University of Macau / Faculty of Education

(<特集>価値多元化社会における教育の目的)

University of Macau / Faculty of Social Sciences / Department of Government and Public Administration

在國際金融蓬勃發展的現況下，國際間的租稅協定與租稅政策如何吸引投資者進行外國證券投資，為各國促進國際金融與經濟的發展的重要議題。本研究探討的問題為國際間的租稅協定與個別國家的租稅改革是否影響投資人在進行外國證券投資的投資決策。 本研究以中國為例，探討於2008年中國實施新企業所得稅法後，與中國簽有租稅協定國之境外投資人，是否因其適用的股利所得稅率較非租稅協定國低，而有較大誘因與動機增加其對中國的外國證券投資金額。而實證結果顯示，於中國2008年的租稅改革後，與中國簽有租稅協定國的境外投資人明顯增加其對中國的外國證券投資額。此結果證明，租稅協定與租稅政策對外國證券投資者的投資之決策有其影響力。 / Since Global Financial has grown rapidly, how countries develop their financial markets and economics by abstract foreign portfolio investment (FPI) through international tax treaty and tax policy has become an important issue. And this study examines the relationship between tax treaty and tax reform to FPI, in order to see how taxation effects foreign investors’ investment decisions. This study derives the hypothesis that Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China of 2008 should lead to a portfolio reallocation by foreign investors toward equities in tax-favored countries. An analysis that compares foreign equity holdings in treaty and un-treaty countries with China finds a substantial portfolio reallocation toward the former. The empirical results of the study indicates that after the tax reform of 2008 in china, treaty countries have more incentive than un-treaty countries to increase their FPI toward equities due to their lower dividends tax rates. And this result suggests that tax treaty and tax reform have an impact on FPI investors’ decisions.

中國在2001年底加入WTO後，為其五年後金融開放及金融監理之需要，除陸續對中、農、工、建等四大國有商業銀行進行大規模注資、處理不良債權及公司化上市等金融改革外，並且對累積了近人民幣5仟億元不良資產的農村信用合作社進行股份制改革。歷經數年的調整後，雖然中國銀行業的體質強化了，但因而對農村基層金融造成資金外流的問題。為了解決佔中國47.43%人口的農民、農村及農業(三農)等基層金融需要，中國銀監會推行了新型農村金融機構計劃，並在2007年1月公布「村鎮銀行管理暫行規定」，開放外資銀行可參與設置村鎮銀行，並給予快速審批設立、全面人民幣業務以及視同國內銀行待遇等優惠准入及業務項目，並在之後「十二五規劃」(2011~2015)重點發展中強調城鄉所得平衡發展，積極發展農村金融業務等重點項目，這對於台灣銀行業者在設立分行、法人銀行及參股投資等三個苦等進入中國市場的方式外，無異提供了一個快速進入的管道。 在本次研究中，我們可以觀察到，對擁有良好銀行行銷、管理技術且擅長中小企業融資的台灣銀行業者來說，村鎮銀行所提供的快速申設審批、視同中國國內銀行業的待遇、以及全部人民幣業務等條件恰好可互補雙方之所需，所缺者，慎選具經營特色之據點耳。但赴中國申設村鎮銀行，並不是為了響應中國農村的金融改革政策，而是要在中國政策的支持下，更快地把握住中國農村經濟發展的市場機遇，充分利用台灣銀行業訓練良好的從業人員、成熟的通路管理制度，以及有效率的中小企業融資技術。如此，以銀行業者在台灣激烈競爭的金融紅海中都能創下令人驚艷的成果。那麼，在進入中國經營村鎮銀行後的營運前景應可值得期待。

蘇聯時期性質單一的「意識型菁英」在戈巴契夫的政經改革下開始分化成政治菁英與經濟菁英兩大類。到了葉爾欽時期，由於國家制度不彰、政府職能紊亂以及聯邦從屬關係被破壞，再加上總統本人執政後期健康情形不佳而導致大權旁落等緣故，造成各方菁英團體為了自身利益而彼此傾軋不已，也形成了以地方勢力、反對派政黨以及經濟寡頭為箭頭的「分散型菁英」。進入普丁時期，新執政者承繼了前朝唯一「正面」的遺緒 –「集權總統制」，再佐以個人的施政風格與高人氣支持，於第一任期內便大抵完成收編菁英的政治改革：於新設立的七大聯邦區派駐聯邦權力代理人 – 總統全權代表；改革聯邦委員會以削弱地方首長勢力；組建權力黨「統一俄羅斯黨」 並掌控國家杜馬。而在「共識型菁英」的氛圍下，作為普丁政權主要幹部甄補來源的「聖彼得堡幫」成員當中，又以所謂的「強力部門幹部」為大宗。其軍警情治背景與國家治理手法不僅為普丁治下的俄羅斯型塑了「軍事政體」的外觀，更讓後共俄羅斯或多或少出現了「蘇維埃化」的傾向。 / The single-natured “ideocratic elite” of the Soviet Union begins to differentiate into political and economic elite under the impact of Gorbachev’s reforms. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin’s elites jostled with each other for their interests and transformed into the “fragmented elite,” characterized by regional leaders, opposition parties and economic oligarchs. This occurred due to the malfunction of state institutions, disorder of government functions, destruction of central-peripheral relations and the regency by the President’s cronies during his illness in the second term. Later in Putin’s Russia, with the only “positive” legacy – “authoritarian presidential rule” that the new ruler inherits from his predecessor as well as his own personal ruling styles and high popularity, Putin achieves the approximate incorporation of Russian elites with the political reforms in his first term, including the delegation of Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoys as federal agents in the seven new federal districts, the weakening of regional elites by reforming the Federation Council, and the seizure of the State Duma with the party of power – “United Russia.” Under the atmosphere of the “consensual elite,” the “Petersburgers” – especially the so-called “siloviki” – constitute the main source of cadre recruitment in Putin’s Russia. The security-intelligence background and state governance tactics of these siloviki not only mold the façade of “militocracy” for Putin’s regime, but more or less contribute to the tendency of “sovietization” in post-communist Russia.

Since the open door policy, the PRC’s social structure has been deteriorating and its social stratums have been broadening along with the economic development. Comparing to the long-standing social stability before the open door policy, the central CPC has worried about the deteriorating development of social order and crime problems triggered by the redistribution of wealth. The central CPC thought that the Ministry of Public Security could not handle the social order and crime problems with its old system and functions. The problems would have great negative impact on the CPC’s ability of internal control, if the police systems and functions had not been reformed or improved. This study has found that on the basis of the highest guideline of “one center and two basic points,” the progressive reform steps taken by the Ministry of Public Security were as follows. First, it aimed at the reform of police organs and administrative systems. Second, it focused on the reform of police assignments system. Third, it stressed on the reform of grass-roots police and stations. Lastly, it emphasized on the reform of the concept of law enforcement and the quality of the police. To sum up, there were four development shifts on police. The first one was the reform of police organs and administrative duties from 1979 to 1996. The second one was the reform of police assignments system form 1997 to 2002. The third one was the combination of crime control, prevention and crackdown by police stations and community policing from 2003 to 2005. The fourth one was the three-base project from 2006 to 2008. The new Minister, Meng Jen-tzu, took office at the end of 2008 and he addressed “the three-construction” project as the further and sequent fulfillment of the three-base project. The related developments of the three-construction project are still going on. How they shape the functions and roles of the Ministry of Public Security requires sequent observation.

本文初始，筆者提出一個要解答的困惑：為什麼中國大陸地方的政治改革，其模式與幅度都不是「全國一盤棋」？本文將「地方」設定在「省級」，並將「政治改革」設定為「基層首長選制」與「行政三分制」，去分析在為何少數的省份，出現較大規模的政治改革。筆者試圖建構「政績─派系」模式，去解釋省委書記是如何推動中國大陸的政改。 在「政績」的面向，由於各地「初始條件」的考量，使得省委書記相繼追求「和諧社會」或「小康社會」的「政績」。「基層首長選制」有助於前者的完成，「行政三分制」的推進和後者有關。這說明各地政改的形式，為何出現互異。另一個因素是「派系關係」。和「最高領導人」存在「派系關係」的省級領導，因為能降低「硬制度」改革的風險，因此更容易在全省推動「大規模」的政改。 以2002之後的四川，和2008年之後的廣東，分別是經濟發展不佳與良好之地，政治改革的兩個代表案例。四川省委書記張學忠、廣東省委書記汪洋，都是胡錦濤的嫡系，使得兩省的政改力度冠居全國。但由於兩省的經濟環境迥異，使得張學忠、汪洋，分別推動「基層首長選制」和「行政三分制」。但筆者也指出，於分離主義盛行的西部省份，在「穩定壓倒一切」的思量下，該省並不會推動過多政改。即便省委書記是「最高領導人」的派系，亦是如此。筆者相信，將解釋層級聚焦在省級領導，並結合「政績」與「派系」因素，最能解釋省級為何會發動大規模的激進政改。  此外，筆者納入江蘇的個案，其主因是該省的政改途徑過於殊異。江蘇的經濟發展在中國名列前茅，與廣東類似，但該省卻走向「基層首長選制」改革。筆者認為，胡錦濤有意在東部省份，豎立一個「和諧社會」的推行樣版，因此提高江蘇推動「和諧社會」政績的效用函數，以鼓勵省委書記李源潮繼續在江蘇改革「基層首長選制」。換言之，江蘇的案例完全不能說明經濟發展與民主化的聯繫，它反而再現了黨國體制的國家能力中央對省級的絕對控制。 / The beginning of this article, we offer a question: why the range and pattern of political reform in Mainland China are not the same? For replying the question, we focus on the provincial level, and discuss the two categories of reform—the elective reform of local leader and separation of the three administrative powers ─ the most important and sensitive institutions of all the political reform for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). We try to generate the “Faction-Performance” Model, and use it to explain the provincial reforms. The theory covers two main points. First, these province leaders depend on the initial condition of economic development, to choose the reform’s pattern. At the no richness provinces, leaders wish to push the personnel system reform; on the other hand, leaders tend to practice administrative reform on the affluent provinces. Second, all the province leaders that enforce the radical political reforms are the top leader’s faction. The reason is that the patron-clientship may decrease the risk of political reform. We give two examples Sichuan and Guangdong, to prove the aboving inferences. Sichuan is the late developmental area, existing the unstable society, and the provincial leaders want to reach for the performance of the harmonious society. Besides, the provincial secretary of the CCP Committee, Zhang Xuezhong, ever had the colleague relationship with Hu Jintao. Zhang would be regarded as the clique of Hu. In the condition, after Zhang assumed the official, he pushed the large scale of the elective reform of local leader in Sichuan. On the contrary, Guangdong has the good economical growth. The administrative reform has been the important issue for the province. When Wangyang took on the provincial secretary, he pushed the large scale of the separation of the three administrative powers. Checking his background, we find Wangyang is the Communist Youth League (CYL) cadre—the faction of Hu. For the two cases, Zhang Xuezhong and Wangyang are all the faction of Hu. So, the two examples can confirm my hypothesis. Besides, the dissertation focuses on the Giangsu as a deviant case, to discuss why the large scale of elective reform of local leaders occurring on the wealth province. There are enough evidences to show that Hu Jintao inspired Li Yuanchao to advance the reform. Hu adjusted the performance utility function of the Giangsu and made the provincial leaders to accomplish the “harmonious society” in the area. The case represents the ability of party-state system ─ central committee has the absolute power to adjust and control the political reforms in provinces.

本論文在實質與貨幣內生成長模型中探討政府租稅的效果，而其中又以稅制改革政策為主角。 在第二章中，我們將內生生育率的概念引入了Romer (1986)的實質經濟成長模型，並說明當政府在維持稅收中立的原則下將所得稅制轉換為消費稅制時，將可能對經濟成長與社會福利有所傷害。而後我們也提供了一些數值模擬以支持我們的論點。至於第三章，我們將勞動供給內生的概念引入一個有預付現金限制(Cash-in-Advance)的貨幣經濟成模型，在本章中我們得到了所謂「Mundell-Tobin Effect」與「消費稅中立性」的成立與否，將取決於政府稅收的用途；接著我們把焦點放在資本的生產外部性與消費稅所造成的扭曲上並導出最適貨幣政策；最後，在維持政府的支出水準下，我們得到將消費稅制轉換為通膨稅制時，將對經濟成長有正面的效果。 / The dissertation provides a theoretical framework to investigate the effects of tax policies, especially the tax reform, in real and monetary models of endogenous growth. In Chapter 2, by shedding light on the endogenous fertility choice, we set up a simple Romer (1986)-type endogenous growth model and show that, in a departure from the existing literature, a switch from a decrease in income tax rate to an increase in consumption tax rate so as to ensure a revenue-neutrality could be harmful, rather than favorable, to both growth and welfare. In addition, we also conduct a simple numerical analysis to investigate the conditions in which the negative effect on growth and welfare occurs. As to the monetary model, an endogenous growth model with endogenous labor-leisure choice and cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint which is only imposed on consumption is established in Chapter 3. Through the model, we found that the Mundell-Tobin effect and the validity of consumption tax neutrality depend on the usages of tax revenue. Next, focusing on the distortions due to the production externality of capital and consumption tax, the optimal monetary policy is also derived. Finally, we show that a switch from consumption taxation to inflation taxation to finance a given stream of government expenditure, namely tax switch, enhances economic growth through the increase in labor supply in a CIA economy and the qualitative equivalence between MIU and CIA approaches is still valid.

本文利用介入模式分析中共改革開放所造成的經濟結構之轉變，並建構包含軍事、非軍事政府、及私人等三部門的生產函數，來探討其與經濟成長之間的關聯性。實證結果顯示，改革開放使得中國大陸由閉關自守的內向型經濟轉為高貿易依存度的外向型經濟，經濟體制由計劃經濟邁向多元經濟成分共同發展的市場經濟，整體投資環境獲得改善，而軍事支出雖持續增加，但相對於高經濟成長，其軍事支出規模卻是下降的。此外，中共的經濟成長主要來自於積累率的提昇、公部門支出的正面影響和外溢效果、及國際經濟關係的開放，而技術變遷和勞動投入之成長的影響並不顯著。 / This article proposes intervention model to analyze the structural change of China’s transitional economy. We identify the relationship between economic growth and structural change by using the production functions from military, nonmilitary, and private sectors. The results indicate a more market-oriented economy and changing relationship between private and public ownership will continue to drive China toward modernization. In contrast to high economic growth, although military expenditure is still increasing but its relative scale is declining. The main sources of China’s economic growth are from the increase of accumulation rate, the positive and spillover effects of public expenditures, and the liberalization of international economic relations. Especially, much of China’s growth has come from producing goods for foreign trade. While on the other hand, the impacts of technological change and increased labor inputs are not significant in this study.