Zugl.: Magdeburg, Univ., Diss., 2006

Under det senaste decenniet har Ryssland nyttjat det militära maktmedlet mot forna sovjetstater i syfte att uppnå politiska målsättningar. Skälen till detta är troligtvis flera, där Natos och EUs expandering till Rysslands närmaste intressesfär antas utgöra en väsentlig drivkraft. Den ryska interveneringen i Georgien år 2008 och annekteringen av Krim i Ukraina år 2014, var ur ett svenskt strategiperspektiv oväntade samt överraskande händelser som bidrog till djupgående förändringar av den svenska säkerhetsstrategin. Denna undersökning syftar till att analysera om och i så fall hur, dessa två ryska strategiska chocker har påverkat svensk säkerhetsstrategi under de senaste tio åren. Undersökningen ämnar även ge en ökad förståelse för utformningen av svenska säkerhetsstrategier, dess bakgrund, påverkansfaktorer och förhållande till ryskt geopolitiskt agerande. Denna kunskap skapar även förutsättningar att bättre förstå den aktuella strategin, generella säkerhetspolitiska ageranden likväl som den utgör ett bidrag till analys av framtida strategier. Denna fallstudie nyttjar en referensram som utgår ifrån Jacob Westbergs modell av strategins komponenter, miljö, mål, medel och metod. Genom textanalys studeras fyra analysenheter bestående av officiella säkerhetsstrategier och försvarspropositioner. Undersökningens första analysenhet utgörs av En strategi för Sveriges säkerhet från år 2006 och den sista analysenheten är Nationell säkerhetsstrategi från år 2017 med dess delrapport från år 2018. För att ytterligare berika empirin har även tidigare forskning inom ämnesområdet använts, likväl som rapporter från Försvarsberedningen och Försvarsmakten. Undersökningens slutsatser visar att de två strategiska chockerna har haft en betydande påverkan på svensk säkerhetsstrategi under det senaste decenniet. Chockerna har bidragit till ett skifte från internationella operationer, en solidaritetsdoktrin och ett frivilligt anställt försvar, till ett ökat fokus på närområdet, en form av Östersjöallians samt upprättandet av ett totalförsvar med värnplikt. Rysslands intervenering i Georgien hade dock inledningsvis en blygsam påverkan i jämförelse med annekteringen av Krim, som orsakade ett paradigmskifte inom svensk säkerhetsstrategi. Det framstår som att den första chocken delvis absorberades av en övertro till europeisk säkerhet i kombination med Sveriges 200-åriga tradition av fred samt den rotade synen på neutralitet och alliansfrihet. Den initialt absorberade chocken visar sig dock senare utgöra en förstärkare till den andra chocken, vilket leder till en helomvändning i säkerhetsstrategin. Följderna kan ses i återupprättandet av totalförsvaret, nya militära förmågor, ökad nationell försvarsförmåga och etableringen av en ökad permanent militär närvaro på Gotland. Det innebär även fördjupade bilaterala samarbeten med Finland, USA, NATO samt de nordiska och baltiska länderna. Svenskt fokus kanaliserades nu främst till två metoder, att kunna möta ett militärt väpnat angrepp mot Sverige, samt en form av alliansstrategi med främst Finland och USA i östersjöområdet. / Over the course of the past ten years, Russia has used its military means against former Soviet states in an effort to achieve its political objectives. The explanations behind this behavior are probably several, but NATO’s and EU’s expansion to Russia’s proximity and area of interest could very well have played a significant role. The Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 were from a Swedish strategy perspective, both unexpected, surprising and led to severe changes in Swedish security strategy, thus by definition being strategic shocks. This study aims to analyze if and, in that case how two Russian strategic shocks have affected Sweden’s national security strategy over the course of the past decade. Thus, in doing so it contributes to an increase in understanding the development of Swedish security strategy, its underlying causes, background and relation to Russian geopolitical behavior. This knowledge will also help to better understand the current strategy, political security actions in general as well as a contribution to future analysis of strategies. This case study utilizes a frame of reference based on Jacob Westberg’s model of a strategies components, environment, ends, means andways, to define, analyze and evaluate the security strategy in its right context. Through qualitative text analysis, this case study analyzes four analysis units consisting of official security strategy and Defense bills by the Swedish government. Spanning from 2006 to the last unit, the National security strategy from 2017. To enrich the empirical analysis, earlier research on the subject at hand, as well as, reports from the Swedish Defense Commission and the Swedish armed forces have been added to the study.   The study concludes that the two strategic shocks have in fact had a major impact on Swedish security strategies over the past decade. Causing a shift from focusing on international operations, a solidarity doctrine and a strictly professional armed force mainly used abroad, to focusing on Sweden’s immediate vicinity, with a Baltic Sea alliance and a re-establishment of a total defense concept. Russia’s intervention in Georgia had a modest impact compared to the annexation of Crimea which created a paradigm in Swedish security strategy. It seems like the first shock was partly absorbed due to a misbelief of European safety as well as Sweden’s two-hundred-year long history of peace, mainly due to a neutral- and alliance free policy. As a result, the first shock functioned as a catalyst, amplifying the impact of the second strategic shock, causing a total turnaround of the Swedish security strategy. Its effects initiated the re-establishment of a total defense concept, new military means, strengthening of the national defense and establishing an increased permanent military presence on Gotland. It also included deepening the bi-lateral co-operation with Finland, USA, the other Nordic-Baltic countries as well as with NATO. The Swedish security strategy is now being focused to two main courses of action. The first, being able to handle a military attack on Swedish soil, the other an alliance strategy with mainly Finland and the USA in the Baltic area.

När USA fördjupar sitt engagemang i Georgien, Armenien och Azerbajdzjan för det med sig såväl risker som möjligheter för den regionala säkerhetspolitiska situationen. Föreliggande uppsats tar sin utgångspunkt i Zbigniew Brzezinskis idé om att USA:s förehavanden i Eurasien är av ett geopolitisk slag. Med anledning därav är syftet med uppsatsen att göra en strategisk analys av USA:s engagemang i Kaukasus, med fokus på säkerhetspolitiska frågor relaterade till USA:s engagemang i regionen. Som kontrast till existerande forskning rörande den säkerhetspolitiska situationen i Kaukasus är detta en strategisk analys. Det innebär att det är en framåtblickande analys som, i detta fall, är baserad på den analysram för säkerhetspolitik som Köpenhamnsskolans politiska realism utvecklat. Analysen har kompletterats med inslag av Leon Festingers teori om kognitiv dissonans. Tillsammans gör det att möjliga, framtida, säkerhetspolitiska frågor kan analyseras. Därmed är det möjligt att diskutera och svara på frågan: vilka säkerhetspolitiska risker och konsekvenser hänger sammans med USA:s engagemang i Kaukasus? Studiens resultat är ett tjugotal identifierade säkerhetsrisker, vilka inte enbart är relaterade till traditionella och fysiska hot rörande militära frågor, politisk instabilitet eller konflikter över hydrokarbontillgångar. Förespråkande av demokrati och västliga värderingar kan dessutom generera nya risker. Ett ökat engagemang kan även leda till andra typer av risker vilka är beroende av hur regionala aktörer uppfattar USA:s engagemang. Genom denna kognitiva aspekt kan traditionella säkerhetsrisker bli kraftigare och farligare. Slutligen kan det konstateras att den verkliga faran uppkommer då perceptiva risker och hot föranleder aktörerna att"säkerhetisera"ordinära politiska frågor som demokrati och därigenom gör dem till fysiska säkerhetspolitiska risker.

The aim of this essay is to examine which of the two approaches within the field of conflicts that best explains the conflict between Georgia and Russia using negotiations, dialogue and conciliation. According to the first approach negotiations are used to handle a conflict, according to the second approach negotiations are used to solve a problem.  The focus will be on how the two states acted and how the dialogue from the European Union as a conciliator was brought before the war escalated in 2008. The EU is today an important actor within the international politics and has established close relations to the two states. The conflict goes back in history and is still not solved.   In the fields of international studies, there is a realistic view that claims the international politics to be shaped by suspicions between states as main actors. War is never far away, what is claimed to be solved through diplomacy. Within this field there are two approaches that explain conflicts. In order to conduct the survey I have chosen to use the qualitative analytic method and apply it on statements and reports from the three actors. The result is that neither of the both approaches gives a good explanation of the conflict, while they both have gaps and the actors did not always act as they were supposed to.

Svensk doktrin stipulerar att grunden för Försvarsmaktens uppträdande att avskräcka olika aktörer från att använda våld. Detta ifrågasätts här grundat på att avskräckning oftast utgår ifrån numerär överlägsenhet, och Sverige kan anses ha en hotbild från regionala stormakter. Vilka luftoperativa förmågor kan då ligga bakom en avskräckande effekt hos en numerärt underlägsen luftstridskraft?  Syftet är att förklara detta genom en flerfallstudie utifrån avskräckningsteorier kopplade till luftmaktsteori i ett småstatsperspektiv. I en avslutande diskussion återkopplas detta mot Sveriges luftoperativa förmågor för att utröna om dessa bidrar till den avskräckande effekt som beskrivs som grundläggande i Försvarsmaktens doktrin. Fallstudien gav att Jaktflyg var den enda variabeln som sågs samvariera med lyckad avskräckning. I diskussionen om Sveriges motsvarande förmågor framkom att Försvarsmakten har en relativt hög förmåga till jaktflyg.

Abstract – From de facto to de jure: A comparative study between three post-Soviet territories path towards diplomatic recognition The purpose of this essay has been to study how well three post-Soviet de facto states live up to the definition of the concepts of state and sovereignty. Basically, the focus has been to, with the help of an analysis scheme constructed specifically for this study, analyse the situation the three de facto states are currently in and then compare their situations to one another. With the study I want to show that the history of the de facto states, as well as their current legal status, carry with them differences and similarities that play a major role in their future. By analysing a number of scientific articles and other research material within the social science sphere, I have been able to compile a table that shows how well the case studies live up to the seven criteria of the state outlined by Martin Glassner in Political Geography (2004). The main result of the study has been that various historical and demographic circumstances in the three de facto states have distinguished them from one another during the more than three decades that have passed since the fall of the Soviet Union. However, this is in stark contrast to the strong ties they all have to a patron state, which in all cases is crucial to the legal state of limbo they are all currently residing in.

Following the 2008 Georgian war, Russia identified major deficiencies in its warfare capability, which lead to an extensive reformation and modernization of Russian forces. The reformation was accompanied by a Russian theoretical discussion concerning the wars of tomorrow. Several eminent Russian theorists emphasized the growing importance of non-kinetic means and methods, of which psychological warfare was considered as one of the most primary. Western scholars also emphasized an increased Russian focus on psychological warfare. Despite the identified increased significance on the subject, there is a palpable lack of research on contemporary Russian psychological warfare. This study aims to decrease this lack of research on the subject. Using a theory consuming approach, Russian psychological warfare is analyzed from two cases, Georgia 2008 and Crimea 2014. The study is based on a qualitative text analysis of open sources. By combining two theories on psychological warfare, an analytical tool is developed which is then used in the analysis of the two cases. The theories that form the study´s theoretical base derives from Martin Libicki and Ron Schleifer. The two cases are analyzed and then followed by a comparative analysis of the cases. The study’s result shows that psychological warfare is an important component in Russian warfare, especially in the case of Crimea. Furthermore the study indicates that psychological warfare was a main component in the Crimea case, whereas it was a mere supportive component in the Georgian case.   The results show that Russian psychological warfare is used above all to create a favorable strategic context, where the Russian society and neutrals appears to be the most important target audiences to influence. The results also indicates that psychological warfare contributes in misleading the opponent and could thereby also contribute with obvious operational and tactical advantages for Russian warfare.

The characteristics of the Russian military operations during the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 and again in the Crimean Crisis 2014, were “rude awakenings” to a shift in the strategic behaviour of Russia, not refraining from military aggression as means to political aims. In the aftermath of these “strategic shocks”, the scholarly debate on how to interpret and understand these limited wars, has several ongoing discussions, among which is whether this modern Russian style of warfare, as demonstrated in Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine and elsewhere, really is a novel concept or plainly “old wine in a new bottle”. This thesis is part taking in that debate through the theoretical framework of three Soviet era warfare methods from the psychological dimension: Deception – Maskirovka, Information Warfare – Reflexive Control, and Subversion – Active Measures. Within the framework, an analytical tool for qualitative text analysis is designed and then applied for the case studies of the Russo-Georgian War, as it compares to the Crimean Crisis, collecting indicators for the apparent presence of traditional methods in these cases. The study concludes that the Soviet era warfare concepts of Maskirovka, Reflexive Control and Active Measures, are relevant as explanators for a facet of the modern day Russian warfare style, in alignment with the general argument on the Russian warfare doctrine as evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, vis-a-vis the strategic practices of the Soviet era.

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Studies have shown that the Russian operations in Georgia and Crimea have been described as both examples of failed and successful operations. Both conflicts had hybrid elements to them, especially the Russian annexation of Crimea which jumpstarted the western debate into the subject.  This study aims to analyse the difference in Russian methodology and differences between the two conflicts, this is done based on a theoretical framework of ‘effective hybrid warfare’. The goal of this study is to discern to what extent these two cases can be described as effective hybrid warfare operations. This is done thru the method of comparative studies.  The results showed that the operation on Crimea to a greater extent could be considered effective hybrid warfare, more specifically, the weaker aspects of the Russian operation in Georgia seemed to have been corrected and were less present in the Crimean operation. This indicates that the Russian staff learned from its mistakes and the weak points of the Crimean operation is not likely to be present in their next campaign.