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41	Mellan kroppar : Om ett förenande men också förpliktigande fenomen hos Maurice Merleau-Ponty & Donald Winnicott Björk, Carola January 2019 (has links) For phenomenology, subjective experience is essential, as is the relationship with the other. But despite these central themes, the relationship between bodies is not primary focus. Philosophical understanding of bodily encounter is lacking. It is for this reason I have put Maurice Merleau-Ponty in dialogue with psychoanalyst and paediatrician Donald Winnicott who claims that the meeting between bodies is vital. Merleau-Ponty talks about the body's relationship with the other based on an intentional act of the subject. How the body comes into being with the world. Winnicott talks about the subject as continually developing through the interaction of bodies where the intention is expressed somewhat differently. He argues that it ́s not always the child's intention that matters. Winnicott also claims that my own body has not always had the experience of being a separate body. There is a phase in development where the child is a subjectobject as he puts it. With no border between the other. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the formation of subjectivity. The thesis contribution is a complement to philosophical understanding of subject-construction with the desire to point toward the responsibility of the body who has come further in life. Merleau-Ponty Winnicott Phenomenology Developmental psychology In-between Transitional object Chiasm Intersubjectivity Subjectivity Consciousness Merleau-Ponty Winnicott fenomenologi utvecklingspsykologi mellanrum övergångsobjekt kiasm intersubjektivitet subjektivitet medvetande Philosophy, Ethics and Religion Filosofi, etik och religion
42	Phenomenal consciousness without a self: Ego dissolution and its philosophical bearings Caserta, Fabiana January 2023 (has links) Do all conscious states structurally necessitate self-consciousness? For many, the answer is affirmative: self-consciousness is an inherent property of phenomenal consciousness. I refer to this family of theses under the denomination of Strong Subjectivity Claim (SSC). However, reports of DIED (Drug-Induced Ego Dissolution) and MIED (Meditation-InducedEgo Dissolution) seem to suggest otherwise: there are at least some extraordinary circumstances under which no sense of self contributes to the resulting phenomenology. Similarly, subjectivity is altered in depersonalisation, a condition whereby the subject feels detached from oneself. I argue that different varieties of self-consciousness are altered or missing in concomitance with ego dissolution and depersonalisation. Nonetheless, I speculate that depersonalisation per se does not involve a lack of basic self-consciousness — while some reports of ego dissolution indicate that even the most minimal formulation of phenomenal self-consciousness is not adequately present. I identify two modalities —boundlessness and centrelessness — whose implication seems to be crucial in experiences of total lack of self-consciousness. All things considered, I conclude that, while self-consciousness could be a frequent feature of our ordinary experience, SSC is not plausible. In the absence of phenomenal self-consciousness, what remains is the epistemic observation that experiences are self-bounded: no one can have access to each other’s experiences in a first-personal manner. This ontological fact, however, need not be accompanied by a corresponding “sense of self”. Finally, I propose an account explaining the conceivableness of selfless self-reports resting on the premise of the subject being conscious and on her dispositional ability for self-consciousness. / Kräver alla medvetna tillstånd strukturellt självmedvetenhet? För många är svaret jakande: självmedvetenhet är en inneboende egenskap hos fenomenalt medvetande. Jag hänvisar till denna familj av avhandlingar under benämningen Strong Subjectivity Claim (SSC). Rapporter om DIED (Drug-Induced Ego Dissolution) och MIED (Meditation-Induced Ego Dissolution) verkar dock antyda något annat: det finns åtminstone några extraordinära omständigheter när en brist av känsla av jaget bidrar till den resulterande fenomenologin. På liknande sätt förändrar depersonalisation subjektiviteten, ett tillstånd där subjektet känner sig fristående från sig själv. Jag hävdar att olika varianter av självmedvetande förändras ellersaknas i samband med ego upplösning och depersonalisering. Icke desto mindre spekulerar jag att depersonalisation i sig inte innebär brist på grundläggande självmedvetenhet – medan vissa rapporter om egoupplösning indikerar att även den mest minimala formuleringen av fenomenal självmedvetenhet inte är tillräckligt närvarande. Jag identifierar två modaliteter -gränslöshet och centerlöshet - vars implikation verkar vara avgörande i upplevelser av total avsaknad av självmedvetenhet. Sammantaget drar jag slutsatsen att även om självmedvetenhet kan vara ett vanligt inslag i vår vanliga upplevelse, är SSC inte rimligt. I frånvaro av fenomenal självmedvetenhet, kvarstår den epistemiska observationen att upplevelser är självbundna: ingen kan ha tillgång till varandras upplevelser på ett förstapersonligt sätt. Detta ontologiska faktum behöver dock inte åtföljas av en motsvarande "känsla av jaget". Slutligen föreslår jag en redogörelse som förklarar tänkbarheten av osjälviska självrapporter som vilar på premissen att subjektet är medvetet och på hennes dispositionsförmåga till självmedvetenhet. phenomenal consciousness self-consciousness pre-reflective self-consciousness ego dissolution psychedelics meditation depersonalisation subjectivity self-awareness fenomenalt medvetande självmedvetande egoupplösning psykedelika förreflektiva självmedvetenhet meditation depersonalisation subjektivitet självmedvetenhet Philosophy Filosofi
43	Rytmen bor i mina steg : En rytmanalytisk studie om kropp, stad och kunskap / The rhythm lives in my steps : A rhythm-analytical study of body, city and knowledge Johansson, Sara January 2013 (has links) This thesis brings together a fascination with the city and a keen interest in the knowledge process. The point of departure is the bodily, sensory and emotional experience. That the author uses her own perceptions and experiences and is preoccupied with her own knowledge process means that she writes herself into an autoethnographic context. She also experiments with the writing and allows it to take on a more literary form as she writes about her own sensory impressions and feelings. The term rhythmanalysis is employed as a way of assessing, exploring, interpreting and understanding the world that embraces the embodied experience. Human beings are embodied beings, a claim we can make by referring to our own experiences as well as how we perceive, communicate and interact. The study delves into two aspects of rhythmanalysis, first as a way of describing the knowledge process as rhythm-analytical, which implies that bodily experiences are equally important as intellectual ones, and secondly as a way of talking about the city as polyrhythmic. It follows upon the latter that embodied rhythmanalysis of the city is possible. The rhythmanalysis may ultimately be seen as a project aimed at overthrowing the Cartesian dualism between body and mind. That we are embodied has a methodological consequence that is as simple as it is essential: the scholar exists in the world she studies. The researcher is not a neutral observer. She is a co-creator. She is a body, placed in time, space and history. She is situated, which means that her knowledge is also situated. Thus, the rhythmanalysis encompasses the body, the senses and feelings, and can be described with one key word: movement. It finds support in theories that acknowledge the fluid, the becoming, the situated, the performative, the relational, the dynamic, the material. It seeks methods that experiment, that focus on practices rather than discourses, that are preoccupied with a movable world rather than a static one. rhythmanalysis rhythm methodology method knowledge process movement city walking body mind embodiment Cartesian dualism affect emotion feeling senses touch sensory ethnography non-representational theory phenomenology new materialism/material feminism situated knowledge autoethnography memory rytmanalys rytm metodologi metod kunskap rörelse stad promenad kropp medvetande förkroppsligande cartesiansk dualism affekt emotion känsla sinnen känsel sinnlig/sensorisk etnografi icke-representationell teori fenomenologi ny materialism/materiell feminism situerad kunskap autoetnografi minne
44	Landningsbana för tidsresande Eklund, Mira January 2012 (has links) No description available. perception of sound and music perception of reality virtual objects phantom sensations holographic sound essence of music staging theater semifictivity déjà vu as a method presence body in space switch bodies consciousness historiography soundart sourroundsound binaural recordings interactive sculptures interactive installation perceptive sculpture headphoneconcert perception av ljud och musik verklighetsuppfattning fantomsensationer holografiskt ljud musikens innersta väsen iscensättningar teater semifiktivitet déjà vu som metod närvaro kroppen i rummer byta kropp medvetande historieskrivning ljudkonst surroundljud binaurala inspelingar interaktiv skulptur interaktiv installation perceptiv skulptur hörlurskonsert masteressä Arts Konst

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