Le droit international évolue et se traduit par une augmentation des normes, des organisations et des juridictions internationales, faisant craindre une fragmentation du droit international au sein de l’ordre juridique international. L’ordre juridique international s’entend, au sens large, comme le droit international régissant la société internationale. Celui-ci englobe les ordres juridiques internationaux spécialisés, composés des organisations internationales. Chacune d’entre elles comprend une juridiction ou un tribunal arbitral. La problématique de cette thèse est de déterminer, par l’étude du pluralisme juridique international, si ce risque de fragmentation du droit international est avéré ou non. Elle se fonde, pour ce faire, sur une analyse systémique des ordres juridiques internationaux, pour établir si ceux-ci établissent des rapports de droit entre eux, ainsi que sur une analyse normative des ordres juridiques, afin de déterminer si chacun d’entre eux a une cohérence propre. Dans une première partie, il est démontré que le pluralisme juridique international semble désordonné, induisant un risque de fragmentation du droit international, en raison, d’une part, de la multiplication des ordres juridiques internationaux et, d’autre part, de leur carence institutionnelle. Il est démontré ensuite, dans une seconde partie, que le pluralisme juridique international s’ordonne grâce à la mise en cohérence du droit international par les juges internationaux. Ceux-ci coordonnent la jurisprudence internationale grâce à leur jurisdictio (dire le droit) et érigent un véritable pouvoir juridictionnel international à travers leur imperium (rendre une décision obligatoire). / International law evolves at a rapid pace, and results in a strong increase in norms, organizations and international courts, raising increasing fears about a fragmentation of international law within the international legal order itself. The international legal order is defined, in the broadest sense of the term, as international law aimed at governing international society. This includes specialized international legal systems, made up of a number of international organizations ; each one including a court or an arbitral tribunal. The aim of this thesis is to determine, through the study of international legal pluralism, weather this foreseen risk of a possible fragmentation of the international law is, in the end, proven or not. In order to fulfill this aim, our work is based, on the one hand, on a systemic analysis of international legal orders, this in order to determine whether these bodies establish legal relationships between themselves, and on the other hand, on a normative analysis of legal systems, to determine this time whether each one sets up, or not, its proper inner coherence.In the first part, we show that the international legal pluralism seems to be uncoordinated, inducing a risk of fragmentation of international law, this due, in part, to the proliferation of international legal orders and, and in other part, to their lack of institutional ground. In the second part, we aim at proving that the international legal pluralism finds best its balance when international law is put into practice by international judges. They coordinate international jurisprudence through their jurisdictio (apply the law) and set out the boundaries of a true international judicial power through their imperium (to pronounce a binding decision).

Within the context of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments the recognition and enforcement of foreign custody orders is unique. By reason of the fact that custody orders are always modifiable "in the best interests of the child" they cannot be regarded as final orders and are thus not capable of recognition and enforcement on the same basis as final orders. The failure of courts to afford foreign custody orders recognition and enforcement in the normal course has created the potential for a person deprived of the custody of a child to remove the child from the jurisdiction of a court rendering a custody order to another jurisdiction within which he or she may seek a new, more favourable order. This potential for behaviour in contempt of an existing order has been exploited by numerous parents who feel aggrieved by custody orders. The problem of parental child snatching has escalated to such a degree that the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction was drawn up to introduce uniform measures amongst member states to address this problem. Despite being a meaningful step in the fight against international child abduction the Hague Convention does not fully resolve the problem. For this reason other measures have been suggested to supplement the Convention. The different approaches taken in South Africa, the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States of America to recognition and enforcement of foreign custody orders and the measures to overcome the problem of international child abduction are examined and a comparative methodology applied to the design of a model approach for South Africa. The object of this model is to permit the South African courts to address the international child abduction problem without falling prey to any of the pitfalls experienced elsewhere in the legal systems examined. / Law / LL.D.

Constante alvo de preocupação dos processualistas, os efeitos das decisões judiciais ganham contornos inovadores e polêmicos no domínio da jurisdição constitucional brasileira. O presente estudo, além de fazer breve incursão sobre as premissas conceituais e classificatórias do controle de constitucionalidade, busca subsídios doutrinários sobre a classificação da sentença à luz dos efeitos que produzem, para, após, sistematizar idéias capazes de eliminar a falta de nitidez que paira sobre muitos dos efeitos produzidos na fiscalização judicial de constitucionalidade. A investigação se debruça sobre quais são esses efeitos, como e quando se operam no processo, o campo pelos quais se estendem e a quem alcançam; tal exame é feito de acordo com as características do controle difuso, incidental e concreto, de um lado, e da fiscalização concentrada, principal e abstrata, de outro. Nessa parte da pesquisa, para além de temas como o da retroatividade da decisão e o da modulação de efeitos, despontam, ainda: (i) a assimilação da súmula vinculante e da repercussão geral como institutos que potencializam a eficácia das decisões; (ii) projeção de efeitos erga omnes por meio de recurso extraordinário; (iii) o efeito vinculante visto como fator de aproximação entre os sistemas da common law e da civil law; (iv) as características do denominado processo objetivo; (v) a força obrigatória dos motivos determinantes do decisório; (vi) natureza dúplice e causa petendi aberta das ações de controle abstrato, entre outros. Ao final, considerando-se os possíveis conflitos entre as decisões editadas no controle difuso e no concentrado, analisa-se o impacto de um processo sobre o outro. Nesse contexto, destaca-se a abordagem da ação rescisória e dos instrumentos previstos nos artigos 475-L, §1º, I e 741, parágrafo único do Código de Processo Civil como possíveis caminhos de revisão da sentença que contraria decisão do Supremo Tribunal Federal em matéria constitucional. Considerações conclusivas de cunho crítico encerram o trabalho. / Object of constant concern for Procedural Law authors, the effects of judicial decisions gain new and controversial configurations in the scope of the Brazilian constitutional jurisdiction. This paper, besides presenting a brief overview on the conceptual and classificatory premises of the control of constitutionality, seeks support in legal writings on the classification of the sentences regarding the effects they produce, and then systematizes ideas capable of eliminating the lack of clarity in many of the effects produced in the judicial control of constitutionality. This study looks into such effects, how and when they manifest in the proceeding, the scope to which they extend and who they affect. Such examination is based, on the one hand, on the characteristics of diffuse, incidental and concrete control, and on the other hand, on the main and abstract concentrated control. In this part of the research, besides issues like retroactivity of decision and flexibilization of decision effects, other questions emerge, such as: (i) assimilation of binding precedent and of the general repercussion as potentializing agents of the efficacy of the decisions; (ii) projection of erga omnes effects, by means of extraordinary appeal; (iii) binding effect seen as a factor of approximation between common law and civil law systems; (iv) the characteristics of the so-called objective proceeding; (v) the binding force of the motives that determine the decision; (vi) Double nature and open causa petendi of the actions of abstract control, among others. Finally, considering the possible conflicts between the decisions passed in the diffuse control and in the concentrated control, the impact of one proceeding on the other is analyzed. Accordingly, rescissory action and instruments provided for in articles 475-L, paragraph 1, I and 741, sole paragraph, of the Code of Civil Procedure, are highlighted as possible paths towards revision of sentence, which contradicts decision by the STF (Federal Supreme Court) in constitutional matter. The paper is concluded with critical considerations.

ALes instances civile et pénale parallèles suscitent des risques de contrariétés que le droit positif prévient traditionnellement par l'utilisation de la règle de l'autorité du pénal sur le civil et du sursis à statuer de l'article 4 du Code de procédure pénale. Or ce double mécanisme de la primauté du pénal sur le civil est tout à fait singulier. Il assure en effet une cohérence entre les motifs des décisions concernées, dont le droit positif ne se soucie guère au sein des autres contentieux. Il est de plus unilatéral, puisqu'il ne joue qu'au bénéfice des décisions pénales. Justifié initialement par l'importance et les garanties de vérité des décisions pénales, il s'avère cependant, à l'analyse, largement discutable. Quant à ses fondements d'abord, ce mécanisme assure certes une certaine cohérence des choses jugées, mais maintient une apparence de vérité plus qu'il ne la garantit. Or précisément, la cohérence entre motifs de jugements distincts n'est légitime qu'autant qu'elle sert l'objectif de vérité. Quant à son régime, ensuite, l'autorité du pénal sur le civil entrave la liberté du juge civil et viole, par son caractère absolu, le principe du contradictoire, tandis qu'une application systématique du sursis à statuer est source de lenteur des procédures et contrevient à l'objectif de célérité. Afin de pallier ces inconvénients, le législateur et la jurisprudence se sont d'abord efforcés de restreindre les effets les plus néfastes de ce principe, en dissociant les concepts civils et répressifs, puis en le cantonnant étroitement. Néanmoins, l'objectif de célérité l'a finalement emporté, et le législateur, par la loi du 5 mars 2007, n'a maintenu le caractère obligatoire du sursis à statuer de l'article 4 qu'à l'égard de l'action civile en réparation du dommage né de l'infraction. Le nouveau dispositif consacre désormais le principe d'une indépendance des procédures parallèles, au risque de l'incohérence, même si pour l'heure les juridictions du fond tiennent compte du risque de contrariété et maintiennent la règle de l'autorité du pénal sur le civil. Il conviendrait néanmoins de revenir sur cette dernière règle, et d'attribuer aux énonciations qui constituent le soutien nécessaire de la décision pénale, la valeur d'une présomption réfragable de vérité. Il serait ainsi tenu compte des spécificités des décisions pénales, de même que seraient préservées les exigences, parfois antagonistes, d'autonomie des juridictions, de cohérence des choses jugées, et de recherche de vérité. / AWhen civil and penal proceedings occur in parallel, there is a risk of conflicting judgments, which positive law traditionally precludes by making penal proceedings paramount and by deferring adjudication on article 4 of the Criminal Code. This double mechanism, which ensures supremacy of criminal proceedings over civil proceedings, is quite singular. Indeed, it guarantees that the justifications for the decisions made are coherent. In other contentious matters, positive law pays little attention to such concerns. Moreover, it is unilateral, since it exclusively favours criminal law decisions. Though this supremacy was initially justified by the notion that criminal law decisions guaranteed truth, analysis has shown that this is largely debatable. First of all, with regard to the foundations themselves, this mechanism of course ensures a certain coherence of the matters judged, but maintains an appearance of truth rather than a guarantee of truth. Yet, precisely, the coherence of the justifications for distinct judgments is only legitimate insofar as it seeks to determine the truth. Then with regard to the system itself, the supremacy of criminal over civil proceedings interferes with the freedom of the civil judge, and violates by its absolute nature, the adversarial principle, while the systematic deferral of adjudication slows down procedures and undermines the objective of celerity. In order to remedy these drawbacks, legislators and jurisprudence have made an effort to limit the most damaging effects of this principle, by dissociating civil from repressive concepts, then by compartmentalising each within strict limits. Nevertheless, the objective of celerity finally won the day and legislators, through the law of 5th March 2007, retained the compulsory nature of the deferral of adjudication of article 4, but only with regard to civil action for damages resulting from the offence. The new law now establishes the principle of independence of parallel proceedings, even though it carries a risk of conflicting results. For the time being, however, the jurisdictions take into account the risk of conflicting results and have maintained the supremacy of criminal proceedings over civil proceedings. It is nonetheless desirable to revise the recent law, and to incorporate in the reasons which are necessary support for the criminal decision, the value of a refragable presumption of truth. The specific nature of decisions in criminal proceedings would thus be taken into account, and the sometimes antagonistic requirement of autonomy of the different jurisdictions, the coherence of the matters being judged, and the search for truth would thus be preserved.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:24:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rodrigo Giacomeli Nunes Massud.pdf: 1110890 bytes, checksum: e4b492fcf06926736dbb3cffae5f2bbf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-11 / Two major factors should be highlighted for a thematic overview of this study: (i) the revolution of language studies (linguistic turn) and its great repercussion on the interpretation and establishment of a legal reality, having its peak with the proposal for cognitive isolation, the so called abyss of knowledge; and (ii) the appreciation of legal precedents in shaping the legal-tax relations and in the construction of the normative senses, with the projection for the legitimate future expectations, rationalizing the jurisdictional rendering through its programmed mechanization and thereby distancing from the factual particularities of concrete cases. A combination of the arising phenomena of these categorical axes, a legal-philosophical and dogmatic integration in the study of res judicata and rescission in tax matters by alteration of precedent cases was accomplished, in light of the Brazilian Civil Procedure Code of 2015, having its methodological counterpoint on the guidance disseminated by the Legal Opinion PGFN nª 492/2011 / Dois grandes fatores se destacam numa síntese temática do trabalho: (i) a revolução dos estudos da linguagem (linguistic turn) e sua grande repercussão em matéria de interpretação e constituição da realidade jurídica, com ápice na proposta de isolamento cognitivo do ser, o chamado abismo do conhecimento; e (ii) a valorização dos precedentes na conformação das relações jurídico-tributárias e na construção dos sentidos normativos, com a projeção para as legítimas expectativas futuras, racionalizando-se a prestação jurisdicional por meio de sua mecanização programada e, com isso, distanciando-se das particularidades fáticas dos casos em concreto. Aliando os fenômenos decorrentes destes eixos categóricos, procuramos realizar uma integração jurídico-filosófica e dogmática no estudo da coisa julgada e da rescisória em matéria tributária por alteração de jurisprudência, à luz do Código de Processo Civil de 2015, tendo como contraponto metodológico as orientações veiculadas e difundidas pelo Parecer PGFN n.º 492/2011

Le coauteur est traditionnellement défini en droit pénal comme l’individu qui, agissant avec un autre, réunit sur sa tête l’ensemble des éléments constitutifs de l’infraction. Pourtant, il est permis de douter de la pertinence de cette affirmation tant la jurisprudence comme la doctrine en dévoient le sens.En réalité, loin d’être cantonnée à une simple juxtaposition d’actions, la coaction doit être appréhendée comme un mode à part entière de participation à l’infraction. En effet, elle apparaît comme un titre d’imputation à mi-chemin entre l’action et la complicité, auxquelles elle emprunte certains caractères. Autrement dit, elle se révèle être un mode de participation à sa propre infraction. Surtout, son particularisme est assuré par l’interdépendance unissant les coauteurs : parce que chacun s’associe à son alter ego, tous sont placés sur un pied d’égalité. Ces différents éléments, qui se retrouvent dans sa notion et dans son régime, permettent ainsi d’affirmer la spécificité de la coaction tout en renforçant la cohérence entre les différents modes de participation criminelle. / In criminal law, the co-perpetrator is classically presented as an individual who, acting jointly with another, gathers all the constitutive elements of the offence. However, one may harbor doubts concerning the relevance of this assertion since both case law and legal scholars denature its meaning.Actually, far from being limited to a mere juxtaposition of perpetrations, co-perpetration must be understood as a full mode of participation in the offence. Indeed, it appears as a form of imputation halfway between perpetration and complicity, from which it borrows some characteristics. In other words, it proves to be a mode of participation in one’s own offence. Above all, its particularism is provided by the interdependence between the co-perpetrators : because each of them joins forces with his alter ego, all are placed on an equal footing. These elements, which are found both in it’s concept and in it’s regime, demonstrate thereby the specificity of co-perpetration while strengthening the coherence of the different modes of criminal participation.

The thesis aims to reconstruct the procedural rules that apply whenever the simulation of contract becomes an issue within a civil proceeding.To this end, a different method is followed from that commonly used by the courts and in the scholarly literature, which have mostly deduced the content of these rules assuming, as a starting point, a certain solution to the problem of the nature of simulated contracts. The courts, that still adhere to the traditional doctrine of nullity of the simulated contract, state that the rules of the civil code dedicated to the action and the objection of nullity shall also apply to the action and objection of simulation. Part of the scholars, rejecting such premises, uphold interpretative solutions that are at odds with those supported by the courts. On the contrary, in this thesis, the legal notion of simulation is assumed as a starting point. Such a legal notion describes the set of facts that lead to a simulation of a contract and to the legal consequences set forth in articles 1414 and ff of the civil code; these facts are thus material to the process in which the simulation is an issue. Hence, the first part of the thesis (chapters 1 to 4) aims at framing the legal notion of simulation within the main categories of civil procedure, and starts from the definition of the legal notion of simulation by critically assessing the two main conceptions of the simulation phenomenon that emerge from the conspicuous literature on the subject: a “negative” conception, which sees the simulation as the lack of an essential element of the contract, and a “positive” conception, which sees the simulation as an agreement between the parties with the aim of excluding the legal effects of a contract between them (simulation agreement). The arguments in support of this last conception are set forth; after that, the question of the structure of the so-called “concealed contract” and the role of the simulation agreement on its formation and effectiveness is examined. The framing of the simulation in the fundamental categories of the process is then carried out through the observation of the legal effects that the simulation activity produces with regard to third parties, and the procedural classification of the substantial categories referred to in Articles 1415 and 1416 of the Italian Civil Code (in particular, unopposability). Finally, the objective scope of the process in which the ascertainment of the simulation of a contract is requested (action of simulation) is defined by critically examining the prevailing doctrine, according to which the said action aims at ascertaining the lack of a “contractual relationship”. Another doctrine is then examined, according to which simulation and nullity may be described as authonomous legal effects capable of being ascertained within a judgment having the force of res judicata. The second part (chapters 5 and 6) is dedicated to the discussion of selected issues of “procedural dynamics”, namely: a) the objection of absolute simulation, and the problem wether the judge may decide upon it ex officio in both the processes aimed at enforcing a simulated contract, and in those that aim, on the contrary, at the declaration of nullity, or at the annulment, rescission or termination of the same contract; b) the multiple facets that the issue of absolute simulation presents in the course of a forced expropriation proceeding undertaken against an “apparent owner”; c) the form of the concealed contract and the extent to which the simulants may prove a relative simulation by witnesses, particularly in the event that the relative simulation of the price of a sale contract is alleged as an objection to an avoidance action promoted by the bankruptcy trustee; d) the stading to an action of simulation; e) the objective scope of the res judicata in the same action. / La tesi mira a ricostruire la disciplina processuale della simulazione negoziale, ossia le regole concernenti l'attività compiuta nel processo dalle parti e dal giudice, ogniqualvolta la simulazione di un negozio giuridico sia oggetto di allegazione, prova e decisione (nella forma della mera cognizione o dell'accertamento). Si segue, a tal fine, un metodo diverso da quello comunemente impiegato dalla giurisprudenza e dalla dottrina, le quali hanno perlopiù dedotto il contenuto di tali regole a partire dalla soluzione di volta in volta prescelta al problema della qualificazione del contratto simulato. La giurisprudenza, muovendo dalla tesi della nullità del contratto simulato, conclude per la diretta applicabilità delle norme del codice civile dedicate all'azione e all'eccezione di nullità. Parte della dottrina, discostandosi da quella premessa, propone soluzioni applicative di segno opposto. Al contrario, nel presente lavoro, la centralità solitamente assegnata al contratto simulato, è occupata dalla simulazione, ossia dalla fattispecie degli effetti che gli artt. 1414 e seguenti designano quali “effetti della simulazione”. Detta fattispecie è infatti quanto forma oggetto dell'attività dei soggetti del processo (l'allegazione, la prova, la cognizione e l'accertamento). La ricostruzione della disciplina processuale della simulazione muove pertanto dalla collocazione della fattispecie simulatoria entro le categorie che informano il contenuto di quella disciplina, e cioè la qualificazione della simulazione come tema di prova, come questione di merito oggetto di mera cognizione, nonché, infine, come oggetto del processo e dell'accertamento munito di autorità di cosa giudicata. La prima parte della tesi (capitoli da 1 a 4) si occupa esattamente di tale inquadramento, prendendo le mosse dalla definizione della fattispecie simulatoria e dalla discussione critica delle due opposte concezioni del fenomeno simulatorio che emergono dalla cospicua letteratura sul tema: una concezione “negativa”, che vede nella simulazione una forma qualificata di difetto della fattispecie negoziale, e una concezione “positiva”, che ravvisa la fattispecie simulatoria in un negozio distinto da quello simulato (il c.d. accordo simulatorio). Enunciate le ragioni a sostegno di quest'ultima concezione, si prende in esame la questione della struttura del contratto dissimulato e del ruolo dell'accordo simulatorio sulla formazione e l'efficacia del medesimo. L'inquadramento della simulazione nelle categorie fondamentali del processo prosegue mediante l'osservazione degli effetti giuridici che l'attività simulatoria produce riguardo ai terzi, e l'inquadramento processuale delle categorie sostanziali richiamate negli artt. 1415 e 1416 c.c. (segnatamente, l'inopponibilità). Infine, si definisce l'oggetto dell'azione di simulazione, mettendo di fronte la prevalente tesi che detto oggetto fa coincidere con il rapporto fondamentale contrattuale, e quella minoritaria che addita le azioni di simulazione e nullità quali esempi di processi di accertamento di situazioni giuridiche preliminari. Si sottopone quindi a critica la tesi del rapporto fondamentale. La seconda parte (capitoli 5 e 6) è dedicata alla discussione di profili scelti di dinamica processuale, segnatamente: l'eccezione di simulazione assoluta, e il problema della sua rilevabilità d'ufficio nei processi diretti all'esecuzione del contratto simulato, nonché in quelli che mirano, al contrario, alla dichiarazione della nullità, ovvero all'annullamento, alla rescissione o alla risoluzione dello stesso contratto; le molteplici sfaccettature che presenta la cognizione della simulazione assoluta nel corso (o a lato) dell'espropriazione forzata intrapresa contro il titolare apparente; la forma del contratto dissimulato e l'ampiezza dei poteri istruttori dei simulanti che intendano dar prova della simulazione relativa, e per suo tramite del contratto dissimulato, particolarmente nel caso in cui la simulazione relativa del prezzo venga addotta per contrastare l'azione revocatoria promossa dal curatore fallimentare contro una compravendita immobiliare “a prezzo vile”; la legittimazione ad agire nell'azione di simulazione; i limiti oggettivi del giudicato di accertamento della simulazione.

Malgré le peu de fondements écrits consacrés à la justice dans le texte de la Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, le Conseil constitutionnel, en réalisant un travail d’actualisation à partir de la Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, a permis l’émergence d’un droit constitutionnel processuel, construit autour de principes directeurs. Ceux-ci peuvent être répartis dans trois catégories : deux principales, selon que l’acteur du procès prioritairement concerné soit le juge ou les parties et une troisième, complémentaire, celle des garanties procédurales, permettant de favoriser les qualités essentielles du juge et de contrôler le respect des droits des parties. Une gradation des exigences du Conseil constitutionnel est discrètement perceptible entre les deux premières catégories de principes, plus facilement identifiable entre celles-ci et la dernière famille. Cette échelle décroissante de « densité » des principes directeurs du procès témoigne d’une véritable politique jurisprudentielle en matière de droit constitutionnel processuel, qui met l’accent sur l’accès au juge, doté des qualités indispensables à l’accomplissement de sa mission juridictionnelle. Toutefois, aussi satisfaisante que soit l’action du juge constitutionnel français à l’égard du droit du procès, celle-ci nécessiterait aujourd’hui le relais du constituant, afin de moderniser le statut constitutionnel de la justice. / In spite of a relatively low number of written dispositions dedicated to justice inside of the body of the Constitution of October 1958 4th, the constitutional Council, while updating this text through the Declaration of Human Rights, contributed to the development of a procedural constitutional law, which is structured around guiding principles. Those principles can be classified within three different categories : two major categories depend on the trial actor that is primarily concerned, either the judge or the parties; a third and additional category pertaining to procedural protections, fosters the essential qualities of the judge and secure the protection of the parties’ rights. A gradation of the requirements of the constitutional Council is discreetly perceptible between the first two categories of principles, and more easily identifiable between those first two categories and the last one. This decreasing scale of “density” yoked to the trial guiding principles highlights a genuine judicial policy when it comes to procedural constitutional law, emphasizing access to the judge, whom is given essential qualities in order to achieve its judicial duty. However, the action of the French constitutional judge, as satisfactory as it is towards the rights of the trial, would easily support the intervention of the constituent power in order to update Justice’s constitutional status.