Ce travail vise à mettre en valeur l’importance de la justice pour la réalisation de l’homme chez Thomas d’Aquin. La première partie traite de la connaissance scientifique et de l’action humaine, l’idée d’ordre dirigeant, selon Thomas, aussi bien le plan théorique que le plan pratique. La deuxième partie traite plus spécifiquement de la vertu de justice, ce qui demande l’analyse des autres vertus morales, mais aussi intellectuelles, qui opèrent avec elle en vue du bien de l’homme. La troisième partie traite des relations entre la justice, le droit et la loi, le droit pouvant être conçu d’après deux perspectives qui se rejoignent, soit comme objet de la justice, soit comme résultat de la juste application de la loi. / This work aims at emphasizing the importance of justice in the realization of man in Thomas Aquinas. The first part deals with scientific knowledge and human action, the idea of order ruling, for him, the theoretical level as well as the practical level. The second part deals more specifically with the virtue of justice, requiring the analysis of the other not only moral but also intellectual virtues, which operate together with it for the good of man. The third part handles with the relations between justice, right and law; the right understood from two related perspectives, either as the object of justice, or as the result of the fair application of the law.

Submitted by SBI Biblioteca Digital (sbi.bibliotecadigital@puc-campinas.edu.br) on 2018-04-12T17:50:52Z No. of bitstreams: 1 BRUNO VIEIRA DINIZ.pdf: 2490348 bytes, checksum: b26b41d5296d2042dfc74dfa81a6d99c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-04-12T17:50:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 BRUNO VIEIRA DINIZ.pdf: 2490348 bytes, checksum: b26b41d5296d2042dfc74dfa81a6d99c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-12-19 / This dissertation has as the main goal the identification of principles of a possible psychotherapy in the light of the tomasian psychology. To reach this objective, we initially discussed the importance of the theme, namely, the importance of Thomism and of a possible psychotherapy in the light of Saint Thomas Aquinas in the present days. In this regard, we believe, among other things, that Thomism has the ability to bring us closer to the truth about human nature in its fullest completeness. Next, we discussed and established some important theoretical assumptions for this work, which are the definitions of Tomasian psychology and Thomistic psychotherapy. We defined that Tomasian psychology is the theological treaty of Thomas Aquinas on the human soul, its essence, powers and acts; and that Thomistic psychotherapy would be a possible application of this psychology: a science and a prudential art whose objectives would be, through interpersonal help, to alleviate suffering and to seek the perfection of the human soul. Then, in order to identify in the psychology developed by Saint Thomas possible principles for a psychotherapy, we undertook a long study in which we tried to synthesize, systematize and analyze the entire content of Tomasian psychology, having as reference the Summa Theologica. Thus, we studied the human soul, its powers and acts, with emphasis on the following themes: the voluntary act and its principles, the ultimate end of man (and the happiness), the passions of the soul, and human virtues and vices. Finally, in the last chapter of this work, we presented, briefly, by way of conclusion, possible principles of a Thomistic psychotherapy, which were identified and inferred from the previous study. We believe that such principles can shed important light on the nature of the therapeutic relationship and on the means of pursuing the main psychotherapeutic goals, as previously presupposed, that are: the alleviation of emotional suffering and the pursuit of human happiness. / Esta disserta??o tem como objetivo principal a identifica??o de princ?pios de uma poss?vel psicoterapia ? luz da psicologia tomasiana. Para atingir esse objetivo, inicialmente, discutimos a import?ncia do tema, ou seja, a import?ncia do tomismo e de uma poss?vel psicoterapia ? luz de Santo Tom?s de Aquino nos dias atuais. Quanto a isso, acreditamos, dentre outras coisas, que o tomismo tem a capacidade de nos aproximar da verdade a respeito da natureza humana em sua maior integralidade. Em seguida, discutimos e estabelecemos alguns importantes pressupostos te?ricos para este trabalho, que s?o as defini??es de psicologia tomasiana e de psicoterapia tomista. Definimos que a psicologia tomasiana ? o tratado teol?gico de Tom?s de Aquino acerca da alma humana, sua ess?ncia, pot?ncias e atos; e que a psicoterapia tomista seria uma poss?vel aplica??o dessa psicologia: uma ci?ncia e uma arte prudencial cujos objetivos seriam, por meio da ajuda interpessoal, o al?vio do sofrimento e a busca da perfei??o da alma humana. Em seguida, com o intuito de identificar na psicologia desenvolvida por Santo Tom?s poss?veis princ?pios para uma psicoterapia, empreendemos um longo estudo em que procuramos sintetizar, sistematizar e analisar o conte?do de toda psicologia tomasiana, tendo como refer?ncia a Suma Teol?gica. Estudamos assim a alma humana, suas pot?ncias e atos, com destaque para os seguintes temas: o ato volunt?rio e seus princ?pios, o fim ?ltimo do homem (e a felicidade), as paix?es da alma, as virtudes e os v?cios humanos. Por fim, no ?ltimo cap?tulo deste trabalho, apresentamos ent?o, sinteticamente, a t?tulo de conclus?o, poss?veis princ?pios de uma psicoterapia tomista, identificados e inferidos a partir do estudo anterior. Acreditamos que tais princ?pios podem nos lan?ar importantes luzes sobre a natureza da rela??o terap?utica e sobre os meios de persecu??o dos principais objetivos psicoterap?uticos, como pressupostos anteriormente, que s?o o al?vio do sofrimento emocional e a busca da felicidade humana.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Adriano Martins Soler.pdf: 951415 bytes, checksum: 38157557b0356bd234445a4288a2bc1d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-09-04 / Secretaria da Educação do Estado de São Paulo / The theory of knowledge in Aquinas is an interest target of many researchers of the period. Its importance is singular, among other things, due to the disruption that it causes between the established doctrine about knowledge itself, the Augustinian doctrine of divine illumination and some orders, that until that moment, remained faithful to (Augustinian s). This dissertation aims, from the articles five and six from question 84 inserted in the first part of the Summa of theology of Thomas Aquinas, return to this issue that is far from being exhaustedly explored given its richness and complexity. Therefore, we present, at first, the historical context in which the Summa of Theology was written, as well as what it is in its shape and utility. Subsequently, we turn our attention to its first part. In it, Thomas refers to God and to what proceeds from him, better said, the work of the creation and its action in the world, to then, be able to focus on the group of questions regarding human knowledge, ie, questions 84 - 89 Next, we turn our attention to the question 84 and its articles, exposing its structure and systematize, to finally be able to concentrate on the axioms of articles five and six. In them, we realized Thomas skillfully taking advantage of auctoritates technique to harmonize Augustinian and Aristotle thinking regarding the theory studied in this paper / A teoria do conhecimento em Tomás de Aquino é alvo de interesse de vários pesquisadores do período. Sua importância é singular, dentre outras coisas, devido à ruptura que causa entre a doutrina estabelecida acerca do conhecimento, qual seja, a doutrina agostiniana da iluminação divina e algumas ordens, até então, fiéis a ela. Esta dissertação de mestrado tem como objetivo, a partir dos artigos cinco e seis da questão 84 inseridos na primeira parte da Suma de Teologia de Tomás de Aquino, retomar esse tema que está longe de ser esgotado dado sua riqueza e complexidade. Para tanto, apresentamos, em um primeiro momento, o contexto histórico em que a Suma de Teologia fora escrita, bem como, o que ela é em seu formato e utilidade. Posteriormente, voltamos nossa atenção para sua primeira parte. Nela, Tomás refere-se a Deus e a o que dele procede, ou seja, à obra da criação e à sua ação no mundo, para, então, concentrarmo-nos no bloco de questões que tratam do conhecimento humano, isto é, das questões 84 - 89. Em seguida, voltamos nossa atenção para a questão 84 e seus artigos, expondo sua estrutura e sistematização, para, finalmente, atermo-nos aos axiomas dos artigos cinco e seis. Neles, pudemos perceber Tomás valendo-se habilmente da técnica das auctoritates para harmonizar o pensamento de Agostinho com o de Aristóteles no tocante á teoria em estudo nesse trabalho

Este trabalho apresenta o argumento que Tomás de Aquino (1225-1274) oferece como a quinta das vias para demonstrar a existência de Deus na Suma de Teologia. O foco desta apresentação não é explorar o contexto histórico em que o argumento se originou, nem examinar as fontes gregas, latinas e islâmicas sobre as quais Tomás teria se baseado, mas sim analisar a possibilidade de sustentá-lo de modo atemporal como um argumento plausível a favor da existência de Deus. Minha intenção é oferecer boas razões em seu favor e rebater as objeções mais notórias em contrário, apontando os limites explicativos do argumento e oferecendo sugestões para fortalecê-lo. Inicio distinguindo diferentes tipos de teleologia e de argumentos teleológicos pela existência de Deus, comparando a quinta via com os demais argumentos teleológicos de Tomás e com o argumento de William Paley pelo projeto inteligente (Intelligent Design). Em seguida, passo à análise da própria via, mostrando evidências das inclinações e tendências a fins a que Tomás faz referência e tratando das teses metafísicas que defende a partir da observação destas inclinações. Também ofereço respostas às objeções que pretendem que esta teleologia seja redutível a leis de natureza ou ao acaso. No último capítulo, considero a segunda parte da quinta via, que afirma que tais inclinações em direção a fins dependem em última instância de uma inteligência ordenadora que seria Deus. Analisando, ao fim, em que medida procedem as objeções de que esta conclusão não passa de um antropomorfismo injustificado e de que Tomás vai além do que lhe permite a conclusão ao considerar que esta inteligência é Deus. / This work presents the argument Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) offers as the fifth of his ways to demonstrate the existence of God in the Summa Theologiae. The main point of this presentation is not to explore the historical context in which the argument was written, neither to examine the Greek, Latin and Islamic sources upon which Thomas could have based himself, but rather to analyze the possibility of sustaining it timelessly as a plausible argument in favor of God’s existence. My purpose is to offer good reasons in its favor and to rebut the most notorious objections against it, pointing out the explanatory limits of the argument, and providing suggestions to strengthen it. I start by distinguishing different sorts of teleology and of teleological arguments for the existence of God, then I compare the Fifth Way with others teleological arguments formulated by Thomas and with the argument of William Paley for the “inteligente design” hypothesis. I also analyze the way itself, pointing out evidences for the inclinations and tendencies towards ends that Thomas refers to, also dealing with the metaphysical theses that Thomas defends based on the observation of these inclinations. Moreover, I offer answers to objections that intend to reduce teleology to laws of nature or to chance. In the last chapter, I consider the second part of Fifth Way, which affirms that those inclinations towards ends ultimately depend on an ordering intelligence that would be God. Lastly, I examine to what extent are valid the objections that claim this conclusion is simply an unjustified anthropomorphism and that Thomas goes beyond what his conclusion allows him when he takes this intelligence to be God.

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The concept of matter as it is treated in the philosophical systems of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus is examined, partly to ascertain the influence which the original Aristotelian concept of matter had on the two medieval thinkers, and partly to determine which of these two thinkers remained more faithful to the original Aristotelian concept. An analysis is carried out of the views of the three philosophers regarding the ontological status of matter; the intelligibility of matter; the issue of the real distinction between matter and form; the role played by matter in individuating composite substances; and its role in defining composite substances and determining their essences. Finally, the views of Aquinas and Scotus regarding the theory of universal hylomorphism and the theory of the plurality of forms are discussed and compared. It is shown that, while most of the Franciscan philosophical tradition up to Scotus's time was far more influenced by Platonist than by Aristotelian principles, Scotus, though a Franciscan, was much closer to Aristotle than to Plato in his views regarding matter. In fact, the few deviations from the original Aristotelian concept found in Scotus's theory can be ascribed to theological concerns. It is argued, furthermore, that Scotus's views on the concept of matter are far closer to the original Aristotelian theory than our analysis shows Aquinas himself to be.

Nous entendons, dans ce mémoire, préciser le sens d'actus essendi par l’analyse de l’emploi du terme par Thomas d’Aquin. Bien que la notion d’acte d’être soit sousjacente à nombre de développements philosophiques et théologiques de l’Aquinate, elle n’est considérée pour elle-même dans aucun texte du corpus thomasien. En exposant le cadre théorique des onze unités textuelles dans lesquelles on retrouve nommément l’expression, nous explicitons les distinctions qu’opère Thomas entre l’acte d’être et les notions ontologiques corrélatives (étant, quiddité, être du jugement prédicatif et être commun). Si « actus essendi » désigne en premier lieu un principe constitutif de l’étant, il peut encore désigner le terme abstrait correspondant à cette perfection de l’étant. L’acte d’être est ainsi ce par quoi l’étant est étant; il est cependant, au plan ontologique, propre à chaque étant singulier tandis que, au plan conceptuel, le même terme exprime ce qui est commun à tous les étants. Une traduction des extraits du Scriptum super Sententiis, des Quæstiones de quolibet, de la Summa Theologiæ, des Quæstiones disputatæ De potentia, de l’Expositio libri De hebdomadibus et de la Expositio libri Metaphysicæ a été produite pour les fins de cette étude. / In this paper, we intend to precise the meaning of actus essendi by analyzing how Thomas Aquinas uses this term. If the notion of the act of being underlies a number of Aquinas’ philosophical and theological developments, it is not treated in itself in any of his writings. By exposing the theoretical framework of the eleven textual units in which the expression namely appears, we explicate how he distinguishes between the act of being and the correlative ontological notions (the being, the essence, the predicamental judgment being and common being). If « actus essendi » first designates a constitutive principle of being, it can also designate the corresponding abstract term of this perfection of being. The act of being is that by which being is being; however, it belongs, at the ontological level, to each particular being whereas at the conceptual level, the same term expresses that which is common to all beings. Extracts of the following texts have been translated in French for this purpose: Scriptum super Sententiis, Quæstiones de quolibet, Summa Theologiæ, Quæstiones disputatæ De potentia, Expositio libri De hebdomadibus and the Sententia libri Metaphysicæ.

Dans la philosophie de Thomas d’Aquin, les puissances principales de l’âme, l’intelligence et la volonté, interagissent dans les activités humaines. Une des activités les plus importantes est identifiée par le docteur comme étant la recherche de la vérité. Cette recherche s’inscrit dans la finalité ultime de l’homme. La vérité, en tant que bien de l’intelligence, est voulue par la volonté qui est un appétit rationnel. Ainsi, selon le Dominicain « la volonté veut que l’intelligence intellige ». Puisque la vérité n’est pas le seul bien proposé au libre arbitre, la volonté doit choisir de poursuivre cette fin au détriment d’autres biens concurrents. Elle doit pour se faire perfectionner les puissances de l’âme par le biais d’habitus et de vertus en plus d’éviter les vices qui conduisent à l’erreur. La recherche de la vérité est, selon Thomas d’Aquin, un acte moral. / According to the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, the main powers of the soul, the intellect and the will, interact in human activities. One of the most important activities is identified by the doctor as the search for truth. This research is part of the ultimate purpose of man. The truth, which is the good of the intelligence, is willed by the will which is a rational appetite. Thus, according to the Dominican “the will wants that the intelligence thinks.” Because the truth is not the only good proposed to the free will, the will must choose to pursue it to the detriment of other competing goods. To achieve this goal, the will must perfect the powers of the soul through habitus and virtues while avoiding the vices that lead to errors. The search for truth is, according to Thomas Aquinas, a moral act.

Ce mémoire propose une analyse de la théorie de la volonté en relation avec le mal dans la pensée de Thomas d’Aquin. Le mal est une privation d’être et l’être est identique au bien. La volonté est une forme intellectuelle d’appétit, ainsi que la gouvernante des puissances inférieures, mais aussi de la raison qui est à la fois son principe. L’appétit est un mouvement vers ce qui est le bien d’une nature, il est donc difficile d’accepter que la volonté puisse élire son contraire qui est le mal. La thèse de Platon selon laquelle le mal n’est désiré que par ignorance est écartée, puisque le propos de Thomas est d’expliquer le consentement en faveur du mal connu. Or, si le mal peut être voulu, on ne peut le vouloir sans le référer au bien. Ainsi, le libre arbitre, bien qu’ayant Dieu pour principe, est le principe du premier mauvais choix. La compréhension de la problématique passe par la division de ce qui appartient à l’extérieur de la volonté et ensuite à l’intérieur. De soi, un acte extérieur peut être immoral, comme le vol, mais la volonté d’une intention bonne qui choisit cet acte devient mauvaise, bien qu’elle garde le mérite de sa bonne intention. Son choix mauvais est parfois dû à une certaine ignorance, mais, puisque nous n’ignorons pas toujours le mal, il faut attribuer une faiblesse à la volonté, car elle n’accomplit pas pleinement sa nature. Quand elle répète ses actes de faiblesse à l’égard du mal, elle se dispose à accueillir l’habitus de la malice, et alors elle cherche d’elle-même le mal. Aucun de ces principes, cependant, ne peut s’appliquer à l’homme originel ni au diable. Ceux-ci n’auront pour principe de leurs choix que l’orgueil dans le libre exercice de la volonté. / This paper proposes to analyse the theory of will in interaction with evil in Thomas Aquinas’s thought. Evil is a privation of being, and being is identical to good. The will is an intellectual form of appetite, as well as the governor of lower faculties and of reason, which is also its principle. Appetite is a movement towards the good of a nature; it is therefore difficult to accept that will could elect its opposite, which is evil. Plato’s thesis consisting of attributing the will towards bad to ignorance is discarded, because Thomas’s explanation concerns the consent towards evil witch is known. Now, if evil can be wanted, we cannot want it without referring it to good. In that way, free will, though having God for principle, is the principle of the first bad choice. The comprehension of the problem has to go through the division of that which belongs to the will’s exterior and to it’s interior. In itself, an exterior act can be immoral, like stealing, but the good intentioned will that choses this act then becomes evil, keeping nonetheless the merit of its good intention. The bad choice is sometimes attributable to ignorance, but since we do not always ignore evil, we have to accuse a certain weakness in the will for not being able to fulfill its nature. When it repeatedly acts weakly towards evil, it makes itself available for the mischievous habitus, and it then, on its own, searches the evil act. None of these principles, though, can apply to the original man or for the devil. They will not have any other principle for their choice than that of pride in the free exercise of their will.

Thesis The Philosophy of Education, Theory and Reality focuses on the brief historical development of educational ideals, the determination of the necessary virtues of the raised man, and the subsequent comparison of the established virtues with the current educational policy of the Czech Republic. After comparing with educational documents at national level, it has been found that some of the necessary virtues in these documents are not included.