Le monde arabe, où l’Égypte occupe une place de choix par sa situation géographique et son histoire, n’a pas connu de gouvernements démocratiques depuis l’accès à l’indépendance des pays le composant. On soulève dans ce travail la question des mécanismes de la survivance autoritaire dans le monde arabe en prenant pour cas d’étude le régime d’Hosni Moubarak, les récentes mobilisations de janvier 2011 constituant à notre avis un « test » pour les dynamiques d’ajustement autoritaire à l’œuvre depuis trente ans en Égypte. Alors que certains auteurs soutiennent la cause d’une judiciarisation de la vie politique en Egypte stimulée par la place du droit et des juridictions judiciaires dans le pays, dans quel sens ont évolué les marges de manœuvre d’agents politiques et juridiques égyptiens ? La Haute Cour constitutionnelle a-t-elle été un facteur de stabilisation pour le régime autoritaire d’Hosni Moubarak ou bien, a-t-elle constitue un rempart contre le régime en place? Alors que les Democratization studies ont démontré leurs limites conceptuelles pour appréhender les évolutions politiques dans un espace supposément aux prises avec une « exception autoritaire » régionale, cette recherche s’inscrit dans la vague d’écrits offrant une lecture de la reconfiguration autoritaire dans l’espace arabe. En premier lieu, nous analyserons l’impact de l’activité jurisprudentielle émanant de la Haute Cour constitutionnelle égyptienne en matière de défense des droits politiques, et cela afin de montrer de quelle manière cette institution a participé à la survivance du régime de Moubarak (1981-2010). En second lieu, on confirmera nos observations à partir d’une étude portant sur les droits économiques levant le voile sur une « complaisance stratégique » des juges constitutionnels vis-à-vis du pouvoir politique. Néanmoins, ce ne sera qu’en remettant en contexte cette sphère professionnelle qu’il sera possible, dans un troisième temps, d’en expliquer les raisons en appréciant la sensibilité de ce segment professionnel à la notion d’indépendance judiciaire.

Addressing complex global health challenges, including the burden of noncommunicable diseases (NCDs), will require change in sectors outside of traditional public health. Contemporary regional trade and investment agreements (RTAs) like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) continue to move further ‘behind-the-border’ into domestic policy space introducing new challenges in the regulation of health risk factors. This dissertation aimed to clarify the pathways through which RTAs influence NCDs, and to explore points along those pathways with the intent of improving the existing evidence base and supporting policy development. This work develops a critical theoretical framework exploring the ideas, institutions, and interests behind trade and investment policy; it also develops a conceptual framework specifying how trade and investment treaty provisions influence NCD rates through the effects of trade and investment on tobacco, alcohol, and ultra-processed food and beverage products, as well as access to medicines and the social determinants of health. Using health impact assessment methodology, three analytical components were designed to examine pathways of influence from RTAs to health outcomes as mediated by the interests of transnational corporations (TNCs). The first component explored the influence of industry during the TPP negotiations and how its health-related interests were reflected in the final TPP text. The second component examined the role of trade and investment liberalisation in health-harmful commodity markets, finding a rise in TNC sales after a period of liberalisation. The third component demonstrated how investor rights and investor-state dispute can challenge the state’s right to regulate if it damages the profits of TNCs, which may threaten effective health regulation, and provides opportunities to strengthen the right to regulate. The work in this dissertation provides support for the thesis that trade and investment policies are a fundamental structural determinant of health and well-being, which are highly influenced by TNCs that guide such policies in the interest of maximising their profits and protections, often to the detriment of public policy and population health. This work identifies the need for more robust health impact assessments of RTAs before future agreements are ratified, as well as an imperative to challenge vested interests that entrench neoliberal policy preferences that have hindered sustainable and equitable development.

[pt] Em 7 de fevereiro de 2009, a Bolívia promulgava uma nova Constituição. A carta, fruto de um longo processo constituinte, com aproximadamente quatro anos de duração, refundou o país a partir de uma concepção plurinacional, com respeito aos povos originários, aos trabalhadores, à natureza, à solidariedade e às filosofias ancestrais. Nela, estabeleceu-se o direito à autodeterminação dos povos indígenas originários, a ser materializada, dentre outros meios, pela autonomia indígena originário campesina. Entretanto, a união em torno do objetivo comum da descolonização do país não foi suficiente para erradicar as contradições da Bolívia, fruto da manutenção de estruturas do colonialismo nas relações sociais e entre sociedades, razão pela qual a concretização dos direitos reconhecidos constitucionalmente tem se operado a passos lentos e enfrentado desafios oriundos tanto de setores governistas quanto da oposição. Por essa razão, o presente trabalho tem como objetivo analisar se, e de que forma, a autonomia indígena originário campesina vem sendo implementada na Bolívia, mais de uma década após a promulgação do texto constitucional, por meio do estudo de caso do processo de aquisição de autonomia da nação originária Uru Chipaya, identificando eventuais entraves e dificuldades à materialização do direito à autodeterminação e do Estado Plurinacional. / [en] On February 7, 2009, Bolivia promulgated a new Constitution. The text, the result of a long constituent process, lasting approximately four years, re-founded the country from a plurinational concept, with respect to native peoples, workers, nature, solidarity and ancestral philosophies. In it, the right to self-determination of originay indigenous peoples was established, to be materialized, among other means, by indigenous originary peasant autonomy. However, the union around the common objective of the decolonization of the country was not enough to eradicate the contradictions of Bolivia, fruit of the maintenance of structures of colonialism in the social relations and between societies, reason why the realization of the constitutionally recognized rights has operated in slow steps and faced challenges from both government and opposition sectors. For this reason, the present work aims to analyze if, and in what way, the indigenous originary peasant autonomy has been implemented in Bolivia, more than a decade after the promulgation of the constitutional text, through the case study of originaru nation Uru Chipaya s acquisition process of indigenous originary peasant autonomy, identifying possible obstacles and difficulties to the materialization of the right to self-determination and the Plurinational State. / [es] En el 7 de febrero de 2009, Bolivia promulgó una nueva Constitución. La carta, fruto de un largo proceso constituyente, de aproximadamente cuatro años, refundó el país desde un concepto multinacional, con respeto a los pueblos originarios, los trabajadores, la naturaleza, la solidaridad y las filosofías ancestrales. En él, se establece el derecho a la autodeterminación de los pueblos indígena originario, que se materializará, entre otros medios, en la autonomía indígena originario campesina. Sin embargo, la unidad en torno al objetivo común de descolonización del país no fue suficiente para erradicar las contradicciones en Bolivia, resultado del mantenimiento de las estructuras del colonialismo en las relaciones sociales y entre las sociedades, ya que se pretendía la realización de dos derechos constitucionalmente reconocidos. operó a pasos lentos y enfrentó desafíos tanto del gobierno como de los sectores de oposición. Por eso, el presente trabajo tiene como objetivo analizar si, y de qué manera, se implementó la autonomía indígena originario campesina en Bolivia, a más de una década de la promulgación del texto constitucional, a través del estudio de caso del proceso de adquisición de la autonomía de la nación originaria Uru Chipaya, identificando posibles obstáculos y dificultades en la realización del derecho a la libre determinación y al Estado Plurinacional.

[pt] A União Europeia se apresenta como a mais bem sucedida experiência supranacional. Diante do seu inevitável, e necessário, projeto de integração regional, a presente pesquisa tem como objetivo verificar a existência de um déficit democrático em sua instituição parlamentar. Para tanto, serão abordadas as teorias democráticas liberais que dão forma teórica à democracia representativa ocidental, para que se possa fundamentar as instituições que compõem o bloco. Após, serão analisadas as posições quanto à existência do déficit democrático na União, a perspectiva de um constitucionalismo para além do Estado-Nação, a impossibilidade de aprofundamento federalista, e às críticas à abordagem liberal europeísta, para que assim se analise a atuação do Parlamento Europeu como órgão democraticamente legítimo de representatividade supranacional. / [en] The European Union presents itself as the most successful supranational experiment. In view of its inevitable and necessary regional integration project, the present research aims to verify the existence of a democratic deficit in its parliamentary institution. To this end, liberal democratic theories that give theoretical form to western representative democracy will be addressed, so that the institutions that make up the bloc can be founded. Afterwards, the positions regarding the existence of the democratic deficit in the Union, the perspective of a constitutionalism beyond the Nation-State, the impossibility of federalist deepening, and the criticisms of the liberal Europeanist approach will be analyzed, so that the performance of Parliament can be analyzed. European Union as a democratically legitimate supranational representative body.

Politics and social life are essentially about decision making, but great parts of that which politics aims to govern, that which social life revolves around and that which is studied in political science is not necessarily the result of conscious decisions. This some philosophers and political theorists would attribute to spontaneous order, arguing that certain norms, customs and institutions have evolved as the result of human action without, for that matter, being the result of human design. The theory of spontaneous order was primarily developed by the Austrian-British philosopher and economist Friedrich Hayek (1899–1992). To him, spontaneous order was a way of solving problems with information deficits in society as well as an important part of his economic, political and institutional theory. However, Hayek’s social theory, which is largely based on the idea of spontaneous order, gives rise to a number of questions. The purpose of this essay is to examine the relationship between individual freedom, constitutionalism and spontaneous order in Friedrich Hayek’s social theory, and to critically evaluate this relationship in the light of that same theory. The purpose is achieved through critical analysis and by answering the following three questions: How does individual freedom, constitutionalism and spontaneous order relate to each other according to Hayek? Is Hayek’s proposal for constitutional design logically compatible with the theory of spontaneous order? Are there institutions, according to Hayek, that limit individual freedom, but are legitimate nevertheless by virtue of having developed spontaneously? The general conclusion of the essay is that Hayek’s proposal for constitutional design is logically compatible with the theory of spontaneous order, and that the principles of individual freedom, constitutionalism and spontaneous order are related to each other in a logically valid manner, but that the other institutions that Hayek proposes give rise to contradictions and indeterminacy vis-à-vis the fundamental principles of his theory.

[pt] Superado está o paradigma metodológico positivista, que chegava à norma tomando como pressuposto tão só o Direito posto validamente, segundo a lógica de cima para baixo. Face às plúrimas, e cada vez mais complexas, demandas suscitadas pelas sociedades nacionais, e pelo próprio Direito, e também em atenção aos impactos dos fatos e forças regionais, supranacionais e internacionais, surge no âmbito do pensamento jurídico o movimento denominado póspositivismo, o qual incorpora outros elementos ao Direito, como, v. g., valores, princípios, políticas, diretrizes, procedimentos e argumentos. Concebidos assim o Direito Constitucional e o Direito da Constituição (formal e conteudisticamente), impõe-se uma sua material interpretação - i. é., uma interpretação comprometida com a realização de valores -; uma leitura também de baixo para cima, uma leitura que enxerga o Direito Constitucional não só na perspectiva ab intra, mas também, naquela outra: ab extra. Isto se justifica no fato de a Constituição ser concebida como ordem de valores. Nesta platéia ocupam um assento de destaque as Cortes Constitucionais, às quais cabe, por último, decidir sobre a constitucionalidade das leis e atos outros dos poderes públicos; se tais atos são assimiladores das aspirações e valores individuais e compartilhados intersubjetivamente. No que especificamente toca aos Direitos Fundamentais, impende reconhecer que o princípio da dignidade da Pessoa Humana, com todo o seu vigor deôntico nos articulados 1°, III, da Constituição da Rep. Fed. do Brasil de 1988, e 1°, da Constituição da Rep. Portuguesa de 1976, além da dicção do artigo 1° da Declaração Universal dos Direitos Humanos de 1948, tornou-se o epicentro do extenso catálogo de direitos com status de fundamentalidade, na sua dualidade: direitos, liberdades e garantias, e direitos sociais, econômicos e culturais; e, também, outros conceitos constitucionais de conteúdo aberto ou 0 indeterminado, os quais irradiam seus efeitos para toda ordem jurídica subconstitucional. Mesmo em situações de colisão ou conflito de interesses e pretensões nas quais se impõe a aplicação do catálogo tópico dos princípios de interpretação constitucional, máxime a proporcionalidade, o princípio dos princípios, é um imperativo ético e de consciência impor àquele que sofre limitação ou restrição quanto ao gozo e exercício dos direitos o menor sacrifício humano possível. / [en] The positivist methodological paradigm is overcome. It used to get to the norm taking as a presupposition solely the Law validly observed, according to the logics of head to bottom. Since we have many, and each time more complex, discussions demanded by national societies, and by the Law science itself, and also with attention to the impact of facts and regional powers, supra and international, arises related to the juridical thought the movement called postpositivism, which incorporates other elements to the Law science, such as, e.g., values, principles, politics, directions, procedures and arguments. Conceived like that, the Constitutional Law and the Law of the Constitution (both in form and content), impose a material interpretation - that is, an interpretation concerned with values accomplishment -; a reading which is also done from head tobottom, a reading which sees the Constitutional Law not only from the ad intra perspective, but also from the ab extra one. This is justified by the fact that the Constitution is conceived as an order of values. In this audience, a distinguished seat is held by the Constitutional Courts, which are supposed, at last, to decide about the constitutionality of laws and other acts related to public powers, and if such acts assimilate individual longings and values and are shared intersubjectively. Concerning Fundamental Rights, it is important to realize that the human dignity principle, with all its deonthic values in the articles 1st, III of the Brazilian Federative Constitution of 1988, and 1st of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic of 1976, together with the article 1st of the Human Rights Universal Declaration, became the epicentre of the large catalogue of rights with fundamentality status, in its duality: rights, liberties and warranties, and social, economical and cultural rights; and, also, other open or indeterminate contents constitutional concepts, which irradiate their effects to every sub-constitutional juridical order. Even in collision situations or interest conflicts and pretensions in which the application of the topic catalogue of the constitutional interpretation principles, mainly the proportionality, the principle of principles, is an ethic imperative and of consciousness to impose to the one who suffers limitation and restriction concerning freedom and exercise of rights with the lesser possible human sacrifice.

The objective of this thesis is to assess the impact and influence of South Africa's Constitutional Court in the first two years of our democracy. To achieve this objective, some of the definitive and controversial cases already decided by the Court have been selected and analysed in an attempt to glean some jurisprudential perspectives of the Court. It focuses on the work of the Court over the past two years. It deals with the evolution of South Africa into a democracy, and analyzes the South African legal system prior to the beginning of the process of transformation. It briefly surveys the evolution of our constitutional system, dating back from the pre-1910 colonial period and provides a broad outline of the legal system in the post-April 1994 period of transformation. It analyzes the Court from the point of view of, inter alia, its composition, jurisdiction and powers. The Court is also contrasted with courts in other jurisdictions which exercise full judicial review. The Court's emerging jurisprudence is examined. A review is made, inter alia, of the Court's understanding of, and approach to, the questions of the values underpinning the post-apartheid society and its constitutional system, and constitutional interpretation. The right against self-incrimination and South African company law and the two relevant Constitutional Court cases are discussed. The collection of evidence by the State and the constitutionality of provisions relating to search and seizure and the taking of fingerprints are looked into. The Court's approach to statutory presumptions and criminal prosecutions; some aspects of our appeals procedures; an accused's right to be assisted by a lawyer at state expense; the question of a fair trial and access to information; capital punishment; corporal punishment; committal to prison for debt; and the certification of constitutions is analyzed. Two of the cases in which the provinces clashed with the national government on the distribution of posers between provinces and the national government are discussed. The conclusion is that the Court has, overall, hitherto acquitted itself well in the handling of particularly the controversial quasi-political questions that arose in the cases it has decided. / Constitutional, International & Indigenous Law / L.L. D. (Law)

O objetivo desta dissertação é expor as características centrais da teoria do filósofo norte-americano Ronald Dworkin sobre a natureza dos direitos fundamentais ou morais. A referida teoria é aqui compreendida como uma defesa da noção de direitos fundamentais, tal como aparece no sistema constitucional norte-americano, contra os ataques do utilitarismo e do juspositivismo. A concepção dworkiniana dos direitos fundamentais como razões de justiça (ou princípios) que operam como trunfos contra a utilidade geral é contrastada com duas teses adversárias: a concepção utilitarista dos direitos morais de John Stuart Mill e a tese juspositivista das fontes sociais. A famosa querela entre Ronald Dworkin e os juspositivistas é analisada em um enfoque normativo, como uma disputa sobre o conceito de autoridade política: Dworkin compreende os direitos fundamentais como a fonte última da autoridade jurídica, enquanto os positivistas sustentam que uma das funções da autoridade jurídica é precisamente estabelecer quais são os direitos das pessoas. / The purpose of this research is to expound the main characteristics of Ronald Dworkins theory of fundamental (or moral) rights. Dworkins theory is herein considered as a defense of the idea of fundamental rights, as it appears in the United States Constitutional System, against the attacks advanced by the doctrines of utilitarianism and legal positivism. Dworkins conception of fundamental rights as reasons of justice (or principles) that function as trumps against the general utility is contrasted with two defiant theories: John Stuart Mills utilitarian conception of moral rights and the positivist social sources thesis. The well-known debate between Ronald Dworkin and the legal positivists is approached as a normative dispute concerning the concept of political authority: Dworkin regards fundamental rights as the ultimate source of legal authority, whereas legal positivists argue that one of laws main functions is precisely to settle peoples rights.

Le génocide des Tutsi du Rwanda est singulier au regard des génocides du XXème siècle. Il l’est par le nombre de ses victimes, par sa rapidité, ses modes d’exécution et surtout par le nombre de ses auteurs. Ce sont plus d’un million de Rwandais (Hutu) qui ont pris part directement aux massacres. La sanction de ces crimes de masse dans une société en quête de reconstruction soulevait d’innombrables difficultés notamment dans l’appréhension d’une criminalité collective en termes de responsabilité individuelle. L’ampleur et le paroxysme atteint dans ce drame a nécessité un traitement spécifique. Trois instances de justice ont été activées de manière concomitante : les juridictions classiques rwandaises (relayées par des juridictions coutumières dites Gacaca), le Tribunal international créé par le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies et enfin les juridictions nationales étrangères en application du principe de la compétence universelle. L’intérêt scientifique de notre démarche réside justement dans l’étude de ce traitement juridictionnel multiniveaux. Deux questions se posent : quelle est la pertinence de ce modèle de justice 20 ans après le drame rwandais ?Quel bilan provisoire peut-on tirer de tous les jugements rendus par ces différentes juridictions ? / The Tutsi genocide in Rwanda is singular in consider genocides of the XXth century. It is true by the number of victims, the speed and methods of implementation and, above all the number of the authors. These are more than one million Rwandan (Hutu) who participated directly in the massacres. Punishment of the massive crimes in a society in search of reconstruction, run into problems of group crime and individual responsibility. The scale and the speak of human tragedy needed specific treatment. Rwandan ordinary courts (replace by customary Courts called Gacaca), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (created by United Nations Security Council) and lastly, national foreign jurisdictions are also begin simultaneously in application of the principle of universal jurisdiction. The interest of our scientific approach lies in the study of multilevel constitutionalism. This raises two obvious questions: What is the relevance of this justice model twenty years after the Rwandan tragedy? What has been the interim review of all the judgments handed down by the different jurisdictions?

The nature of the Republican constitution has been much contested by scholars studying the history of the Roman Republic. In considering the problems of the late Republic, the nature of the constitution is an important question, for if we do not understand what the constitution was, how can we explain Rome’s transition from ‘Republic’ to ‘Empire’? Such a question is particularly pertinent when looking at events at Rome following the assassination of Caesar, as we try to understand why it was that the Republic, as we understand it as a polity without a sole ruler, was not restored. This thesis examines the Roman understanding of the constitution in the aftermath of Caesar’s death and argues that for the Romans the constitution was a contested entity, its proper nature debated and fought over, and that this contest led to conflict on the political stage, becoming a key factor in the failure to restore the Republic and the establishment of the Second Triumvirate. The thesis proposes a new methodology for the examination of the constitution, employing modern critical theories of discourse and the formation of knowledge to establish and analyse the Roman constitution as a discursive entity: interpreted, contested and established through discourse. I argue that the Roman knowledge of the proper nature of the constitution of the res publica had fractured by the time of Caesar’s death and that this fracturing led to multiple understandings of the constitution. In this thesis I describe the state of Rome in 44-43 B.C. to reveal these multiple understandings of the constitution, and undertake an analysis of the discourse of Cicero and Sallust after 44 B.C. in order to describe the way in which different understandings of the constitution were formulated and expressed. Through this examination this thesis shows that the expression and interrelation of these multiple understandings in Roman political discourse made arrival at a unified agreement on a common course of action all but impossible and that this combined with the volatile atmosphere at Rome after Caesar’s death played a major role in Rome’s slide towards civil war and the eventual establishment of a different political system.