Denna studie syftar till att utforska och problematisera en specifik definition av musikterapi: den som användes av World Federation of Music Therapy från 1996 till 2011. Följande frågeställningar undersöks: vilket sorts språk används, på vilka sätt det finns outsagda förväntningar på förförståelse, vilken typ av definition den kan sägas vara samt om den är giltig och användbar. De teoretiska utgångspunkterna är hermeneutik, analytisk språkfilosofi i G. E. Moores efterföljd samt modern teoribildning kring definitioner enligt A. Gupta. För att svara på frågorna har metoden ”text tolkar text” använts. Definitionen har brutits mot andra texter från angränsande områden och försök har gjorts att fastställa vilken plats och vilken funktion den har i de traditioner den refererar till: musik, terapi och musikterapi. Resultatet visar att definitionen använder sig av ett utvidgat språk och den förutsätter en förförståelse för framför allt ”musik” som inte är intuitivt självklar. Definitionen förefaller också vara av typen explikativ analytisk definition samt en cirkeldefinition. Den är dock användbar och giltig utifrån vad Gupta kallar ”revisionsteorin för definitioner” då den kan användas som det Bruscia kallar ”arbetsdefinition”. / The purpose of this study is to examine and problematize a specific definition of music therapy: the 1996 to 2011 World Federation of Music Therapy definition. The following questions are raised: what kind of language is in use, in what way exist silent expectations regarding pre-understanding, what kind of definition is it and is it valid and useful? Theoretical starting points are hermeneutics, analytical philosophy of language in the tradition following G. E. Moore and modern theories concerning definitions according to A. Gupta. In order to answer the questions the method of ”text explains text” has been employed. The definition has been interpreted by using other texts from neighboring fields of research, and an attempt has been made to identify the place and function of the definition in the traditions it refers to: music, therapy and music therapy. The result show that the definition makes use of an expanded language and presupposes an understanding of above all ”music” that goes beyond what is intuitively self-evident. It appears to be an explicative analytical definition and a circular definition. However it is both valid and useful from the perspective of what Gupta calls the ”theory of revisions of definitions” and as such it is close to what Bruscia calls ”working definitions”.

Slurs are offensive words used about people on account of them belonging to certain groups,for example based on gender, sexual orientation or ethnicity. The topic of slurs has interestedphilosophers of language recently, and there are several theories trying to explain them. Mostassume that slurs have Neutral Counterparts, non-offensive words that can be used more or lesssynonymously with certain slurs. In this thesis I attempt to construct a theory of slurs withoutneutral counterparts. First, I give a background where I explain extension, content and neutralcounterparts. Then I describe popular theories about how slurs offend. After that I summarizeAlice Damirjian’s critique against neutral counterparts in her article “Rethinking slurs”. Againstthis background I explain my theory of slurs; slurs lack neutral counterparts, and they refer toentirely different classes than so called “neutral counterparts” do. Instead, slurs refer nonphysical sociocultural constructions, while “Neutral counterparts” refer to physical people.While the relation between slurs and “neutral counterparts” is non-semantic, it is pragmatic;there is a widespread misconception that slurs and “neutral counterparts” are more or lesssynonymous. Slurs offend since their sociocultural constructions are associated withstereotypes that are attributed to the people that their so called “neutral counterparts” refer to.After I explain my theory I respond to counterarguments, and the thesis is concluded with asummary.

No form of philosophy is without literary style. This is not always appreciated and opponents of style within philosophy often seem to be unaware of the role of style. Arguments that style is bad, good, or that diversity of styles is good needs to be investigated so that the underlying presuppositions and the meaning of different literary styles becomes clear. This thesis examines three arguments for and against style within philosophy and the relevance of literary style for the philosophical method. I investigate what arguments and fundamental assumptions about language that underlies the judgments that literary style in philosophy is either 1.) bad, 2.) good or, 3.) both bad and good (a diversity position). An analysis of three different positions to the question of the relevance of style will be performed. The analysis focuses on the basic understandings of what language is and does and reveals the underlying presuppositions of the attitudes towards style in philosophy. Only then can the different positions and attitudes towards style be defended and examined in an interesting and relevant way. The debate about philosophical style often misses a significant point because many are unaware of the philosophical presuppositions behind the arguments, and the argumentation risks to be flawed in relation to this. Firstly, a presentation of three different attitudes towards the relevance of style to the philosophical method is outlined. The approaches are represented by a reading of philosophers who either describe the relevance of literary style as 1.) bad, or not important for the method, 2.) important/necessary for the method, or 3.) that diversity is good for philosophy. Secondly, I examine how these three approaches are affected by the underlying philosophy of language with a focus on theories of metaphor. Depending on how one believes that language is related to reality and ourselves, one will assess style as a more, or less, relevant and contributing aspect of the philosophical work and method. The analysis shows that metaphors and other literary stylistic tools might sometimes be necessary and mediate something that cannot be expressed in another way: language can never capture the full potential of reality.

In Otherwise than Being (1974), Levinas asked if and how philosophy could make justice of the concrete ethical meeting by philosophical practice, which is unconditionally conditioned by language. Language, understood as partly situated in being and ontology, is analysed as an appropriation of the other, who is other than being. Language could therefore according to Levinas never fully express the other – sometimes referred to as “otherism”. A condition, then, that needs to be fulfilled for philosophical practice to reach the goal of making justice for the other, and hence be meaningful in the Levinasian picture, is to transcend language through language. In the essay, I analyse through textual interpretation what appears to be a contradiction regarding Levinas’ answer to the possibility of transcendence through and by language in philosophy. On one hand, it appears as if philosophy could not overcome language through language, and that philosophical practice therefore is not meaningful. On the other hand, it appears as if sceptical discourse could overcome language through language. Scepticism might then be considered as the only meaningful practice and philosophy a game of deconstructive dialogue. Since skepticism is understood as a part of philosophy, this would imply that there is a contradiction. I argue that the contradiction could be understood as apparent when considering the criticism executed in Levinas’ analysis of language. I suggest that the contradiction is apparent because sceptical interchange is meaningful.

Together with an basic assumption of the main thesis of the theory of singular direct reference, this paper formulates two original theses grounded in the Kripkean notion of proper names. Regarding the assumption of the main thesis, efforts have been made to explicitly explain its essence as a reactionary theory against the description theory of proper names, a theory mainly due to Bertrand Russells (1905) influential article "On Denoting". Grounded in Russell, outlining the fundamental idea of proper names as abbreviated or disguised definite descriptions, this paper moves forward through the critiques of Strawsons (1950) "On Referring", Donnellans (1966) "Reference and Definite Descriptions" and Kripkes (1977) "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference". With the historical background in place, in accordance with Salmons (1982) "Reference & Essence" the arguments against the theory of descriptions for proper names are put forward, which leads to the assumption of the mentioned main thesis. Regarding the papers more original theses, the first of these distinguishes between different kinds of proper names depending on whether or not they refer to an object capable of cognitive functioning. The main thrust of this paper is however made through the formulation of the second thesis, as it is being aimed at challenging Kripke's Millian notion of all proper names as being non-connoting. However, in contrast to this view in accordance with the view being put forward in this paper, cognition-referring proper names are connoting. Additionally, a finishing discussion is supplemented concluding descriptions of such connotations as being questions for pragmatism.

This thesis aims at formulating a human rights justification based on the assumption that disbelief in human rights is found in communicative grounds, rather than some sort of unreasonable evil. I first identify what I believe to be a flaw in the communicative strength of existing human rights justifications in explaining why rights should be. I suggest that there is a gap between the justifications of human rights that contain metaphysical narrative, and the justifications that rely on subjective experience of rights as good. I further explain how this is a gap that political consensus and the idea of Kantian moral reason cannot seem to fill. I subsequently boil this gap down to the concept of value, since the foundation for each justification is based on a type of value. These are categorized as either given value – which applies to all attributes of value that is “given” to us independently of our actions or opinions, or created value – which applies to all attributes of value that stem from social interaction (thus action) and experience. As justifications are funneled into either of these two categories of value, it begins to look like no other type of value exist, and as a result no one looks for it. To respond to this problem, I formulate a philosophical explanation, in Robert Nozicks terms. This explanation shows that there may be other routes to apply to value than sticking to simply given or created value. My explanation utilizes the three theories of philosophical anthropology, internal metaphysical realism and Wittgensteins philosophy of language, and it is based on the result of an analysis of material consisting of human rights justification arguments by Nicholas Wolterstorff, Alasdaire MacIntyre, Martha Nussbaum and Richard Rorty. The actual philosophical explanation I formulate utilizes the metaphysics of Helen Steward to provide a given-value foundation for the primitive reactions of Stefan Eriksson, which creates value through social organization. Overall, I find that there are untried possibilities which may allow for a different type of value to act as the foundation for a human rights justification. My contribution to the field rests in the novelty of the theories used in my explanation, and the angle of the problem formulation.

<p>Jag ämnar med den här uppsatsen att belysa det teologiska språket som den mänskliga konstruktion jag anser det vara. Mitt syfte är att fokusera på faran att ensidigt betona metaforen om Gud som en man, som personlig och opersonlig varelse, och att diskutera den metaforiska innebörden hos den bibliska Gudsbilden och att påskina den revidering jag anser vara nödvändig i det metaforiska språket av Gudsbilden, som är genomsyrat av en patriarkalisk anda. Det andra blir litteraturstudier med anknytning till ämnet och en slutlig avhandling och diskussion med hjälp av vad jag fått fram.</p>

Jag ämnar med den här uppsatsen att belysa det teologiska språket som den mänskliga konstruktion jag anser det vara. Mitt syfte är att fokusera på faran att ensidigt betona metaforen om Gud som en man, som personlig och opersonlig varelse, och att diskutera den metaforiska innebörden hos den bibliska Gudsbilden och att påskina den revidering jag anser vara nödvändig i det metaforiska språket av Gudsbilden, som är genomsyrat av en patriarkalisk anda. Det andra blir litteraturstudier med anknytning till ämnet och en slutlig avhandling och diskussion med hjälp av vad jag fått fram.

En systemarkitekts praktik består till stor del av att tolka, beskriva och strukturera verksamhetsprocesser och -information som underlag för förändrings- och utvecklingsarbete, oftast med stöd av it-system. Professionen betraktas traditionellt som en teknisk ingenjörskonst. Men de problem jag ställs inför som arkitekt handlar inte enbart om att designa tekniska system och kommunikation mellan maskiner, utan minst lika ofta om att hantera utmaningar relaterade till mellanmänsklig kommunikation i komplexa situationer. Vad händer om vi fokuserar på denna andra del av arkitektens praktiska kunskap? Denna magister- uppsats handlar om språkets och kommunikationens roll i kontexten av ett systemutvecklingsprojekt. Författaren använder sig av metaforer i en gestaltande skönlitterär kontext som kreativ metod för att visualisera och förmedla olika aspekter på systemarkitektens yrkesroll och praktik. På så vis utnyttjar uppsatsen den mer experimentella form som essän erbjuder för att även utforska sina egna uttrycksmöjligheter. Essäns teoretiska material baserar sig på den språkfilosofiska tradition som utvecklats av Ludwig Wittgenstein och Gilbert Ryle. Utifrån dessa båda tänkares verk förs ett resonemang runt språkets och den kontextuella förståelsens betydelse för systemarkitektens praktiska kunskap. Essän väver även in tankegångar från Thomas Kuhn, Peter Naur och Donald Schön i syfte att utforska just metaforens, improvisationens och den kreativa kommunikationens roll som verktyg i systemarkitektens praktik. / The system architect ́s practice is mainly about interpreting, describing and structuring the processes and information of an enterprise in order to create a foundation for change and development, often supported by IT systems. The profession is traditionally regarded as an art of technical engineering. But the problems I face as architect is not exclusively about designing technical systems and communication between machines, but just as much about handling challenges related to inter-subjective communi- cation between human beings in situations of complex interaction. What happens if we focus on this second aspect of the practical knowledge of the architect? This essay is about the role of language and communication in the context of a system development project. The author uses metaphors in fictional context as a creative method to visualize and mediate different aspects on the architect ́s professional role and practice. In that sense the text utilizes the more experimental form offered by the essay in order to explore its own expressive possibilities. The theoretical material of this essay is based on the language philosophical tradition developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein and Gilbert Ryle. Starting out from these two thinkers, the author reasons around the importance language and contextual understanding has for the practical knowledge of the system architect. Further on the essay weaves in thoughts from Thomas Kuhn, Peter Naur and Donald Schön with the purpose of exploring the role of the metaphor, improvisation and creative communication as tools in the practice of the system architect.

Ämnet för denna vetenskapliga essän är simultan flerspråkighet, det vill säga individer som växer upp med två eller fler modersmål från födseln. Essän har sin utgångspunkt i en berättelse. Berättelsen gestaltar en svår situation från mitt arbete som fritidshemslärare där ett pedagogiskt dilemma uppstår. I del ett undersöker jag vad språkforskning säger om simultan flerspråkighet och språkutveckling. Del två handlar om flerspråkighet ur ett pedagogisk perspektiv. Där berörs hur känslor är sammanflätade med språk samt hur det påverkar fritidshemsläraren och lärarens roll och ansvar för flerspråkighet i en skola med enspråkig norm. I del tre undersöker jag flerspråkighet ur ett språkfilosofisk perspektiv och fördjupar min analys med hjälp av ett resonemang om erfarenhet, kunskap och språkbruk. Det framkommer att simultan flerspråkighet kan innebära en viss försening av språket under de första åren men sedan är till fördel för elevens språkutveckling. Barn kan vara mer känslomässigt förenade med ett av sina två språk i vissa situationer. Slutligen framgår det att i en skola där enspråkighet är en norm bär pedagoger ett stort ansvar i att välkomna flerspråkighet. / The subject for this scientific essay is simultaneous multilingualism. This is where an individual learns to speak two languages from birth. The essay has its beginning with a story. The story is based on experiences at my work as a Leisure time teacher where a pedagogical dilemma occurs. In part one I examine what linguistic research says about simultaneous multilingualism and language development. Part two is about multilingualism from an educational perspective, and how emotions are intertwined with language. This paper analyzes the leisure-time teacher and the teacher's role and responsibility for multilingualism in a school with a monolingual norm. In part three I examine multilingualism from a philosophical perspective and immersed myself in the view of experience, knowledge, and use of language. It appears that simultaneous multilingualism could mean a certain delay in language development for the first few years but in the end is beneficial to the pupils language development. Children may be more emotionally connected to one of the two languages in certain situations. Finally it appears that in a school where monolingualism is the norm the educators carry a great responsibility to welcome multilingualism.