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41	Interpretação e instituições: o diálogo entre Cass Sunstein e Ronald Dworkin / Interpretation and institutions: the dialogue between Cass Sunstein and Ronald Dworkin. Paschoalini, Felipe 09 April 2015 (has links) Este trabalho analisa o diálogo entre Cass Sunstein e Ronald Dworkin. Enquanto Dworkin desenvolveu uma abordagem da prática jurídica como a continuação de uma grande teoria baseada em valores morais, Sunstein recomenda um caminho supostamente mais modesto, baseado em passos obtidos em acordos que pudessem ser alcançados por pessoas com convicções morais diversas. A escolha por esse caminho é justificada não só por razões institucionais, mas também por razões morais e políticas substantivas. A crítica central de Sunstein a Dworkin é um suposto ponto cego quanto às questões de capacidade institucional. Sunstein pode ser lido de duas maneiras: como um autor essencialmente pragmático (e incompatível com Dworkin) ou como um interpretativista ao modo Dworkiniano. Conforme o caso, os contornos do seu diálogo com Dworkin são diferentes. De acordo com a primeira leitura, o argumento do ponto cego levantado por Sunstein tem o objetivo de desqualificar todo o projeto teórico Dworkiniano, na medida em que o problema das capacidades institucionais seria tomado como fundamento para um tipo específico de ceticismo moral, o que inutilizaria o critério de correção moral que embasa o interpretativismo Dworkiniano. Essa visão considera que o debate entre Sunstein e Dworkin seria um capítulo do debate entre Dworkin e os pragmatistas céticos. Nos termos da segunda leitura, Sunstein não é um cético na verdade, ele pressupõe um interpretativismo Dworkiniano e sua posição é complementar à obra de Dworkin. No capítulo I, analiso alguns trabalhos centrais de Sunstein e concluo que ele é melhor lido como um Dworkiniano, visto sua teoria pressupõe valores independentes. No capítulo II, estudo os principais pontos da teoria do direito de Dworkin e sugiro que o conceito de integridade, entendido como um conceito corretivo que serve para construir um sistema judicial no qual os juízes podem barganhar uma concepção de justiça ideal por outros fatores do mundo real, indica que a teoria Dworkiniana pode sim ser sensível às questões empíricas e de capacidade institucional. No capítulo III, identifico os pontos do confronto direto entre Sunstein e Dworkin e exponho o proveito que pode ser extraído do estudo desse debate. / This dissertation analyzes the dialogue between Cass Sunstein and Ronald Dworkin. While Dworkin developed an approach that sees the legal practice as a continuum of a greater theory based on moral values, Sunstein recommends a supposedly more modest approach, based on steps obtained in agreements which could be achieved by people holding different moral convictions. The choice of this path is justified not only for institutional reasons, but also for moral and political reasons. The central criticism of Sunstein against Dworkin is a \"blind spot\" with respect to the institutional capacities of judges. Sunstein can be read in two ways: as an essentially pragmatist author (and incompatible with Dworkin) or as an interpretative Dworkinian. As the case may be, the contours of his debate with Dworkin are different. Under to the first reading, the \"blind spot\" argument raised by Sunstein aims to disqualify any Dworkinian theoretical project to the extent that the problem of institutional capacities should be taken as the basis for a specific type of moral skepticism, which would deny the claim to moral correctness that supports Dworkinian interpretativism. In this case, that the debate between Dworkin and Sunstein should be seen as a chapter of the debate between Dworkin and the skeptic legal pragmatists. Under the the second reading, Sunstein is not a skeptic - in fact, he presupposes a Dworkinian interpretativism and his position is complementary to Dworkins work. In Chapter I, I analyze Sunsteins central work on legal interpretation and conclude that he is best read as a Dworkinian, as his theory assumes independent values. In Chapter II, I study the main points of Dworkins jurisprudence and I suggest that the concept of integrity, understood as a \"corrective\" concept used to build a judicial system in which judges can bargain an ideal conception of justice by other factors of the real world, indicates that Dworkin´s theory can be sensitive to the empirical institutional capacities raised by Sunstein. In Chapter III, identify the points of direct confrontation between Sunstein and Dworkin and explain the agenda that can be extracted from the debate. Análise do discurso Cass Cass Sunstein Dworkin Filosofia do direito Institutions Interpretation Interpretivism Legal theory Ronald 1931- Ronald Dworkin Sunstein Teoria do direito (interpretação)
42	Racionalidade e correção da decisão jurídica em Ronald Dworkin, Jürgen Habermas e Robert Alexy Blanco, Carolina Souza Torres 12 November 2014 (has links) Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:23:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Carolina Souza Torres Blanco.pdf: 1215182 bytes, checksum: 18d310b8bcb4bddc8090e95dc754796a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-11-12 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / The transformations through the linguistic turn and hermeneutics, awareness of the interpretative character of knowledge of cultural objects, as in the case of law, and the role of language in human understanding of the world generates a crisis paradigm on how to understand the law and how to operate it. There are theories supporting the linking of law and legal decisions to a question of political morality and a claim to correctness. These transformations in theory of law lead to direct modifications on Constitutionalism. However, performing this requirement of Fulcrum in initial Constitution, compliance with the pretense of correction of the legal decision? If we differ on what's fair or unfair, how to reconcile it with the requirements of legal certainty and the democratic character of our coexistence? This dissertation proposes a contribution to this debate through the study of three contemporary authors: Ronald Dworkin, Robert Alexy, Jürgen Habermas. Study the problems of rationality and the correction of legal decision in the optical of these three authors, so we defend, at the end, the idea of implementation of the Constitution as argumentative venture-discursive and hermeneutical-constructive, tuned to rational agreements shared between human beings in the world of life / Com as transformações operadas através da guinada linguística e hermenêutica, a conscientização do caráter interpretativo do conhecimento de objetos culturais, como é o caso do direito, e do papel da linguagem na compreensão humana de mundo gera uma crise paradigmática sobre o modo de se compreender o direito e de como se operar com ele. Teorias surgem sustentando a vinculação do direito e das decisões jurídicas a uma problemática de moralidade política e a uma pretensão de correção. Essas transformações na teoria do direito conduzem a modificações diretas no Constitucionalismo. Contudo, como executar esta exigência, de fulcro inicial na concretização da Constituição, de cumprimento da pretensão de correção da decisão jurídica? Se divergimos sobre o que é justo ou injusto, como conciliá-la com exigências de segurança jurídica e ao caráter democrático de nossa convivência? A presente dissertação propõe uma contribuição a este debate através do estudo de três autores contemporâneos: Ronald Dworkin, Robert Alexy, Jürgen Habermas. Estuda-se, assim, a problemática da racionalidade e da correção da decisão jurídica nas óticas desses três autores, para, ao fim, defendermos, a ideia de concretização da Constituição como empreendimento argumentativo-discursivo e hermenêutico-construtivo, atento ao compartilhamento intersubjetivo do acordado racionalmente no mundo da vida Ronald Dworkin Jürgen Habermas Robert Alexy Argumentação jurídica Legal argument
43	Interpretação e instituições: o diálogo entre Cass Sunstein e Ronald Dworkin / Interpretation and institutions: the dialogue between Cass Sunstein and Ronald Dworkin. Felipe Paschoalini 09 April 2015 (has links) Este trabalho analisa o diálogo entre Cass Sunstein e Ronald Dworkin. Enquanto Dworkin desenvolveu uma abordagem da prática jurídica como a continuação de uma grande teoria baseada em valores morais, Sunstein recomenda um caminho supostamente mais modesto, baseado em passos obtidos em acordos que pudessem ser alcançados por pessoas com convicções morais diversas. A escolha por esse caminho é justificada não só por razões institucionais, mas também por razões morais e políticas substantivas. A crítica central de Sunstein a Dworkin é um suposto ponto cego quanto às questões de capacidade institucional. Sunstein pode ser lido de duas maneiras: como um autor essencialmente pragmático (e incompatível com Dworkin) ou como um interpretativista ao modo Dworkiniano. Conforme o caso, os contornos do seu diálogo com Dworkin são diferentes. De acordo com a primeira leitura, o argumento do ponto cego levantado por Sunstein tem o objetivo de desqualificar todo o projeto teórico Dworkiniano, na medida em que o problema das capacidades institucionais seria tomado como fundamento para um tipo específico de ceticismo moral, o que inutilizaria o critério de correção moral que embasa o interpretativismo Dworkiniano. Essa visão considera que o debate entre Sunstein e Dworkin seria um capítulo do debate entre Dworkin e os pragmatistas céticos. Nos termos da segunda leitura, Sunstein não é um cético na verdade, ele pressupõe um interpretativismo Dworkiniano e sua posição é complementar à obra de Dworkin. No capítulo I, analiso alguns trabalhos centrais de Sunstein e concluo que ele é melhor lido como um Dworkiniano, visto sua teoria pressupõe valores independentes. No capítulo II, estudo os principais pontos da teoria do direito de Dworkin e sugiro que o conceito de integridade, entendido como um conceito corretivo que serve para construir um sistema judicial no qual os juízes podem barganhar uma concepção de justiça ideal por outros fatores do mundo real, indica que a teoria Dworkiniana pode sim ser sensível às questões empíricas e de capacidade institucional. No capítulo III, identifico os pontos do confronto direto entre Sunstein e Dworkin e exponho o proveito que pode ser extraído do estudo desse debate. / This dissertation analyzes the dialogue between Cass Sunstein and Ronald Dworkin. While Dworkin developed an approach that sees the legal practice as a continuum of a greater theory based on moral values, Sunstein recommends a supposedly more modest approach, based on steps obtained in agreements which could be achieved by people holding different moral convictions. The choice of this path is justified not only for institutional reasons, but also for moral and political reasons. The central criticism of Sunstein against Dworkin is a \"blind spot\" with respect to the institutional capacities of judges. Sunstein can be read in two ways: as an essentially pragmatist author (and incompatible with Dworkin) or as an interpretative Dworkinian. As the case may be, the contours of his debate with Dworkin are different. Under to the first reading, the \"blind spot\" argument raised by Sunstein aims to disqualify any Dworkinian theoretical project to the extent that the problem of institutional capacities should be taken as the basis for a specific type of moral skepticism, which would deny the claim to moral correctness that supports Dworkinian interpretativism. In this case, that the debate between Dworkin and Sunstein should be seen as a chapter of the debate between Dworkin and the skeptic legal pragmatists. Under the the second reading, Sunstein is not a skeptic - in fact, he presupposes a Dworkinian interpretativism and his position is complementary to Dworkins work. In Chapter I, I analyze Sunsteins central work on legal interpretation and conclude that he is best read as a Dworkinian, as his theory assumes independent values. In Chapter II, I study the main points of Dworkins jurisprudence and I suggest that the concept of integrity, understood as a \"corrective\" concept used to build a judicial system in which judges can bargain an ideal conception of justice by other factors of the real world, indicates that Dworkin´s theory can be sensitive to the empirical institutional capacities raised by Sunstein. In Chapter III, identify the points of direct confrontation between Sunstein and Dworkin and explain the agenda that can be extracted from the debate. Análise do discurso Cass Dworkin Filosofia do direito Ronald 1931- Sunstein Teoria do direito (interpretação) Cass Sunstein Institutions Interpretation Interpretivism Legal theory Ronald Dworkin
44	Monetização dos riscos no meio ambiente do trabalho uma leitura a partir do liberalismo igualitário TAVARES, Sílvia Gabriele Corrêa January 2014 (has links) Submitted by Diego Barros (diegobbarros@ufpa.br) on 2015-03-18T12:12:28Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 22974 bytes, checksum: 99c771d9f0b9c46790009b9874d49253 (MD5) Dissertacao_MonetizacaoRiscosMeio.pdf: 1305651 bytes, checksum: cfb61fda688d11d0657afa382cfa2e4d (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Rosa Silva (arosa@ufpa.br) on 2015-03-19T13:32:27Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 22974 bytes, checksum: 99c771d9f0b9c46790009b9874d49253 (MD5) Dissertacao_MonetizacaoRiscosMeio.pdf: 1305651 bytes, checksum: cfb61fda688d11d0657afa382cfa2e4d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-19T13:32:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 22974 bytes, checksum: 99c771d9f0b9c46790009b9874d49253 (MD5) Dissertacao_MonetizacaoRiscosMeio.pdf: 1305651 bytes, checksum: cfb61fda688d11d0657afa382cfa2e4d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / CNPq - Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / Esta dissertação trata da Monetização dos Riscos no Meio Ambiente do Trabalho – fenômeno que autoriza a compensação financeira para o trabalhador em razão de sua exposição a riscos existentes no local de trabalho –, sob a ótica do Liberalismo Igualitário de John Rawls e Ronald Dworkin. O primeiro capítulo analisa e compara as teorias liberais igualitárias apresentadas por John Rawls e Ronald e Dworkin com a teoria da Análise Econômica do Direito de Richard Posner. O segundo capítulo demonstra quais são as práticas do ordenamento jurídico brasileiro com relação à monetização dos riscos. O terceiro capítulo realiza uma análise normativa e principiológica para responder se há necessidade de reformular tais práticas, analisando, ainda, quais são os óbices à efetivação da proteção aos trabalhadores. / This thesis analyses the Risks Monetization in the Work Environment – phenomenon that authorizes the financial compensation for the worker due to his exposure to risks existing in the place of work –, which is done by the optics of the Egalitarian Liberalism of John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. The first chapter analyses and compares the liberal egalitarian theories presented by John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin with the Economic Analysis of the Law theory of Richard Posner. The second chapter demonstrates which are the brazilian juridical practices related to the risks monetization. The third chapter makes a norm and principles based analysis in order to answer if it is necessary to reform those practices, analyzing, yet, which are the obstacles for the effective workers protection. Monetização dos riscos Liberalismo Ronald Dworkin, 1931-2013 John Rawls, 1921-2002 Ambiente de trabalho Risco ambiental Trabalhadores
45	德渥金論公民違抗 / Ronald Dworkin on Civil Disobedience 楊士奇 Unknown Date (has links) 本論文題旨為：德渥金論公民違抗。公民違抗概念的存在與政治哲學同時並起而大興於二十世紀，包括甘地以之倡議印度獨立，乃至於六○年代的美國用以爭取黑人民權、女權、反越戰、校園反叛等等，如今更是民主國家中人民意見表達、抗議之常見方式。在違抗政府的意義界定上，公民違抗與流血革命不同，其特質為（廣義的）非暴力（non-violence），目的並非推翻政府，而是人民基於良心、基於正義，同時也基於對政策、法律的不同意見，迫使政府改變其法律、政策。然而，公民違抗不僅是一項政治與社會實踐。對本論文的中心關懷而言，更重要的是，公民違抗產生的原因與背景是什麼？它背後所代表的意義又是什麼？筆者認為，儘管公民違抗作為一政治、社會實踐，在實踐過程中充滿變化與挑戰，然而就理論思考而言，公民違抗不啻為探究與反省民主理論之最佳對象。要之，公民違抗為人民自發性的行動，旨在違抗政府政策、法律等政令；然而在基礎意義上，以民主作為立國基礎之國家，政治是向人民開放的，即，民主國家中的人民具有參與政治的權利與權力──公民違抗的出現使得這項民主定義被凸顯出來而被重新檢視：人民被迫以違法抗議的方式作為意見表達的出口，必然在政治參與的理論與實踐上出現難以跨越的橫溝與歧異。據此，審視公民違抗的實踐之於政治理論，有其時代意義與重要性。本論文共分五章，分別簡述如下：第一章為導論，分為兩節。第一節為問題脈絡，主要就現實社會的觀察提出思考與反省：政治的本質是什麼？公民違抗與政治的關係又是什麼？第二節為研究進路，說明本文以德渥金的權利理論作為探查公民違抗及其背後所代表意旨的角度。公民違抗本質上強調與爭取人民權利，而德渥金權利理論正是取眼於人民權利保障，本論文寄望在兩者之間，取得理論與實踐之調諧與平衡。第二章旨在回溯公民違抗議題的發展，主要分為三節。第一節以蘇格拉底、金恩等人所從事之違抗事例說明，對公民違抗者而言：惡法非法；因而面對不義的法律，人民不僅不應遵守，更應起身違抗，使生命更為正義。第二節藉由德渥金與梭羅等人之眼進一步指出，違抗不義的法律之於人民正義生活的必要性，以及政府面對基於正義而違抗法律的人民時，應以寬容的態度對應之。第三節則是兼顧羅爾斯與鄂蘭的見解，指出公民違抗雖出自於人民的正義感與良心，但最終應立基於人民對公共議題的關懷與共識；同時，藉由「公民違抗的憲政地位為何？」與「寬容、以政治方式處理公民違抗的意義為何？」等提問向契約理論開放。第三章藉由古典契約論與當代契約論之比較，指出契約論中的同意理論才是憲政理論的重心，而公民違抗相關於憲政體制，應取眼於同意理論中保障人民權利的視角，作為公民違抗立論的基礎。本章共分為三節，第一節回溯古典契約論者霍布斯、洛克等人對自然狀態的看法，並指出同意概念與自然權利是契約理論的思考核心。第二節接續前節對古典契約論的回顧，指出盧梭最初提出公共意志的真意，並檢討同意理論的實踐問題，包括多數決原則、代議政治等所產生的弊病。筆者認為，同意中的明示（express consent）之於政治同意並不構成基礎性的問題；問題在於默許（tacit consent）。包括洛克、盧梭甚至更早的蘇格拉底都認為，居住是作為對國家、政治權威與制度的一種同意，是一種默許。問題在於，這種默許方式對於國家╱政治權威正當性的肯認基礎過於薄弱，而這正是公民違抗在契約理論中、在憲政層次上存在的必要地位：公民違抗作為一種不同意的表示，在違抗法律、政策並要求改變的同時，也間接反證了違抗對象存在的正當性。第三節旨在說明，當代契約論者羅爾斯的正義理論著重「人們將同意什麼樣的政治制度」，而忽略了「人們憑藉著什麼而得以同意、以及為什麼不同意」這個面向。同時，德渥金也指出，假定的契約不是契約──契約論者要保障的正是人民同意所憑藉的「權利概念」，並進入第四章討論公民違抗與德渥金的權利理論。第四章鋪陳公民違抗與德渥金權利理論的關係，共分三節。第一節鋪陳德渥金權利理論的法學基礎，指出在德渥金權利理論中，以原則（principle）為論旨中心：在法學理論上，權利理論以「法律的發展相應於道德的發展」恰恰與法實證主義相對舉。第二節指出，在德渥金的權利理論中，公民違抗的行動理據證立在「個人有權反對國家」這項命題上。簡言之，當前民主制度以多數決原則作為解決公共爭議的方式，卻凸顯出少數在數量上的弱勢；而在多數的集結經常以利益作為考量的情況上，「個人反對國家」的強意義權利更能對比出利益多數之於政策制定的不公義。第三節討論平等權利與公民違抗。德渥金的權利理論最終以平等作為自由的基礎，其中德渥金的自由主義式平等觀更異於一般：作為平等的個人而受到平等對待的權利。德渥金指出，作為平等的個人所受到的平等對待權利是一種平等的關心與尊重的權利；政府在政策的制定與抉擇上，不能只考慮效益主義齊頭式的平等觀，而必須考量作為少數的弱勢：在利益與機會等的分配上，應該有一種被容許的不平等分配方式，供政府做出整體的決定。要之，公民違抗作為一種政治參與的方式，事實上是一種消極的抗議表達；與其等到人民對於政治現狀、政策法律達到無可忍受的地步，不如在政府施政的同時，便多著眼於人民權利的注重與人民平等地位的關懷，作為一積極意義的政治思考，對於促進人民生活更能有進取性的助益。第五章為結論，主要分兩部份。第一部份總結本論文的研究所得：公民違抗終究只是一種手段，真正的目的仍舊在於使人民獲得公平、正義、良善的生活。第二部份回顧現實：除了台灣近日在政治作為上體現德渥金所言：「公平之路存在於寬容之中」之外，鄰近的菲律賓總統下台事件道出公民違抗的積極面「主權在民」，而當前世界各地反全球化的抗議浪潮更顯示，人民的抗議對象已經從過去在政治上所面對的國家，轉而成隱藏在國家背後的經濟統合體系。德渥金的自由主義式平等觀作為一種資源與福利的分配正義，對本論文的研究題旨而言儘管是一項限制，然而卻在新時代的挑戰中成為新問題的可能進路：過去人們在政治上爭自由與平等，如今人們可能因為經濟問題陷入另一層次的不自由與不平等。據此，德渥金的自由主義式平等觀有更進一步研析的重要性，本文囿於題旨與篇幅限制，僅將此問題向未來開放。德渥金公民違抗社會契約理論同意權利理論 Ronald Dworkin Civil disobedience Social contract Consent Right theories
46	Visar Dworkins teori om jämlika resurser lika hänsyn och respekt för alla medborgare? : En analys av Elizabeth S. Andersons kritik mot “luck egalitarianism”, applicerad på Dworkins teori om jämlika resurser / Does Dworkin’s Theory of Equality of Resources Show Equal Concern and Respect for All Citizens? : An Analysis of Elizabeth S. Andersons Critique of Luck Egalitarianism Applied to Equality of Resources Wahlberg, Linus January 2021 (has links) I uppsatsen presenterar jag “luck egalitarianism” och specifikt Dworkins teori om jämlika resurser. Målet med Dworkins teori är att sammanväva de två till synes motstridiga principerna om lika hänsyn och lika respekt. Dworkin försöker föra samman principerna genom att nå en fördelning som är ambitions-känslig samtidigt som den är talang-okänslig. Han försöker uppnå detta ideal genom att kombinera en fri marknad som visar lika respekt för medborgarnas valfrihet och ansvar, med en försäkringsmarknad som visar lika hänsyn till medborgarna genom möjligheten att teckna försäkring mot oförutsägbara konsekvenser under lika möjlighet och lika risk. Elizabeth S. Anderson påstår att Dworkins teori misslyckas i att kombinera principerna om lika hänsyn och lika respekt på ett rimligt sätt och presenterar två övergripande invändningar: hårdhetsinvändningen och förnedringsinvändningen. Den första invändningen (hårdhetsinvändingen) påstår att teorins ramverk för att fastslå vilka av de utsatta som har rätt till kompensation inte visar lika hänsyn till alla som är utsatta. Den andra invändningen (förnedringsinvändingen) påstår att grunderna för kompensation är förnedrande och inte visar lika respekt för alla medborgare. Målet med uppsatsen är att analysera Dworkins teori och undersöka om den vederläggs av Andersons invändningar. Den slutsats jag skall försvara är att så inte är fallet. Forskningsfrågan är följande: Påvisar Andersons invändningar att Dworkins teori om jämlika resurser inte visar lika hänsyn och respekt för alla medborgare? Dworkin Ronald Dworkin Elizabeth Anderson equality of resources luck egalitarianism luck egalitarianism harshness objection humiliation objection brute luck option luck Philosophy Filosofi
47	由德沃金裁判理論論著作權存續期間的延長 —以Eldred v. Ashcroft案為中心— / Eldred v. Ashcroft—a case study of copyright term extension based on Dworkin's theory of adjudiction 林倍志, Lin, Pei Chih Unknown Date (has links) 自世界上第一部成文著作權法—安妮法案（The Statute of Anne）在1709年問世以來，著作權問題迄今仍一直是紛擾不休。著作權問題的發展一直以來跟科技的進步息息相關。而關於著作權存續期間的問題，一直是著作權領域中最富爭議性的問題之一，兩百年來，這個問題持續不斷的形成各個時代共通的難題，從不曾真正畫下句點。德沃金是當代西方世界最富盛名的一位法哲學家之一，他提出以權利作為核心的裁判理論，試圖解決當法官在面臨沒有明確的法律條文或判例可資作為依循的困難案件時，應如何作出判決的問題。本文以美國聯邦最高法院於2003年所作成的Eldred v. Ashcroft案判決作為觀察的重點，在Eldred v. Ashcroft一案中，雙方當事人最大的爭議在於著作權存續期間的延長是否合憲？本文認為，關於著作權存續期間是否合憲的問題屬於著作權法上的困難案件。因此，本文試圖透過德沃金所提出的裁判理論來觀察Eldred v. Ashcroft案中，美國各級法院裁判的理由構成是否建構在權利的基礎上。本文也希望從Eldred案著作權存續期間延長的爭議中，一審到三審雙方當事人與美國各級法院法官的裁判與主張，提供一個我國法院裁判時可以參考與依據的借鏡，透過外國法院與學說對於這個問題的處理，來幫助我國解決同樣的爭議，並逐步建構我國的裁判理論。德沃金裁判理論權利著作權存續期間 CTEA法案 Ronald Dworkin Theory of Adjudiction Right Copyright Term Copyright Term Extension Act
48	法與道德--德沃京對法實證主義分離命題之批判 / Law and morality--Ronald Dworkin's critique of the separation thesis of legal positivism 許家馨, Hsu, Chia-hsin Unknown Date (has links) 本論文總共分為三部分，共八章。第一部份是「分離命題綜論」，包含了第一、二章。在第一章當中，筆者從歷史及分析的路徑，對分離命題做了一個初步的介紹。歷史的部分，筆者選取邊沁與奧斯丁、美國法現實主義、德國自然法復興運動這三個對於英美法理學界來說較為重要的關於分離命題的討論。在分析的部分，筆者簡單地說明分離命題與法概念以及道德概念的關係。當然，筆者也介紹了本文所探討的主角—德沃京的生平、其學說的發展以及其學說與分離命題的關係。第二章則是特別針對德沃京最主要的理論對手哈特的法理論以及他對分離命題的主張。第一章與第二章一起，才算是完成本文的預備工作。第二部分是德沃京前期對分離命題的批判。本文將德沃京前期與後期區分開來，是因為德沃京學說的前期與後期都有很大的影響力，可是他後期的理論所使用的語彙有經過相當的修正，因此不適合放在一起介紹。第二部分包括第三、四章，筆者分別名之為「原則論I」與「原則論II」。這是因為德沃京前期的法理論是以「原則」概念為主軸所發展出來的。第三章主要是對德沃京《認真看待權利》一書中《規則模式I》一章的介紹。第四章則是對《規則模式II》以及疑難案件這兩章的介紹。《規則模式I》是德沃京整個法理論的出發點。它本身構成一個完整的整體，儘管仍是一個有待發展的整體。《規則模式II》是對《規則模式I》的補充。疑難案件則是德沃京法理論的突破性發展，許多他在後期完整發展的觀念都可以在這篇文章中看到雛形。筆者將《規則模式II》及疑難案件中的重點一起放入第四章作為對於第三章的補充。這些一起構成了德沃京前期的完整面貌。當然，筆者用以貫穿其中的軸線，就是德沃京對分離命題的批判。第三部份是德沃京後期對分離命題之批判。這一部份主要焦點是在德沃京集大成的系統著作法律帝國。這一部份包括第五、六、七章。第五章說明了德沃京後期修正過後的概念架構，以及在這個新的概念架構與分離命題的關係是什麼。處理的對象是法律帝國的第一章。第六章則是對德沃京「詮釋」概念的闡釋。「詮釋」概念是德沃京後期理論的核心，因此我們有必要對之清楚地說明。顯得比較突兀的是第六章的第一節。筆者從社會科學方法論的角度分析了哈特與德沃京法理論在方法上的意涵。這是因為，筆者認為分離命題的焦點乃是在於法理論家如何看待法概念，若要深入地評估法理論的意涵，勢必要探討其方法。這個部分處理的對象主要是法律帝國的第二、三章。第七章則介紹德沃京後期法理論的重點，也就是他認為的法概念的「構念」--作為整全性的法律。最後，也就是第八章是結論。這是筆者對全篇論文的回顧，以及筆者對於分離命題這個主題的價值的看法。第一部分離命題綜論第一章緒論第一節分離命題概論I—歷史的路徑第一項邊沁與奧斯丁第二項法現實主義者的挑戰第三項德國自然法復興運動第二節分離命題概論II—分析的路徑第一項法概念第一款規範取向的法概念與非規範取向的法概念第二款法概念的指涉與理論說明第二項道德概念第三節德沃京的法理論與分離命題第一項德沃京生平簡介第二項德沃京的法理論發展及其分期第三項本文問題意識：德沃京法理論與分離命題第四節本論文架構第二章哈特與分離命題第一節從定義到核心要素第一項定義第二項組織性原則與一組核心要素第二節哈特的法概念與分離命題第一項初級規則與次級規則的結合第二項個別法律的效力第三項法體系的存在第四項個案中的法律第三節哈特法理論的性質第一項一般性第二項描述性第三項一般性、描述性與分離命題第二部德沃京前期對法實證主義分離命題之批判第三章原則論 ( I ) 第一節德沃京的論證第一項原則是存在的第二項原則與規則邏輯性質的差異第三項原則也是法規範第四項原則無法被承認規則鑑別出來第一款妥當感第二款制度上的佐證第三款習慣法的問題第五項原則是某種道德第二節原則是什麼？第一項原則的功能第一款原則的五種功能第二款原則之功能的省思第二項原則的來源第三節規則與原則的邏輯性質差異是否成立？第一項如何判斷是規則或原則？第二項規則衝突則失效？第三項規則與原則之區分的理論意涵第四節原則是不是法規範？第五節原則與道德的關係是什麼？第四章原則論（II）第一節對承認規則的批判第一項哈特的社會規則論第二項對社會規則論的批判第一款社會規則與規範規則第二款「自主而合意的道德」與「從眾而成習的道德」第三款疑難情況的出現第三項對作為社會規則之承認規則的批判第二節權利論第一項權利第一款權利與目標第二款幾種權利的分類第二項法律權利第一款規範與價值第二款作為權利執行者的司法部門第三款政治理論第三項權利與道德第三節對裁量論的批判第一項德沃京對司法裁量論的批判第一款弱意義與強意義的裁量第二款法實證主義者的裁量論第二項對司法裁量論之批判的理論意涵第三部德沃京後期對法實證主義分離命題之批判第五章新的起點：新的法概念第一節新的概念架構第一項關於法律的理論爭議第二項法律命題與法律根據第三項新的法概念第二節疑難案件的實例第三節單純事實觀點第四節語意學的刺第一項法的語義學理論第二項法實證主義第三項語義學的刺第五節小結：新的起點第六章詮釋性的法概念第一節社會科學方法論上的批判第一項法理論的自我理解第二項作為受制於規則之活動的法律言說第一款語言遊戲與說話行動第二款哈特的困境第三項一般性與描述性法理論之困難第一款一般性第二款描述性第四項詮釋性的法理論第二節建構詮釋論第一項建構性詮釋第一款一個虛構的例子第二款對話性詮釋、科學性詮釋與創造性詮釋第三款建構性詮釋第二項對社會實踐的建構性詮釋第一款詮釋的三個階段第二款概念、構念與典範第三節詮釋性的法概念第七章整全的法律第一節成規主義與法實用主義第一項成規主義第二項法實用主義第二節整全性第一項整全性符合嗎？第二項整全性有吸引力嗎？第一款真正的社群第二款政治社群第三節整全的法律第一項連環小說第二項海克力斯法官第三項法律與道德第四節懷疑論的挑戰第八章結論參考文獻 / Abstract This master dissertation elaborates the leading anti-positivist Ronald Dworkin’s standing on critique of the separation thesis, the positivist doctrine that law and morality are separate, or ‘what law is’ is different from ‘what law ought to be’. The author firstly argues that although the dispute over the separation thesis in the old context, which mainly concerns with the relationship between legal validity and morality, no longer stands in the central spotlight, the recent heating concern with the role morality plays in legal reasoning is actually a continuance of the old-time concern. The overarching rationale behind these developments is a battle about where and how to base the objectivity of law in the modern world. Therefore, despite that Dworkin’s legal theory has focused on the part morality plays in legal reasoing, it could still be elaborated as a critique of separation thesis in a broader sense. This dissertation distinguishes ‘early Dworkin’ and ‘later Dworkin’s’ critique of the separation thesis. ‘Early Dworkin’ means Dworkin’s legal theory in Taking Right Seriously. ‘:Later Dworkin’ means Dworkin’s legal theory in Law’s Empire. While the author thinks the essence of Dworkin’s legal theory remained basically the same throughout his early and later thoughts, it is necessary to introduce his theory in two parts because the concepts he used were greatly changed and improved, and the arguments shifted. Dworkin’s early critique of separation thesis is organized around the concept of ‘principle’. The author argues that the most important argument Dworkin should be making is not that principles exist, but that principles are ‘law’ and that principles cannot be identified by the rule of recognition. And these two arguments are not to be cleared up only until Dworkin’s later argument using the concept of ‘interpretation’. The author also criticizes Hart’s claim that the nature of legal theory could fruitfully remain general and descriptive. By surveying the development of the methodology of social science, the author argues that Hart’s standing on the nature of legal theory reveals his ultimate philosophical foundation of empiricism and positivism. The author therefore argues that a fruitful gain a legal theory is to get, it has to be particular and ‘interpretive’, as Dworkin has claimed. 法實證主義自然法論規則與原則承認規則德沃京哈特詮釋性法理論法與道德 legal positivism natural law rule and principle rule of recognition Ronald Dworkin H. L. A. Hart interpretive theory of law law and morality
49	民主原則規範性困境之解決——透過論辯倫理學建構基進審議民主的嘗試 / A Solution to the Normative Dilemma of Principle of Democracy: An Outline of Radical Deliberative Democracy via Discourse Ethics 呂政諺, Lyu, Jheng-Yan Unknown Date (has links) 民主原則之規範性困境，今日已於所有民主國家的政治生活中，展現為層出不窮的民主危機。尤其因為民粹威權主義於成熟民主國家的大行其道，民主危機的解決已成為當代民主迫在眉睫的問題。為求取釜底抽薪的解決之道，則必須從理論層面出發，對民主之概念進行徹底的反省。然而，法學本身顯然難以克服此一困境，而必須將道德哲學與政治哲學的理論資源與方法納入視野之內，以便從規範性證立民主的基本內涵開始，循序漸進地獲致其反映於制度層面應有的具體內容。　　過往的民主理論證立民主之所以具有無法克服的困難，是因為其終須依賴當代多元社會下有爭議的道德信念。對此，本文以Jürgen Habermas的「論辯倫理學」為基礎，從而對民主的基本精神提出無爭議的規範性證立。透過論辯倫理學的進一步推演，Habermas亦導出「法律論辯理論」，以說明法律作為施展強制力的工具是如何被證立的。藉由結合論辯倫理學與法律論辯理論，便能將民主強制付諸於日常生活的實踐之中，據此呈現出民主作為憲法原則的應有樣貌。植基於此一的路徑，本文拓展了Habermas的理念，從而證立並闡發民主的核心精神。　　此一依循論辯倫理學及法律論辯理論所獲致的民主原則內容，即為審議民主理論。依據前述的理論奠基，本文認為審議民主理論蘊含的內容可歸結為「論辯之基本權」以及「政治平等諸規則」兩大理念，並能透過基進民主理論的批判以深化對後者的理解，從而闡發審議民主理論的基進意涵。「基進審議民主」明確而豐富的內容不僅宣告著民主原則規範性困境之解決，也同時於實踐上提出了化解民主危機的制度建議。 / In the political life of all democracies, the normative dilemma of principle of democracy has appeared as endless crises of democracy. Accrodingly, to solve the crisis of democracy thus becomes an urgent issue for the contemporary democracy. As populist authoritarianism propagated on a upsetting scale around developed democracies, finding a resolution also grows more significant. To solve this problems once and for all, we must proceed forward from a theoretical perspective that indicate a profound reflection on the concept of democracy. Because jurisprudence becomes manifest in lack of proper paths to overcome this dilemma by itself, incorporating the theoretical resources and methods of ethics and political philosophy into the field of vision may be imperative and necessary. With the foundation that justifies fundamental connotations of democracy in a normative approch, we will obtain the specific contents that democracy reflects at the institutional level progressively. 　　Previous works on democratic theory are so difficult to justify democracy per se because their justifications depending on controversial moral beliefs in contemporary plural society drift into failure. In this regard, Jürgen Habermas advanced the “Discourse Ethics” which suggests a non-controversial normative justification of democratic essences as the most promising theory at present. Through employing Discourse Ethics, Habermas deduced “Discourse Theory of Law” to explain how to justify law as a compulsory instrument. In this manner, democracy can be forced into daily life, via combining Discourse Ethics and Discourse Theory of Law, to draw a ideal form as a a constitutional principle. Through the illustration of Habermas's doctrine, this thesis tries to broaden the ways to understand and describe the democracy. 　　“Deliberative Democracy” is the very idea derived from Discourse Ethics and Discourse Theory of Law. Based on the foundations of the above, this thesis suggests that the contents of Deliberative Democracy can be attributed to the two basic concepts including “fundamental rights of discourse” and “rules of political equality”, which, through criticisms of radical democracy, shall be further deepen the understanding of the latter to elucidate what radical meanings do Deliberative Democracy have. With specific and profuse contents, radical deliberative democracy not only invents a solution to the normative dilemma of principle of democracy, but puts forward institutional proposals to resolving crises of democracy in practice simultaneously. 基進審議民主民主原則審議民主基進民主政治平等論辯阿列西穆芙洪席耶德沃金伯林桑德爾 Radical Deliberative Democracy Principle of Democracy Deliberative Democracy Radical Democracy Political Equality Discourse Robert Alexy Chantal Mouffe Jacques Rancière Ronald Dworkin Isaiah Berlin Michael Sandel
50	A Pragmatic Standard of Legal Validity Tyler, John 2012 May 1900 (has links) American jurisprudence currently applies two incompatible validity standards to determine which laws are enforceable. The natural law tradition evaluates validity by an uncertain standard of divine law, and its methodology relies on contradictory views of human reason. Legal positivism, on the other hand, relies on a methodology that commits the analytic fallacy, separates law from its application, and produces an incomplete model of law. These incompatible standards have created a schism in American jurisprudence that impairs the delivery of justice. This dissertation therefore formulates a new standard for legal validity. This new standard rejects the uncertainties and inconsistencies inherent in natural law theory. It also rejects the narrow linguistic methodology of legal positivism. In their stead, this dissertation adopts a pragmatic methodology that develops a standard for legal validity based on actual legal experience. This approach focuses on the operations of law and its effects upon ongoing human activities, and it evaluates legal principles by applying the experimental method to the social consequences they produce. Because legal history provides a long record of past experimentation with legal principles, legal history is an essential feature of this method. This new validity standard contains three principles. The principle of reason requires legal systems to respect every subject as a rational creature with a free will. The principle of reason also requires procedural due process to protect against the punishment of the innocent and the tyranny of the majority. Legal systems that respect their subjects' status as rational creatures with free wills permit their subjects to orient their own behavior. The principle of reason therefore requires substantive due process to ensure that laws provide dependable guideposts to individuals in orienting their behavior. The principle of consent recognizes that the legitimacy of law derives from the consent of those subject to its power. Common law custom, the doctrine of stare decisis, and legislation sanctioned by the subjects' legitimate representatives all evidence consent. The principle of autonomy establishes the authority of law. Laws must wield supremacy over political rulers, and political rulers must be subject to the same laws as other citizens. Political rulers may not arbitrarily alter the law to accord to their will. Legal history demonstrates that, in the absence of a validity standard based on these principles, legal systems will not treat their subjects as ends in themselves. They will inevitably treat their subjects as mere means to other ends. Once laws do this, men have no rest from evil. natural law theory legal positivism HLA Hart William Blackstone John Locke Jeremy Bentham John Austin Galileo Socrates Trotsky Athens Soviet law Stuart dynasty John Dewey Dewey Commission Sidney Hook Congregation of the Holy Office Galileo Affair trial of Socrates Moscow Trials trial of Galileo heresy trial of Trotsky reason autonomy consent philosophy of law pragmatism Kant Inquisition ostracism Anaxagoras Protagoras Alcibiades Arginusae Pericles Peloponnesian War Solon Ephialtes Apology Plato Herodotus Xenophon Plutarch Roscoe Pound common law Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. The Common Law The Path of the Law Learned Hand Christopher Columbus Langdell Ronald Dworkin Lon Fuller Lenin Stalin King Rex Sergei Kirov Permanent Revolution Socialism in One Country Great Terror Dekulakization Holomodor Terror Famine Italian positivist school Harold J. Berman Gustav Radbruch Ramon Mercader Trotsky assassination Marteman Ryutin Old Bolsheviks Genrikh Yagoda Pope Urban VIII Walter Duranty Harold Denny New York Times Joseph E. Davies Mission to Moscow New Republic John F. Finerty Lev Sedov Military Collegium Vasili Ulrikh Gaspare Borgia Cardinal Robert Bellarmine Pericles Father Commissary Michelangelo Segizzi Cardinal Francesco Barberini Cardinal Maffeo Barberini Siderius Nuncius Starry Messenger Accademia dei Lincei Letters on Sunspots Friar Tommaso Caccini Niccolo Lorini Commentaries on the Laws of England Second Treatise on Civil Government Henry de Bracton Sir Edward Coke Sir John Fortescue Matthew Hale Ranulf de Glanvil James I Charles I James II Charles II ship money forest fines distraint of knighthood impositions dispensing power royal prerogative Duke of Buckingham Oliver Cromwell Bishops Wars William Prynne Great Migration Declaration of Indulgence Settlement Act Test Act Protectorate Clarendon Code Quaker Act William and Mary English Civil War Puritan Revolution Glorious Revolution Thirty Years' War Earl of Shaftesbuty William Laud Historiomatrix Long Parliament Rump Parliament Barebones Parliament sociological jurisprudence Red Terror war communism New Economic Policy 1926 Criminal Code Kirov Amendments judicial discretion semantic sting The Concept of Law Fragments on Government The Province of Jurisprudence Determined A Fragment on Government Anarchical Fallacies primary rules secondary rules rule of recognition legal validity internal point of view external point of view law as prediction the bad man perspective on law life of the law page of history Basilikon Doron Trew Law of Free Monarchies

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