Diese Dissertation enthält drei Aufsätze zur Theorie der Anreizsetzung bei nicht-verifizierbaren Leistungsmaßen. Untersuchungsgegenstand sind die Auswirkungen individueller Fairnesspräferenzen auf die Ausgestaltung und Eignung verschiedener Anreizmechanismen, welche in realen wirtschaftlichen Situationen Anwendung finden. Alle Arbeiten analysieren Umgebungen moralischen Risikos, in denen eine Firma zwei ungerechtigkeitsaverse Mitarbeiter beschäftigt, deren individuelle Arbeitsleistung zwar beobachtbar, jedoch nicht kontrahierbar ist. Der erste Aufsatz untersucht die Effekte von Ungerechtigkeitsaversion auf relationale Anreizverträge. Als Leistungsmaß eines Agenten dient sein individueller Beitrag zum Firmenwert. Abweichend von der Literatur zeigt sich, dass Ungerechtigkeitsaversion vorteilhaft sein kann: Für bestimmte Zinssätze können relationale Verträge mit neidischen Agenten profitabler sein, wenn sie nicht sogar nur mit solchen implementierbar sind. Der zweite Aufsatz vergleicht relationale Individual- und Gruppenbonusverträge. Durch das Vermeiden ungleicher Löhne sind letztere profitabler, solange sich die Firma keinem Glaubwürdigkeitsproblem gegenübersieht. Dies kann sich jedoch umkehren, da Individualboni vergleichsweise kleiner sind und somit die Selbstdurchsetzung des Vertrags fördern. Ursachen dafür sind das Vermeiden des Trittbrettfahrerproblems und die Anreizwirkung von Neid. Im dritten Aufsatz wird relationalen Individualbonusverträgen ein relatives Leistungsturnier gegenübergestellt. Im Gegensatz zum Bonusvertrag unterliegt das Turnier keiner Glaubwürdigkeitsbeschränkung. Dennoch ist ersteres Anreizschema profitabler, solange das Glaubwürdigkeitsproblem der Firma nicht zu groß ist. Dies liegt an der zwingenden Auszahlung ungleicher Löhne im Turnier und den daraus resultierenden hohen Kosten für Ungleichheitsprämien. Weiter wird für ein Beispiel gezeigt, dass die Zinsspanne, für die der Bonusvertrag das Turnier dominiert, im Neid der Agenten steigt. / This thesis consists of three self-contained essays that investigate the impact of fairness concerns among agents on the design of real-world incentive contracts used to mitigate moral-hazard problems under non-verifiable performance. All papers consider situations in which a firm employs two inequity averse workers whose individual performances are, albeit observable by the contracting parties, not contractible. The first paper studies the effects of inequity aversion on relational employment contracts. Performance is evaluated via an agent’s individual non-verifiable contribution to firm value. In contrast to the literature, we find that inequity aversion may be beneficial: In the presence of envy, for a certain range of interest rates relational contracts may be more profitable. For some interest rates reputational equilibria exist only with envious agents. In the second paper, I compare group to individual performance pay. Avoiding payoff inequity, the group bonus contract is superior as long as the firm faces no credibility problem. The individual bonus contract may, however, become superior due to two reasons: The group bonus scheme is subject to a free-rider problem requiring a higher incentive pay and impeding credibility of the firm. Moreover, with individual bonuses the firm benefits from the incentive-strengthening effect of envy, further softening the credibility constraint. The third paper contrasts a rank-order tournament with independent bonus contracts. Whereas the bonus scheme must be self-enforcing, the tournament is contractible. Yet the former incentive regime outperforms the latter as long as credibility problems are not too severe. This is due the fact that the tournament requires unequal pay across peers with certainty and thus imposes large inequity premium costs on the firm. For a simple example, I show that the more envious the agents are the larger is the range of interest rates for which the bonus scheme dominates the tournament.

Diese kumulative Dissertation besteht aus drei eigenständigen Arbeiten aus dem Bereich der Rechnungslegungsforschung. Die erste Arbeit ist eine Befragungsstudie von 137 internationalen Rechnungslegungsforschern über die Fair-Value-Orientierung von 28 lokalen Rechnungslegungssystemen. Anhand der Umfrageergebnisse war es möglich, einen internationalen Fair-Value Score zu bilden. Dieser zeigt, dass das portugiesische, slowenische und das russische Rechnungslegungssystem am meisten und das österreichische, deutsche und italienische Rechnungslegungssystem am wenigsten Fair-Value orientiert ist. Die zweite Arbeit untersucht die Determinanten der Wahl von Rechnungslegungssystemen mittels eines Prinzipal-Agenten-Models. In dem Model kann ein risikoneutraler Entrepreneur (Prinzipal) mit einem Anreiz zur Konsumglättung zwischen zwei Rechnungslegungssystemen wählen. Das Rechnungslegungssystem wird genutzt, um eine effiziente vertragstheoretische Lösung mit dem Manager herbeizuführen und um Informationen über das Unternehmen für Kapitalmarktteilnehmer bereitzustellen. Die Modellergebnisse zeigen, dass der Entrepreneur eher gewillt ist das Fair-Value-orientierte Rechnungslegungssystem zu wählen, wenn die Bedeutung von Eigenkapitalmärkten steigt, die Opportunitätskosten des Managements steigen, die Produktivität des Managements sinkt und die Qualität des Enforcements von Rechnungslegungsregeln abnimmt. Die empirischen Ergebnisse bestätigen größtenteils die theoretischen Erwartungen. Die dritte Arbeit untersucht, ob die verpflichtende Einführung der IFRS bei gleichzeitiger Anpassung des Enforcements zu einer Verbesserung der Ergebnisqualität geführt hat. Die empirischen Ergebnisse sind uneinheitlich und können daher den vermuteten Effekt nicht bestätigen. / This cumulative PhD-thesis consists of three papers within the field of empirical accounting research. The first paper provides descriptive evidence on the fair value orientation of existing local GAAP systems by surveying the perception of 137 international accounting academics about the fair value orientation of 28 local GAAP systems. The survey results enable us to rank countries’ local GAAP systems by their fair value orientation. The score ranking shows that Portuguese, Slovenian and Russian GAAP are the top three and Austrian, German and Italian GAAP are the bottom three of the fair value orientation. Furthermore, we are able to show that the fair value orientation of IFRS is higher than any of the 28 local GAAP systems. The second paper investigates the determinants of financial accounting regime choice in a principal agent setting. The model considers a risk-neutral entrepreneur who needs financial accounting information for contracting with a managerial agent and for communicating the firm value to a risk-averse secondary capital market. The comparative static results indicate that the preference of the entrepreneur for a fair value accounting regime increases with the relative importance of the secondary capital market and the opportunity costs of the managerial agent, while it decreases with the overall quality of the accounting signal, the effectiveness of the enforcement process and managerial productivity. Empirical evidence, which is based on country-year and country-level and US time series analysis, provides support for most of the theoretical predictions. The third paper investigates whether earnings quality effects are more pronounced post mandatory IFRS adoption in countries that substantially changed their enforcement system of accounting standards in comparison to countries that already had a strict enforcement system in place. The empirical analysis gives inconclusive results for the earnings quality measures.

The use of renewable energy as part of the solution for stabilising global warming has been promoted in industrialised countries for the past three decades. In the last ten years, China, a non-democratic and less-developed state, has implemented non-hydro alternative energy sources through top-down, technology-oriented measures and expanded its renewable energy capacity with unprecedented speed and breadth. This phenomenon seems to contradict to the principle of orthodox environmental governance, in which stakeholder participation is deemed as necessary condition for effective policy outcomes. Given that little research has been conducted on environmental politics in an authoritarian context, I first set out to explore the role of the Chinese state in enabling transformation of the renewable energy sector and to understand the ways in which policy elites seek to introduce developmental state and ecological modernisation strategy in the policy area. Second, by adopting principal-agent theory, I explicate how the governance mechanisms have been deployed and how challenges of the expansion of the sector in the governance system with a large territory have being mitigated. Based upon news reports, policy documents, and interviews with 32 provincial officials, business leaders, academic researchers, and NGO practitioners in two subnational governments, I argue that the renewable energy development in China is governed through a hybrid mode of environmental policy model that uses, upon the existing developmental state regime, ecological modernisation as a policy paradigm, which is partially incorporated in the process. Ultimately, I examine in this thesis the possibility of an alternative form of environmental governance in which renewable energy can be diffused in a less-participatory manner, with more direct controls and target-oriented state intervention measures. This thesis challenges the orthodox assumption that the inclusive mode of governance are the only capable form of environmental governance that reaches desired policy outcomes of renewable energy deployment.

本文是以新制度研究方法，來分析台灣派系政治的穩定與變遷。本文的論點是我們在(1)台灣的地方派系政治互動，存在著交易成本。(2)制度因素控制交易成本，進而影響威權時期與民主轉型期的派系政治互動的研究目標前提下，藉由補助金制度運作為例，來理解台灣派系政治的變化。因此我們將全文的探討，建立在下列的假設上：”威權時期的台灣地方派系政治，之所以能維持穩定的運作而成為國民黨有效的統治形式，補助金制度能降低交易成本是主要原因之一。而在民主轉型期間，派系政治所發生的變遷，也是因為補助金制度無法再有效控制交易成本所導致的結果。” 而在對於上述假設的探討上，我們首先發現在整體地方財政結構上的嚴重失衡，使得地方財政必須強烈依恃於中央的補助支持。但是由於補助金制度缺乏有效的監督機制，導致主事者可以藉由制度上的缺失，來進行自身政治目的的運作。 因此在威權時期，補助金制度之所以能控制交易成本，維持派系政治穩定運作主要是由於： (1)補助制度能有效的弱化地方政府的能力、藉由政策的滲透達到監督地方的效果，並且能有效的介入選舉運作。因此降低民選精英向國民黨挑戰的風險成本，而使得雙方的互動呈現低交易成本的穩定合作關係。 (2)由於補助金制度能提供地方政治精英一個穩定的資源汲取管道，使得其底下樁腳系統的向心力可以穩定的維持下去。另一方面，補助計畫必須透過層級申請的特性，也為政治精英帶來低成本的監督環境，使得其能有效的防止樁腳跑票行為。導致雙方在低交易成本的互動下，維持穩定合作關係。 (3)但地方派系與選民之間的互動，則是因為選民缺乏監督誘因以及集體行動的協調成本太高，使得雙方呈現出一種高交易成本的關係。然而由於補助金制度的運作下，派系的政治精英往往可以藉由補助計畫申請的方式，來規避對選民的政治承諾，並將地方建設的功勞予以個人化。使地方政治精英能在規避對選民的政治責任時，卻又同時還能獲得選民的高度認同，而維持一種穩定的選民動員能力。 然而在民主轉型期，補助金制度之所以無法控制交易成本，導致派系政治發生變化的主要原因是在於： (1)國民黨需要地方政治精英對中央政權的支持，但本身卻喪失藉由補助款來進行監督的功能，導致雙方呈現出一種高交易成本的互動模式。 (2)由於補助款制度所存在的制度機制以及反對黨對於地方執政權的競爭日益激烈，導致樁腳因為補助管道日益多元化，使得樁腳維持自主性的成本下降。但卻因此弱化了地方政治精英對樁腳進行監督的能力。這使得雙方的合作關係呈現出一種不穩定的高交易成本狀態。 (3)最後在選民與地方派系的互動上，由於反對黨藉由福利政策來直接訴諸選民，使得選民在存有比較利益機會的誘因下，願意耗費成本來對政治人物的承諾進行監督。在縣級行政首長選舉上，選民因為監督誘因的增加以及反對黨出現所帶來訊息成本的降低，對派系領領袖的互動就呈現低交易成本模式。但是在基層小單位選舉上，由於區域樁腳仍然具有多元的申請管道，來利用申請補助計畫的方式來經營選區，導致選民仍缺乏監督的誘因，而繼續維持雙方高交易成本的互動方式。而且由於這種方式容易規避政治責任，並且將政績予以個人化，因此樁腳仍然維持高度的選民動員能力。 由於民主轉型期間，補助金制度無法再維持一個低交易成本環境。使得派系政治中的相關行動者過去穩定的合作關係發生變化。這種改變受害最深的，莫過於想維繫政權生存的國民黨。高交易成本，使得身為委託者的國民黨無法再控制地方派系對政權支持的政治承諾。因此國民黨會憑仗著執政優勢，藉由國家政策工具來降低交易成本，以便維持派系政治的穩定運作。諸如凍省、統籌分配款收回中央等政策，都可以視為在這種情境下所作的考量。但相對的，當民進黨執政，為了維持民進黨縣市首長與選民之間低交易成本的有利競爭環境，也會藉由國家政策的主導，來弱化派系政治的發展。諸如鄉鎮市長官派的宣示、收回小型工程補助款的決議等，都是在自我利益考量下，所得出的結果。因此派系政治在轉變後，未來可能的發展，就在台灣兩大政治勢力自我利益考量的前提中，成為政策腳力的拉鋸戰。然而在可預見四年的民進黨執政日子裡，民進黨在考量自身利益下，應該會朝向弱化派系政治的政策來發展。 最後在政策建議上，基於弱化派系政治的政策立場進行考量。則在長程目標上，就是要提高地方財源自主性，包括中央與地方財源的重新劃分、考慮開放地方在一定程度上的租稅立法權等措施，來落實地方自治、強化責任政治以實現充分政黨競爭的理想。而在短期的制度修正上，則應該恢復補助金制度維持社會公平正義的補助精神，藉由降低計畫型補助與中央部會補助款，以及建立公開透明的補助審核制度等技術性手段，來降低補助制度中，人為政治因素干擾的誘因。

企業併購的成敗，基本上應視其併購的策略性目標是否達成，然而策略性的目標往往只能從收購後整體的營運績效或投資收益來進行評估。事實上，企業併購即是一種投資活動，投資後的環境變化事先即難以掌握，如何有效的預防企業併購的風險問題，尤為進行併購規劃時重要的課題。本文嘗試以「代理問題」來解釋企業併購完成後的「雙方道德風險問題」，希望利用支付方式的財務規劃，有效的對企業併購完成後的道德風險作防範。 本文的主要目的在於，利用訊息理論中的代理模型（principal-agent model），研究企業併購雙方在「資訊不對稱」下，利用「雙方道德風險模型」（double-sided moral hazard model）的建立，規劃最適的支付方式設計，並對模型最適支付方式契約特性與影響因素作分析。設定企業併購的買方公司（the bidder）為所有人角色，目標公司（the target）為代理人角色，並且雙方公司皆為「風險趨避」的態度，以期望效用極大作為決策依據。買方公司基於「風險分散(risk- sharing)」與「契約誘因(incentives)」的考量，設計一種最適的「簡單線性支付方式」契約型態，綜合部分現金與部分股票支付的「混合性支付方式」，進行併購投資的要約行動。 模型的結果，買方公司所提出的最適目標公司持股比例，為雙方的風險趨避係數、公司價值的變異風險，以及雙方努力投入的成本係數所決定。並且進一步求出最適的努力水準，與最適現金支付金額，設計最適的股票與現金支付比例，以作為企業併購支付方式財務規劃的建議。 分析最適支付契約的比較靜態結果。在其他條件不變之下，(1) 若買方公司風險趨避態度增加時，買方公司將提高目標公司持股比例的契約設計，增加契約誘因強度，以避免承擔過多企業併購的不確定風險；(2) 當公司價值估計變異風險增加（外在不確定風險增加），若買方公司的風險趨避係數大於目標公司的風險趨避係數時，買方公司將增加目標公司持股比例作為要約；(3) 若買方公司的努力成本增加時，買方公司愈不願意付出努力水準，傾向於提高誘因機制給目標公司增加目標公司的持股比例作要約。 修正訊息結構的假設，引入契約中加入「承諾付出一定努力」的條款，加入「買方承諾」條款時，雙方道德風險的最適契約設計可以簡化為單方道德風險模型。加入「雙方承諾」的條款時，模型則可簡化成以「完全訊息」沒有道德風險問題的方式來分析。比較三個方面的差異：(1) 誘因強度大小的比較：在單方道德風險下，最適目標公司持股比例契約，將大於雙方道德風險模型下設計的最適契約；雙方道德模型則需視彼此道德風險問題的抵換，誘因強度不一定大於完全訊息模型。(2) 比較靜態結果比較：就影響方向而言，風險趨避係數變動，對不同訊息設計影響方向皆相同；外生誤差風險變動時，單方道德風險的影響則確定為負；至於努力成本的影響方向則不變。就影響大小而言，雙方道德風險模型誘因強度敏感性則恆小於單方道德風險模型的影響；與完全訊息的敏感程度大小則不一定。(3) 雙方期望效用總和比較：在雙方道德風險模型下，最適契約符合契約雙方期望效用確定等值極大的條件。 修正風險趨避特性的假設，探討風險中立假設下，最適的簡單線性支付契約適用性的問題。可得在風險中立情況下，只有雙方道德風險模型，混合性支付方式線性契約的誘因機制仍存在。最後，利用「制度性的比較靜態分析」，歸納出企業併購雙方道德風險問題下，當外生變數變動時，「完全現金支付」與「混合性支付方式」的選擇取捨。

都市更新權利變換運作過程中的土地權利人與實施者的關係，是現代經濟活動典型的專業分工委託代理關係。土地權利人與實施者基於都市更新法制下相關的權利義務契約，執行都市更新事業，由於訊息不對稱、目標不一致與風險偏好之差異，實施者基於機會主義的決策或行動，經常不利於土地權利人的利益，於是產生代理問題、增加代理成本，雙方無法產生高度互信的基礎，而成為都市更新延宕與成效不彰的主因。本論文從土地權利人與實施者之間，於都市更新條例機制下的互動契約中，探討分析雙方之委託代理關係，並從土地權利人的角度設計監督方式，以維護土地權利人的權益，促進都市更新事業之實施。 當土地權利人與實施者，共同於一都市更新單元，組成生產團隊時，土地權利人初期擁有較強的提議與同意之控制權，隨著實施者握有超過都市更新法定之同意書門檻後，實施者掌握較強的執行控制權，土地權利人擁有較弱的監督控制權。又現行都市更新權利變換的價值分配，是實施者投入共同負擔費用，並以更新完成後之土地與建築物部分折價抵付，其餘土地及建築物則分配與原土地所有權人，因此土地權利人得到大部分的剩餘索取權。這樣的控制權與剩餘索取權分離狀態下，其權利變換價值分配模式，是否為適當的產權安排？對於都市更新參與人能否有所激勵？能否促進都市更新之推動效率？是本論文主要的探討分析重點。 此外，同一更新單元之土地權利人與實施者，具有短期且為一次性合作的特性，依現行都市更新法律規範，交易雙方以簽訂同意書做為實施都市更新事業的關鍵契約，由於契約簽定後，交易雙方所投入的特殊投資比例不相同，因而普遍引起期初契約簽署的遲疑，甚而契約簽定後，仍有權利義務不明確之爭議。本論文透過不完全契約理論的思維，探討分析土地權利人與實施者的契約關係與特殊投資關係，並建議一個新的交易契約模式，以降低雙方之機會主義行為，進而希能促進都市更新事業之推動。 / In the process of rights transformation of urban renewal, the relationships between land owners and the implementers are the typical Principal-Agent Relationship in modern economic activities. Based on the related rights and obligations under the regulations of urban renewal, land owners and the implementers execute urban renewal business. Due to the differences of asymmetric information, inconsistent goals, and risk preference, the decision-making and/or actions of implementers based on the opportunism, will often unfavorable to the benefits of land owners. Therefore, the problem of Principal-Agent Relationship arises that increases agent cost. Both sides cannot generate the foundation of highly mutual trust, and thus creates the major reason of delaying and inefficiency for urban renewal. This paper studies and analyzes the Principal-Agent Relationship of both land owners and the implementers from both sides with their interaction of contract under unban renewal regulation mechanism, and further from the land owners perspective to design ways of monitoring to protect rights and benefits of land owners, to facilitate the implementation of urban renewal business. When the land owners and the implementers organize as a「Production Team」on a very urban renewal unit, the land owners initially hold stronger control rights on both proposing step and agreement step; along the implementers hold agreement letters exceeding the official threshold of urban renewal regulations, they will control better execution rights, and the landowners hold weaker surveillance control rights. The current value allocation of rights transformation for urban renewal employs common sharing of expenses with the implementers. After deducting the common sharing of the discounted price substitute payment of the land and buildings after the rights transformation, the remaining lands and buildings shall be allocated to the original landowners according to the rights value proportion before each piece of land rights was transformed. In so doing, the land owners obtain most of the residual claim. Under such separation of the control rights and the residual claim, whether the value allocation of the rights transformation is as suitable arrangement for property rights? Will it be the incentives to the urban renewal participants? Whether it will facilitate the efficiency of urban renewal promotion? These are the main points of the analysis of this paper. Land owners and the implementers with the same Renewal Unit retain a short-term and once-for-all cooperative nature. According to the regulations of current Urban Renewal Act, both parties of the transaction by signing an agreement as the key contract of implementing urban renewal business. After signing up the contract, due to the different ratio of specific investment input by both sides of the transaction, the initial contract thus normally has been delaying or doubtfully signed. Even worse, after eventually signing the contract, there are still uncertain disputes on rights and obligations. Via the thoughts of Incomplete Contracts Theory, this paper not only analyzes the contractual relationship and the specific investment relationship of land owners and the implementers, but also recommends a new transaction contract model to decrease the opportunism behaviors of both sides, and further more, to facilitate the implement of urban renewal business.

近年來，國際間政府推動資訊公開蔚為風潮，伴隨著資訊通信科技的發展，電子化政府和政府網站更普遍被各界視為一個低成本且高效率的透明化途徑。台灣的政府網站長期受到國際間高度評價，在發展中國家更是名列前茅。然而，既有的研究與調查大多數僅片面側重於政府供給面的探究，通常以化約且可標準化的指標來評鑑特定政府網站的介面資訊功能。相形之下，鮮少有關注民眾的需求認知、機關政策執行以及網站內容評估等較全面的研究成果供參。因而無法更深入地釐清政府網站、法制和政策執行績效不彰等困境與透明化治理之間的關聯。 在委託代理理論的運用之下，本研究兼顧政府治理中委託方民眾的認知以及代理方政府機關的經驗與成效。目的在於釐清網站資訊公開供給和需求的現況與問題，並更具體地檢證政府網站資訊公開對機關施政資訊揭露、績效衡量和政府課責的影響。爰此，研究者參與多項網站資訊公開相關研究，以蒐集多元化次級資料，包括：量化的網路民眾問卷調查，各級機關的跨年度問卷調查，機關網站內容評估比較，以及質性的個別訪談、焦點團體座談。藉由理論聚焦與多重研究方法的交叉檢證分析，以達研究綜效。 研究結果分為網站資訊公開對政府施政資訊揭露，施政績效衡量，以及政府課責的影響三個部分來討論。首先，相較於法制，網站資訊公開更有助於揭露政府施政資訊，特別是網站資訊公開實施過程可呈現出政府治理內、外部的多重代理關係及代理問題，甚至可緩和部分的代理問題。其次，網站資訊公開可具體地呈現並衡量施政績效，以因應傳統官僚體系內各層代理績效難以衡量的困境。但囿於目前整體制度缺乏績效誘因設計，而限制了此效益。最後，因整體資訊公開績效制度的匱乏，也使得網站資訊公開對政府課責的效益備受限制。 整體而言，本研究揭示了代理理論應用於政府治理的價值，並檢證政府資訊公開、績效和課責等三項治理要件的關聯。研究成果可彌補實務與研究的落差，並對相關文獻做出貢獻。 / In recent years, governments from around the world have adopted Freedom of Information Act to increase transparency in their governance. With advancements in information and communication technologies (ICTs), e-Government has been seen as a cost-effective and possible mean to promote openness and transparency. Taiwan’s efforts to develop e-Government services have been well-recognized; especially, have made remarkable advantages among developing countries. Nevertheless, most of the existing researches in evaluating e-Government service are based on supply-side indicators and often assess websites alone; as yet, little information is available on the demand aspect of e-Government. The paper aims to explore the potential and practice of government website information disclosure in terms of the perspective of end user and government agencies. The results show the significance of three aspects in information disclosure of Taiwanese government websites through the application of quantitative and qualitative methodology, including self-administered questionnaire, website evaluation, individual interview, and focus group interview. First, government website information disclosure benefits the revelation of government information, manifestation of multi-agent relationships in internal and external governance of government, and alleviation of partial ageny problems. Second, government website information disclosure enhances revealing and measuring the performance of government agencies; nevertheless, in which the effectiveness is limited due to the absence of institutional incentives. Third, under the circumstances of unsound institution, the effectiveness of accountability has difficulties to be thoroughly realized through government website information disclosure. In sum, the finding contributes to a valuable reference for other countries in implementing information transparency of e-Government, and has significant implications for policy makers, government agencies, and system designers.

Globalisering har möjliggjort för svenska företag att expandera utomlands och etablera sig påinternationella marknader. Det största hindret för små- och medelstora företag (SMFs) i ainternationaliseringsprocess är avsaknad av finansiella medel och kunskap om den nyamarknaden. På grund av detta är användandet av en utlandsbaserad agent ett bra alternativ. Enagent har en god lokal marknadskunskap och representerar en etableringsform som är mindrekostsam i jämförelse med etableringen av ett dotterbolag. Med hänsyn till detta äranvändandet av en agent ett vanligt tillvägagångssätt bland internationaliserande SMFs.Samtidigt drivs företaget och dess agent av olika mål på grund av skillnader i egenintresse.Trots att en agent är anlitad i syfte att arbeta i enighet med företagets ambitioner, kan denneha ett egenintresse som kolliderar med företaget. Det är därför nödvändigt för företag attskydda det egna intresset genom implementering av olika kontrollsystem. I denna studie harvi använt oss av principal- agentteorin i syfte att förklara förhållandet mellan svenska SMFsoch dess agenter. Utöver detta undersöker vi även hur svenska SMFs kan kontrollera sinautlandsagenter. För att undersöka detta har vi formulerat följande forskningsfrågor: “Hur kanprincipal-agenteorin tillämpas i syfte att beskriva uppdragsrelationen mellan svenska SMFoch dess agent på den internationella marknaden?” samt ”Hur kan svenska SMFs styra attdess agent på den internationella marknaden arbetar enligt företagets önskemål?”. I syfte attbesvara dessa forskningsfrågor har det insamlats och bearbetats teoretiskt material, vilketutgjort underlag för den semistrukturerade intervjuguide som besvarats av studiensintervjupersoner. Detta har resulterat i en analys följt av slutsats där forskningsfrågornabesvaras. Studien avslutas med rekommendationer till framtida forskning. / Globalization has enabled firms to expand abroad and enter international markets. The mainobstacle for small and medium-sized firms in their internationalization-process is the lack offinancial resources and local market knowledge. Therefore, the use of an offshore agent is agood option. An agent holds good local market knowledge and represents an establishmentform that is less costly, compared to the start-up of a subsidiary. Hence, the use of an agent isa common approach amongst internationalized small and medium-sized firms (SME’s).Simultaneously, a firm and its agent are driven by different ambitions due to divergence intheir self-interests. Although an agent is hired to work in unity with the firm’s ambitions, itmay hold a self-interest that collides with the firm’s objectives. Therefore, it is vital for firmsto protect their own interests by implementing different mechanisms that can control theagent. In this study, the principal-agent theory has been applied in order to explain therelationship between Swedish SME’s and their agents. Additionally, it has been investigatedhow Swedish SME’s are able to control their offshore agents on the international market. Toexamine this, the following two research questions have been formulated: “How can theprincipal-agent theory be applied to describe the relation between Swedish SME’s and theiragent on the international market?” and “How can Swedish SME’s control that their agent onthe international market are working in unity with the firm’s requests?” In order to answerthese two questions, theoretical material has been collected and processed in order toformulate the basis of the semi-structured interview guide that has been answered by therespondents. This has resulted in an analysis followed by a conclusion where the researchquestions are answered.

Korruption lässt sich als ökonomische Austauschbeziehung mit den Akteuren Prinzipal, Agent und Klient darstellen. Die Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, welche Faktoren das Ausmaß der Schädigung des Prinzipals durch Korruption beeinflussen und mit welchen Mitteln der Prinzipal entgegen steuern kann. Neben den Auswirkungen von Kontrollen, Strafandrohung, kulturellen und individuellen Faktoren wird insbesondere der Einfluss der Entlohnungsgestaltung untersucht. Die Zusammenhänge werden mit Hilfe formaler Modelle dargestellt und durch eine Auswertung empirischer Untersuchungen ergänzt.

Andelen konkurrensutsatt offentlig verksamhet har ökat i jämn takt sedan början av 1990-talet, och utvecklingen har både sina förespråkare och kritiker. När det gäller de stora partierna inom de olika politiska blocken, är konsensus numera att konkurrensutsättning är här för att stanna, skiljelinjen ligger mer på hur stor andel av den offentliga verksamheten som skall konkurrensutsättas. Även bristen på en genomlysning och uppföljning av konkurrensutsatta verksamheter har väckt kritik. Kostnadseffektivitet är det som förespråkas vid konkurrensutsättning och används som syfte till att anlita privata eller korporativa aktörer etc., för att bedriva en tidigare offentlig verksamhet på ett mer företagsekonomiskt effektivt sätt. Syftet med uppsatsen var att undersöka hur Region Gotland använder sig av konkurrensutsättning och upphandling för att nå en företagsekonomisk effektivitet i sin verksamhet, och jämföra det empiriska underlaget mot tillgängliga teoretiska källor. För uppsatsen har följande två frågeställningar valts som uppsatsens problemformulering: (1) På vilket sätt genomförs konkurrensutsättning för att uppnå företagsekonomisk effektivitet i offentlig verksamhet? (2) I vilken omfattning sker uppföljning av verksamheter för att kontrollera att tilldelade resurser används på bästa sätt? Uppsatsen visade inte på något otvetydigt klargörande när det gäller ekonomisk vinst vid konkurrensutsättning, eftersom uppföljning och utvärdering av upphandlade verksamheter inte sker i den utsträckning som vore önskvärd. Detta skapar problem med att dra några konkreta slutsatser om det råder någon ekonomisk skillnad, ifall verksamheten bedrivs i offentlig eller privat regi, det blir mer ett antagande än bevisad kunskap. Det framkom även att den byråkratisering som medföljer vid konkurrensutsättning innebär ökad kostnad för det offentliga, och det är inte alltid som effektiviseringarna motsvarar omkostnaderna. Ingen av respondenterna ansåg att konkurrensutsättning är ett felaktigt förfarande utan det behövs mer tid för att bygga upp kunskapen, och att därmed fullt ut utnyttja upphandlingen som ett ekonomiskt instrument. Skiljepunkten mellan respondenterna är snarare hur användandet av konkurrensutsättning bör användas för att gynna Region Gotland och det lokala näringslivet. Flertalet av de anbudsförfaranden som har utfallit med bra resultat, är inom områden där konkurrensutsättning har använts under längre tid, och ”trial and error” är en av förklaringarna som uppsatsen har kommit fram till. Storleken på förfrågningsunderlagen är betydelsefullt, för att öka antalet anbud och därmed konkurrensen. Vilket i sin tur minskar risken för oligopol - eller monopol - ställning för något enstaka storföretag.  Antalet anbud ger också en prispress vilket för det offentliga kan betyda större ”effektivitetsvinster”. / The proportion of Swedish public sector exposed to competitive tendering has increased steadily since the early 1990s. This development or progress has its proponents as well as critics. As for the major parties in the two political blocs, there is now a consensus that competitive tendering is here to stay. The dividing line is more on what proportion of the public sector to be opened to competition. The purpose of this thesis was to examine how The Region of Gotland uses the competitive tendering and procurement to achieve business efficiency in their activities, and compare the empirical basis in relation to the available theoretical sources. For our thesis the following questions are chosen: In what way are implementations of competitive tendering used in order to achieve business efficiency within the public sector? To what extent is monitoring of public sector to ensure that allocated resources are used as intended in the best way? The empirical data shows that there is no straight line in terms of financial results of competitive tendering, as the monitoring and evaluation of procurement activities does not occur to the extent needed. For the same reason a comparison with financial outcome of public operation would become more an assumption than proved knowledge. Areas where a tender procedure has turned out with good results are mostly, in areas where competition has been used for a long time. Our conclusion is that time is needed to develop knowledge of good practice and examples. The size of the tender specifications is important, to increase the number of tender and thus competition. This in turn reduces the risk of monopoly. The number of tenders also provides a downward pressure in prices which can mean greater “efficiency gains”.