Cybersecurity threats have grown to become a global threat to private actors and states. While work processes are becoming more efficient, rapid technological developments are exposing network and information systems to vulnerabilities. The private sector plays a significant role in keeping the EU and Sweden safe in cyberspace since technological development is essentially controlled by private actors. When it comes to socially important activities, private actors both own and operate large parts of the market, which in turn means that attacks on private actors affecting trade secrets can pose a threat to market competition and economic prosperity. This thesis maps out how the EU has chosen to combat this with the NIS and NIS2 Directives. Specifically, this thesis maps out changes in cybersecurity requirements for private actors providing digital solutions in the light of NIS2. The previous NIS has shown to be inherently flawed with regards to the EU goal of achieving a high common level of security for network and information systems. The need for renewed legislation is therefore great and, as the investigation shows, NIS2 entails a change in the content, structure, and scope of important and essential entities. In short, the NIS2 Directive requires entities to perform their due diligence and document appropriate and proportionate measures based on an all-risk analysis. The increased and broadened requirements in NIS2, which are certainly justified by the increased cybersecurity threats, must also be weighed against an overly burdensome bureaucracy for authorities and private actors. In addition, this thesis analyzes the format of NIS2 and its potential impact on the internal market of the EU. Given the fact that it is a market regulation, a proportionality assessment is required in relation to the competitive disadvantages that an overly burdensome legislation may result in for private actors. At the same time, sanctions and enforcement measures must be sufficiently dissuasive. In conclusion, this thesis argues NIS2 to bring important changes, albeit still posing risks of further fragmenting the cybersecurity levels in the union due to the flexibility given to member states. However, NIS2 is a key step in the right direction towards achieving a high common level of cybersecurity across member states.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a regional economic community established by Treaty in 1992 and comprising fifteen southern African countries. The Tribunal, SADC’s judicial organ, is situated in Windhoek, Namibia and became operational in 2005. The Tribunal enjoys a wide mandate to hear and determine disputes between states, states and SADC, and between natural and legal persons and states or SADC. It is mandated to develop its own jurisprudence having regard to applicable treaties, general rules and principles of public international law, and principles and rules of law of member states. Being new in the field, the Tribunal has not as yet developed a significant jurisprudence although it has delivered a number of judgments some of which are referred to in the study. The Tribunal is expected to develop its own jurisprudence having regard to the jurisprudence developed by other international courts involved in the judicial settlement of disputes. The study offers a comparative review and analysis of the jurisprudence of two selected courts: the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ). The focus is on four selected areas considered crucial to the functioning of the Tribunal and the selected courts. The study discusses the parties with access to the Tribunal and compares this with access to the ICJ and ECJ. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is contrasted with that of the two selected courts. The sources of law available to the Tribunal are discussed and contrasted to those of the two courts. Lastly, the enforcement of law in SADC is contrasted to what applies in relation to the selected courts. In each selected area, similarities and differences between the Tribunal and the two courts are noted and critically evaluated. Further, rules and principles developed by the two selected courts are explored in depth with a view to identifying those which could be of use to the Tribunal. Recommendations are made on rules and principles which could be of use to the Tribunal and on possible improvements to the SADC treaty regime. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.

The rule-making power of the European Commission, dissertation Mgr. Mgr. Jiří Lenfeld, M.A.; supervisor: doc. JUDr. Richard Král, Ph.D., LL.M. Charles University, Faculty of Law, Department of European Law Prague, March 2013 The aim of the dissertation is to analyse the role of the European Commission in the legislative process of the European Union with the focus on procedures for adoption of legally binding Union acts. The European Commission is one of the main institutions of the European Union. It represents and upholds the interests of the EU as a whole and manages the day-to-day business of implementing EU policies. However, to limit the role of the European Commission to that of an executive body would be misleading. Its role in the EU institutional system is much broader than that. The European Commission is the most important legislator among the EU institutions and is also empowered with an almost exclusive power to submit drafts of EU legal acts. The rule-making power of the European Commission could be seen from two different points of view. In a narrow sense of the word it could be seen as a power conferred on the European Commission by the Treaties to propose drafts and to adopt EU legal acts implementing legally binding Union acts. However, the exercise of the rule-making power may...

1 Abstract This dissertation deals with investment protection in the European Union from several points of view. The first part deals with the history of investment protection and its main basis and grounds for current legislation and proposals for future regulation, particularly within the EU. In subsequent parts, current legislation and intra-European Union investment protection is analysed in detail, including the question of validity and applicability of Intra-EU BITs, i.e. bilateral treaties concluded between two EU Member States. The analysis is made from the perspective of EU law, as well as from the point of view of public international law. The dissertation further deals with their relationship and demonstrates contradictions between them in two crucial cases, Eureko/Achmea and Micula. Additional themes of this dissertation are the powers of the European Union regarding investment protection and the conclusion of international treaties such as CETA and TTIP. This dissertation further deals with the status, jurisdiction and functioning of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), demonstrating the relatively smooth and widely accepted investment dispute settlement mechanism. In this regard, the proposed EU Multilateral Investment Court project in analysed, including a...

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a regional economic community established by Treaty in 1992 and comprising fifteen southern African countries. The Tribunal, SADC’s judicial organ, is situated in Windhoek, Namibia and became operational in 2005. The Tribunal enjoys a wide mandate to hear and determine disputes between states, states and SADC, and between natural and legal persons and states or SADC. It is mandated to develop its own jurisprudence having regard to applicable treaties, general rules and principles of public international law, and principles and rules of law of member states. Being new in the field, the Tribunal has not as yet developed a significant jurisprudence although it has delivered a number of judgments some of which are referred to in the study. The Tribunal is expected to develop its own jurisprudence having regard to the jurisprudence developed by other international courts involved in the judicial settlement of disputes. The study offers a comparative review and analysis of the jurisprudence of two selected courts: the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ). The focus is on four selected areas considered crucial to the functioning of the Tribunal and the selected courts. The study discusses the parties with access to the Tribunal and compares this with access to the ICJ and ECJ. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is contrasted with that of the two selected courts. The sources of law available to the Tribunal are discussed and contrasted to those of the two courts. Lastly, the enforcement of law in SADC is contrasted to what applies in relation to the selected courts. In each selected area, similarities and differences between the Tribunal and the two courts are noted and critically evaluated. Further, rules and principles developed by the two selected courts are explored in depth with a view to identifying those which could be of use to the Tribunal. Recommendations are made on rules and principles which could be of use to the Tribunal and on possible improvements to the SADC treaty regime. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.

Primauté absolue du droit de l’UE ou suprématie des dispositions constitutionnelles ? Consacrée à l’analyse des conflits nés ou à naître entre normes constitutionnelle et celles du droit de l’UE, cette étude doctorale s’est focalisée sur l’analyse du lien entre les termes primauté et recours pour relever que dans ce genre de litiges contentieux un syllogisme juridique inédit est appliqué. Il s’agit de celui qui préserve cumulativement le critère hiérarchique caractérisant les ordres juridiques internes des États membres, à son sommet le principe de suprématie des dispositions constitutionnelles sur toutes les autres et l’application effective de la primauté matérielle du droit de l’Union ; les évolutions récentes du droit interne de l’UE convergent toutes dans ce sens : dans le cadre d’un litige contentieux, la primauté n’est plus une problématique de légalité constitutionnelle, le conflit est contourné. En la matière, les débats sur l’autorité et la force du droit international classique sur le droit constitutionnel ne se pose plus. Il a été séparé entre la force et l’effet des traités du droit international de l’Union. Pourtant sur le plan des principes, même au sein d’un État fédéral, le contenu définitionnel et surtout le maniement du texte constitutionnel n’ont pas été revisités ; la Constitution est le fondement sans être le contenu de validité de la primauté du droit de l’Union, le texte suprême opère en tant que technique de renvoi, il cadre deux types de champs en fonction du critère de l’objet du litige contentieux. Suprématie et primauté sont deux principes de nature juridique différente qui ne s’affrontent pas. La prévalence de la primauté matérielle du droit de l’Union n’affecte nullement la suprématie au sommet de la hiérarchie pyramidale des normes de chacun des États adhérents. / Absolute primacy of Community law or supremacy of constitutional provisions ? Devoted to the analysis of the conflicts born or to be born between EU law and constitutional standards, this doctoral study focused on analysis of the link between the terms of primacy or preemption rule and jurisdictional actions to raise that in this kind of litigation disputes a unreported legal syllogism is applied. It's one that cumulatively preserves the hierarchical criterion characterizing the domestic legal systems of the Member States, at its peak the principle of supremacy of the Constitution over all others and the effective application of the material primacy of Union law ; recent developments in internal law of the Union converge in this sense : in a dispute litigation, primacy is no longer a problem of constitutional legality, the conflict is circumvent. Concerning this matter, the debate on the authority and the force of traditional international law on constitutional law no longer arises. It has been separated between the force and the effect of the treaties of international law of the Union. Yet in terms of principles, even within a federal State, the definitional content and especially the handling of the constitutional text have not been revisited ; the Constitution is the legal basis without being the content validity of the primacy of Union law, the supreme text operates as a reference technique, it fits two types of fields based on the criterion of the contentious issue. Supremacy and rule are two different legal nature principles which do not compete. The prevalence of the material primacy of Union law sets no supremacy at the top of the pyramidal hierarchy of standards of each of the acceding States.

This paper addresses the principle of care in the recast asylum procedure directive (2013/32/EU). The purpose of the study has been to analyze how the principle of care is expressed in the directive regarding procedures for granting or rejecting asylum, as well as to analyze how the directive was implemented in Sweden. The recast asylum procedure directive aims to harmonize EU’s member states' procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection. Initially, this paper describes how the directive was created and how the principle of care is expressed in the directive and the meaning and content of the principle of care at EU level as well as its content and meaning according to Swedish law. To conclude, the Swedish implementation of the directive’s provisions directly connected to the principle of care will be discussed. The principle of care is one of the principles of good governance. The principles of good governance have been important in EU law to ensure legal protection for individuals when they are in contact with authorities of EU or Member States. In the analysis, what is found is that the principle of care can be divided into several sub-principles or requirements: individuals’ right to get their affairs treated; the obligation of authorities to investigate a request in an impartial manner; fair procedure and handling; authorities’ duty to take individual interests in consideration; authorities’ obligation to act within reasonable time and also other requirements regarding routines and procedure. Since a major part of this paper regards analyzing the relationship between EU law and national Swedish law, a discussion about the Member States’ institutional and procedural autonomy towards EU is also included. A conclusion is that the Swedish implementation of the directive's provisions related to the principle of care was deficient and that the directive itself restricts the Member States’ institutional and procedural autonomy. / Den här uppsatsen behandlar omsorgsprincipen i det omarbetade asylprocedurdirektivet (2013/32/EU). Syftet med arbetet är att analysera hur omsorgsprincipen uttrycks i direktivet avseende procedurer för beviljandet eller avslag av asyl, samt hur direktivet har genomförts i Sverige. Det omarbetade asylprocedurdirektivet syftar till att harmonisera EU- medlemsstaternas förfarande vid ansökan om internationellt skydd. Inledningsvis redogörs för hur direktivet skapades och hur omsorgsprincipen uttrycks i direktivet, vad omsorgsprincipen omfattar på EU-nivå, liksom principens omfattning i svensk rätt. Avslutningsvis analyseras genomförandet av direktivets bestämmelser med anknytning till omsorgsprincipen i svensk rätt. Omsorgsprincipen är en av principerna om god förvaltning. Principerna om god förvaltning har varit viktiga inom EU-rätten för att säkerställa ett rättsskydd för enskilda när dessa är i kontakt med EU:s eller medlemsstaternas myndigheter. Analysen kommer fram till att omsorgsprincipen kan delas in i flera mindre principer eller krav: enskildes rätt att få sina angelägenheter behandlade; myndigheters skyldighet att på ett opartiskt sätt undersöka en begäran; rättvis procedur och handläggning; myndigheters skyldighet att väga in enskildes intresse; myndigheters skyldighet att agera inom rimlig tid; samt andra krav på handläggningsrutiner. Eftersom en huvuddel av den här uppsatsen handlar om att analysera relationen mellan EU-rätt och svensk rätt, förs också en diskussion om medlemsstaternas institutionella och processuella autonomi gentemot EU. Slutligen presenteras slutsatsen att det svenska genomförandet av direktivets bestämmelser som anknyter till omsorgprincipen varit bristande och att direktivet har begränsat såväl medlemsstaternas institutionella som processuella autonomi.

Dagens samhälle förändras snabbt, och digitala marknader med det. Digitaliseringen har lett till revolutionerande utvecklingar av vårt samhälle, och bakom dessa förändringar står primärt ett fåtal dominerande teknikjättar och deras plattformar. Dessa dominerande digitala plattformar, och de marknader på vilka dessa verkar, är ofta flersidiga och karaktäriseras av särskilda möjligheter till kostnadsfördelning, utveckling och ett beroende av starka nätverkseffekter, samt möjligheter att utveckla affärsmodeller som på olika sätt utnyttjar och kapitaliserar på insamlad data. Detta möjliggör inte bara upprättandet och bibehållandet av marknadsmakt på dessa marknader, utan leder även till höga inträdeshinder med resultatet att marknadens aktörer blir få och att inträdeshindren är höga. Trots att digitaliseringen till stora delar måste anses positiv, har utvecklingen även medfört nya typer av konkurrensproblematik som inte alltid kan hanteras på ett effektivt och adekvat sätt av den tidigare EU-rättsliga konkurrenslagstiftningen. Denna framställning undersöker hur EU:s konkurrenslagstiftning kan tillämpas på nyare typer av dominansmissbruk på digitala plattformar genom att analysera den tidigare regleringen av dominansmissbruk och hur denna har tillämpats rent praktiskt. För att uppnå detta mål undersöker detta arbete de särskilda utmaningar och särdrag som finns på dessa marknader, och ger en utförlig sammanfattning av hur artikel 102 FEUF har använts för att hantera dessa. Här konstateras att denna konkurrenslagstiftning lämnar en del att önska, och att inträdeshinder och risken för tippning ger starka incitament för dominanta digitala plattformar att försöka kringgå prestationsbaserad konkurrens. Framställningen utvärderar även de kompletteringar som gjorts av konkurrenslagstiftningen på dessa områden genom DMA, och hur denna reglering kan tänkas påverka hanteringen av vissa av de dominanta digitala plattformarnas beteenden framöver. Här konkluderas att DMA är en välbehövlig komplettering av tidigare konkurrensreglering på området, men att det fortfarande finns osäkerheter och utvecklingspotential, samt att de snabbföränderliga marknaderna förr eller senare kommer att hitta nya, innovativa sätt att kringgå även denna reglering. Därmed är det viktigt att den EU-rättsliga konkurrensregleringen gör vad den kan för att ligga steget före.

Since the US National Security Agency’s former contractor Edward Snowden exposed the Agency’s mass surveillance, the EU has been making a series of attempts toward a more safeguarded and stricter path concerning its data privacy protection. On 8 April 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (the CJEU) invalidated the EU Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC on the basis of incompatibility with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter). After this judgment, the CJEU examined the legality of the Safe Harbour Agreement, which had been the main legal basis for transfers of personal data from the EU to the US under Decision 2000/520/EC. Subsequently, on 6 October 2015, in the case of Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, the CJEU declared the Safe Harbour Decision invalid. The ground for the Court’s judgment was the fact that the Decision enabled interference, by US public authorities, with the fundamental rights to privacy and personal data protection under Article 7 and 8 of the Charter, when processing the personal data of EU citizens. According to the judgment, this interference has been beyond what is strictly necessary and proportionate to the protection of national security and the persons concerned were not offered any administrative or judicial means of redress enabling the data relating to them to be accessed, rectified or erased. The Court’s analysis of the Safe Harbour was borne out of the EU Commission’s own previous assessments. Consequently, since the transfers of personal data between the EU and the US can no longer be carried out through the Safe Harbour, the EU legislature is left with the task to create a safer option, which will guarantee that the fundamental rights to privacy and protection of personal data of the EU citizens will be respected. However, although the EU is the party dictating the terms for these transatlantic transfers of personal data, the current provisions of the US law are able to provide for derogations from every possible renewed agreement unless they become compatible with the EU data privacy law. Moreover, as much business is at stake and prominent US companies are involved in this battle, the pressure toward the US is not only coming from the EU, but some American companies are also taking the fight for EU citizens’ right to privacy and protection of their personal data.

The relationship between international investment agreements and EU law has attracted increased attention in past few years. The aim of this thesis is to bring a detailed analysis of various aspects of this complicated relationship. In attainment of this aim it proceeds in the following steps. After a short introduction (Chapter I.), Chapter II. briefly overviews typical content of bilateral investment treaties, following with a more detailed analysis of relevant EU law rules concerning foreign investment and subsequent comparison of both sets of rules. Chapter III. deals with investment agreements to be concluded by the EU, in particular with questions of external competence for foreign investment, responsibility for breaches of investment agreements concluded by the EU and the future shape of EU investment policy. The status of existing bilateral investment treaties concluded between EU member states and third countries is analyzed in Chapter IV. Chapter V. tackles various issues related to investment treaties concluded between member states (so called intra-EU BITs).