This study aims to defend value formalism, like the formalism useful to the procedure as a means of achieving a fair process. For both historical analysis is made of the jurisdiction under the focus of the power conferred on the Judge from the Roman State to the present day. Takes the postwar constitutionalism as a starting point to treat the state as insurer of the fundamental rights of the citizen and as a provider of public policies. The process no longer seen as a mere tool in the service of the right stuff and will be recognized as a fundamental constitutional guarantee, as applied constitutional law. To do so, we start a process permeated by formalism-excessive in search of a value formalism emptying into the necessary balance or balance between the principles of effectiveness and legal certainty. Shows the need and possibility to change the paradigm of legal positivism to the model of principles and rules, as well as the possibility of dialogue in the countries of civil law institutes the common law. Search on the judicial activism the means to achieve the necessary flexibility procedural, either by technical management of litigation, the principle of elasticity, the use of axiological and ontological gaps as well as the principle of proportionality. All analysis aims to find solutions to reach decisions fairer and according with the democratic rule of law. / O presente estudo tem por objetivo defender o formalismo-valorativo, ou seja, o formalismo útil ao procedimento, como meio de se alcançar um processo justo. Para tanto é feita a análise histórica da jurisdição sob o enfoque do poder conferido ao Juiz desde o Estado Romano até os dias atuais. Toma-se o constitucionalismo do pósguerra como ponto de partida para tratar do Estado como assegurador dos direitos fundamentais do cidadão e como provedor das políticas públicas. O processo deixa de ser visto como mero instrumento a serviço do direito material e passa a ser reconhecido como uma garantia constitucional fundamental, como direito constitucional aplicado. Para tanto, parte-se de um processo permeado por um formalismo-excessivo em busca de um formalismo-valorativo a desaguar no necessário equilíbrio ou ponderação entre os princípios da efetividade e segurança jurídica. Mostra-se a necessidade e possibilidade de mudança do paradigma do positivismo jurídico para o modelo de princípios e regras, como também a possibilidade de diálogo nos países da civil law de institutos da common law. Buscase no ativismo judicial o meio de concretizar a necessária flexibilização procedimental, seja pela técnica de gerenciamento de processos judiciais, pela aplicação do princípio da elasticidade, do uso das lacunas axiológicas e ontológicas, bem como do princípio da proporcionalidade. Toda a análise visa buscar soluções para o alcance de decisões mais justas e consetâneas com o Estado Democrático de Direito.

O objetivo desta dissertação é expor as características centrais da teoria do filósofo norte-americano Ronald Dworkin sobre a natureza dos direitos fundamentais ou morais. A referida teoria é aqui compreendida como uma defesa da noção de direitos fundamentais, tal como aparece no sistema constitucional norte-americano, contra os ataques do utilitarismo e do juspositivismo. A concepção dworkiniana dos direitos fundamentais como razões de justiça (ou princípios) que operam como trunfos contra a utilidade geral é contrastada com duas teses adversárias: a concepção utilitarista dos direitos morais de John Stuart Mill e a tese juspositivista das fontes sociais. A famosa querela entre Ronald Dworkin e os juspositivistas é analisada em um enfoque normativo, como uma disputa sobre o conceito de autoridade política: Dworkin compreende os direitos fundamentais como a fonte última da autoridade jurídica, enquanto os positivistas sustentam que uma das funções da autoridade jurídica é precisamente estabelecer quais são os direitos das pessoas. / The purpose of this research is to expound the main characteristics of Ronald Dworkins theory of fundamental (or moral) rights. Dworkins theory is herein considered as a defense of the idea of fundamental rights, as it appears in the United States Constitutional System, against the attacks advanced by the doctrines of utilitarianism and legal positivism. Dworkins conception of fundamental rights as reasons of justice (or principles) that function as trumps against the general utility is contrasted with two defiant theories: John Stuart Mills utilitarian conception of moral rights and the positivist social sources thesis. The well-known debate between Ronald Dworkin and the legal positivists is approached as a normative dispute concerning the concept of political authority: Dworkin regards fundamental rights as the ultimate source of legal authority, whereas legal positivists argue that one of laws main functions is precisely to settle peoples rights.

This study aims to defend value formalism, like the formalism useful to the procedure as a means of achieving a fair process. For both historical analysis is made of the jurisdiction under the focus of the power conferred on the Judge from the Roman State to the present day. Takes the postwar constitutionalism as a starting point to treat the state as insurer of the fundamental rights of the citizen and as a provider of public policies. The process no longer seen as a mere tool in the service of the right stuff and will be recognized as a fundamental constitutional guarantee, as applied constitutional law. To do so, we start a process permeated by formalism-excessive in search of a value formalism emptying into the necessary balance or balance between the principles of effectiveness and legal certainty. Shows the need and possibility to change the paradigm of legal positivism to the model of principles and rules, as well as the possibility of dialogue in the countries of civil law institutes the common law. Search on the judicial activism the means to achieve the necessary flexibility procedural, either by technical management of litigation, the principle of elasticity, the use of axiological and ontological gaps as well as the principle of proportionality. All analysis aims to find solutions to reach decisions fairer and according with the democratic rule of law. / O presente estudo tem por objetivo defender o formalismo-valorativo, ou seja, o formalismo útil ao procedimento, como meio de se alcançar um processo justo. Para tanto é feita a análise histórica da jurisdição sob o enfoque do poder conferido ao Juiz desde o Estado Romano até os dias atuais. Toma-se o constitucionalismo do pósguerra como ponto de partida para tratar do Estado como assegurador dos direitos fundamentais do cidadão e como provedor das políticas públicas. O processo deixa de ser visto como mero instrumento a serviço do direito material e passa a ser reconhecido como uma garantia constitucional fundamental, como direito constitucional aplicado. Para tanto, parte-se de um processo permeado por um formalismo-excessivo em busca de um formalismo-valorativo a desaguar no necessário equilíbrio ou ponderação entre os princípios da efetividade e segurança jurídica. Mostra-se a necessidade e possibilidade de mudança do paradigma do positivismo jurídico para o modelo de princípios e regras, como também a possibilidade de diálogo nos países da civil law de institutos da common law. Buscase no ativismo judicial o meio de concretizar a necessária flexibilização procedimental, seja pela técnica de gerenciamento de processos judiciais, pela aplicação do princípio da elasticidade, do uso das lacunas axiológicas e ontológicas, bem como do princípio da proporcionalidade. Toda a análise visa buscar soluções para o alcance de decisões mais justas e consetâneas com o Estado Democrático de Direito.

L’objectif de la présente étude est de faire l’état de la lutte contre la fraude à la constitution qui entrave le processus de démocratisation en Afrique noire francophone. Il s’agit de montrer que le renforcement de la démocratie et de l’État de droit a favorisé l’émergence de nouveaux usages de la constitution dans la plupart des États africains. Les gouvernants qui ont intériorisé les contraintes du constitutionnalisme le rejettent de plus en plus par le recours à des artifices juridiques qui se révèlent très difficiles à combattre sur le terrain du droit. Il en est ainsi parce que le fraudeur à la constitution prend toujours le soin de se conformer à la lettre de la constitution pour en combattre son fond. Toutefois, on voit émerger au niveau national, régional et international une synergie d’actions de quelques institutions juridictionnelles, politiques et sociales tendant à combattre les actes des pouvoirs publics qui, revêtant l’apparence de la légalité constitutionnelle, la contrarie. Pour ce faire, les acteurs impliqués dans la lutte contre la fraude n’hésitent pas à tirer du dispositif normatif qui se révèle dans sa mise en œuvre inadaptée, les moyens pour identifier et sanctionner. Le bilan des actions menées contre la fraude révèle des rares succès. Les échecs enregistrés induisent que pour la consolidation de la démocratie en Afrique, la lutte contre la fraude à la constitution doit être placée au centre du contrôle du juge constitutionnel. / The objective of this study is to review the state of the fight against fraud in the constitution that hinders the process of democratization in francophone Africa. These show that the strengthening of democracy and the rule of law has encouraged the emergence of new uses of the constitution in most African states. The leaders who have internalized the constraints of constitutionalism reject more and more by the use of legal devices that are very difficult to fight on the field of law. This is so because the fraudster to the formation always takes care to comply with the letter of the constitution to fight his background.However, are emerging at national, regional and international synergy of actions of some judicial institutions, and social policies aimed at combating acts of public authorities, taking on the appearance of constitutional legality, the upsets. To do this, those involved in the fight against fraud do not hesitate to draw the normative system which is revealed in its inadequate implementation, the means to identify and punish. Review the actions conducted against fraud reveals rare success. The failures that lead to the consolidation of democracy in Africa, the fight against fraud in the constitution must be central control of the constitutional court.

Le renouveau du constitutionnalisme amorcé dans les années 1990 en Afrique subsaharienne francophone et la menace sécuritaire grandissante à travers le monde réorientent la problématique des rapports qu’entretient la liberté d’opinion avec l’ordre public sécuritaire. La reconnaissance constitutionnelle de la liberté d’opinion exige que l’exercice de cette liberté se fasse dans le respect de l’ordre public matériel, avec au coeur de cet ordre juridicisé, la sécurité des personnes, des biens et du territoire national par extension. Cette reconnaissance impose de s’interroger sur la conciliation de la liberté d’opinion avec l’ordre public sécuritaire en Afrique subsaharienne francophone (Bénin- Côte d’Ivoire-Sénégal) à la lumière de l’expérience des grandes démocraties contemporaines (Allemagne-France). Dans la présente recherche, l’exigence de conciliation s’appuie sur des fondements constitutionnels et son respect doit être assuré par un ensemble de garanties juridiques. Cependant, la conciliation trouve ses limites dans les contingences politiques, économiques et sociales propres aux États de l’Afrique subsaharienne francophone. En effet, dans des pays où l’État de droit est en gestation,la conciliation de deux normes de valeur constitutionnelle est incertaine, surtout lorsque l’une d’entre elle, la liberté d’opinion, peut être mise en oeuvre contre le pouvoir politique tandis que l’autre, l’ordre public sécuritaire, peut lui servir de prétexte pour limiter l’exercice de cette liberté. La réflexion invite in fine à repenser la conciliation de la liberté d’opinion avec l’ordre public sécuritaire comme un nouveau principe constitutionnel en Afrique subsaharienne francophone. / The renewal of constitutionalism, initiated in the 1990’s in francophone sub-Saharan Africa,and the worldwide growing security threat reorient the issue of the relationships between freedom of opinion and public security order. The constitutional recognition of freedom of opinion requires that the exercise of this freedom be done according to substantive public policy, with, at the heart of this legalised policy, the safety of people, property and, by extension, national territory. This recognition demands that we question the conciliation of freedom of opinion with public security order in francophone sub-Saharan Africa (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal) in the light of the experience of great contemporary democracies (Germany, France). In this research, constitutional grounds support the conciliation requirement and its respect must be ensured by legal guarantees. However, conciliation finds its limits in the political, economic and social contingencies specific to the francophone sub-Saharan States of Africa. Indeed, in these countries where the rule of law is building up, the conciliation of two constitutional standards is uncertain, especially when one of them, freedom of opinion, can threaten political power whereas the other one, public security order, can become an excuse to limit the exercise of this freedom. The essay invites in fine to reconsider the conciliation of freedom of opinion with public security order as a new constitutional principle in francophone sub-Saharan Africa.

Le point de départ des travaux entrepris est la définition lefortienne de la démocratie par opposition au totalitarisme. Le totalitarisme est l’institution d’une société organique, une et homogène, dans laquelle aucune division sociale, aucun désaccord avec l’idéologie véhiculée par le parti ne sont possibles. La spécificité de la démocratie, a contrario, est de s’enrichir de la désintrication du pouvoir, du droit, et du savoir. Les citoyens, dotés de droits fondamentaux, sont juges de la légitimité du pouvoir établi. Leurs désaccords ainsi que l’antagonisme entre les classes sociales nourrissent l’exercice d’un commun litigieux. De là, une question fondamentale : une telle définition de la démocratie est-elle historiquement datée, ou continue-t-elle d’être pertinente aujourd’hui ? Doit-on encore concevoir la démocratie, pour la rendre authentique, par le conflit civil érigé en principe politique, ou faut-il l’envisager de manière consensualiste au lendemain de son opposition avec le totalitarisme ? Claude Lefort s’inspirait de Machiavel pour dépasser les limites du marxisme et repenser la démocratie par la valorisation du conflit civil, indissociable de la figure de l’imaginaire social. La thèse ici soutenue adopte différemment une perspective néo-machiavélienne. Elle revient à proposer un espace public dissensuel à partir du modèle machiavélien de l’entente dans le conflit, par confrontation avec l’espace public habermassien et d’autres conceptions du tort et du conflit dans les démocraties contemporaines. Comment concevoir aujourd’hui les figures du conflit civil et de l’imaginaire social, en s’inspirant paradoxalement de Machiavel pour interroger la démocratie ? / The starting point of the present work is the Lefortian definition of democracy as opposed to totalitarism. Totalitarism is the institution of an organic society, one and homogeneous, where no social division, no disagreement with the party’s ideology are possible. On the contrary democracy’s specificity consists in enriching itself with the disentanglement of power, law and knowledge. Citizens, endowed with fundamental rights can judge of the legitimacy of the power in place. Their disagreements as well as the antagonism between social classes fuel the dispute about common good.Hence a fundamental question: is such a definition of democracy historically dated or is it still relevant today? To make it authentic should democracy be seen through civil conflict made into a political principle or should it be viewed in a consensualist way just after its opposition to totalitarism? Claude Lefort drew from Machiavelli to go beyond the limits of Marxism and rethink democracy by giving more importance to civil conflict as an integral part of the theme of social imaginary. The present dissertation adopts in a different way a neo-Machiavellian perspective. It amounts to proposing a dissensual public space on the Machiavellian model of understanding within conflict by confronting it with the Habermassian public space and with other conceptions of wrong and conflict in contemporary democracies.Today how can the themes of civil conflict and social imaginary be viewed – paradoxically drawing from Machiavelli- to question democracy?

Text in English with summaries in English and Afrikaans / Bibliography: leaves 89-108 / Democracy in South Africa came at a price. The apartheid era did not accommodate or incorporate democratic and constitutional principles. The year 1996 saw a democratic Constitution being adopted, having been certified by the Constitutional Court. The Bill of Rights in the Constitution guarantees the rights and freedoms of all South Africans. The apartheid era ensured that the rights which are enjoyed today were reserved for only a portion of the South African population. This study emphasises the importance of the Constitution and the role and responsibility of every citizen to defend it. In defending the Constitution, the rights and freedoms of all South Africans are defended. The Bill of Rights promotes social development for all South Africans, as opposed to disparate social development under the divisive apartheid era. The Constitution is a powerful enabler for democracy and social cohesion and unity. This study depended on secondary sources which are vital to keeping historical facts alive and truthful. Desktop research is qualitative and, while less expensive, produces acceptable results and findings. / Demokrasie in Suid-Afrika het met 'n prys gekom. Die apartheidsera het nie demokratiese en grondwetlike beginsels geakkommodeer of opgeneem nie. In 1996 word 'n demokratiese Grondwet aanvaar, wat deur die Grondwet Hof gesertifiseer was. Die Handves van Menseregte in die Grondwet waarborg die regte en vryhede van alle Suid-Afrikaners. Die apartheidsera het verseker dat die regte wat vandag geniet word, slegs vir 'n gedeelte van die Suid-Afrikaanse bevolking gereserveer is. Hierdie studie beklemtoon die belangrikheid van die Grondwet en die rol en verantwoordelikheid van elke burger om dit te verdedig. Deur die Grondwet te verdedig word die regte en vryhede van alle Suid-Afrikaners verdedig. Die Handves van Menseregte bevorder sosiale ontwikkeling vir alle Suid-Afrikaners, in teenstelling met uiteenlopende sosiale ontwikkeling onder die verdelende apartheidsera. Die Grondwet is 'n kragtige instaatsteller vir demokrasie, sosiale samehorigheid en eenheid. Hierdie studie was afhanklik van sekondêre bronne wat noodsaaklik is om historiese feite lewendig en waaragtig te hou. Desktop-navorsing (boek) is kwalitatief en hoewel dit goedkoper is, lewer dit aanvaarbare resultate en bevindings op. / Development Studies / M.A. (Development Studies)

With discussion of Indigenous laws on the rise in Canada, this thesis explores the question of law’s power: jurisdiction. In this project, I ask whether Indigenous jurisdiction is active in conflicts between Indigenous and state actors over the environment, in the context of the Heiltsuk Nation on the central coast of British Columbia. This project looks to critical legal theory for an understanding of jurisdiction. It identifies three aspects of jurisdiction that are discussed in critical legal theory and related fields: that it is technical, it is authoritative, and it is spatial. Adopting these qualities as provisional indicators of jurisdiction, it applies thefzm to three case studies of Heiltsuk (or “Haíɫzaqv”) conflicts with the state, which engage colonial law in different ways. The three case studies concern (1) herring harvest and management, which was litigated in R v Gladstone; (2) land use and forestry, which is the subject of the Great Bear Rainforest agreements; and (3) trophy hunting for bears, which is the subject of a grassroots campaign based on Indigenous law. Adopting a qualitative approach adapted from institutional ethnography, this project applies a critical jurisdictional lens to each case study, using documentary review and interviews to explore the technical, authoritative, and spatial aspects of each conflict. Ultimately, I find that expressions of Heiltsuk jurisdiction – as understood from a colonial, critical perspective – are already at play in each conflict, although this is not immediately visible from the point of view of colonial law. In the conclusion, I explore the different manifestations and strategies of Heiltsuk jurisdictional expressions, and the ways that colonial jurisdiction interacts with them. / Graduate / 2021-12-19

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This thesis delineates the transformation of Iran’s so-called post-revolutionary ‘religious intellectuals’ (rowshanfekran-e dini) from ideological legitimators within the political class of the newly-established theocratic-populist regime to internal critics whose revised vision for the politico-religious order coalesced and converged with the growing disillusionment and frustration of the ‘Islamic left’, a constellation of political forces within the governing elite of the Islamic Republic, that following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini increasingly felt itself marginalised and on the outskirts of power. The historical evolution of this complex, quasi-institutionalised and routinized network, encompassing theologians, jurists, political strategists and journalists, which rose to prominence in the course of the 1990s, and its critical engagement with the ruling political theology of the ‘guardianship of the jurist’, the supremacy of Islamic jurisprudence, political Islamism and all forms of ‘revolutionary’ and ‘utopian’ political and social transformation, are scrutinised in detail. In this vein, the thesis examines the various issues provoked by the rowshanfekran-e dini’s strategic deployment and translation of the concepts and ideas of a number of Western thinkers, several of which played a pivotal role in the assault on the ideological foundations of Soviet-style communism in the 1950s and 1960s. It then moves to show how this network of intellectuals and politicos following the election of Mohammad Khatami to the presidency in May 1997 sought to disseminate their ideas at the popular level by means of the press and numerous party and political periodicals, and thereby achieve ideological and political hegemony. The thesis proceeds to demonstrate the intimate connection between the project of ‘religious intellectualism’ and elite-defined notions of ‘democracy’, ‘electoral participation’, ‘reform’ and ‘political development’ as part of an effort to accumulate symbolic capital and assert their intellectual and moral leadership of the polity.