática. Nessa linha de raciocínio, esta dissertação adota como ponto de partida o fenômeno da jurisdicionalização da política ou a politização do direito, entendido aqui como fenômeno social apto a demonstrar o novo papel assumido pelo Poder Judiciário nos dias atuais. Em seguida, o trabalho reconstrói a linha histórica da formação do ente estatal, passa pelo Estado Liberal e pelos direitos fundamentais de liberdade, caminha pelo Estado Social e pela consolidação dos direitos de prestação e termina na formação do Estado Constitucional de Direito e no surgimento dos direitos supraindividuais, envolvendo a esfera da solidariedade e fraternidade dos povos como destinatária de tais direitos. No terceiro capítulo, a preocupação se dá com a doutrina da separação de poderes, passando por sua concepção e posterior evolução, na tentativa de situar o trabalho da função jurisdicional como contraponto dos demais poderes instituídos. Durante o quarto capítulo, demonstra-se conceitualmente o movimento do constitucionalismo e o surgimento e a operacionalização histórica, ante a centralidade que a Constituição adquiriu modernamente, das Justiças Constitucionais em diversos países. Outrossim, o terceiro capítulo traz a problematização do neoconstitucionalismo como nova teoria do Direito, a demonstrar ainda os métodos de interpretação da Lei Maior que pretendem dar cabo da missão de tornar efetiva, pela aplicação direta de valores, dos princípios havidos nas Constituições modernas, bem como o problema do chamado ativismo judicial que, por vezes, ultrapassa a tênue linha demarcatória havida entre a legitimidade da função judicante própria e a usurpação das decisões políticas concebidas em processo legítimo em outras esferas democráticas. Finalmente, à guisa de conclusão, percebe-se a necessidade do equilíbrio entre as diversas funções estatais, salutar para a manutenção coesa do sistema democrático.

Difficile de nier qu’il arrive quelque chose au droit constitutionnel sousl’effet conjugué de l’internationalisation du droit et de la construction communautaire. Eneffet, le droit constitutionnel s’internationalise, se régionalise dans un mouvementexponentiel. L’Afrique en général et l’espace CEDEAO en particulier n’échappent guère àcette dynamique globale du constitutionnalisme moderne. Aussi, a-t-on constaté quel’internationalisation du droit constitutionnel sur le continent africain qui prend la forme d’unprocessus d’impact, d’influence ou parfois de contraintes induit à la fois à une reconfigurationhorizontale des pouvoirs constitutionnels et une redistribution verticale du pouvoir au sein del’Etat. En revanche, au niveau supranational, ce processus dynamique et intense qui marqueune ouverture des systèmes de droit et favorise la communicabilité entre ordres juridiques setraduit par un phénomène d’intégration, d’harmonisation progressive des systèmesconstitutionnels étatiques autour de standards démocratiques consacrés par le Protocole de laCEDEAO sur la démocratie et la bonne gouvernance de 2001. La dialectique est, au final,paradoxale en ce que l’internationalisation du droit constitutionnel en Afrique et plusparticulièrement dans l’espace CEDEAO se révèle être l’expression d’un phénomèneperturbateur des ordres juridiques constitutionnels étatiques et communautaire mais aussi eten même temps un instrument de convergence matérielle (droits fondamentaux) et structurelle(régime politique démocratique) de ces dits ordres au travers de standards constitutifs dupatrimoine constitutionnel commun. / It is difficult to deny that something has happened to constitutional lawunder the combined effect of the internationalization of law and the construction of thecommunity. Indeed, constitutional law is internationalized, regionalized in an exponentialmovement. Africa in general and the ECOWAS area in particular do not escape the globaldynamics of modern constitutionalism. Thus, it has been observed that theinternationalization of constitutional law on the African continent, which takes the form of aprocess of impact, influence or sometimes constraints, leads both to a horizontalreconfiguration of constitutional and a vertical redistribution of power within the state. Onthe other hand, at the supranational level, this dynamic and intense process, which marks anopening up of legal systems and promotes communication between legal orders, is reflectedin a phenomenon of integration and progressive harmonization of the state's constitutionalsystems around democratic standards The ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and GoodGovernance of 2001. The dialectic is, in the end, paradoxical in that the internationalizationof constitutional law in Africa and more particularly in the ECOWAS area proves to be aphenomenon Disrupting the constitutional legal systems of the state and the community,and at the same time an instrument of material (fundamental) and structural (democraticpolitical rule, rule of law) convergence of these orders through standards which constitutethe common constitutional heritage.

L’application extraterritoriale de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés soulève la question du rôle du principe de territorialité dans la détermination de l’étendue des droits constitutionnels. De façon plus générale, elle soulève la question du rapport entre territoire et droit. Cette thèse explore, dans un premier temps, les jalons de la méthodologie territorialiste en abordant les prémisses qui sous-tendent l’ascension du principe de territorialité comme paradigme juridique dominant. Les anomalies de ce paradigme sont par la suite présentées, de façon à illustrer un affaiblissement du principe de territorialité. Par la suite, l’auteure entreprend de déterminer le rôle du principe de territorialité dans l’établissement de l’espace occupé par la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés en situation d’extraterritorialité. Les développements jurisprudentiels récents attestent de la prédominance du paradigme territorial, mais de nombreuses difficultés d’application sont rencontrées. Après avoir testé la viabilité de ce paradigme, l’auteure entreprend de définir un nouveau cadre analytique permettant de répondre à la question de l’application de la Charte en situation d’extraterritorialité sans se référer à la position géographique du demandeur, ni à son appartenance à une certaine communauté politique pré-déterminée. Ce cadre repose sur une conceptualisation de la notion d’autorité étatique transcendant l’exercice d’un pouvoir coercitif de l’État fixé à l’intérieur de ses limites territoriales. Une autorité relationnelle, qui s’appuie sur l’idée que tout pouvoir étatique tire sa source de la Constitution et, conséquemment, doit être assujetti à son contrôle. / This thesis is about the relationship between law and territory, and more particularly, about the relationship between the principle of territoriality and the scope of Charter rights. The author first introduces territoriality as dominant legal paradigm and analyses its underlying premises. The challenges that territoriality and methodological territorialism have recently faced are also examined. The purpose of the first part of this thesis is to show that the territorial paradigm is not immune to challenge, and to provide conceptual tools to get out of the “territorial trap”. The author then looks at how, and to what extent, territoriality currently shapes the scope of Charter rights. By analysing cases on point, the author concludes that although territoriality is, officially, the answer to the question of the scope of Charter rights, in practice, the principle does not provide sufficient guidance to the judiciary. The territorial principle’s normative weaknesses are added to its practical inability to determine the scope of Charter rights. In order to examine potential alternatives to the territorial principle, the author examines the parallel debate regarding the extraterritorial scope of American constitutional rights. American courts, rather than endorsing strict territoriaity, emphasize either the membership of the claimant (the subject of constitutional litigation), the limitations on state actions (the object of constitutional litigation), or pragmatic concerns in order to determine whether a constitutional protection applies in an extraterritorial context. The author then proceeds to examining how an alternative model could be developed in Canada in the context of extraterritorial Charter cases. She argues that the personal entitlement approach, when superimposed on the territorial paradigm, brings more injustice, not less, in that people can be sufficiently related to Canada to trigger a state action, but insufficiently connected to trigger Charter protection, hence creating a state of asymmetry. She also argues that territoriality, if understood in Westphalian terms, leads to the belief that a state action is not an action within the authority of the Canadian government if it is conducted outside of Canada, hence shielding these actions from constitutional srcutiny. The model the author advocates is based on a notion of relational authority and it seeks to emphasize not the place where a government act is performed, nor the identity of the persons subject to it, but the idea that any exercise of government power is potentially amenable to constitutional scrutiny.